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This thesis explores, first, the evolvement and implementation of competition 
policy in China, where a competition culture was largely missing for decades; and 
second, the extent to which the government has resolved the inherent contradiction 
between preserving state control and promoting competition. The main aim is to 
evaluate how a competition law, which is essentially a product of capitalist free market 
economy, is being applied in China, a socialist country where predominant state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) together with their owner – the Chinese government – 
generate the most distortions to market competition. To achieve this aim, the thesis 
studies, first, the ongoing economic transition and the historical development of 
Chinese competition policy; second, the prolonged drafting process of the Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML); third, the substantive and institutional aspects of the 
enforcement of the AML, and the outstanding problems of the current competition 
system; and fourth, the role of the government in the interplay between competition 
policy and SOEs. 
The thesis also studies the European Union (EU) competition regime, which had 
substantial influence on the adoption of the AML and the design of China’s 
competition system. This discussion intends to use the experiences of the EU in 
modernising its competition system and in handling competition-related issues 
involving public enterprises to provide some meaningful answers to certain problems 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores, first, the evolution and implementation of competition 
policy in China,1 where a competition culture was largely absent for decades; and 
second, the extent to which the government has resolved the inherent contradiction 
between preserving state control and promoting competition. Since the government 
exerts control over, and directly engages in, economic activities through state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which represent significant political interests, the latter part of this 
thesis focuses on the interplay between competition policy and the government’s 
treatment of SOEs.  
‘China often appears as a contradiction within itself’.2 Indeed, as reflected in the 
term ‘socialist market economy’,3 China seeks to establish a capitalist-style market-
oriented economy whilst refusing to relinquish its socialist ideology. The introduction 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in China is closely related to this paradox: a 
socialist state that protects its SOEs and a large segment of the industrial sector from 
competition, and yet adopts and implements a competition legislation, which in 
essence promotes market liberalisation and competition. Therefore, on the one hand, 
                                                             
1  Unless otherwise indicated, the term ‘China’ as used hereinafter in this thesis denotes only the 
mainland of the People’s Republic of China and makes no reference to the Special Administrative 
Regions of Hong Kong, where a competition legislation – the Competition Ordinance – will enter into 
force on 14 December 2015, and Macau, where there is no general competition legislation (some 
competition-related provisions are included in the Commercial Code of Macau). In addition, Chinese 
names appearing in this thesis, except for those in citations, are written in the traditional Chinese order, 
namely, family name first, followed by given name. 
2 Christopher McNally, ‘The China Impact’ in Christopher McNally (eds.) China’s Emergent Political 
Economy: Capitalism in the Dragon’s Lair (Routledge 2008) 4. 
3 This term is adopted in Article 15 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China as revised on 
29 March 1993, but is not defined or explained in either the Constitution itself or anywhere else. The 




since China’s ongoing economic reform has to be responsive to changing needs 
resulting from its integration with the global economy, 4 the AML is expected to 
nurture and promote a competitive market in China. On the other, the fundamental 
interests of the socialist market economy – even the anti-competitive aspect, such as 
the isolation of state sector – are not to be placed at risk. In light of this paradox, this 
thesis studies, first, China’s ongoing economic transition and the historical 
development of Chinese competition policy; second, the prolonged drafting history of 
the AML; third, the substantive and institutional aspects of the enforcement of the 
AML and the outstanding problems of the current competition system; and fourth, the 
role of the government in the interplay between competition policy and SOEs. 
1.1 Background 
Until recent decades, competition as an economic driver had been largely 
overlooked in China. The dominant political policies of each dynasty required 
extensive state control over different kinds of resources, and this prevalent feature 
made competition an unrealistic tool for economic development. The very same 
situation persisted even into the early decades of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
During that time, economy-driving sectors other than agriculture had already 
developed prosperously in the western world, but China’s economy still relied 
substantially on agricultural production and its early attempt to transfer the country 
into an industrial state tragically failed.5 However, in recent decades, and against the 
backdrop of the evolution of the business world and overwhelming globalisation, 
China has gradually taken steps towards shaping its economy into a more modern form, 
and inevitably opened its door to foreign capital.6 As a consequence, although state 
                                                             
4  Henry C. Cheng, ‘China’s New Anti-monopoly Law: Big Trouble in Little China?’ (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344921, 43. 
5 This refers to the ‘Great Leap Forward’ movement, started in 1959. This incident will be further 
explored in section 1.2, Chapter 2. See also Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press 2005) 101. 
6 See Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons for other 
Countries’ (2002) IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP/02/3, 
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control remains significant, private sectors have now been effectively contributing to 
economic development.7 
In August 2007, China joined the club consisting of more than 120 countries8 
which have at least some form of regulatory regime governing competition, by 
enacting its long-awaited AML,9 the first comprehensive set of competition rules in 
China’s history. In light of the substantial growth of China’s markets and the vast 
amounts of foreign capital invested in China in recent decades, especially after China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the AML has engendered an 
‘unprecedented level of interest’10 in the political circles, the business community, and 
of course academia. 
Apart from standard competition provisions – monopoly agreement,11 abuse of a 
                                                             
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2002/pdp03.pdf; and OECD, ‘FDI in Figures’ (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf. 
7 As of 2012, the private sector contributes 60% of China’s GDP, pays 50% of the taxes and creates 
more than 70% of the jobs. CCTV, ‘China to Work on Developing Private Sector’, 20 December 2012, 
http://english.cntv.cn/program/bizasia/20121220/102630.shtml. 
8 Maher Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
3. See also OECD Secretariat, ‘Optimal Design of a Competition Policy’, submitted to the Global Forum 
on Competition (2003), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/29/2485827.pdf. 
9 The Anti-Monopoly Law of China, adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 30 August 2007, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm. The full text of the 
English version of the AML is provided in the Appendix, where the authentic Chinese text of the AML 
can also be found. 
10 H. Stephen Harris, ‘The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the 
People’s Republic of China’ (2006) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 169, 169. 
11 Chapter II, AML. Chapter II can to a degree be treated as equivalent to Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), therefore monopoly agreements can be seen as ‘all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices’. 
Nonetheless, the term ‘monopoly agreements’ – which is a direct literal translation of the Chinese term 
longduan xieyi [垄断协议] – in the AML can cause confusion. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
‘monopoly’ as, first, ‘the exclusive possession or control of the supply of or trade in a commodity or 
service’; second, ‘a company or group having exclusive control over a commodity or service’; and third, 
‘a commodity or service in the exclusive control of a company or group’. According to these definitions, 
‘exclusivity’ is at the core of ‘monopoly’; however, the conclusion of an ‘agreement’ requires no fewer 
than two parties. Therefore, the term ‘monopoly agreements’ represents an inherent contradiction. 
Similarly, as can be seen in Chapter 3 of the AML, ‘monopoly’ does not constitute a violation of the 
AML in itself, therefore, it seems that the very title of this law – Anti-Monopoly Law – also represents 
the same type of contradiction. Nonetheless, it has to be acknowledged that both the terms ‘monopoly 
agreements’ and ‘Anti-Monopoly Law’ are accurately translated based on the Chinese language used in 
the AML, and almost all scholars and competition officials use ‘monopoly agreements’ to refer to anti-
competitive agreements when the AML is concerned. Therefore, for the sake of coherence, this thesis 
will use ‘monopoly agreements’ to refer to ‘agreements, decisions or other concerted actions which 
eliminate or restrict competition’ – the definition of ‘monopoly agreements’ set out in para. 2 of Article 
13 of the AML. 
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dominant position,12 and merger control13 – the new law creatively takes into account 
some significant issues which are unique to China. It includes the prohibition of anti-
competitive practices carried out by undertakings operating in ‘industries controlled 
by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and 
national security’,14 most if not all of which are in fact SOEs. In China, the socialist 
ideology dictates that economic intervention by the government by means of SOEs 
will always be a prevalent phenomenon. As a consequence, SOEs practically 
controlled the entire Chinese economy in the centrally planned model era, and have 
been playing a significant role in China’s ongoing economic transformation to a 
socialist market economy.15 Given the extensive economic involvement of SOEs, it 
can be suggested that the enforcement of the AML will not be deemed effective if it is 
to circumvent the issues of SOEs. 
In capitalist economies, discrimination normally arises between domestic and 
foreign undertakings. In China, discrimination also exists between SOEs and private 
undertakings. Whilst private undertakings in most cases have to adopt a myriad of 
means to establish a relationship with government departments – most notably through 
bribery – there is an inherent connection between the government and SOEs. Indeed, 
ownership is what makes state-owned and privately-owned undertakings different in 
the eyes of the government. The government always has a tendency towards treating 
the undertakings which are actually owned by it more preferably. State ownership of 
SOEs hence makes them formidable market players, not only in terms of financial 
conditions, but also in terms of political support. However, one of the most essential 
functions of competition law is to ensure that unencumbered market forces determine 
                                                             
12 Chapter III, AML. 
13 Chapter IV, AML. 
14 Article 7, AML. 
15 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, ‘An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism 




the allocation of resources in the marketplace;16 government should only intervene 
when there is a persistent market failure which cannot be overcome by the market 
itself.17 Therefore, whilst the promulgation of the AML represents the willingness of 
the Chinese government to facilitate the construction of a market-oriented economy, 
an inherent contradiction was nonetheless raised: market competition is at the core of 
a market economy, and state control is pervasive in a socialist economy; how then can 
these seemingly conflicting ideologies be reconciled?  
It is against the backdrop of the growing interest of the public in competition 
issues, China’s long-standing state control over the economy, and the profound impacts 
of SOEs, that the evolving topic of competition development in China is elaborated 
and evaluated in this thesis. 
1.2 The Definition of SOEs 
Since this thesis specifically studies the application of the AML to SOEs, it 
implies that, in practice, state-owned and private undertakings are treated differently 
under the AML. It is therefore necessary first to understand what SOEs are. In practice, 
there is no single accurate definition for the term ‘SOE’, as ownership of enterprises 
in China is inconveniently mixed. In official statistics, SOEs are ‘business entities 
established by central and local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from 
the government’. 18  However, this category includes only wholly state-funded 
enterprises and excludes share-holding cooperative enterprises, joint-operation 
enterprises, and limited liability corporations.19 Therefore, a considerable number of 
enterprises whose management is practically overseen and supervised by state actors, 
are not officially considered as SOEs. Another category is ‘state-owned and state-
                                                             
16  Niamh Dunne, Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 7. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Junyeop Lee, ‘State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence’ (2009) OECD Occasional 
Paper, 5. 
19 Ibid., 6. 
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holding enterprises’, 20  which includes fully state-owned enterprises and those 
enterprises whose majority shareholder is the government, public organisations, or 
other SOEs.21 This category, unlike the previous one which rigidly requires full state 
ownership, emphasises the external ‘controlling influence’ over management and 
operation of an enterprise, which mainly comes from the government and other 
SOEs.22 Therefore, it also includes enterprises in which the state-owned or SOE-
owned share is less than 50%.23 
Despite the uncertain definitions of SOEs, the AML does not explicitly make a 
distinction between private and public enterprises, therefore, it is not necessary – at 
least for the purpose of this thesis – to go to the root of a particular enterprise in order 
to ascertain if it is a SOE in the strictest sense. The second part of this thesis – the 
implementation of competition policy in the state sector – does not focus on ownership 
status per se, but rather examines how the strong political ties between the government 
and SOEs have shaped competition policy and enforcement outcomes. Therefore, so 
long as there is prima facie evidence that the state holds shares in an enterprise – 
irrespective of how small the share is and how indirectly the state exerts its influence 
on the enterprise – it is deemed a SOE in this thesis. 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1 Research Question 1 (Chapter 2) 
Given China’s unique and ingrained characteristic of extensive state involvement 
in economic activities, the first research question consists of two interrelated aspects: 
first, it asks what the main characteristics of the Chinese government were before the 
                                                             
20 This category is in line with the definition of SOEs provided by the World Bank – ‘government 
owned or government controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling 
goods and services’. World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership (Oxford University Press 1995) 26. 
21 Lee (fn 18) 6. 
22 Ibid. 
23 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: China (Revised) (WTO 2010) 54. 
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economic transition; and second, it asks what the main driving factors behind the 
establishment of a competition system in China were. This thesis argues that the 
outstanding problems of China’s competition system stem not only from current 
environment in which the system operates, but also from historical events which 
changed the environment that nurtured the system. Therefore an appraisal of these 
events may be the only way to understand the outstanding problems. 
There is extensive literature discussing either the reason why China needs a 
competition law, or the drivers of the adoption of the AML.24 Generally, it has been 
agreed that there were three major factors behind China’s decision to establish a 
competition system. 25  First, and the most essential factor, is China’s historic 
transaction from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy. 26 
Second, foreign pressures, especially after China’s accession to the WTO on 11 
November 2002, have been some of the vital impetuses for the acceleration of the 
drafting process of the AML.27 Third, there has been a growing need to overhaul 
China’s legal system to adapt to the new competition environment.28 
However, it should be acknowledged that the emergence of these drivers was a 
result of the failure of the centrally planned economy and political campaigns initiated 
by the Communist Party of China (CPC). Before the Reform and Opening Up 
policy,29 China had gone through decades of economic recession and political turmoil 
                                                             
24 See for example, Bing Song, ‘Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China’ 
(1995) 31 Stanford Journal of International Law 387; and Jared A. Berry, ‘Anti-Monopoly Law in China: 
A Socialist Market Economy Wrestles with Its Antitrust Regime’ (2005) 2 International Law & 
Management Review 129. For general discussion on the historical aspect of China’s competition system, 
see David J Gerber, ‘Economics, Law & Institutions: The Shaping of Chinese Competition Law’ (2008) 
26 Journal of Law & Policy 271; Yong Huang, ‘Pursuing the Second Best: The History Momentum, 
and Remaining Issues of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 117; and Grace 
Li and Angus Young, ‘Competition Laws and Policies in China and Hong Kong: A Tale of Two 
Regulatory Journeys’ (2008) 7 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 186. 
25 See for example, Dan Wei, ‘Antitrust in China: An Overview of Recent Implementation of Anti-
Monopoly Law’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 119, 120. 
26 Gerber (fn 24) 282-283. 
27 Mark Furse, ‘Competition Law Choice in China’ (2007) 30 World Competition 323, 332; and Gerber 
(fn 23) 281. For discussion of the impact of WTO accession on China’s legal system, see Donald Clarke, 
‘China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance’ (2003) 2 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. 
Rev. 97. 
28 Berry (fn 24) 136. 
29 Adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party Congress in 1978. 
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resulting from unrealistic economic policy and radical ideological conflicts.30 Whilst 
years of social unrest were finally terminated by the more pragmatic reformers in the 
Communist Party, and the abovementioned drivers gradually emerged to influence 
China’s economic development and policy-making, the political environment and 
structure have not hitherto been fundamentally changed. As a consequence, China’s 
astonishing economic reforms over recent decades has not been accompanied by 
corresponding reform in the political arena.31 Such mismatching leads to a situation 
where modern legal instruments governing evolved market practices are drafted and 
implemented by outmoded bureaucratic institutions which are profoundly influenced 
by the residual political characteristics of the Chinese government in the era of 
centrally planned economy – pervasive state intervention in economic activities and 
superior status of political goals in government’s decision-making.  
Given the topic of this thesis, which puts significant emphasis on the role that 
the government has played and is playing in the implementation of competition policy, 
this first research question, besides discussing the drivers of the adoption of the AML, 
briefly introduces the government control over the economy through the operation of 
SOEs before the economic transition, and important historical events that defined the 
characteristics of the Chinese government. 
2.2 Research Question 2 (Chapter 3) 
The second research question asks what the major concerns were during the 
drafting of the AML that prolonged the drafting process and shaped the AML into its 
current form. Since the drafting of the AML was a prolonged and tedious process that 
took China 13 years finally to accomplish, it must to a degree have involved debates 
over the most central issues. Indeed, the drafting of the AML was subject to fierce 
                                                             
30 For comprehensive studies on China in the pre-reform era, see Gregory C. Chow, China’s Economic 
Transformation (Blackwell Publishing 2007); Peter Nolan, Transforming China: Globalization, 
Transition and Development (Anthem Press 2004); and Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: 
Transitions and Growth (MIT Press 2007). 
31 Xiaoye Wang and Jessica Su, Competition Law in China (Kluwer Law International 2012) 20. 
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internal dispute amongst government departments, ‘each of which had different 
interests and stakes in the outcome of the legislative proceedings’.32  
The thesis finds that during the drafting of the AML, the most complicated task 
for drafters was not what types of modern competition doctrines should be 
incorporated and how to address them, but how to balance various sources of interest 
deriving from China’s ingrained socialist ideology. First, the market-driven principle 
introduced by the AML would inevitably endanger the interests of many influential 
factions that gained their powerful status from China’s traditional state-controlled 
economy.33 Second, pervasive state involvement in the allocation of resources had 
made government departments used to struggling for more policy-making powers, and 
the introduction of the AML initiated a new round of conflicts over competition 
enforcement power. 34  In the end, political compromises were made. As will be 
discussed in the thesis, the non-transparent and incoherent enforcement by the Anti-
Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) is a direct result of excessive compromise 
made in the drafting process of different interests and stakes.35  
Through a discussion on its drafting, two important issues concerning the 
enforcement of the AML will be addressed. First, what were the considerations behind 
the insertion of the provisions that have unique Chinese characteristics? Second, why 
had a tripartite enforcement system – one of the most controversial issues of China’s 
competition system – been designed under the AML?  
2.3 Research Question 3 (Chapters 4 and 5) 
The third research question asks how well the AML has been applied to regulate 
anti-competitive behaviour, and if the current competition system is able to ensure an 
                                                             
32 Yi Shin Tang, ‘Lawmaking Process and Non-Governmental Stakeholders in China's Antimonopoly 
Law’ (2015) 36 European Competition Law Review 174, 179-180. 
33 Williams (fn 5)192. 
34 Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘The Enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: An Institutional Design 
Perspective’ (2011) 56 Antitrust Bulletin 630, 640-645. 
35 Tang (fn 32) 180. 
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effective enforcement of the AML. It is answered through evaluating both the 
application of the substantive text of the AML to monopolistic conduct and the public 
enforcement system in general.  
Considerable resources have been devoted to the making of the AML, but the 
enforcement is the actual spirit that decides if the devotion is worth it. ‘[T]he legal 
instruments governing both substance, competences and procedure’ and ‘the 
administrative structures and processes through which the legal instruments are 
implemented’ are the two essential components that form a competition system.36 The 
effectiveness of these two components is interdependent: a well drafted competition 
law requires properly designed enforcement structures and procedures, and vice 
versa.37 This thesis finds that, after seven years of development,38 legal instruments, 
administrative structures, and processes in China’s competition system still have 
substantial weaknesses that impede the effective enforcement of the AML, and in some 
cases induce more serious market distortions.39 
The inefficiency of China’s competition system results from various factors, and 
extensive literature has touched upon this issue. 40  Nonetheless, since the 
administration of the CPC led by President Xi Jinping came to power, new sets of 
                                                             
36 Philip Lowe, ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century – the Experience 
of the European Commission and DG Competition’ (2008) Competition Policy Newsletter, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2008_3_1.pdf, 1. 
37 Ibid. 
38  In the formative years of China’s competition system, the effectiveness of the AML has been 
questioned due to infrequent application. See for example, Nathan Bush, ‘Chinese Competition Policy: 
It Takes More than Law’ (2005) The China Business Review, 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0505/bush.html; and Salil Mehra and Meng Yanbei, 
‘Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law’ (2008) 49 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 379. 
39 See for example, the consideration of industrial policy in competition analysis, section 5.3, Chapter 
6. 
40 See for example, Liyang Hou, ‘An Evaluation of the Enforcement of China's Anti-Monopoly Law in 
2008-2013’ (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292296; Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2014) King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-9, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391187; Angela Huyue 
Zhang, ‘The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An Institutional Design Perspective’ 
(2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783037; Yong Huang and Zhiyan Li, ‘An 
Overview of Chinese Competition Policy: Between Fragmentation and Consolidation’ in Adrian Emch 




initiatives for further political and economic reform have been enforced.41 Given the 
importance that the AML had in the preservation of market orders, the enforcement of 
the AML has been at the top of government’s agenda, and more resources have been 
devoted to the better functioning of the AMEAs.42 The recent enforcement actions, 
given the increasing number of investigations and more frequent disclosure of 
enforcement decisions, have shown a positive trend towards more effective 
enforcement of the AML. In addition, Chinese courts are increasingly familiar with 
the economic reasoning and analysis. 43 It is against this backdrop that this thesis 
provides an up to date examination of the application of the AML, and the structure 
and effectiveness of the enforcement system. 
2.4 Research Question 4 (Chapter 6) 
The last research question asks what the relation between competition policy and 
SOEs is in China’s current economic and political environment. A number of scholars 
have stated that SOEs are generally less economically efficient than private 
undertakings in the same sector because in theory government ownership provides 
fewer incentives for business operators to pursue profits maximisation. 44  Such 
argument is supported by various statistics on the performance of China’s SOEs.45 
                                                             
41 For example, see Xinhua News Agency, ‘Initiative of Reform on Structure and Functioning of State 
Council Has been Approved’, 14 March 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013lh/2013-
03/14/c_115024855.htm. 
42 China News, ‘China Plans to Reinforce Supervision of Anti-Monopoly Enforcement and Establish 
the Essential Status of Competition Policy’, 15 October 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/10-
15/7571992.shtml. 
43 Howard Chang, David Evans and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang ‘Analyzing Competition among Internet 
Players: Qihoo 360 v. Tencent’ (2013) Antitrust Chronicle, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/analyzing-competition-among-internet-players-
qihoo-360-v-tencent. 
44 See for example, D.Daniel Sokol, ‘Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises’ (2009) BYU L. Rev. 1713, 1720; Wei Li and Lixin Xu, ‘The Political 
Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecommunications 
Sector’ (2002) 30 Journal of Comparative Economics 439, 456; and Joel Samuel, ‘‘Tain't What You Do’ 
Effect of China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State Owned Enterprises’ (2007) 29 Penn. St. Int’l. 
Rev. 169, 176. 
45 According to China Enterprise Confederation and China Entrepreneur Association, among the top 
500 undertakings in China, 43 suffered a loss last year, and 42 of them are SOEs. See Xinhua News 




However, as will be suggested in Chapter 6, it has to be recognised that although the 
AML may be able to play an important role in opening up to competition some sectors 
currently monopolised by inefficient SOEs, that alone would not be sufficient for 
China to achieve this goal.46 SOEs represent a complex subject which is not created 
by a single piece of law, and can definitely not be dealt with by another piece. The 
outcome of competition enforcement against SOEs depends substantially on more 
meaningful reform of SOEs in the short term, and that of the political system in the 
long term.  
In addition, there is an intense conflict between competition policy and industrial 
policy in China.47 As a socialist country placing significant emphasis on rigorous 
control over the economy, China commonly uses industrial policy to achieve political 
goals, which may not necessarily be in conformity with competition goals.48 Since the 
most important industries are controlled by SOEs, 49  the government’s attitude 
towards the state sector can be partially demonstrated by how industrial policy is 
evolving. This research question therefore also studies how the government reacts in 
the case of a conflict between market competition and industrial interests. 
3. REASONS FOR INTRODUCING THE EU COMPETITION SYSTEM  
In addition to answering the four research questions, this thesis – in Chapter 7 – 
also adopts a comparative research methodology by introducing the competition 
system in the EU. Although the focus of this thesis is not on the EU, and Chapter 7 is 
not designed to provide an in-depth critical analysis of EU competition system, the 
                                                             
46 Zhang (fn 40) 23. 
47 See generally Yanbei Meng, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between Antitrust Enforcement and Industry-
Specific Regulation in China’ in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds.) China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: 
the First Five Years (Wolters Kluwer 2013). 
48 Samuel (fn 44) 199. 
49 The government maintains absolute control over seven strategically important industrial sectors. 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, ‘Guiding Opinions on the 




EU’s way of enforcing its competition law has valuable lessons for its Chinese 
counterpart for several reasons.  
First, as one of the oldest and most sophisticated competition jurisdictions, the 
EU has always been an important model for developing countries to design their own 
competition systems to prevent anti-competitive activities and promote competition in 
the market. 50  Second, whilst the US was founded on the ideology of economic 
liberalism and the belief that market activities should be free from excessive state 
intervention, Europe had been in a period when state control over the economy was 
pervasive.51 The experiences of many EU member states in replacing their rigorously 
controlled economies with liberal market economies through economic and legal 
means are a valuable reference for Chinese policymakers.52 Third, China and the EU 
share a similar legal tradition.53 In the US common law system, which has case law 
as the main legal source, the judiciary is placed at the centre of the enforcement of 
competition rules. In contrast, the civil law tradition followed by China and the EU 
relies primarily on written law.54 Fourth, based on the similarities between the EU and 
China, China’s competition system has been modelled substantially on EU competition 
law.55 Indeed, it is significantly influenced by the EU competition system, from which 
meaningful assistances have been sought during the drafting of the AML. Moreover, 
like competition enforcement in the EU, the AML is mostly enforced through 
administrative remedial mechanism, in contrast with the preferred mechanism of 
judicial enforcement through litigation in the US. 
                                                             
50  Qianlan Wu, ‘EU–China Competition Dialogue: A New Step in the Internationalisation of EU 
Competition Law?’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 461, 461. 
51 Jacob Schneider, ‘Administrative Monopoly and China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Lessons from 
Europe’s State Aid Doctrine’ (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review 869, 884. 
52 Dan Wei, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and Its Merger Enforcement: Convergence and Flexibility’ 
(2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 807, 813. 
53 Ibid. 
54 David J. Gerber, ‘Economics, Law and Institutions: The Shaping of Chinese Competition Law’ (2008) 
26 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 271, 293. 
55  See Nathan Bush, ‘Constraints on Convergence in Chinese Antitrust’ (2009) 54 The Antitrust 
Bulletin 87, 93; and Cornelia Lefter, ‘Law Antimonopoly of China – a Model of European Inspiration’ 
(2011) 18 Theoretical and Applied Economics 75, 76. See also section 3, Chapter 3. 
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These similarities and the close link in the realm of competition law between 
these two jurisdictions make a comparative study of competition systems in China and 
the EU relevant and worthwhile. It is possible to use the experiences of the EU as a 
mirror to reflect the status quo of China’s competition system. By illustrating the 
European experiences in enforcing competition law, the main purpose of this chapter 
is to introduce the merits of the EU competition system that make it one of the most 
advanced, and, in light of these merits, what practical solutions can be provided to 





Historical Development of Economic Transition, 
Competition Policy and Institutions in China 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides, first, an introduction of the historical aspect of economic 
development in China; second, an analysis of the reasons behind China’s decision to 
establish a competition system; and third, a brief overview of AML-related 
institutional reform. All of these historical developments have had profound impacts 
on how China’s competition policy was formulated and the way in which the AML is 
enforced. This chapter intends to demonstrate that the outstanding issues currently 
facing China’s competition system – in particular the issue concerning SOEs – can 
only be properly understood in a wider historical context. 
Since ancient times, agriculture was the major source of fiscal revenue in feudal 
China,1 where a history of restraining private business activities was longstanding.2 
Even in modern times, competition as an important factor to promote economic 
performance in the market had not been appreciated for a considerably long time since 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. However, along with 
the stunning evolution of civilisation and the globalisation of the world economy, the 
competition environment in China began to gradually change.  
Aiming – at least apparently3  – to protect competition process and promote 
                                                             
1 Agricultural tax on rural households’ operating income and production, which has been effective for 
more than 2600 years, was abolished for the first time in China’s history in 2006. See Central 
Government of China, ‘Abolition of Agricultural Tax’, 6 March 2006, http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-
03/06/content_219801.htm. 
2 ‘Zhongnong yishang [重农抑商]’ is a commonly known saying describing the basic policy of empires 
in feudal period, it means literally ‘stressing agriculture, restraining commerce’. 
3 As will be discussed later, external factors had played a significant role in the development of China’s 
competition policy, it is questionable as to if pure competition-related consideration was the most 
essential reason for China to adopt the AML. 
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market economy,4 the enactment of the AML in 2007 signalled the long-awaited 
appreciation of competition by Chinese authorities. Nevertheless, the imperative need 
on the part of China to start building a market economy and taking market competition 
seriously did not exist in a vacuum. What then were the major events and driving forces 
that spurred China to finally perceive that competition legislation was needed? And to 
what extent did these factors shape the competition policy and its institutions in 
present-day China? In light of the close relationship between the development of 
competition policy and that of the economy, an investigation into China’s unique 
economic environment – the foundation on which China’s competition policy is based 
– is necessary.  
Ronald Coase, a Nobel laureate in economics, once said: ‘We cannot possibly 
understand this incredible transformation or the path that China had travelled to get 
there without a clear notion of where it started – China under Mao’.5 This chapter will 
start with a discussion of China in Mao’s era.6 
2. PAIN IN SEEKING THE RIGHT PATH  
For nearly a century before the founding of the PRC in 1949, both the economy 
and the life of the people on the land had been severely damaged by military invasion 
by foreign expansionists. Maybe it was because of these long years of bitter experience 
that many Chinese people associated capitalism with imperialism as it was practised 
by capitalist countries. 7  The founding of the CPC in Shanghai in 1921 and the 
                                                             
4 Interestingly, Ulen argues that ‘there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that any form of substantive 
or procedural law has been or might be a valuable spur to growth in the developing countries’, and 
regulatory or competition law enforcement cannot improve the performance of the Chinese economy. 
Thomas Ulen, ‘The Uneasy Case for Competition Law and Regulation as Decisive Factors in 
Development: Some Lessons for China’ in Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang (eds.) Competition Policy 
and Regulation: Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe (Edward Elgar 2011) 13-14 and 
33-34. 
5 Ronald Coase and Ning Wang, How China Became Capitalist (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 2. 
6 Mao Zedong, the founding father of the PRC and the most paramount leader in the PRC’s history, 
was in office from 1949 to 1976. 
7 Gregory C. Chow, China’s Economic Transformation (Blackwell Publishing 2007) 24. 
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Communist ideology the CPC supported gave the people a new perspective as to how 
a better country could be built by avoiding the pitfalls of capitalism. 8  The CPC 
inherited an economy ‘whose growth potential was obscured by the ravages of war 
and inflation’. 9  At the very beginning, inflation was quelled, fiscal balance was 
revived, and it seemed that a rapid economic resurgence was to be expected. 10 
However, it took little time for the masses to realise that the long-lasting nightmare 
had not been driven away; if anything, it had become even more terrifying.  
2.1 China’s Planned Economy 
At the beginning of 1950s, a land reform – the Land Reform Campaign – was 
introduced. In order to increase agricultural productivity, most or all of the land 
belonging to landlords was confiscated by local government and redistributed to 
peasants.11 This campaign was extremely welcome among poor peasants who had 
been exploited by landlords for years;12 however, it also resulted in the death of 
millions of landlords and their families.13 During this period, private undertakings 
were allowed to continue their operation, whilst SOEs of the Republic of China (ROC) 
were taken over by the CPC.14 However, in order to mobilise all necessary resources 
to deliver China’s first Five-Year Plan, major changes took place.  
The core of the Five-Year Plan of 1953-1957 was to adopt a Soviet economic 
model in China that aimed to bring China onto a fast track towards industrialisation 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 
9 Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, ‘China’s Great Economic Transformation’ in Loren Brandt and 
Thomas G. Rawski (eds.) China’s Great Economic Transformation ( Cambridge University Press 2008) 
4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The proportion of land to be surrendered was calculated based on the per capita land ownership rate 
in a given village. 
12 According to the classification of social class during the Land Reform Campaign, people who owned 
land, collected rents and employed farmers to work on their land were classified as ‘landlords’ and 
subject to overthrow and public humiliation unless they or their family members also farmed on the 
land, in which case they would be classified as ‘rich peasants’, who would not be overthrown.  




and socialisation.15 The basic characteristics of such model were, first, centralised 
planning for every aspect of the economy; second, prevalent state ownership in all 
factories and undertakings – the rudiment of today’s state sector; third, numerous 
collectively owned units in the countryside responsible for agricultural activities; and 
fourth, concentration of state capital on heavy industry. As a result, market competition 
and the forces of demand and supply were virtually non-existent in China’s centrally 
planned economy.16 
The central planning authority was the State Planning Commission under the then 
Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government.17 It was a 
powerful body that controlled all raw materials and inputs required for production. It 
decided the production quotas of all production units – enterprises, farms and factories 
– all of which were either state- or collectively owned.18 The whole economy was 
administered as a single enterprise. 19  Before the economic reforms of 1978, 
competition played a negligible role in China’s economy since SOEs enjoyed a 
predominant presence in economic activities. They were merely production units 
rather than corporations in the modern sense, and there was also no competition 
amongst SOEs. In 1978, SOEs’ share of national industrial output was 77.6%, whilst 
private enterprises consisted only of 0.2%.20 At that time, profit-driving business was 
‘condemned as a symptom of corrupt capitalist systems’ by communist ideology.21 In 
addition, the State Planning Commission had control over the supply of all consumer 
                                                             
15  Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 109; and Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 
1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press 1995) 6. 
16 Chow (fn 7) 29. 
17 The Government Administration Council was dissolved as a result of the constitutional amendment 
in 1954, which created the State Council. The State Planning Commission was then under the 
supervision of the State Council. 
18 Chow (fn 7) 29. 
19 Peter Nolan, Transforming China: Globalization, Transition and Development (Anthem Press 2004) 
57. 
20 The remaining share was held by the collectively owned enterprises. Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, 
‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition Regime’ (2003) 24 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1, 5. 
21 BM Owen, Su Sun and Wentong Zheng, ‘China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Antimonopoly 
Law and Beyond’ (2007) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 231, 238. 
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goods. In the centrally planned economy, most products such as food and commodities 
could only be purchased by ration coupons, the quota of which for each month was 
calculated based on the demographic nature of each household.22  
As for the agricultural sector, even before the land redistribution was complete, 
the CPC had decided to promote the transformation of land ownership from privately 
owned to collectively-owned. 23  As a consequence, peasants were forced to form 
collective agricultural units where all land and farming equipment were deemed to be 
collectively owned.24 In addition, in order to finance sustainable industrialisation, 
which was characterised by concentration of capital and resources in heavy industry,25 
all agricultural produce was procured by the government at extremely low prices and 
resold to fulfil domestic needs or exports at much higher prices. 26  From the 
implementation of the Plan, the government used its control over virtually all fiscal 
and physical resources to build new factories and increase industrial outputs, which 
grew 11.5% annually between 1952 and 1978.27 In addition, industry’s share of total 
GDP grew from 18% in 1952 to 44% in 1978, whilst agriculture’s share declined from 
51% to 28%.28 
Nevertheless, central economic planning was interrupted by two notorious 
economic and political campaigns that substantially changed the course of 
development of China. 
2.2 Disastrous Social Upheaval 
Inspired by a couple years of desirable performance of this Soviet-style economy, 
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Mao became overconfident and believed that China was ready to surpass the United 
Kingdom in 15 years.29 In 1958, he launched the Great Leap Forward movement with 
the purpose of increasing China’s industrial output and developing its economy 
dramatically, and of rapidly transforming the country from an agrarian-based economy 
into an advanced socialist economy through industrialisation by forcing the whole 
country to be part of the ‘construction current’. The whole movement was built on the 
false belief that China’s vast supply of cheap labour would compensate for the lack of 
technological and financial support. 
Another round of collectivisation took place in the Great Leap Forward 
movement whereby farmers were organised into ‘communes’.30 Within less than a 
year during 1958, almost all farms in China were converted to communes.31 Farmers 
were asked to build furnaces in their backyards to produce iron. 32  To satisfy 
unreasonable output targets, every piece of metal that could be found in ordinary 
households and which could be used to produce iron and steel – normally cooker and 
metal farming implements – was put into the furnace. 33  Because investment and 
manpower were diverted to increase industrial output, agricultural development was 
inevitably overlooked. Consequently, and accompanied by serious natural disasters 
such as drought and flooding, famine resulted. The end result of the Great Leap 
Forward was a complete disaster in the history of China. This ‘disastrous utopian 
fantasy’34 is said to have caused more than 30 million people to starve to death in this 
country of agrarian tradition.35 
After the Great Leap Forward ended in 1961, although Mao was still the chairman 
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of the CPC Central Committee, he was practically suspended. Nonetheless, a campaign 
called the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was initiated by Mao in 1966.36 This class conflict 
aimed to restore Mao’s prestige in the country and enforce the orthodox Maoist 
thought by accusing the more moderate government led by President Liu Shaoqi as 
being ‘capitalist roaders’. Millions of Chinese youths formed the ‘Red Guard’ which, 
as a well-known slogan during that time said, ‘would defend Chairman Mao with blood 
and lives’. Government buildings and economic infrastructure was attacked by the 
radical Red Guards.37 Moreover, since the Cultural Revolution called for the overturn 
of Chinese traditional culture, such as Confucianism, universities were closed, books 
were destroyed, and many intellectuals were hurt or killed.38  
The movement spread to all segments of society and seriously hindered the 
development of the Chinese economy.39 It also led to the deaths of many important 
politicians in the CPC, and the most influential figure in the following economic 
transition, Deng Xiaoping, was exiled. This movement directly resulted in a decade-
long recession of China’s already poor economy and the total elimination of positive 
social and cultural activities. China in the era of Cultural Revolution was ‘in a state of 
lawless chaos and desperately poor’.40 After Mao’s death in 1976, Hua Guofeng, 
Mao’s designated successor, brought down the so-called Gang of Four,41 who were 
responsible for helping to engineer the Cultural Revolution, and finally ended the 
campaign. 
Two main features in this age of turbulence were embedded in the bureaucratic 
culture of the government that continues to exist today – although no longer in an 
explicit way – and impacts upon China’s competition system. First, state control over 
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every aspect of economic activities was pervasive. It was the state, rather than the 
market, that determined what goods the public could have, the way in which they were 
distributed, and their prices. The principles on which SOEs were established required 
them to be directly controlled by the government. SOEs were therefore more like 
government departments instead of market players, since there was no market as 
such. 42  Second, like economic control, political control was equally if not more 
pervasive. Orderly operation of the government was frequently disrupted by the CPC’s 
recourse to mass campaigns.43 Political goals always took precedence over any other 
goals, be they economic or social in nature. Goals deriving from either superior 
political ideology – the Great Leap Forward – or political conflicts – the Culture 
Revolution – had to be achieved even it required the mobilisation of the whole nation 
and the deaths of many. 
3. AN ERA OF REFORMS AND RAPID DEVELOPMENT – THE PATH 
LEADING TO A CHINESE COMPETITION SYSTEM 
While China impenitently persisted in the planned economy, some Asian 
countries and regions surrounding it were doing extraordinarily well in terms of social 
and economic development. Following a capitalist ideology, which emphasised the 
importance of market forces, Asia’s ‘Four Little Dragons’ – Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea – maintained high growth rates between the 1960s and 1990s, 
and had all become highly developed and industrialised economies. This rapid wealth 
accumulation in the rest of East Asia did not go unnoticed by the leaders,44 it in fact 
increased the pressure for reform. 45 Although catastrophic economic policies and 
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political campaigns brought suffering and death to the country, they nonetheless helped 
free China’s new leaders from substantial constraints.46 It became clearer to the reform 
faction within the CPC – which had overtaken its more conservative rivals47 – that 
after years of social upheaval, realistic economic development rather than impossible 
uniformity of political ideology should be the top priority for China.  
In 1978, after Deng Xiaoping – who himself had been victim of the Cultural 
Revolution during which he was purged twice – took over power from Hua Guofeng 
and became the leader of China.48 China gained new life and entered an era of rapid 
development at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party Congress. This 
meeting – at which the Reform and Opening Up policy was initiated – is now widely 
recognised as ‘a watershed in the history of the PRC and the beginning of China’s 
post-Mao economic reform’.49 
From then, China began its journey of experimentation and gradual economic 
reform, which aimed to ‘solidify [the CPC’s] political position’.50 Initial reform took 
place in the rural part of China where the agricultural sector was based. On 20 October 
1984, the Third Plenum of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC adopted a major 
decision to overhaul the entire economic system, which consisted of seven major 
reform priorities.51 A dual-track price system was established which formed the basis 
for the first round of SOE reform and, after the tragic Tiananmen Square Incident in 
June 1989,52 as a way to promptly placate public indignation and shift the attention of 
the enraged masses, there was a fundamental veer of priorities within the CPC from 
ideological debates and political struggles to economic reform and development. 
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Subsequently, the Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning 
the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure was adopted at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee in November 1993. This called 
for the establishment of the socialist market economy – a modern competitive and 
market-oriented economy in which the predominance of public ownership and direct 
economic administration was preserved. From then, China entered the second phase 
of economic reform characterised by, inter alia, more market-oriented and liberalised 
economic policies, the growing presence and importance of non-public – both 
domestic and foreign – undertakings, deepening reform in the state sector, and 
strengthening of government’s legal and regulatory oversight of economic activities. 
The reform of Chinese economy is itself a subject too broad and comprehensive 
to be fully discussed in this chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the following 
sections discuss aspects of economic reform that are most relevant to the establishment 
of competition system. More specifically, they address the main drivers – both internal 
and external – of the adoption of the AML.  
3.1 Emergence of Competition in China’s Domestic Market 
In March 1979, a few months after the landmark Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
CPC Central Committee, Chen Yun was appointed as the director of the Financial and 
Economic Affairs Committee under the State Council, and carried out a series of 
reform plans.53 Although these reform plans called for the overhaul of a wide range 
of economic sectors under the centrally planned economy, initial success was seen in 
the rural areas, where collective ownership was and still is predominant, with dramatic 
agricultural reform. It was not only because China’s agriculture was in need of reform, 
but also because the agricultural industry was far more flexible than the enormous state 
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sector and rural areas were considered less strategically important than urban areas.54 
As a result, rural areas became a major field for local governments to implement ‘secret’ 
tentative projects toward which the central government turned a blind eye. 55 
Nonetheless, the success of rural reform was unforeseen by Chinese leaders.56 
The rural communes established during the Great Leap Forward had proven 
extremely inefficient and unproductive. Central planners, sometimes technically 
incompetent political cadres,57 lacked the required farming-related knowledge and the 
ability to appreciate special conditions in local areas, and the output quotas were 
largely unrealistic and impractical. Farmers were inadequately incentivised to conduct 
agricultural activities since the procurement price paid for agricultural produce had 
been extremely low to cross-subsidise urbanisation and industrialisation. Secret 
experiments took place in several rural areas, where each farm household was assigned 
a piece of land – the ownership of which was still collective – by communes. In return, 
a fixed delivery quota would be imposed on each household, and the above-quota 
output would be retained by farmers who could choose to trade in local markets. This 
household responsibility system generated incentives for farmers to take on 
agricultural tasks whilst at the same time ensuring that the procurement targets for rural 
communes – which were no longer as unfeasible in 1978 – could be met.58 The 
household responsibility system was later supported by both Deng Xiaoping and Chen 
Yun, and was introduced on a national scale. The output of grain increased 
dramatically as a result: 305 million tonnes in 1978, 355 million in 1982, and 407 
million in 1984.59  
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In addition, the increase in agricultural output and income of farmers stimulated 
the development of non-agricultural businesses in rural areas. After fulfilling the 
delivery quota, the farm household would be free to keep the remaining output for its 
own consumption or for sale on the market. As local trading became more vigorous, 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) were established under the auspices of local 
government in order to meet the increasing demands of the market.60 Rural industry 
in general and TVEs in particular – which were once described by Deng Xiaoping 
using a Chinese idiom as ‘yijun tuqi [异军突起]’61 – played a significant role in the 
dissolution of the monopoly enjoyed by SOEs and changed the course of China’s 
transition economy. 62  Between 1978 and 1996 – the ‘golden age of TVEs’ – 
development of TVEs was prosperous in China’s rural areas, which were less 
economically and politically scrutinised than their urban counterparts. 63  In 1978, 
TVEs absorbed 28 million employees and accounted for 6% of GDP; in 1996, 
employment increased to 135 million and their share of GDP grew to 26%.64 During 
the same period, rural TVEs’ share of output increased from 9% to 28%. The 
astonishing performance of TVEs, which were collectively owned as opposed to state-
owned, gave rise to market competitive challenge at local level that SOEs had never 
encountered before. Consequently, SOEs’ share in industrial output declined from 77% 
in 1978 to only 33% in 1996.65 
TVEs were originally transformed from rural communes, and therefore their 
collective status had close government connections. However, since the mid-1990s, 
when marketisation was introduced nationwide and market competition became 
intensified, the advantages TVEs once had – for example, easy access to a large pool 
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of rural labour – were lost and their intrinsic disadvantages – for example, small scale 
of operations and difficulty in acquiring financial aid – were revealed.66 Consequently, 
TVEs underwent an ownership transformation beginning in the mid-1990s, during 
which time a considerable number of TVEs were privatised. From then, TVEs ‘never 
regained their momentum of the 1980s’.67 Nonetheless, the emergence of TVEs was 
the most important internal factor that accelerated China’s marketisation process and 
forced institutional transformation in China’s industrial sector. In addition, the ensuing 
emergence of urban private and foreign undertakings, when the Chinese market was 
further liberalised as a result of the Reform and Opening Up policy, also boosted 
China’s industrial reform process. In 1993, the share of industrial output in the non-
state sector – 53% – exceeded that of the state sector for the first time in China’s 
history.68  
Increasingly intensive market competition generated by the entry of non-public 
undertakings, which was deemed one of the most striking elements of China’s 
economic reform,69 brutally exposed the severe inefficiency of SOEs. The central 
leadership started to consider the reform of its state sector as a necessary step towards 
successful economic transition. 
3.2 Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
As discussed above, the core of centrally planned economy was planning every 
single aspect of economic activities, ranging from the annual output of steel to the 
number of ration coupons issued to every household. Under China’s traditional 
centrally planned economy, SOEs were not considered as modern corporations even 
in the loosest sense. Instead, they were more like government departments or 
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production units with no managerial autonomy, which were assigned the task of 
carrying out the most basic business activities such as manufacturing and selling 
products that any real enterprise would normally perform, and fulfilling the 
quantitative output targets.70 Other important elements found in a modern enterprise 
such as marketing, autonomous decision-making, corporate governance, corporate 
strategy and corporate accountability were all missing in China’s SOEs at that time.71 
Moreover, since a non-public economy literally did not exist before China’s economic 
transition, the number of people working in the public sector was massive. For the sake 
of social stability, SOEs were, and in fact still are, responsible for some significant 
non-economic tasks, such as the provision of health care, housing, and even education 
for the employees’ family members. For the same reason, workers of SOEs were not 
subject to layoffs – the so-called ‘golden rice bowl’ – and SOEs were not subject to 
bankruptcy, no matter how unprofitable they were,72 since the social security system 
robust enough to provide sufficient protection to redundant workers was not to be 
found in China.73 
Since SOEs were practically embedded in the bureaucratic hierarchy, they did not 
have the right to retain any profits, but at the same time they would not be held 
responsible for any losses.74 As a consequence, managers of SOEs believed in ‘not 
hoping to acquire merit, just avoiding mistakes’ 75  and were therefore scarcely 
incentivised to increase either the productivity or profitability of the enterprise. 76 
Moreover, SOE management placed significant emphasis on the quality and quantity 
of the tangibles, such as machineries and equipment, but placed less or no emphasis 
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on the intangibles, such as incentives and business strategy.77  
Consequently, the state sector in the era of the centrally planned economy suffered 
from serious principal-agent problems as a result of information asymmetry and 
incentive incompatibility. Since the planning agency and the ministries were not able 
to monitor the performance of individual SOE closely, and the managers of SOEs, who 
had the first-hand information concerning the enterprise, were not sufficiently 
rewarded on the basis of business performance of their enterprises, they had a tendency 
to act in their own interests at the expense of the interests of state. Since the profits of 
profitable SOEs would be remitted to compensate for the loss made by unprofitable 
SOEs, the more productive SOEs would be given higher future output targets if they 
over-fulfilled their previous targets,78 a situation in which the managers certainly 
would not wish to be. As a consequence, the managers were incentivised to understate 
their production capacity. Moreover, since SOEs faced a soft budget constraint, the 
managers were incentivised to overstate the input requirements in order to obtain 
additional financial support.79 
These problems concerning SOEs in China’s centrally plan economy were well 
recognised. Soon after the Reform and Opening Up policy was introduced, industrial 
reform started. The first phase of industrial reform did not see privatisation as a 
feasible option for public sector. Instead, it focused on strengthening profitability-
related incentives for the managers.80 During the initial period, due to the fear that 
dramatic restructuring might lead to disquiet among industrial workers who were 
‘wrapped […] in a cocoon of stability’ in the state-owned sector, reformers chose to 
maintain an essential character of the existing planned economy – economic planning 
– whilst at the same time incentivising managers of SOEs to promote productivity and 
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profitability by rewarding them based on the performance of individual SOE.81 In 
order to implement this incentive plan, the government followed a gradualist approach 
and created a ‘dual-track’ pricing system – the start of China’s price liberation and the 
formation of market economy – which put emphasis on incentivising the SOEs to 
promote their productivity, as opposed to the ‘big bang’ approach adopted by the 
Soviet Union, 82  which was characterised by complete privatisation of the SOEs. 
Under the dual-track system, SOEs which had fulfilled their output targets were 
allowed to trade their surplus at market prices, whilst their planned output was sold at 
state-set prices. In addition, SOEs were no longer required to remit all their profits to 
the state; instead, under a new contract responsibility system, the managers of SOEs 
signed contracts – known as profit retention – with the government in relation to the 
fixed sums to be remitted and consequently retained the remaining profits.83 Also, 
salaries and bonuses of SOE managers were calculated based on the profits made by 
the SOE they managed. Managers were therefore incentivised to improve productivity 
so that the amount of products to be sold on the market increased, so did the 
profitability of undertaking and their own incomes. As a consequence, market 
competition in the industrial sector started to emerge.  
However, there were serious residual problems with this incentive plan. First, the 
soft budget constraint still existed. Market competition arising from the dual-track 
pricing system led some of the previously unprofitable SOEs to be even more 
unprofitable. However, due to the soft budget constraint, the income of the profitable 
SOEs was fiscally redistributed to unprofitable ones in the form of subsidies to avoid 
bankruptcy.84 Second, the principal-agent problem still existed. Since the government 
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required additional funds to bail out unprofitable SOEs, the managers of profitable 
SOEs would be incentivised to understate the enterprises’ productivity potential, 
otherwise the planned output target would be increased and so would the income 
remitted to the government. In addition, the margin between state-set and market prices 
– known as institutional rent85 – and the government’s inability to acquire accurate 
information concerning the operation of SOEs, had created incentives and 
opportunities for managers to engage in rent-seeking by abusing their managerial 
discretion for personal gain which caused a serious loss of state-owned assets. 86 
Whilst SOEs could sell above-quota output for higher prices, they were still entitled to 
buy cheap input, such as raw material and machinery.87 The managers became the 
ultimate beneficiaries as a result of the increase in retained profits, whilst the overall 
profitability of SOEs was less promising.88 
At the same time as the restructuring of a large number of TVEs in the mid-1990s, 
the necessity to bring the reform of SOEs to the next level – ownership restructuring 
and corporate governance – was widely perceived.89 The adoption of the Company 
Law in 1993 was considered by many as the beginning of the second phase of industrial 
reform.90 It provided a legal framework not only for the corporatisation of SOEs, but 
also for the diversification of ownership forms: private undertakings were able to 
acquire the shares of public undertakings, which were converted into a legal form of 
corporation.91 In September 1995, an important reform policy – zhuada fangxiao [抓
大放小] (grasping the large and letting go of the small) – was introduced at the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee,92 which was another milestone 
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in SOEs history. According to this policy, the state would maintain control of the large 
– particularly central – SOEs, and enhance their efficiency by reorganisation and 
restructuring; but would tighten the credits available to SOEs and privatise a large 
number of small and medium-size – particularly local – loss-making SOEs, and would 
allow some of them to go into bankruptcy.93 In addition, many of the larger SOEs 
started to issue tradable shares on stock exchanges, although public listing did not 
essentially transfer corporate control from government to private actors.94 Whilst a 
large number of SOEs became financially efficient after the second round of reforms, 
they nonetheless faced serious corporate governance problems after being converted 
into modern enterprises. Due to their entrenched link with government, SOEs started 
to adversely influence China’s socialist market economy in order to protect the 
dominant market power they had been enjoying since the centrally planned economy.95  
Nonetheless, it should be fully acknowledged that the TVEs and SOEs – both of 
which played vital roles in the industrial growth – contributed significantly to bringing 
about competition that did not exist before the end of the 1970s. China finally had a 
functioning market, which could be regulated within the legal framework. A large 
number of laws and regulations governing business practices of market players, such 
as those that will be discussed in section 2.5 below, were promulgated during this 
period of time. The first attempt to enact a competition law was seen in 1987 against 
this backdrop.96 
Accompanying the advent of TVEs and reform of SOEs was the emergence of 
foreign undertakings facilitated primarily by the Reform and Opening Up policy. 
These undertakings became the new blood of the transition economy and contributed 
significantly to the increasingly vibrant and competitive market in China. 
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3.3 The Emergence of Foreign Capital 
Even before the PRC was founded, the importance of foreign trade was 
recognised by the CPC leadership.97 However, due to years of political turmoil and 
deterioration of the political relationship with the US and the Soviet Union,98 China 
had been largely isolated from the world economy until the adoption of the Reform 
and Opening Up policy. In 1978, China had a total volume of import and export of 
$20.6 billion, which ranked 32nd worldwide.99 After nearly four decades, the number 
had increased to $4.3 trillion in 2014, which made China the largest trading nation in 
the world.100 In addition, the Reform and Opening Up policy significantly attracted 
foreign capital to invest in China. From 1979 to 1983, the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows were $1.8 billion, whilst in 2014, China became the world’s largest FDI 
recipient with inflows of $129 billion.101  
One of the greatest achievements of the Reform and Opening Up policy with 
regard to attracting foreign investment was the opening up of various designated 
regions in China through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). As 
mentioned above, in the past China’s general public always associated capitalism with 
imperialism and exploitation, and would normally resist the idea of having foreign 
investors establishing businesses and hiring local workers in China.102 In addition, 
even if Chinese reformers considered foreign investment essential to boost China’s 
economic growth, a conducive business environment – well-enforced legal 
instruments protecting the interests of investors and basic infrastructure supporting the 
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operation of business – for foreign investment was largely lacking. 103  As a 
consequence, the SEZ project was put forward to increase the confidence of foreign 
investors in China’s development potential. Initially, four SEZs – Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou and Xiamen – were established in 1980 as ‘experimental stations for sceptical 
Party members and government officials to observe’. 104  Essentially, the SEZs 
provided foreign undertakings with a more favourable tax policy – notably the tax rate 
of enterprise income tax was merely 15% whilst the rate for a domestic undertaking at 
that time was 33% – less bureaucratic red tape, and complete sets of law and regulation. 
The Shenzhen SEZ has been the most outstanding achievement under this project. The 
city of Shenzhen, neighbouring Hong Kong, was originally a small village where fiscal 
revenue depended heavily if not solely on fishing. However, since the establishment 
of the SEZ, low land costs and cheap labour made investing in Shenzhen a wise and 
profitable option for Hong Kong businessmen – Shenzhen’s very first foreign investors 
– who invested considerable capital in establishing numerous manufacturing plants.105 
Thirty four years after the establishment of SEZ, Shenzhen had the 4th largest 
municipal GDP of CNY 1.6 trillion in 2014, after Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.106  
In the early days of the establishment of SEZs, in order to prevent foreign capital 
from ‘invading’ the Chinese market by wiping out domestic undertakings, the 
government cautiously adopted a gradualist and scrutiny-oriented approach. Initially, 
foreign capital could only be invested through equity joint ventures,107 whilst wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) were prohibited. When WFOEs were permitted 
to be established in China in 1986, 108 the scope of operation allowed was rather 
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limited as WFOEs ‘shall’ use advanced technology and equipment and export all or a 
greater portion of their products.109 The scope was significantly widened for WFOEs 
by a revision of the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law in 2000,110 as China was 
moving closer in its bid for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership. In light 
of China’s more liberalised and active attitude towards foreign capital, as well as the 
adoption of preferential policies encouraging foreign investment,111 the inflow of FDI 
has been growing steadily over the past three decades. Inward FDI increased from 
$1.769 billion in 1979 to $123.911 billion in 2013.112 However, whilst during the same 
period the number of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) grew from 920 to 22,819, 
there was a sheer and continuous decline after 1993 when the number of FEIs reached 
the peak at 83,437. Such a phenomenon suggests that multinational conglomerates are 
becoming more financially powerful, the efficiency and business performance of 
which in China has been significantly strengthened. Indeed, 490 out of the top 500 
undertakings in the world have businesses operating in China.113 
The emergence of foreign undertakings made China’s domestic market much 
more open and competitive. Domestic undertakings benefited significantly from the 
capital, technology, modern management theory, and labour training project brought 
by foreign undertakings.114 Moreover, in order to build up the confidence of foreign 
undertakings in investing in China, the Chinese government had to refrain from 
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supervising economic activities in the same way as it did in the planned economy era. 
Instead, it started the process of deregulation, initially in SEZs and later in a wider area, 
and performed its functions in a more normative and standardised manner. Therefore, 
foreign undertakings were helpful not only in terms of massive capital, but also in 
relation to forcing the government to pay more attention to the importance of market 
forces in allocating resources and of establishing a legalised framework and a level 
playing field to safeguard the interests of market players.  
As illustrated by the above discussion on China’s dramatic economic expansion 
from the late 1970s to 1990s, one can appreciate the overwhelming change regarding 
the rise of private – both domestic and foreign – actors and market competition in 
China’s socialist market. The Reform and Opening Up policy created a policy 
environment conducive to economic diversification, which in turn furthered both the 
‘reform’ – reforms in rural areas and public sectors – and ‘open’ – open of domestic 
market facilitated by the establishment of SEZs – aspects of China’s economic 
transition. The diversion of the policy priority of the central government from 
ideology-oriented political campaigns and movements to market-oriented economic 
development laid the foundation for China’s integration into the global economy, and 
hence for the legal framework to safeguard its increasingly open and competitive 
market. At the dawn of the new millennium, the integration process was fundamentally 
promoted by China’s accession to the WTO. The next section discusses how the WTO 
membership significantly influenced China’s decision to establish a competition 
system. 
3.4 Accession to the WTO 
After losing the civil war in 1949, the Kuomintang re-established a ROC 
government in Taiwan and announced the decision to withdraw from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which ROC was one of the 23 original 
signatories. Not long after the Reform and Opening Up policy was introduced, the 
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leadership of the PRC saw the necessity to expand the scale of economy by integrating 
China more closely into the global economy. In 1986, the PRC officially notified the 
GATT of its request for resumption of China’s status as a GATT contracting party.115 
In 1995, China applied for accession to the Marrakesh Agreement that had replaced 
the GATT and established the WTO. China’s WTO membership was finally approved 
in 2001 after years of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with other WTO members, 
in particular the US and the EU. 
Using foreign competition to promote economic reform had been one of the main 
motivations for China to join the WTO.116 As discussed, in the mid-1990s, China’s 
economic reform entered a stage where a large number of TVEs were privatised and 
the reform of SOEs was moving from promoting the incentives of management to 
wide-scale corporatisation. Nonetheless, corporate reform faced drastic resistance as a 
result of vested interests deeply embedded in the state economy.117 Most SOEs still 
had not become efficient corporations, largely because corporate governance was 
unsatisfactory. However, the accession to the WTO was likely to induce more foreign 
capital to invest in a larger geographical area and a wider scope of industries of China, 
which meant that China’s SOEs would be subject to a scale of foreign competition the 
SEZs were not capable of creating. Foreign undertakings were able to help create a 
competitive environment conducive to spurring SOEs to improve efficiency.  
Moreover, apart from the emergence of domestic and foreign competition 
discussed above, the accession to WTO has been another vital impetus for the adoption 
of the AML.118 Essentially, WTO membership gives members access to the markets 
of other members, whilst in return, members are required to open domestic markets to 
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foreign competitors. 119  A regulatory scheme overseeing government actions and 
business conducts which may have adverse impact on market competition and setting 
a level playing field is therefore important for the protection of foreign undertakings’ 
interests in host countries. Whilst the Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO 
and the Working Party Report specifically stipulate principles concerning non-
discrimination, tariff reduction, abolition of nontariff barriers, and transparency, 
competition policy (which normally scatters across a wider range of WTO agreements) 
did not form a substantive part in the entry negotiations at the WTO level.120 Although 
WTO membership was and is still not explicitly conditional on the existence of a 
comprehensive competition regime, 121  there has been a general requirement for 
members to promote open, fair and undistorted competition 122  – which was also 
reflected in the reference to China’s competition policy in the Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China123 – and the adoption of a competition law, which 
complements the existing legislation on protection of fair competition, can partially 
fulfil this requirement. Moreover, the persistent pressure from other WTO members, 
seeking to protect their own undertakings from distorted competition in China, has 
also impelled the Chinese government to take meaningful action toward the 
improvement of competition regulatory framework. 124  Therefore, it was both 
economically and politically wise to have comprehensive competition legislation in 
place to cement China’s status in global trade and investment. 
In summary, in relation to the pre-AML policy and economic environment in 
China, it was a combination of internal and external factors that raised the need to 
establish a modern competition system in China. Internally, successful rural reform 
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had created competitors – the TVEs – to SOEs and functioning markets where 
domestic trade could take place; SOEs were reformed to respond to increasing 
pressures generated by non-public actors whilst competition between SOEs also 
intensified as a result of the reform. Externally, foreign undertakings were incentivised 
by the Reform and Opening Up policy to invest in China whilst the accession to the 
WTO forced China further to diversify its domestic market. China’s integration with 
global economy brought not only vigorous competition into China but also the needs 
to regulate competition. 
Besides China’s economic transition and foreign pressures,125 there was another 
driving force behind the adoption of the AML – the weakness of China’s pre-AML 
legal framework governing competition-related activities – without which there would 
not have been a need for China to establish a competition system in order to be 
compatible with WTO requirements in the first place. 
3.5 Dispersal of Competition-Related Laws 
The enforcement of the Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978 created the need 
for economic regulation to stabilise its socialist market economy,126 but such need did 
not become a priority since considerable resources at that time had been devoted to 
economic development. In general, China’s pre-AML legal framework governing 
competition issues was ‘interwoven with uncertainty, inconsistency, and 
unenforceability’.127  
Before the enactment of the AML, China did not have a systemic body of 
competition rules, possibly the result of a lack of theoretical awareness of the 
competition concept in a less developed economy. In 1980 the Provisional Rules on 
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the Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy was introduced. 
It was China’s first law dealing with competition issues.128 However, this law created 
significant contradictions and became a ‘fruitless exercise’.129 On the one hand, it 
purported to outlaw monopoly, while on the other it articulated that the trade of all 
products was reserved to the government.130 During the initial period of the Reform 
and Opening Up policy, although some damaging anti-competitive activities were 
found in the market, the Chinese authorities had to rely on competition-related 
provisions scattered across a number of miscellaneous laws and administrative rules 
with varying degrees of competition relevance to regulate market behaviours, 131 
which led to inconsistent and unpredictable enforcement of market-related 
legislation.132  
At the start of China’s second-phase reform in 1993 there was a shift in transition 
strategy that the policy makers began to recognise the need to build a firmer legal basis 
to preserve the fruit the continuing reform had achieved.133 Since then, with China’s 
changing attitude towards legal framework and the closer connection with the outside 
world, legislation on economic matters was enacted more frequently and drafted with 
more sophistication. The most comprehensive set of competition-related rules in place 
before the enactment of the AML was the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), 
promulgated in 1993.134 This law contains several provisions that are usually found in 
competition law, such as prohibition of dumping,135 tie-in sales,136 and prohibition of 
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price fixing and bid rigging. 137  But these provisions, unlike typical competition 
provisions, do not lay down the requirement of market share or market power, namely, 
the party in question may be in breach even if it does not hold a significant position in 
the market. Moreover, the AUCL also addresses many other practices that are not 
normally considered by a competition law, including bribery, 138  deceptive 
advertising,139 and appropriation of business secrets.140 Therefore, the AUCL is in 
fact a fusion of a small fraction of competition provisions and a large fraction of 
consumer protection provisions. The main objective of the AUCL is to safeguard and 
maintain the order and fairness of competition in the market, which is premised on the 
fact that there is market competition to start with. The AML, on the other hand, protects 
and promotes the freedom of competition in the market, which will otherwise be 
prevented or restricted. As required by the AUCL, also in 1993 the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) – the enforcer of the AUCL – issued 
the Rules on Prohibiting Public Utility Companies from Restricting Competition,141 
which addresses the abuse of dominant position on the part of public utility companies. 
These rules are relatively short and general in nature, and contain no detailed and 
enforceable provisions. 
Another competition-related law is the Price Law enacted in 1997,142 which 
contains provisions against improper pricing behaviour including price-fixing, 
predatory pricing, and price discrimination.143 As will be seen in Chapter V of this 
thesis, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – the enforcer of 
both the Price Law and the AML – on several occasions applied the Price Law instead 
of the AML to punish anti-competitive practices. To complement the implementation 
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of the Price Law, the Rules on the Prohibition of Below-Cost Sales was issued by the 
State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) – the predecessor of NDRC – 
in 1999, it prevents business operators from eliminating competitors or monopolising 
the market through predatory pricing.144 Later in 2006, the Administrative Measures 
on Fair Transaction between Retailers and Suppliers was issued to address, inter alia, 
rebates,145  tying,146  and resale price maintenance. 147  In spite of the existence of 
competition-related provisions, the Price Law is mainly applied to control the prices 
of key commodities and services. The direct price control feature of the Price Law 
dictates that it is not suitable to be treated as a piece of competition legislation. 
Moreover, after China joined the WTO, an increasing number of multinational 
undertakings reoriented their operational strategies and concentrated major capital on 
the emerging Chinese market. Acquisition of domestic undertakings became one of 
the most favourable means of starting businesses in China, and the government 
gradually appreciated the necessity to establish a merger control framework. On 7 
March 2003, the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Provisional M&A Rules) were adopted, which 
provided the legal basis for a merger review mechanism applicable to foreign-domestic 
transactions. As stated in Article 19, notification to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and SAIC is required before a merger can legally 
proceed if certain conditions are met. The Provisional M&A Rules were replaced by 
the Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
in 2006. As suggested by the title, the Provisional M&A Rules only concerned foreign 
acquisition of domestic undertakings; mergers and acquisitions between domestic 
undertakings were therefore not appropriately scrutinised. 
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Apart from the above anti-competitive behaviours, abuse of administrative power 
to eliminate or restrict competition by government departments – the so-called 
administrative monopoly – has been a prevalent source of distortion of market 
competition in China.148 Administrative monopoly was already subject to regulation 
by legal instruments in pre-AML era. More than thirty years ago, anti-competitive 
administrative practices such as local blockades and protectionism were already 
addressed in regulations. Paragraph one of the abrogated Provisional Rules on the 
Promotion of Economic Alliance stated that economic alliance was conducive to 
breaking down regional blockades, and Article 6 of the abrogated Provisional Rules 
on the Promotion and Protection of Socialist Competition stipulated that the 
development of competition required the breakdown of regional blockades and 
departmental barriers. Explicit prohibition of administrative monopoly in the form of 
local blockade was included in the AUCL149 and the Rules of the State Council on the 
Prohibition of Regional Blockade in Market Economic Activities. Moreover, in the 
Provisional Rules on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly Conduct of 2003, 150 
government agencies were restrained from illegally intervening in market price setting. 
However, the prohibitions under these regulations were merely general principles, and 
were not accompanied by practical enforcement mechanisms or sufficient deterrence. 
Therefore, whilst an increasing number of practices that adversely impacted upon 
competition were sanctioned under miscellaneous laws, administrative monopoly was 
largely intact in the pre-AML era. 
It has to be appreciated that the promulgation of these regulations and rules 
showed the awareness of the government of some major competition concerns in 
China’s market such as the widespread abuse of market power by the SOEs and 
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damaging impacts brought by administrative monopoly. However, the competition-
related provisions in these regulations are ‘fragmented’ and ‘vague’. 151  Also, the 
effectiveness of enforcement is largely compromised by inconsistent and 
unpredictable decisions brought by the existence of multiple enforcement agencies 
authorised by different laws.152  
As will be shown in later chapters of this thesis, this multiple-agencies problem 
has not been solved by the AML at all. As Zenguo Wu argues, there are four main 
issues with China’s pre-AML legislation. First, there is no unified and complete anti-
monopoly law and system. Second, the content of the existing rules is relatively 
general and impractical. Third, the actual impact of the existing rules was likely to be 
relatively low, and consequently the rules were not perceived as authoritative, and 
fourth, there were insufficient penalties for violations.153 It was, therefore, anticipated 
by many that market competition should be more properly protected by comprehensive 
competition legislation instead of a myriad of laws containing competition-related 
provisions but suffering from major shortfalls. 
Sections 3.1-3.5 above discussed the three determinants of the adoption of the 
AML; China’ economic transition from centrally planned economy to socialist market 
economy, foreign pressures in general, and the accession to the WTO in particular, and 
the lack of legal instruments overseeing market competition. Each of these 
determinants played a significant part in reinforcing Chinese policymakers’ awareness 
of the necessity of competition law in a market-oriented economy. However, whilst 
China’s increasingly open domestic market and its integration into global economy 
represented the forward-looking aspect of China’s policymaking, the above discussion 
also shows that the government was reluctant to relinquish its pervasive control over 
economy as proved by the relentless SOEs reform as opposed to thorough privatization. 
Consequently this conservative aspect of policymaking deriving from considerations 
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of political and social stability inevitably collided with the capitalist ideology of free 
market economy. As will be seen in the following chapters of this thesis, such collision 
existed throughout the formulation and implementation of China’s competition policy. 
When various factors stimulated the emergence of China’s competition policy, in 
order to address and accommodate novel issues raised by its economic integration 
China had also taken steps towards reforming its institutions. The next section briefly 
introduces the institutional reform of the State Council in 2003, which had a decisive 
impact on the drafting of the AML and more generally on the functioning of China’s 
competition system. 
4. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF REFORM IN 2003 
At the same time when legislation and regulations – including the AML – was 
either revised or drafted in conformity with WTO obligations and requirements, a 
series of administrative reform also took place within the State Council to provide a 
more efficient and ‘investor-friendly’154 institutional framework to safeguard a more 
open and market-oriented economy.  
Since the founding of the PRC, design of economic institutions has always been 
a major topic for the leadership. This was especially true after China was freed from 
decades of political turmoil and started its economic transition. In 1986, Premier Zhao 
Ziyang stated at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress 
(NPC) that in order to accommodate the change of government function from direct 
management of enterprises to indirect management, the functions of economic 
supervision departments at each level should be transformed from assigning quotas, 
approving projects, and allotting funds and materials, to overall planning, 
comprehending policies, organising coordination, providing services, using economic 
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means of regulation, and reinforcing inspection and supervision.155 As the accession 
to the WTO had changed the economic landscape significantly in China, bureaucratic 
institutions in charge of managing economic activities should also be transformed to 
fulfil new requirements. 
On 10 March 2003, the Decision of the First Plenary Session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress on the Plan of the Institutional Reform of the State Council 
(Decision) was approved.156 This is the first major institutional reform of the State 
Council after China joined the WTO, and it was designed purposefully, at least in part, 
to address the challenges brought by the WTO accession.157 In this Decision, several 
institutional changes essentially influencing the drafting and future enforcement of the 
AML as well as the reform of SOEs have been made.  
4.1 Ministry of Commerce 
First, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was established, which was to be 
responsible for merger control under the AML.158 According to the Decision, parts of 
the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC),159 parts of SDPC, and the entire 
MOFTEC were merged to form MOFCOM.160  Before WTO accession, domestic 
trade and foreign trade including anti-dumping and countervailing duty were 
supervised by SETC and MOFTEC respectively, and these two departments, along 
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with SDPC, were also responsible for the supervision of product import and export. 
Such a regulating system separating internal and external trade, internal and external 
markets, and import and export quotas could not adapt to the new requirements 
stemming from accession.161 As a consequence, some functions of SETC, including 
management of domestic trade, coordination of foreign economic cooperation, and 
organisation of import and export of raw materials, and some functions of SDPC 
including organisation of import and export of agricultural produce, and all the 
functions of MOFTEC were transferred to the newly established MOFCOM.162  
A major part of the functions of MOFCOM is ‘outward-facing’, involving 
overseas investment and foreign economic cooperation, representing China in bilateral 
and plurilateral trade negotiations, and trade-related international organisations. 163 
These functions provide MOFCOM with the ability to obtain the most up-to-date 
global information and a forward-looking perspective on handling economic matters, 
which the departments overseeing mere domestic issues do not have. This feature, as 
will be demonstrated in later chapters, has proved to be extremely valuable in bilateral 
communication with competition authorities from other jurisdictions.164 
4.2 National Development and Reform Commission 
Second, NDRC was established, which was to be responsible for enforcement 
against price-related anti-competitive agreement and abuse of dominant position. In 
order to reduce overlap of government functions, increase departmental efficiency, and 
strengthen macroeconomic regulation and control, SDPC was re-organised to form 
NDRC, which, like MOFCOM, also absorbed some functions from SETC. In addition, 
all functions of the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System – 
                                                             
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 MOFCOM, ‘Mission’, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml. 
164 See for example, section 2, Chapter 7. 
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mainly involved guiding the operation of experimental units for economic reform in 
different areas and industries – were transferred to NDRC. 
After its establishment, NDRC became one of the most powerful and influential 
ministries in China, overseeing a tremendous range of economic activities165 and is 
dubbed ‘Little State Council’ by the general public due to the fact that some of its 
departments practically have policy-making powers comparable to those of some 
ministries under the State Council. Its most important functions include sector 
planning, industrial policy making, and economic operation regulating, which range 
from approving the construction of metro lines to issuing water conservation plans; 
and from deciding the size of Shanghai Disneyland to supervising the management of 
nature reserves. Not to mention that NDRC has the ultimate power to set prices,166 
which is the main reason why enforcement responsibilities are divided between NDRC 
and SAIC based on whether an alleged monopolistic conduct is price-related.  
SDPC, NDRC’s predecessor, was the last government body that had the word 
‘planning’ in its name. This change signals that planning has an increasingly nominal 
role to play in government’s macroeconomic regulation and control. However, since 
NDRC can trace its history back to the State Planning Commission, China’s first 
central planning agency, it inevitably inherited certain departmental modes of 
operation characterised by government intervention. This can be seen in the name of 
the unit responsible for competition enforcement – the Price Supervision and Anti-
Monopoly Bureau – which is also empowered to enforce price regulation, namely, the 
Price Law. As will be seen in Chapter 5, whilst the super ministry status of NDRC did 
to a certain degree promote its engagement in competition enforcement, on some 
                                                             
165 In September 2015 alone, the worth of projects officially approved by NDRC – including the 
construction of railway, highway and tramway in different cities – exceeded CNY 1.2 trillion. Details 
of the projects approved by NDRC are available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt. 
166 In China, when the prices of most consumer products are determined by the market itself, there are 
still a small number of commodities deemed vital to the Chinese economy and to everyday life subject 
to governmental supervision, the prices of which are either set – for example, salt and petrol – or 
regulated – for example, agricultural produce and medicine – by the government. The unit responsible 
for direct price oversight within NDRC is the Price Department. 
49 
 
occasions it was suspicious if the purpose of NDRC’s intervention was one that based 
on economic analysis or one that based solely on direct price control. 
4.3 State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
Third, a brand new government body, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) was established. It absorbed the function of 
SETC in guiding the reform and management of SOEs, all functions of the Central 
Party Work Committee on Large Enterprises, and the function of the Ministry of 
Finance in state-owned assets management. 167  SASAC was created as a new 
experiment to fulfil the government’s investor responsibilities, uphold shareholder 
rights, and advance the management of state-owned assets on behalf of the state.168 At 
the time when SASAC was established, the number of undertakings under the control 
of central SASAC – the so-called central SOEs169 – was 196. After over a decade of 
restructuring, the number declined to 107 by 11 December 2015,170 which is nominal 
compared to the total number of SOEs – 155,000.171 However, central SOEs are the 
largest and most capitalised undertakings in China. They account for 88.1% of the 
revenue, 84.1% of the profits, and 86.4% of the net assets of all nonfinancial SOEs.172  
This new institution was expected to separate government’s roles of market 
participant from those of market regulator, and separate its functions as owner of state-
owned assets from its managerial functions. The essential functions of the SASAC 
                                                             
167 NPC (fn 157). 
168 The Decision on the Plan of the Institutional Reform of the State Council (fn 156). 
169 In the narrow sense, the term ‘central SOEs’ only refers to SOEs that are controlled and supervised 
by SASAC; however, in the broad sense, it can additionally include, first, financial undertakings 
supervised by China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, or 
China Banking Regulatory Commission; and second, undertakings supervised by other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transport. For the purpose of this thesis, the broader 
interpretation is followed. 
170  For the full list of central SOEs, see 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html. The subsidiaries of central SOEs are 
not included on the list. 




172 Cheng (fn 65) 174. 
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also include guiding and pushing forward the reform and restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises, advancing the establishment of modern enterprise system in SOEs, 
improving corporate governance, and propelling the strategic adjustment of the layout 
and structure of the state economy.173 However in practice, the government’s method 
of entrusting a bureaucratic body with powers significantly greater than those of 
ordinary shareholders 174  to supervise the management and operation of business 
entities is not without problems. The issue about corporate governance of SOEs will 
be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5. CONCLUSION 
China has come a long way on a path strewn with setbacks, faulty economic 
policies, and flawed political decisions. Fortunately, instead of experiencing uprising 
and wars as had happened in China’s history for thousands of years, the CPC chose a 
path of profound reform. It did not follow the approach to transition adopted by its old 
comrades in Eastern Europe; there was never a ‘big bang’ that overthrew the entire 
political and economic structure and build a new one from the bottom up. Instead, it 
was assumed that the transformation of the economic system would have to take place 
concurrently with economic development, and the process of economic development 
would drive market transition forward and guarantee its eventual success.175 This 
incremental reform strategy was criticised by many economists, who regarded big 
bang reform as the right strategy for a transition economy. 176  Nonetheless, a 
seemingly longer and more obscure path in fact brought China into an era of 
astonishingly rapid economic development: both private sector and foreign capital 
have been gradually recognised as important parts of China’s socialist economy; the 
                                                             
173 SASAC, ‘Main Functions’, http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408521/index.html. 
174 Cheng (fn 65) 174. 
175 Naughton (fn 27) 86. 
176 Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization 
in China (Cambridge University Press 2003) 1. 
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state sector was forced by intensified market competition to adapt to new challenges; 
and the accession to the WTO opened up new opportunities for China to integrate into 
the global economy. All these factors led to the replacement of the fragmented legal 
framework governing economic activities by a more comprehensive competition 
system. 
Moreover, following the discussion on China’s development history, it is 
unequivocal that two features of the Chinese government stand out. The first is China’s 
entrenched tradition of state intervention in economic activities. Although the level of 
state intervention in the centrally planned economy is not likely to reappear in China 
today, it should be pointed out that socialist ideology the main attribute of which is 
public ownership, will always prevail over capitalist ideology, the main attribute of 
which is private ownership, as long as the CPC is in power. This means SOEs will 
continue to be active players in Chinese market. As will be shown later, it is always 
because of their ideological status rather than the financial dominance per se that gives 
rise to the difficulties of the competition enforcement in state sector.  
The second is China’s prevalent political conflicts. The first three decades of the 
PRC was characterised by irrational and fierce political struggles, which were 
demonstrated by disastrous campaigns and movements leading to the deaths of 
millions of civilians. Decades of political struggles had a decisive impact on how the 
Chinese bureaucracy is functioning now. Whilst political interests take precedence 
over the interests of the public, the discretionary exercise of governmental functions is 
difficult if not impossible to constrain. As the political structure in general has never 
been substantially reformed, political conflicts can be found in every apparatus within 
China’s bureaucratic hierarchy, which are sometimes concealed by positive economic 
development. When China chose to rely on administrative bodies to enforce its 
competition law, the inherent weaknesses of the competition agencies, which are 
deeply embedded in China’s political culture, cannot be overlooked. In fact, serious 
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conflicts among government departments over policy-making powers were found 





The Drafting of the AML 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter studies the long and arduous drafting process of the AML, 
identifying several key points which were deemed most controversial to the drafters 
and others involved. The most debated topics in the drafting of the AML in fact shaped 
the AML and its enforcement system into their current forms, and continue to influence 
the development of competition policy in China. Some outstanding issues concerning 
the application of the AML and the operation of the competition system in general, 
which will be discussed in the next two chapters, can in fact find their origins in the 
drafting process of the AML. 
The AML was adopted in 2007 after 13 years of discussion, during which time 
government departments involving in the drafting of the AML regularly solicited and 
studied comments from public and private organisations, companies, academics, and 
practitioners from regions with mature competition systems. 1  Nonetheless, it is 
apparent that 13 years is not a common length for drafting a piece of legislation, 
especially when meaningful external assistance was provided. Then what were the 
factors that delayed the process? What role had they played in shaping the final AML? 
This chapter finds that, first, the underlying rationale of a competition law 
contradicts that of socialism. Competition law, as a product of capitalism, focuses on 
the liberalisation of markets and the function of market forces in creating public 
welfare. To the direct opposite, socialism seeks to avoid the pitfalls of capitalism 
derived from a free market,2 such as inequality in the distribution of resources and the 
overlook of externality, by stressing public ownership of means of production, and 
                                                             
1  H. Stephen Harris, Peter Wang, Yizhe Zhang, Mark Cohen and Sebastien Evrard (2011) Anti-
Monopoly Law and Practice in China (Oxford University Press 2011) 8. 
2 The Constitution of China regards capitalism as ‘exploitation of man by man [人剥削人]’. Article 6. 
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direct economic administration by the government. Therefore, in a socialist regime, 
the government has the paramount power – which it certainly does not wish to 
relinquish – to supervise and regulate a massive number of properties and various 
economic activities. However, the clash between competition law and socialist 
ideology makes at least partial relinquishment inevitable. Therefore, objections were 
put forward by government departments during the drafting of the AML. Consequently, 
compromise was made. The AML, as a piece of competition legislation in a socialist 
nation, represents an ideological paradox: on the one hand, it incorporates well-
established and normative competition thinking so as to make the Chinese competition 
system more aligned with its western counterparts; on the other, in order fully to 
address China’s unique problems stemming from the political environment and the 
ongoing economic transition, it maximises the appearance of provisions which are not 
normative vis-à-vis normal competition legislation. 
Second, the entrenched tradition of achieving social and economic goals through 
political means had profoundly influenced the ways in which government departments 
exercised their functions. Since socialism dictates government intervention in the 
economy, a huge government apparatus formed by countless departments is 
established in order to govern every aspect of economy. Within such apparatus, 
conflicts between and among government departments over policymaking powers are 
extremely common; the boundary between economic activities is blurred, as is the 
boundary between departmental jurisdictions overseeing these activities. The same 
applies to the power to draft and, more importantly, to enforce the AML. When 
conflicts arose between covetous departments over competition policymaking powers, 
the solution they sought was unfortunately not communication and coordination 
through legalised channel, but uncivilised departmental war. The end result was the 
creation of a tripartite enforcement structure, a uniquely unsound design and a 
completely political compromise. 
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These two factors delaying the drafting process of the AML will be elaborated on 
later in this chapter. The discussion starts by introducing the law-making procedure in 
China. 
2 LAW-MAKING IN CHINA 
As stipulated by the Legislation Law of China, bodies entrusted with law-making 
powers are divided into two levels.3 The primary legislator in China is the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) – the ‘highest organ of state power’4 – and its Standing 
Committee.5 The next level consists of secondary law-making bodies including the 
State Council,6 and local People’s Congresses and their standing committees.7 For 
the purpose of this chapter, and as the AML was adopted by NPC’s Standing 
Committee, the discussion focuses on the legislative procedure of the first level 
legislature. 
The NPC is the only organ allowed to enact ‘basic laws’8 and to amend the 
Constitution.9 It normally has around 3,000 part-time delegates,10 who meet for two 
weeks in the first quarter each year.11 The Standing Committee has around 170 full-
                                                             
3 The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Legislation Law), adopted on 15 March 2000, 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm 
4  Article 57, Constitution. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on 20 
September 1954, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_4264.htm. Since 1954, the 
Chinese Constitution has undergone totally four amendments respectively in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004. 
Unless otherwise stated, the ‘Constitution’ throughout this chapter refers to the Constitution of the PRC 
as amended in 2004, http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. 
5 Article 7, Legislation Law. 
6 The State Council is the highest executive body in China. Article 85, Constitution. 
7 Chapter III. 
8 See Article 62 (3) of the Constitution and Article 7 of the Legislation Law. However, the definition of 
‘basic laws’ is not provided in the Constitution or in the Legislation Law. Generally, basic laws are 
believed to be laws which are fundamentally critical to the basic rights and interests of the public, 
including but not limited to the Criminal Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, the General Principles of 
the Civil Law and the Civil Procedure Law. 
9 Article 62(1), the Constitution. 
10 2987 delegates were elected in 2013 to the 12th NPC, which will be in session from 2013 to 2018. 
11 Article 2, Rules of Procedure of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 
adopted on 4 April 1989, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383914.htm t. 
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time members12 who organise routine meetings and legislative activity every two 
months.13 The NPC also serves the role, constitutionally, to elect and dismiss the 
leadership of the state, which includes the President and Vice-President of China, 
Premier and Vice-Premiers of the State Council, the President of the Supreme People’s 
Court, and the Prosecutor-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate,14 all of 
whom are first nominated by the Presidium of the NPC.15 The predominant power of 
the NPC to determine the leadership of executive and judicial organs of the state 
indicates that China does not adopt the doctrine of separation of powers, and there are 
few if any constitutional checks and balances between governmental branches. 16 
Nonetheless, members of the Standing Committee are not allowed to hold positions in 
any administrative, judicial, or procuratorial bodies.17 
There are several parties who can submit legislative bills to either the NPC or the 
Standing Committee. First, a legislative bill can be submitted to the NPC by the 
Presidium of the NPC. In this case, the bill in question is to be deliberated by the NPC 
with no further condition. 18  Second, a bill can be submitted by the Standing 
Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's 
Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the special committees of the NPC19 
                                                             
12 There are – including Chairman Zhang Dejiang, 13 vice-chairmen and a Secretary-General – 176 
members in the Standing Committee of the 12th NPC. 
13 Article 3, Rules of Procedure of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, adopted on 24 November 1987, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383928.htm. 
14 Articles 62(4) – (8), Constitution. 
15 The Presidium of NPC consists of 178 members, who are elected by the NPC. It ‘is composed of 
senior officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the state, non-Communist parties and All-
China Federation of Industry and Commerce, personages without party affiliation, heads of central 
government agencies and people's organizations, leading members of all the 35 delegations to the NPC 
session including those from Hong Kong and Macao and the People's Liberation Army’. See Xinhua 
News Agency, ‘Presidium Elected, Agenda Set For China's Landmark Parliamentary Session’, 4 March 
2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/04/c_132206014.htm. The actual function of 
this Presidium is provided in the Organic Law of the National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China (Organic Law), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/13/content_1384019.htm. 
16  Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 127. 
17 Article 65, Constitution. 
18 Article 12. 
19 The NPC has nine special committees, each of which is subjected to the leadership of the NPC and 
the Standing Committee, and is responsible to ‘study, examine and draw up bills related to their fields 
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to the NPC. The Presidium should then decide if the bill in question should be put on 
the agenda of a session of the NPC. Similar procedures are adopted when a legislative 
bill is submitted by ‘a delegation or a group of thirty or more deputies’,20 except that 
the Presidium may choose to refer the bill to a relevant special committee for 
deliberation before deciding whether it should be put on an agenda.21  
When the NPC is not in session, a bill may be submitted first to the Standing 
Committee, which will decide after deliberation whether to submit it to the NPC.22 
When the bill has successfully been listed on the agenda of a session of the NPC, it 
should be deliberated first by all the delegates of the NPC and the relevant special 
committees. It is then subject to ‘a unified deliberation by [the NPC’s] Law Committee 
on the basis of the deliberated opinions of the various delegations and the relevant 
special committee’.23 After this deliberation, a report composed of the results of the 
review, major dissenting views, and a revised draft law is submitted to the Presidium.24 
Where significant questions are raised during the deliberation, the NPC may authorise 
the Standing Committee to carry out further deliberation and report to the next session 
of the NPC its decision on the draft bill.25 Alternatively, the Standing Committee may 
be authorised to work out a revision proposal and submit it to the next session of the 
NPC for further deliberation.26 When a revised draft is further revised by the Law 
Committee according to the opinions during the deliberation, the draft may be prepared 
for vote in a plenary meeting of an NPC session.27 The bill is passed and becomes law 
when a simple majority is met, and it signed by the President of China.28 
                                                             
and to assist the NPC and its Standing Committee in their work of legislation, supervision and others.’ 
These special committees are not organs of state power; rather, they are institutions performing 
designated law-enacting functions under the auspices of the NPC, and are composed of specialists, 
academics and practitioners in respective fields.See NPC, ‘Special Committees’, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2849.htm. 
20 Article 13, Legislation Law. 
21 Ibid, Article 13. 
22 Ibid, Article 14. 
23 Ibid, Article 18. 
24 Ibid, Article 18. 
25 Ibid, Article 21. 
26 Ibid, Article 21. 
27 Ibid, Article 22. 
28 Ibid, Article 23. 
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In addition, a legislative bill may be submitted to the Standing Committee. The 
Council of Chairmen29 may submit bills to the Standing Committee for deliberation.30 
It is also responsible for making the decision as to whether a bill submitted by the State 
Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, the special committees under the NPC, 31  or ten or more 
members of the Standing Committee is to be referred to the Standing Committee.32 In 
addition, the Council of Chairman may decide to publish a legislative bill placed on 
the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee to solicit opinions from the 
public.33 Theoretically, a legislative bill is put to a vote after deliberations among 
members of the Standing Committee and relevant special committees in three 
meetings.34 The Law Committee provides reports on the revised draft bill at the last 
two of these three meetings based on the result of deliberation in the meetings. 35 
Nonetheless, the Legislation Law also provides that if major questions concerning the 
bill still exist after three meetings, the Council of Chairman may propose to refer the 
bill to the Law Committee and relevant special committees for further discussion 
without voting. 36  If a bill has been put aside for two years because of major 
disagreement as to the ‘necessity and feasibility of making the bill into a law’, or has 
not been placed back on the agenda of a meeting of the Standing Committee within 
two years after not being put to a vote after the three original meetings, the deliberation 
                                                             
29 The Council of the Chairman is composed of the Standing Committee's Chairman, Vice-Chairmen 
and Secretary-General, and is responsible for the handling of the important day-to-day work of the 
Standing Committee.’ Article 25, Organic Law. 
30 Article 24, Legislation Law. 
31 The nine permanent special committees under the NPC are: the Ethnic Groups Committee, the Law 
Committee, the Financial and Economic Committee, the Education, Science, Culture and Health 
Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Overseas Chinese Committee, the Civil and Judicial 
Affairs Committee, the Environment and Resources Protection Committee and the Agriculture and 
Rural Areas Committee. See NPC, ‘Special Committees’, at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2849.htm. 
32 Articles 24 and 25, Legislation Law. 
33 Ibid., Article 35. 
34 Ibid., Articles 27, 29 and 30. 
35 Ibid., Article 27. 
36 Ibid., Article 38. 
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on the bill in question is terminated.37 As with the voting procedures with regard to 
the NPC, a simple majority is required in the voting of the Standing Committee.38 
The law-making system of China is not fiendishly complex, and the procedures 
laid down in the Legislation Law are not to be blamed for the unusual length of the 
AML drafting process. The political interests involved in the deliberation of drafts are 
what made the drafting of the AML controversial. The following sections will consider 
the drafting of the AML and main concerns raised during this process. 
3. DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE AML 
As discussed in the previous chapter, when China opened its doors to the world 
after the Reform and Opening Up Policy and its resolution to establish a socialist 
market economy, the necessity to adopt a comprehensive law on competition issues 
further to sustain its astonishingly growing economy became increasingly appreciated. 
The first Chinese attempt to enact a competition law can be traced back almost thirty 
years.39 As early as August 1987, the Legal Affairs Bureau40 of the State Council 
founded an AML drafting team.41 It was in charge of producing a Draft Provisional 
Rules on Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition, which was completed in 1988. 
Nonetheless, whilst the second part of this draft was passed as AUCL42 at the Third 
Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Standing Committee of the NPC on 2 September 1993, 
                                                             
37 Ibid., Article 39. 
38 Ibid., Article 40. 
39 For an exhaustive introduction to the drafting history of the AML, see Xiaoye Wang, The Evolution 
of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (Edward Elgar 2014). 
40 The Bureau was restructured to form the current Legal Affairs Office of the State Council in March 
1998.  
41 People Daily, ‘Departmental ‘Confrontation’ behind the Anti-Monopoly Law’, 3 March 2005, at 
http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42731/3216347.html. See also Jijian Yang, ‘Market Power in China: 
Manifestations, Effects and Legislation’ (2002) 21 Rev. Indus. Org. 167; Yong Zhao, ‘Will 
Protectionists Hijack China’s Competition Law?’ (2004) 23 Int’L Fin. L. Rev. 21; and Gordon Chan, 
‘Administrative Monopoly and the Anti-Monopoly Law: an Examination of the Debate in China’ (2009) 
18 Journal of Contemporary China 263. 
42 As discussed in the preceding chapter, although the AUCL addresses competition issues such as 
predatory pricing, tying and regional blockades, it is not a comprehensive competition legislation. It 
mainly focuses on consumer protection, and includes issues such as business bribery, passing-off, false 
advertising and trade secrets. 
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the content concerning anti-monopoly was ‘met with intense opposition’43 and in the 
end failed to gain consensus.  
Nonetheless, the attempt to enact competition legislation did not cease. In 1994, 
a year after the promulgation of the AUCL, the project to draft the current AML 
officially commenced. The AML was included on the legislative agenda of the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth NPC,44 and two government agencies – SETC and 
SAIC – were commissioned by the State Council jointly to draft the AML.45 An ‘AML 
Drafting Leading Group’ and an ‘AML Drafting Working Group’ were established in 
May 1994. The first and second draft outline of the AML were produced in July 1997 
and November 1998 respectively. The first consultation draft of the AML was 
distributed to the relevant government departments for comments in June 2000, which 
was followed by the second consultation draft in July 2002. In 2003, as discussed in 
section 3.1 of Chapter 2, MOFCOM was established as a result of institutional reform 
within the State Council and subsequently held the ‘lead role’ in the drafting of the 
AML.46 With the establishment of this new ministry, the AML project was ‘suddenly 
revived and expedited.’47 MOFCOM undertook a few rounds of revision, after which 
in 2004 it submitted a draft AML48 to the Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) of the 
State Council,49 where an ‘AML Review and Revision Leading Group’,50 an ‘AML 
Revision Working Group’ and an ‘AML Review and Revision Expert Advisory Group’ 
were established. LAO’s work was complete on 7 June 2006 after State Council 
                                                             
43  Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution In China: A Third Way for 
Competition Regime?’ (2003) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121126, 8. 
44 The AML was later listed on the legislative agenda of the Standing Committee of the following two 
consecutive NPC, namely, the Ninth and Tenth in 1998 and 2003 respectively. The NPC is elected for 
a term of five years. Article 60, Constitution. 
45  Xinhua News Agency, ‘The Drafting Anti-monopoly Law under Review’, 25 May 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-05/25/content_2998831.htm. 
46 Williams (fn 16) 204. 
47 Yong Huang, ‘Pursuing the Second Best: the History, Momentum, and Remaining Issues of China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 117, 119. 
48 Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, ‘On the Explanation of the Anti-Monopoly Law of 
China (Draft)’, 24 June 2006, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2007-10/09/content_5374671.htm. 
49 A ministry has no right under the Legislation Law directly to submit a draft law to the NPC or its 
Standing Committee for deliberation. See supra notes 35 and 37. 
50 LAO (fn 48). 
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approval of the revised AML, which was then submitted to the Standing Committee 
of the NPC. Further revisions were undertook by the Law Committee of the NPC, and 
the draft AML was deliberated at the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the 
10th NPC in June 2006, the 28th Session in June 2007, and the 29th Session in August 
2007 at which it was finally adopted. 
Although the whole process took thirteen years to complete, meaningful drafting 
efforts were not visible until China became a WTO member in 2001, after which 
several drafts were circulated and comments were more frequently solicited. 
Speculation began that the sudden acceleration of the drafting process was a direct 
outcome of international pressure. Indeed, WTO membership, which furthers China’s 
economic integration with foreign countries, is the most important and evident 
stimulus to the acceleration of the AML drafting process. Although in the late 1970s, 
China did voluntarily adopt the Reform and Opening Up policy, which signalled the 
beginning of its economic transformation and opened its market to the outside world, 
it was in fact introduced at a time of egregious chaos. The CPC had to regain its 
legitimacy through restoring promptly social and economic order, otherwise it would 
have been the doom of the CPC and the PRC. On the issue concerning the pressures 
for reform in the late 1970s, Harry Harding remarks:  
‘[T]he difficulties China faced at the time of Mao’s death were so massive, 
the inefficiencies so glaring, and the advantages of political and economic 
liberalization so obvious, that the reforms later undertaken by Deng 
Xiaoping were inevitable […] The situation in the political sphere was too 
explosive for the status quo to remain intact.’51 
Yet, when China gained WTO membership, it was in an era of rapid economic 
development and steady social order. Although market competition has been seriously 
restricted and distorted by the existence of SOEs and local protectionism, the adverse 
impact of the distortion on Chinese economic development still did not seem 
pernicious enough to justify the adoption of a legal instrument – such as competition 
                                                             
51 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (The Brookings Institution 1987) 39. 
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law – that inherently contradicts the socialist ideology, which espouses state ownership 
and state control of economy. However, it is much more plausible when the 
globalisation of the economy is concerned: given China had been through 15 years of 
negotiation in order to become a WTO member, it beyond doubt showed a strong 
eagerness to obtain its own share in the ongoing trend of worldwide economic 
convergence even if the convergence led to the restraint of its freedom of direct 
economic control. This meant that adopting competition legislation – a capitalist-style 
legal framework governing economic activities – and integrating its competition 
system with Western ones was clearly a solid step forward for China.  
As with the opportunity brought about by the WTO accession to benefit from 
overseas markets and more preferential trading terms, the global integration of 
competition law creates opportunity for a new competition jurisdiction like China to 
profit from overseas assistance in relation to competition knowledge and experiences. 
Competition legislation and enforcement have a history dating back to the late 19th 
century, 52  and many developed countries have obtained mature and valuable 
enforcement experiences. Departments involved in drafting the AML – MOFCOM, 
SAIC, the LAO of the State Council, and the Law Committee of the NPC – hosted 
numerous conferences and seminars in which opinions on the development of 
competition policy in China were provided and substance of AML drafts were 
commented on by domestic as well as foreign competition enforcement officials,53 
academics, and practitioners.54 Organisations including the American Bar Association, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World 
                                                             
52  The first competition statute in the world, the Act for the Prevention and Suppression of 
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53 Major contributions were made by enforcement officials from the US Department of Justice, the US 
Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission. Harris (fn 1) 17. 
54 For details of these conferences and seminars, see ibid.; and Wang (fn 39). 
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Bank were also substantially involved in the AML consultation process.55 Given the 
lack of competition-related experience of Chinese government officials, the opinions 
and comments were indispensable in shaping the AML into its final form.56 This 
successful collaboration also helped create a positive and cordial atmosphere 
conducive to future information exchange and cooperation between competition 
agencies.57 
Indeed, the final AML is a fruit of positive international cooperation.58 Despite 
                                                             
55 Harris (fn 1) 17. See also, Xiaoye Wang, ‘Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 
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and International Law and Practice on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China’, July 2003, 
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Trade Commission and Department of Justice Sign Antitrust Memorandum of Understanding with 
Chinese Antitrust Agencies’, 27 July 2011, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/07/federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice-sign-antitrust; in addition, NDRC 
and SAIC have signed a MOU with European Commission in 2012 to increase cooperation between 
competition enforcement agencies in the two jurisdictions. European Commission, ‘Commission Signs 
EU Cooperation Agreement with China’, 20 September 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
12-993_en.htm?locale=en. 
58  Wang (fn 55) 134; and Qianlan Wu, ‘EU–China Competition Dialogue: A New Step in the 
Internationalisation of EU Competition Law?’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 461, 462. See also Carl 
W. Hittinger and John D. Huh, ‘The People’s Republic of China Enacts Its First Comprehensive 
Antitrust Law’ (2007) 4 NYU J. L. & Bus. 245. Although the involvement of foreign assistance did 
reflect the openness and willingness of the Chinese government to solicit and accept professional views 
from myriad sources in adopting economic laws, an issue of ‘selective transparence’ was raised since 
drafts of the AML were not publicly available, but only circulated among domestic and foreign 
government officials and competition law specialists associated with the drafting of the AML. Selene 
Ko, ‘An Introduction to Chinese Legislation’ 3 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 267, 
271. It is noteworthy that improving the transparency of the legislative process of and seeking public 
comments on trade-related laws are obligations imposed on China by its WTO membership. Article 2(c) 
(2), Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm. For analysis of various non-publicly 
available drafts of the AML, see H. Stephen Harris, ‘The Making of an Antitrust Law: the Pending Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (2006) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 169; William Blumenthal, 
‘Presentation to the International Symposium on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic 
of China’ Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 23-24 May 2005, https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2005/05/presentation-international-symposium-draft-anti-monopoly-law-peoples; and 
American Bar Association, ‘Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust 
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certain fundamental ‘Chinese characteristics’ being inevitably taken into account59 – 
as will be discussed later, the adaptation of them may lead to equivocal and ambiguous 
interpretation and implementation of the law – the substance of the AML largely 
mirrored that of EU competition law60 and embodies overall the best practice of 
advanced competition systems in the world.61 Most apparently, the three pillars of 
modern competition law – anti-competitive agreement, 62  abuse of a dominant 
position, 63  and merger control 64  – are incorporated into the substantive text. 
Additionally, several principles well established under EU competition law can also 
find AML equivalence: effects doctrine,65 commitments,66 10% fine ceiling,67 and 
leniency programme.68 
As illustrated by the brief overview of the drafting timeline of the AML above, 
China’s accession to the WTO – as the most important driver to the adoption of the 
AML – divided the AML’s drafting history into two phases. First, before the WTO 
accession, drafting work was negligible with merely several versions of an outline 
being produced, and external assistance was not visibly sought. Second, after WTO 
accession, the drafting process suddenly accelerated, especially after the institutional 
                                                             
Law and International Law and Practice on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic 
of China’, May 2005, at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/chinacommentsantimono
poly.pdf. 
59 See for example Article 7, on the special treatment offered to SOEs in strategically important sectors; 
Chapter V, on the prohibition of abuse of administrative power. 
60 See David Gerber, ‘Economics, Law & Institutions: the Shaping of Chinese Competition Law’, 
(2008) 26 Journal of Law & Policy 281, 289; Nathan Bush, ‘Constraints on Convergence in Chinese 
Antitrust’ (2009) 54 The Antitrust Bulletin 87, 93; and Wu (fn 58) 462. 
61 Allan Fels, ‘China’s Antimonopoly Law 2008: An Overview’ (2012) 41 Rev. Ind. Organ. 7, 7; and 
Roberto Pardolesi, ‘Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Dominance: Some Remarks about the 
Substantive Rules’ in Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang (eds.) Competition Policy and Regulation: 
Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe (Edward Elgar 2011) 281. 
62 Chapter 2, AML; Article 101, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
63 Chapter 3, AML; Article 102 TFEU. 
64 Chapter 4, AML; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24 of 29.01.2004. 
65 Article 2, AML; Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-759, paras. 94-95. 
66  Article 45, AML; Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 001 
of 04.01.2003 (Regulation 1/2003).  
67 Articles 46 and 47, AML; Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. 
68 Paragraph 2, Article 46, AML; Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines 
in cartel cases, OJ C 298 of 08.12.2006. 
65 
 
reform in the State Council. During this phase, intellectual assistance and 
communications started to become frequent and contributive. Whilst the complex 
nature of and China’s unfamiliarity with competition law clearly made the drafting 
work much more arduous, in these two phases there were two major issues that were 
subject to intense debate and seriously hindered the timely drafting of the AML: 
domestic debates in relation to the necessity of competition law and the clash between 
promoting competition and preserving government powers; and the fierceness of 
different departments striving for interests over competition enforcement.69 
3.1 Domestic Debates 
Domestic debates over the adoption of the AML could be grouped into two 
categories. First, at the very early stage, there were debates over whether competition 
law was even necessary in contemporary China.70 Second, at later stages there were 
intense debates over how to reconcile the conflicts between the forbearance of the 
government’s regulatory power – a direct consequence of the liberalisation of domestic 
markets promoted by competition law – and the government’s desire to retain its 
existing power. 
3.1.1 Did China need a competition law? 
In the early stages of China’s economic reform, monopoly as an economic 
concept was largely associated with market power rather than with anti-competitive 
conduct. It was argued that, despite rapid economic development, most private 
undertakings in China merely held insignificant market powers;71 it was therefore 
inappropriate to adopt legislation that was applied only to undertakings with 
considerable market power, like foreign conglomerates. Indeed, China’s pre-WTO 
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market was characterised by a low degree of industrial concentration and 
productivity.72 For example, in 1997 there were 17,831 plastic product manufacturers, 
58,662 non-metal mineral product manufacturers, and 28,283 metal product 
manufacturers in China. In the automobile industry, 47% of undertakings in 1996 
produced less than 1,000 vehicles.73 It was believed that market competition would 
even be significantly restrained if the AML was to be enacted, because undertakings 
would be overly careful in implementing their business strategies, and as a 
consequence it would create more problems than it solved.74 Some also argued that 
competition legislation like Sherman Act in the US was not like what it legally claimed 
to be; it was just used as an excuse for governmental interference in the economy, 
which was exactly the phenomenon that should be curbed in China.75 In an economic 
environment in which state control has been the most prominent element, it is not 
entirely illegitimate to speculate that the idea of a competition law, if used in an 
arbitrary manner, will actually be a tool for the Chinese government to better scrutinise 
private and foreign undertakings. This line of thinking led many to regard competition 
law as unnecessary and unwelcome. 
Nonetheless, when China entered the WTO, the momentum toward adopting the 
AML became irreversible; it was not a question of whether China should draft the 
AML any more, but how China should draft the AML.  
3.1.2 What should be the proper scope of the AML? 
Influenced by years of disastrous social upheaval resulting from recklessly-
formulated economic policy, legal instruments governing economic activities in China 
                                                             
72 Aimin Chen, ‘China One Year after Its WTO Entry’ in Shuming Bao, Shuanglin Lin and Changwen 
Zhao (eds.) The Chinese Economy After WTO Accession (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006) 18. See 
also Aimin Chen, ‘The Structure of Chinese Industry and the Impact from China’s WTO Entry’ (2002) 
44 Comparative Economic Studies 72. 
73 Chen (fn 72) 18.  
74 Zhengxin Huo, ‘A Tiger without Teeth: the Antitrust Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (2008) 
10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 32, 37. 
75 See Jung and Hao (fn 43) 8 citing Zhang Wuchang, ‘An Economic Interpretation: the Fuzzy Nature 
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always pay prominent attention to social and political stability,76 which requires a 
delicate balance of interests. Policy makers also had to ensure that the adoption of the 
AML would not have adverse impact on China’s sustained economic growth. 
Politically influential factions – including both private and public conglomerates and 
consortiums – were afraid that their entrenched interests protected by existing political 
and economic framework would be endangered by the introduction of the AML.77 In 
the political arena, their views and interests could not be overlooked when any novel 
reform plan was to be implemented.78 China’s on-going transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a socialist market economy brought about both economic reform 
and political reform. However, the gradualist approach adopted by the Chinese 
government indicates that economic reform will always takes priority over political 
reform, which is generally narrow in scope.79 Astonishing transformation as found in 
economic development is not seen in the political arena.80 The discordant pace of 
economic and political reform led China into a developing dilemma with too many 
residual issues to be solved and too many interests to be balanced: an inherent 
contradiction between political ideology and social reality, that of the ‘maintenance of 
a socialist country’ and the ‘creation of a dynamic private sector’.81 Consequently, the 
potential effect of the AML on the performance of a single undertaking and even of a 
whole business sector required the drafters to give way to political considerations and 
to gain consent from various interest groups by making significant compromise and 
reaching agreements regarding the specific types of practices the AML was going to 
                                                             
76 Jacob Schneider, ‘Administrative Monopoly and China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Lessons from 
Europe’s State Aid Doctrine’ (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review 869, 883. 
77 Huo (fn 74) 36. For empirical studies on political control in Chinese undertakings, see Lixin Colin 
Xu, Tian Zhu and Yi-min Lin, ‘Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence 
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restraint. It also required them to hold onto the most basic norms and general scope a 
piece of modern competition legislation was supposed to have, without which the role 
of the AML as an ‘Economic Constitution’ would be substantially jeopardised. 
At the end, Article 1 of the AML accommodates the interests of both pro-AML 
groups and literally every political faction by providing: 
 ‘This law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, 
enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers 
and social public interest, promoting the healthy development of the 
socialist market economy.’  
Many of these objectives – preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, 
enhancing economic efficiency, and safeguarding the interests of consumers – are 
consistent with those of other competition jurisdictions.82 Nonetheless, some vague 
and abstract objectives, such the enhancement of social public interest and the 
promotion of healthy development of the socialist market economy, are also provided, 
the meanings of which in practice can be interpreted loosely to take into account a 
myriad of non-competition-related considerations. Due to the vagueness and fuzziness 
of these objectives, the competition agencies may be easily captured by the parties they 
are supposed to regulate or by the political connections those parties possess to favour 
particular interests.83 As will be shown in following chapters, the adoption of these 
non-competition objectives indeed results in serious regulatory capture during 
competition enforcement, as there is wider room for interest groups to intervene and 
for competition agencies to abuse their discretionary powers.84 In addition, unclearly 
defined non-competition objectives may also lead to a situation where the competition 
agencies are pursuing objectives unrelated to the case, such as personal promotion or 
departmental prestige.85 Such weakness is easily used by parties under investigation 
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to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with the competition agencies and 
achieve results that may be detrimental to market competition. 
In addition, resistance also came from central ministries whose regulatory power 
over policy-making and allocation of resources might be seriously undermined if the 
AML was enacted. During the discussion of AML drafts, the then Ministry of 
Railways86 and the Civil Aviation Administration held the opinion that since railways 
and airports were natural monopolies, exemption from the AML should be granted to 
undertakings in these sectors.87 Moreover, the Ministry of Communications, now the 
Ministry of Transport, requested to retain the power to supervise competition issues 
within the transport industry.88 Also, as with the main principle underlying China’s 
current SOE reform – wide scale consolidation – industrial policy at that time 
promoted mergers between SOEs in the same industrial sector, since it was believed 
to be the fastest way for SOEs to increase their size and to be able to compete with 
multinational undertakings which had started to penetrate the Chinese market. 
However, the enactment of the AML might hinder the effectiveness of this policy and 
endanger the interests of a considerable amount of SOEs. Since SOEs were responsible 
for the provision of a wide range of social benefits to workers such as health care and 
pension funds, if some financially inefficient SOEs failed to survive in the increasingly 
competitive market, the interests of the redundant workers would not be adequately 
protected without a well-functioning social security system, which might lead to social 
upheaval on a national scale.89 The government therefore called for properly designed 
competition law to introduce competition into the market without endangering the 
vested interests of, for example, SOEs in strategically important sectors. 
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The end result was the insertion of the most controversial provision in the AML, 
Article 7. It was not included in the draft submitted to the Standing Committee for 
deliberation, but was added later by the Standing Committee.90 Article 7 concerns 
undertakings operating in strategically important sectors, which in most if not all cases 
are SOEs. The issue concerning SOEs is a tricky one for competition policymakers. 
On the one hand, the AML is likely to introduce more competition to the market and 
hopefully put meaningful pressure on SOEs to promote their efficiency, since the 
strong market power of most SOEs results from their monopoly status which is not 
earned by business efficiency.91 On the other, the sudden exposure of SOEs, most of 
which are already accustomed to uncompetitive markets and to following orders and 
instructions concerning business operations on regular basis, to excessive competition 
might make the least economically efficient vulnerable and lead them to bankruptcy. 
Since the vested interests in the most vital industrial sectors were considerable, the 
Standing Committee perceived that it was necessary to protect these interests by 
singling out SOEs for special attention under the AML and preventing private capital, 
especially foreign capital, from entering into these sectors.92 At the end, Article 7 was 
included in the text of the AML and was seen by many as a seeming anti-monopoly 
immunity granted to SOEs in strategic industries.93 
Another major hold-up in the drafting of the AML was the inclusion of the chapter 
on administrative monopoly,94 which is the most prevalent form of anti-competitive 
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practice in China.95 The causes of administrative monopoly are complicated,96 but 
generally include the government’s far-reaching power in resource allocation, its 
financial reliance on tax revenue generated by local undertakings, and the lack of 
transparency and supervision in its decision making.97 The chapter on prohibition of 
administrative monopoly was initially included in the drafts of the AML, but was 
removed completely in 2005 by the State Council.98 However, the chapter appeared 
again in the draft submitted by the State Council to the Standing Committee of the 
NPC.99 
This repeated reversal of the treatment of administrative monopoly is in fact 
understandable. To the government, prohibiting administrative monopoly not only 
endangers its basic interests, it also requires the government to levy penalties on itself, 
a task that will obviously be met with resistance.100 To the policymakers, it is evident 
that administrative monopoly is not likely to be successfully curbed in the near future 
under China’s current political structure. Whilst it becomes a common view that a 
piece of competition legislation is far from competent to achieve any meaningful 
results regarding prohibition of administrative monopoly,101 the reason for bringing 
this sensitive issue into the AML framework and offending enormous interest groups 
seems to be implausible. However, if administrative monopoly is not addressed in the 
AML, it may convey a message to the public that the government does not take 
competition law seriously and as a consequence undermine its authority.102 Although 
this seesaw struggle was eventually won by the more liberal reformers, as will be 
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discussed later, the status quo of the enforcement against administrative monopoly 
suggests that the inclusion of this chapter remains symbolic rather than practical. 
In addition to balancing the interests of different groups by adjusting and revising 
the scope and substance of the AML, conflicts between ministries over competition 
policy-making power also considerably prolonged the drafting of the AML, and finally 
led to unsound design of enforcement system. 
3.2 Institutional Conflicts 
Another crucial cause of the delay in the enactment of the AML, and perhaps the 
most direct and decisive one, was the ‘bureaucratic turf war’103 between would-be 
competition agencies, MOFCOM, SAIC and NDRC. 104  Early drafts of the AML 
prepared by SETC and SAIC called for the creation of an Anti-Monopoly Management 
Body directly under the State Council.105 This new body was to be the only authority 
dedicated to competition policy making and enforcement.106 Despite the fact that even 
competition experts from the US, where the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission share concurrent antitrust jurisdiction, supported the idea of having 
a single agency with a competition mandate,107 the tendency towards creating a new 
competition enforcement authority was not found in later AML drafts since the major 
institutional reform within the State Council took place in 2003. Thereafter, conflicts 
over which existing departments should be empowered to enforce the AML became 
intensified. 
After MOFCOM was established and took over the drafting project, the draft 
AML submitted to the State Council in February 2004 called for an enforcement 
authority under MOFCOM. 108  However, this proposal had met with fierce 
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opposition.109 In the same year, MOFCOM gained the upper hand over its competitors 
and took a bold step to establish a temporary body, the Anti-Monopoly Office, within 
its bureaucratic structure. 110  Officially, the Office was said to be responsible for 
helping speed up the drafting process of the AML, an objective it had indeed 
successfully accomplished, 111  and for related investigations and international 
communications on prevention of monopolies.112 Factually, the establishment of the 
Anti-Monopoly Office could be seen as the revelation of MOFCOM’s ambition to have 
all competition enforcement powers to itself. In fact, some had considered MOFCOM 
the most suitable AML enforcement authority,113 since the nature of its designated 
functions significantly contributed to its bid for AML enforcement powers. MOFCOM 
played a prominent role in ‘[formulating] the strategies, guidelines and policies of 
developing domestic and foreign trade and international economic cooperation’,114 
which made it a well-placed regulator to handle economic-related activities, such as 
competition matters. Its predecessor – MOFTEC – had wide experience from drafting 
the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors,115 of which MOFCOM itself was an enforcer. 
SAIC, on the other hand, was to a certain degree eclipsed by MOFCOM. 
Although SAIC’s efforts in the drafting of the AML were recognised,116 the February 
2004 draft AML was in fact submitted by MOFCOM alone to the State Council.117 
Moreover, in June 2004 the Notice on the Removal of Regional Blockade in Market 
Economic Activities was issued jointly by MOFCOM, the Ministry of Supervision, 
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LAO, the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and the State 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. SAIC was 
excluded on this occasion for unknown reasons. Generally, market behaviour such as 
regional blockade should have fallen within the jurisdiction of SAIC.118 This Notice 
was issued to implement the State Council Rules on the Prohibition of Regional 
Blockade in Market Economy Activities, in which references to ‘Industry and 
Commerce Administration of the State Council’ were explicitly made.119 Nevertheless, 
as the most experienced department in handling competition-related violations, SAIC 
also took steps to preserve its existing regulatory power. In March 2004 SAIC 
published an article entitled ‘Anti-Competitive Behaviours of Multinationals in China 
and the Counter-Measures’ in its official journal.120 In the article, normal prohibited 
business practices such as predatory pricing, refusal to deal, anti-competitive 
agreements, and anti-competitive mergers were analysed, and large multinationals 
such as Lenovo, Kodak, Motorola, Tetra Pak and Coca-Cola were mentioned.121 It 
called for the restriction on the ‘capital invasion’ of foreign undertakings, since the 
interests of millions of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises might be 
undermined by the operation of these undertakings, which were formidable in terms 
of technological advancement, financial condition, and management efficiency. 
Moreover, in 2006 SAIC, as the department responsible for overseeing the registration 
of foreign enterprises, drafted the Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors along with MOFCOM, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, the State Administration of Taxation, 
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China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange.  
Although NDRC was not responsible for drafting the AML, it was a member of 
the AML Review and Revision Leading Group established by LAO.122 In addition, 
NDRC, like MOFOCOM, took up certain functions from SETC, another of the AML 
drafters, during the 2003 institutional reform of the State Council, 123  and its 
predecessor – SDPC124 – was charged with enforcing the Price Law of 1997.125 In 
light of its far-reaching power over macroeconomic planning in general and over the 
enforcement of the Price Law in particular, NDRC also became active in scrambling 
for AML enforcement power. In 2003 it adopted the Provisional Rules on the 
Prohibition of Price Monopoly to prohibit, inter alia, price manipulation, bid rigging 
and resale price maintenance, anti-competitive behaviours which were all to be 
regulated under the AML.126 A year later, in a report entitled ‘Current Economic 
Situation and Policy Orientation in 2005’ NDRC urged further reform in natural 
monopoly sectors and the prompt adoption of the AML.127 
As two powerful ministries established to address new challenges after the WTO 
accession and entrusted with a wide scope of the most important economic mandates, 
MOFCOM and NDRC were expected to exercise their functions to sustain and 
promote China’s economic growth in the WTO era effectively. Unlike MOFCOM and 
NDRC, which oversaw national economic strategies and policies, SAIC’s authority – 
which was not subject to revision in 2003 – mainly lay in regulating market activities 
and maintaining market order. For example, it investigated and punished business 
                                                             
122 See fn 56. 
123 See section 4.2, Chapter 2. 
124 In 2003 SDPC was reorganised into NDRC. Ibid. 
125  Competition-related prohibition in the Price Law includes collusion between competitors and 
predatory pricing. Article 14, Price Law. 
126 Articles 4 to 7, Provisional Rules on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly, adopted on 18 June 2003, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/200506/t20050613_6683.html. 




irregularities such as false advertising, commercial bribery, and smuggling.128 Whilst 
MOFCOM and NDRC certainly had considerable political and financial advantages 
over SAIC, 129  the latter had accumulated sufficient competition enforcement 
experience through years of enforcement of the AUCL. Each ministry had its own 
merits of being responsible for enforcing the AML and wished to have a larger slice of 
the cake, whilst all three apparently opposed the proposal of having a new department 
to take on this task. The lack of channels and incentives for communication among 
them caused the allocation of enforcement jurisdiction to be a chaotic turf war. They 
worked in isolation and busily engaged in largely overlapping and homogeneous 
activities which they believed could demonstrate their own capability of enforcing the 
AML and effectively marked off their ‘spheres of influence’, such as setting up offices, 
and publishing article and reports.  
As a solution to end the conflict among the three ministries, a dispersed tripartite 
enforcement system, rather than a new, unified and independent competition agency, 
was created.130 The three agencies were assigned to oversee certain aspects of the 
AML that were most relevant to their respective pre-AML competition-related 
expertise. After years of debate, this seemed to be a logical and convenient solution; 
nonetheless, since the solution circumvented the core cause of this conflict – political 
interests of government department in policy-making and lack of means to supervise 
coordination – the very same issue will continue to be raised in this tripartite structure. 
In addition, as can be seen in the discussion above, departments other than the three 
central AMEAs were also involved in the revision of the AML, and more departments 
with particular competition-related mandates had a say in the formulation of secondary 
                                                             
128 SAIC, ‘Mission’, http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission.  
129 For example, in 2015 the annual budgets of MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC are respectively CNY 
26.11 billion, CNY 1.07 billion and CNY 0.59 billion. The Annual Departmental Budget of MOFCOM 
2015, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cwgongzuo/feiyqr/201504/20150400943825.shtml; the 
Annual Departmental Budget of NDRC 2015, 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201504/t20150417_688410.html; and the Annual Departmental Budget of 
SAIC 2015, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/zyfb/czzj/201504/P020150417504006779767.pdf. 
130 This complex public enforcement system will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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implementation rules. These industrial policy makers all expected to retain control of 
competition issues within their respective industries after the AML came into force. 
The institutional conflicts between competition and industrial policy led to another end 
result: the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC), which is composed of the three 
central AMEAs and fourteen other ministries, was created to accommodate the 
ministries’ interests in competition policymaking.131 
4. CONCLUSION 
‘Zhongti xiyong [中体西用]’ – ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning 
as functions’132 – was the guiding ideology for the Self-Strengthening Movement in 
the latter half of the 19th century, which was famously expounded by Zhang Zhidong, 
a grand secretary in the imperial government of the Qing Dynasty. This ideology was 
put forward at a time when China was surpassed by western capitalist countries in 
every aspect, in terms of economy, technology, military and so on. Some outward-
looking government officials began to consider it necessary for China to learn from 
the social and technological achievements of western countries, and use them to 
advance the development of China without losing its local roots. After more than a 
century, the very same ideology can also be applied in the drafting process of the AML: 
transplanting western competition norms to establish a competition system based on 
China’s unique political and economic environments. 
The AML, as the first complete set of competition rules vis-à-vis China’s previous 
competition-related laws and regulations, indeed makes significant progress in terms 
of comprehensiveness and clarity in the field of competition law.133 Compared with 
other Chinese legislation, as a result of in-depth international cooperation during the 
                                                             
131 Article 9, AML. 
132 Mingdong Gu, Sinologism: An Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism (Routledge 2013) 
134. 
133 Huang (fn 47) 120. 
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drafting and discussion of the AML, the substantive provisions reflect many 
fundamental competition rules and economic principles acknowledged by most mature 
competition jurisdictions. In addition, the inclusion of the provisions on SOEs and 
administrative monopoly demonstrates that whilst the convergence of competition 
laws across the globe is the general trend, it is equally important for a piece of 
legislation to address and solve the most prominent issues which are unique in a 
country so that legal transplants can be more useful and effective. 
However, the prolonged drafting process raised serious concerns. Conflicts and 
compromises had shaped the final AML, and the most salient causes of delay – 
entrenched interests in economic sectors and a political tug-of-war – will continuously 
impact on the formation of competition policy in the future. Whilst the division of 
enforcement responsibilities among existing ministries significantly mitigated the 
delay, 134  at the same time it generated instability in the competition system and 
uncertainty of enforcement. Since every department involved in or associated with the 
AML drafting wished to preserve its pre-AML bureaucratic functions whilst 
simultaneously striving for further policy control powers in future competition 
enforcement, the legislation which was supposed to be based on rigorous economic 
analysis and intended to promote public welfare was eventually turned into a product 
of political compromise which preserved vested interests and placated departmental 
conflicts at the expense of public welfare. 
In light of the concerns raised in this chapter, the next two chapters will appraise 
respectively the application of the AML by the AMEAs and the courts to monopolistic 
practices in several influential cases, and the operation of the public competition 
enforcement system. As will be shown, the compromises made during the drafting of 
                                                             
134 Xu Kunlin, the then Director General of NDRC’s Price Supervision Inspection and Anti-monopoly 
Bureau, once stated at a press conference: ‘If we had chosen to establish a single agency to enforce the 
AML when it was being drafted, its promulgation would have been postponed for many years.’ 
MOFCOM, ‘The Information Office of the State Council Holds Press Briefing on Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement’, 11 September 2014, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/201409/20140900733559.shtml. 
Xu’s statement was in Chinese and translated by the author. 
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The Application of the AML to Monopolistic Conduct 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the three basic pillars of the AML, namely, anti-competitive 
agreements, abuse of a dominant position, and merger review. 1  It evaluates the 
administrative and judicial application of the AML in several important cases, and 
illustrates the general trends in the enforcement against monopolistic conduct. In 
addition, it sheds some light on the practices in the EU competition system, a model 
which the drafters of the AML heavily emulated.2 
After more than a decade of arduous discussion and drafting, the AML was finally 
adopted on 30 August 2007. As discussed in the previous chapter, during designing its 
own competition system, China substantially benefited from well-founded competition 
law theories and enforcement experiences in advanced competition jurisdictions. 
Therefore, in general, the structure of the AML does not differ significantly from most 
competition laws in other jurisdictions, and the substantive text of the AML is basically 
consistent with international norms.3 It contains 57 Articles divided into 8 Chapters. 
After describing some general principles of the AML in Chapter I such as legislative 
                                                             
1 Article 3, AML. As already mentioned, the AML in fact has four basic pillars, the last one being the 
prohibition of abuse of administrative power – the so-called administrative monopoly. However, since 
the enforcement of the AML against administrative monopoly to a large extent requires sophisticated 
political means instead of legal interpretation of the substantive text, the issue of administrative 
monopoly will be dealt with in the next chapter, which discusses the prominent problems concerning 
the public competition enforcement system. 
2 H. Stephen Harris, Peter Wang, Yizhe Zhang, Mark Cohen and Sebastien Evrard, Anti-Monopoly Law 
and Practice in China (Oxford University Press 2011) 2. 
3 Yi Shin Tang, ‘Lawmaking Process and Non-Governmental Stakeholders in China's Antimonopoly 
Law’ (2015) 36 European Competition Law Review 174, 174; H. Stephen Harris, ‘The Making of an 
Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (2006) 7 Chi. J. 
Int’l L. 169, 172. 
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objectives,4 extraterritorial application of the AML,5 special emphasis on lifeline 
industry,6 and the establishment of the AMC,7 the AML sets out the prohibition of 
monopoly agreements in Chapter II, abuse of dominant position in Chapter III, and 
anti-competitive concentration in control of operator concentration in Chapter IV. 
Chapter V represents the unique feature of the AML by prohibiting the abuse of 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition. Chapter VI articulates the 
procedural rules governing investigation of monopolistic conduct, including the 
possibility for AMEAs to make a commitment decision.8 Chapter VII lays down the 
legal liabilities for the breach of the AML. It stipulates the range of fines,9 introduces 
a leniency programme, 10  and provides the legal basis for private party to claim 
damages.11 It is provided in Chapter VIII that the AML is not applicable to, first, the 
exercise of intellectual property rights (IPRs) so long as the IPRs are not abused to 
eliminate or restrict market competition, 12  and second, the alliance between or 
concerted practices of agricultural producers and rural economic organisations in 
economic activities such as the production, processing, sales, transportation and 
storage of agricultural products.13 
                                                             
4 Article 1, AML. 
5 Article 2, AML. See section 2.1.1 below for a case example of the extraterritorial application of the 
AML. However, the AML does not set forth the required criteria for Article 2 to be triggered by an 
alleged monopolistic conduct formed outside China; neither the AMEAs nor the courts have addressed 
the issue as to how the implementation of effects doctrine under the AML will be justified. Under the 
EU competition law, in Gencor the General Court held that EU merger control law could by applied 
extraterritorially to a concentration leading to a dominant duopoly operating outside the EU since the 
concentration ‘would have had the direct and immediate effect of creating the conditions in which 
abuses [of dominance] were not only possible but economically rational […] [and] would have had an 
immediate effect in the Community’. Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-759, at 94-
95. 
6 Article 7, AML. 
7 Article 9, AML. 
8 Article 45, AML. This commitment procedure is believed to be modelled after Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003, which provides that where undertakings offer commitments to meet the competition concerns 
put forward by the Commission for the purpose of bringing the infringement to an end, the Commission 
may decide to suspend the proceedings.  
9 Articles 46 and 47, AML. 
10 Paragraph 2, Article 46, AML. 
11 Article 50, AML. 
12 Article 55, AML. See section 2.3 of Chapter 5 for the discussion on the Rules on the Prohibition of 
Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition issued by SAIC. 
13 Article 56, AML. 
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Whilst the AML is overall a standard competition law, it does not guarantee a 
consistent and normative application of the law. It is therefore important to examine 
how well internationally recognised competition norms and economic thinking have 
been incorporated by analysing the decisions of both the AMEAs and the courts, and 
what lessons can be drawn from the application of the AML. 
2 PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLY AGREEMENTS 
One of the most important tasks for a competition law is to invalidate agreements 
that eliminate or restrict market competition, also known as monopoly agreements in 
the AML. The AML makes a distinction – apparently inspired by §1 of the German 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)14 instead of Article 101 TFEU, 
which does not distinguish between these two forms of collusion 15  – between 
horizontal agreements formed between competitors in the same market16 and vertical 
agreements formed between undertakings 17  and their trading partners at different 
levels of a supply chain.18 The reason behind such separation of treatment is that the 
restrictive effects of a vertical agreement on market competition are generally less 
                                                             
14 Xiaoye Wang, ‘Highlights of China’s new Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 
133, 136. However, after the seventh amendment to the GWB in 2005, §1 mirrors Article 101 TFEU 
and no longer makes distinction between horizontal and vertical restrictions. 
15 The distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements nevertheless plays an important role 
under EU competition law especially when block exemption regulations are considered, in which a more 
lenient regime for vertical than for horizontal agreements is adopted by the Commission. Ioannis Lianos, 
‘Collusion in Vertical Regulations under Article 81 EC’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1027, 
1032. 
16 Article 13, AML. Under EU competition law, vertical agreement is defined as ‘an agreement or 
concerted practice entered into between two or more undertakings each of which operates […] at a 
different level of the production or distribution chain’. Article 1(1) (a), Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L102/1 of 
23.04.2010. 
17 The term ‘undertakings’ is not defined in the TFEU. In Höfner and Elser, the ECJ stated that ‘the 
concept of an undertakings encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’. Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz 
Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21. In the AML, ‘business operator’ – the AML 
equivalent of ‘undertaking’ – is defined as ‘a natural person, legal person, or any other organization that 
is in the engagement of commodities production or operation or service provision’. Article 12, AML. 
18 Article 14, AML.  
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significant than that generated by a horizontal agreement. In fact, some vertical 
agreements are used to coordinate the actions of upstream and downstream 
undertakings in order to ensure the efficient supply of consumer goods, and therefore 
are welfare improving in nature.19  However, as will be shown later, neither the 
AMEAs nor the courts seem to treat vertical and horizontal agreements any differently 
in practice. 
In relation to horizontal agreements, Article 13 lists five types of agreement 
between competitors which are treated as monopoly agreements and are therefore 
prohibited under the law: first, agreements that fix or change prices of commodities; 
second, agreements that limit the output or sales of commodities; third, agreements 
that divide the sales market or the raw material procurement market; fourth, 
agreements that restrict the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the 
development of new technology or new products; and fifth, agreements that make 
boycott transactions.20 Similar to Article 101(1) TFEU,21 the list is not exhaustive. In 
addition, according to the second paragraph of Article 13, monopoly agreements 
within the meaning of the AML are defined as ‘agreements, decisions, or other 
concerted behaviour that eliminate or restrict competition’.22 This definition is similar 
to what is provided for in Article 101(1) TFEU.23 However, as will be discussed later, 
                                                             
19 Vincent Verouden, ‘Vertical Agreements: Motivation and Impact’ (2008) 3 Competition Law and 
Policy 1813, 1817. 
20 As will be further elaborated in the next Chapter, NDRC and SAIC share parallel jurisdiction in the 
enforcement against monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant position. NDRC enforces the AML 
against price-related infringements whilst SAIC handles non-price-related ones. Therefore, in the 
context of Article 13, NDRC only applies Article 13(1) and Articles 13(2)-(5) are applied by SAIC. 
21 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
[2008] ECR I-8637, paras. 16-17. 
22 During the drafting of the AML, the American Bar Association once recommended that the AML 
should adopt an appreciability test commonly found in advanced competition regimes and only prohibit 
monopolistic conducts that eliminated or substantially restricted competition. However, this 
recommendation was not accepted. See ABA, ‘Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s 
Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of 
the People’s Republic of China’, May 2005, 8. 
23 Although no definition of ‘concerted behaviour’ is given in the AML, it should be plausible to assume 
that ‘concerted behaviour’ has the same meaning as ‘concerted practice’ under EU competition law. The 
ECJ defined concerted practice as ‘a form of coordination [...] which, although it has not been taken to 
the stage of an agreement properly so-called, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation [...] for the 
risks of competition'. Joined Cases 40 to 48/73, 50/73, 54 to 56/73, 113 and 114/73 Coöperatieve 
Vereniging ‘Suiker Unie’ UA and others v Commission [1975] ECR I-1663, para. 25. Article 6 of NDRC 
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the structure of Article 13, providing the definition of monopoly agreements 
immediate after the stipulation of prohibiting horizontal agreements instead of in a 
separate provision, gives rise to prominent problems concerning burden of proof in 
private litigation. 
Article 14 prohibits vertical agreements that fix the price of commodities for 
resale to a third party, or restrict the minimum price of commodities for resale to a 
third party. Therefore, resale price maintenance (RPM) is the only conduct prohibited 
under Article 14. Nonetheless, as with the list in Article 13, the list in Article 14 is not 
exhaustive, and other monopoly agreements as determined by the AMEAs can also be 
prohibited.24 
  Article 15 of the AML, similar to Article 101(3) TFEU, allows monopoly 
agreements falling within the scope of application of Articles 13 and 14 to be exempt 
in five circumstances.25 It effectively provides a ‘rule of reason’ for undertakings to 
rely upon.26 Nonetheless, as will be discussed later, due to the opacity of decision-
making process and the lack of information in official decision, in most cases, it was 
unknown whether infringing undertakings had invoked Article 15 at all, therefore the 
actual interpretation and application of this Article remains largely unclear. 
Article 16 articulates the applicability of Articles 13 and 14 to trade associations, 
which are referred to as ‘associations of undertakings’ in Article 101(1) TFEU. The 
specific reference to trade associations was made at a late stage in the drafting of the 
AML, which was believed to be a direct consequence of the price collusion amongst 
several Chinese instant noodle producers through a trade association – the Chinese 
Branch of World Instant Noodles Associations – not long before the enactment of the 
                                                             
Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly provides that concerted behaviour may be found if there is uniformity 
between the pricing conduct of business operators and there has been communication of intention 
between business operators. 
24 Articles 13(6) and 14(3), AML. 
25 Articles 15(1) – (7), AML. Early drafts of the AML had provided an ex ante notification mechanism 
for anti-competitive agreements to invoke exemptions – very similar to previous EU practices – which 
was removed later. See Allan Fels, ‘China’s Antimonopoly Law 2008: An Overview’ (2012) 41 Rev 
Ind Organ 7, 18; and Harris et al. (fn 3) 190. 
26 Wang (fn 14) 136.  
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law.27 This is in fact a wise step, as will be shown in the case analysis below, because 
a considerable number of cases handled by the AMEAs involved trade associations. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 below will examine respectively the approaches taken by the 
AMEAs and the courts in the application of the provisions on horizontal and vertical 
agreements.28 
2.1 Enforcement against Cartels 
In Western competition jurisdictions, horizontal agreement is deemed hard 
restraint, which represents one of the most serious restrictions on market competition, 
and there are ongoing debates as to whether it should be treated as per se illegal. If a 
formalistic approach is followed, the formation of cartel will be per se illegal, and no 
consideration of its effects on competition or lack thereof will be necessary. On the 
other hand, when an effects-based approach is followed, a more careful appraisal of 
the context in which the agreement operates should be carried out even for a prima 
facie infringement as serious as price fixing or division of markets before a violation 
could be established.  
According to Article 101(1) TFEU, all agreements that have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition are prohibited, and these 
are ‘not cumulative but alternative requirements’. 29  Therefore, a certain form of 
agreements, which ‘by their very nature [are] injurious to the proper functioning of 
normal competition’, 30  can be found to be anti-competitive and therefore illegal 
                                                             
27 Fels (fn 25) 17; and NDRC, ‘NDRC Asserts Increase of Instant Noodle Suspected of Collusion’, 17 
August 2007, http://xwzx.ndrc.gov.cn/mtfy/zymt/200708/t20070820_154545.html. 
28 Unlike SAIC, NDRC has not published all of its detailed official decisions, most of its decisions were 
published in the form of press release by either NDRC or press agencies of the government. Due to the 
fact that the quality in terms of substantive analysis of these ‘notices’ – as opposed to formal decisions 
– is comparatively poor – for example, the notice published by Price Bureau of Guizhou Province on 
Moutai’s RPM practice contains only two paragraphs (Moutai (2012) Xinhua News Agency, ‘Moutai 
Fined CNY 247 million for Price Monopoly by Guizhou Price Bureau’, 22 February 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-02/22/c_124377781.htm) – the case analysis given below 
focuses on official decisions the full text of which is available on NDRC’s website. Nonetheless, most 
of the cases concluded by NDRC will be studied in the next chapter, which deals with the issues 
regarding China’s public competition system in general. 
29 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235, 249. 
30 BIDS (fn 21) para. 17. 
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merely based on their object without the need to assess the actual effects on market 
competition. Nonetheless, this approach does not indicate a per se illegality. After the 
modernisation of EU competition law, which seeks to promote an ‘economics-
principled’ approach in the application of competition law,31 the treatment of hard 
restraints has moving from a strict approach based on the form of a particular 
agreement32 to a flexible approach based on the assessment of its seriousness.33 In 
BIDS, Advocate General Trstenjak stated that in the assessment of whether an 
agreement restricts competition by its object, the content of the agreement must be 
taken into account in the light of its legal and economic context. 34  This line of 
reasoning was followed by the ECJ, which held that whilst there was no need to assess 
the actual effects of an agreement if it was established that its object was to prevent, 
restrict or distort competition, the establishment of such an object must be made in the 
light of the agreement’s content and economic context.35 Therefore, there are two 
steps in the analysis of whether an alleged anti-competition agreement is in breach of 
Article 101(1). First, the seriousness of the agreement will be appraised in light of its 
content and the economic context in which it is to be applied. If the restraint is so 
serious that the goals pursed by EU competition law will inevitably be harmed, the 
agreement will be found to have infringed Article 101(1) by object without the need 
to assess its actual effect. Second, if the seriousness is less obvious, the analysis must 
further prove that competition has in fact been appreciably prevented, restricted, or 
distorted as a result of the agreement.36 
                                                             
31 Arianna Andreangeli, ‘From Mobile Phones to Cattle: How the Court of Justice is Reframing the 
Approach to Article 101 (Formerly 81 EC Treaty) of the EU Treaty’ (2011) 34 World Competition 215, 
216. 
32 See for example, Case T-374-375/94 ENS v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141. 
33 Andreangeli (fn 31) 237. 
34 BIDS (fn 21) per Advocate General Trstenjak, para. 42. See also Case 56/65 LTM [1966] ECR 235, 
at 249; and Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, paras. 
25 to 28 
35 BIDS (fn 21) para. 16. 
36 Ibid., para. 15; and Andreangeli (fn 31) 236. 
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However, the language of Article 13 does not seem to provide any room for 
adopting an EU-style effects-based approach to horizontal agreements. Article 13 
stipulates that ‘[a]ny of the following monopoly agreements between competing 
business operators shall be prohibited’. Following a literal interpretation, it indicates 
that any examples listed in Article 13 are treated as monopoly agreements, therefore 
horizontal agreements which, for example, ‘[fix] or [change] prices of commodities’,37 
‘[limit] the output or sales of commodities’38 or ‘[divide] the sales market or the raw 
material procurement market’ 39  are without doubt monopoly agreements for the 
purpose of Article 13. Paragraph 2 of Article 13 further provides the definition of 
‘monopoly agreements’, which refers to ‘agreements, decisions or other concerted 
actions which eliminate or restrict competition’. As a direct consequence, agreements 
listed in Article 13 are deemed to have the effects of eliminating or restricting 
competition by nature, and is therefore per se illegal. It then seems unnecessary to 
provide any analysis to prove the anti-competitive effects derived from horizontal 
agreements that fix or change prices of commodities before an infringement can be 
found. Similar stipulations in relation to horizontal agreements can also be found in 
NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly40 and SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements.41 Following this method of interpretation, the focus of any cartel case, 
after establishing the existence of the cartel, should be on the assessment of the 
reasoning if any put forward by cartel members under Article 15 AML to prove that 
the pro-competition aspect of the agreement offsets its anti-competitive effects.  
In addition, Article 46 of the AML stipulates that ‘where the concluded monopoly 
agreement has not been performed, a fine of no more than 500,000 yuan shall be 
imposed’. It further proves that under the AML monopoly agreements have 
eliminating or restricting effects on competition by their nature, so the fact that they 
                                                             
37 Article 13(1), AML. 
38 Ibid., Article 13(2). 
39 Ibid., Article 13(3). 
40 Article 7. 
41 Articles 4-7. 
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have not been implemented is not relevant to establishing infringement. However, the 
application of Article 13 by the AMEAs in practice seems to create confusion. 
2.1.1 NDRC 
  So far, NDRC has only published the official decisions of three cases on its 
website,42 two of which concerned cartels. However, the depth of analysis presented 
in the following two cartel decisions is significantly different. 
2.1.1.1 Japanese auto parts and bearings cartels 
On 20 August 2014, NDRC announced that 7 Japanese auto parts manufacturer 
– Denso, Asian, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsuba, Yazaki, Furukawa and Sumitomo – and 
3 bearings manufacturers – NSK, JTEKT and NTN – were fined aggregately CNY 
1.2354 billion for taking part in price-fixing cartels.43 One auto parts manufacturer, 
Hitachi,44 and one bearing manufacturer, Nachi-Fujikoshi,45 were exempt under the 
leniency programme as they were the first undertakings to report the existence of the 
respective cartels and provide important evidence. 
 NDRC found that, for the purpose of reducing competition and obtaining orders 
from automobile manufacturers at most beneficial terms, the eight auto parts 
manufacturers frequently participated in bilateral or multilateral meetings in Japan, 
and reached and implemented agreements concerning price quotations of auto parts 
                                                             
42 Since most price-related AML infringements were handled by local DRCs, the decision of these cases 
were published on the web portals of relevant DRCs or local governments. However, these decisions in 
most cases are general and brief, and in fact they are more like press releases.  
43 NDRC, ‘12 Japanese Auto Parts and Bearings Manufacturers Fined CNY 1.23 thousand million by 
NDRC for Pricing Monopoly’, 20 August 2014, at 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201408/t20140820_622756.html. The initial decision was published in the 
form of press release, whilst 12 separate official decisions were available on 18 September 2014, at 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld. Amongst the manufacturers which were fined by NDRC, 
the four Japanese bearings manufacturers – Nachi-Fujikoshi, NSK, JTEKT and NTN – were fine by 
European Commission in March 2014 for operating a price-fixing cartel. See European Commission, 
Press Release IP/14/280, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-280_en.htm. 
44  Hitachi (2014) NDRC Decision No. 2, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140918_626086.html. 




orders placed by Chinese customers. In addition, from 2000 to June 2011 the four 
bearing manufacturers had organised meetings in both Japan and Shanghai, where 
price increase strategies for bearings, and the timing and scope of price increases in 
Asia and China were discussed. The price increase of bearings sold in China was 
pursuant to the coordination of prices and the exchange of price increase information 
at these meetings.  
In the official decisions on the auto parts cartel – the content of which is 
substantially identical – NDRC first provided the information on how these 
manufacturers colluded to coordinate prices and what orders from automobile 
manufacturers they successfully and unsuccessfully obtained as a result of the 
collusion. It then included a similar paragraph which set out the legal basis for the 
imposition of fines in each decision:  
‘The Authority considers that the monopoly agreements which fixed or 
changed the prices of auto parts your company and competing business 
operators entered into and implemented eliminated and restricted the 
competition in the relevant market, directly affected the prices of relevant 
auto parts, indirectly increased the prices of vehicle of relevant brands, 
impaired the interests of downstream automobile manufacturers and 
consumers. The above conduct of your company violates Article 13(1) of 
the AML, which prohibits monopoly agreement between competing 
business operators that fixes or changes the prices of commodities.’46  
The decisions on the bearings cartel contained no legal analysis of the conduct 
carried out by the cartel. The facts of the case were immediately followed by a brief 
statement concluding that ‘the above conduct violates Article 13(1) of the AML, which 
prohibits monopoly agreement between competing business operators that fixes or 
changes the prices of commodities.’47 
As only the facts concerning the cartel conduct was available in the decisions, and 
the anti-competitive effects of these conducts went virtually unassessed, it appears that 
                                                             
46  See, for example, Hitachi (2014) NDRC Decision No. 2, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140918_626086.html. 




NDRC had treated these two price-fixing cartel as per se illegal – compatible with the 
literal interpretation of Article 13 – although there was no reference to whether any 
undertakings had applied for exemption or provided justification for their conduct 
under Article 15. However, in another cartel case handled by NDRC, a seemingly 
different approach was taken. 
2.1.1.2 Zhejiang insurance cartel 
On 2 September 2014, NDRC published on its website official decisions made in 
December 2013 48  on a car insurance cartel in Zhejiang Province involving 23 
insurance companies and 1 trade association, amongst which one insurance company 
– Zhejiang Branch of PICC, the first whistle-blower – was exempt from penalty49 and 
two companies received significant reduction – 90% for the second whistle-blower,50 
Zhejiang Branch of China Life, and 45% for the third,51 Zhejiang Branch of China 
Ping An – in fines under the leniency programme. 52  The Insurance Industry 
                                                             
48 All of the 24 decisions were dated 30 December 2013. 
49 Zhejiang Branch of China People's Insurance Insurance Co., Ltd. (2013) NDRC Decision No. 4, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140903_624625.html. 
50  Zhejiang Branch of China Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (2013) NDRC Decision No. 8, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140902_624515.html. 
51  Zhejiang Branch of China Ping An Insurance Co., Ltd. (2013) NDRC Decision No. 9, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140902_624516.html. 
52 Article 14 of the NDRC Procedural Rules on Administrative Enforcement against Price Monopoly, 
pursuant to Article 46 of the AML, stipulates that the any business operator voluntarily discloses the 
formulation of price-related monopoly agreement and provides important evidence may receive 
mitigated penalty or exemption. The first reporting business operator is entitled to full exemption, the 
second may receive a reduction of no less than 50% in fine, and the rest may receive a reduction of no 
more than 50%. It seems that there is no maximum number of business operator which can benefit from 
the leniency programme in a single case, as long as the self-reporting undertakings can provide 
‘important evidence’ to prove infringement. However, unlike the practice in the EU, where full 
immunity will only be granted when, first, sufficient evidence is provided about an undetected cartel, 
full immunity under the AML can also be granted even when the application for leniency is filed after 
the AMEA has already initiated an investigation, and second, the monopoly agreement in question 
concerns vertical restraints instead of formation of cartel. See, for example, Infant Formula (details 
available in section 3.4, Chapter 5). Moreover, in Infant Formula, regardless of Article 14 of the 
Procedural Rules on Administrative Enforcement against Price Monopoly, three undertakings received 
full immunity from penalties. This approach seems to be similar to a Commission decision in October 
2015 on an optical disc drives cartel, in which the Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 116 
thousand million on 8 optical disc drive suppliers, amongst which three undertakings were granted full 
immunity. Case COMP/39639 – Optical Disk Drives, Commission decision of 21 October 2015. 
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Association of Zhejiang Province was fined CNY 500,000, the highest possible 
penalty imposed on a trade association.53 
It was found that the Insurance Industry Association of Zhejiang Province issued 
the Self-Discipline Convention of Automobile Insurance Industry of Zhejiang 
Province and organised on several occasions 23 insurance companies to fix both the 
discount rate for car insurance and the agency commission. 54  NDRC found that 
Zhejiang Insurance Industry Association and 23 participating insurance companies had 
violated Articles 16 and 13(1) of the AML.55 
Contrary to the approach taken in Japanese auto parts and bearings cartels, which 
focused primarily on the facts concerning the operation of the cartels, NDRC in 
Zhejiang Insurance Cartel paid significant attention to the anti-competitive effects of 
the fixed discount rate and agency commission.56 In all 24 decisions, NDRC alleged 
that the coordination of price-fixing conduct amongst competing undertakings directly 
excluded price competition amongst them, diminished the incentives for business 
operators to promote product quality and enhance services, deprived consumers of the 
freedom to choose different products, and made it more difficult for them to acquire 
high quality products and services at lower prices. Unified and fixed discount rates for 
new car insurance led to the homogenisation of commercial car insurance services, 
which eliminated price differences and the opportunity for consumers to obtain 
personalised services. Unified and fixed agency commission hindered competition 
amongst insurance companies in recruiting qualified agents for the purpose of market 
expansion, stabilised the market share of each company at the expense of the interests 
of consumers who were not able to benefit from competition amongst companies for 
                                                             
53 Article 46, AML. 
54  Insurance Industry Association of Zhejiang Province (2013) NDRC Decision No. 7, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201409/t20140902_624511.html. 
55  NDRC, ‘Zhejiang Insurance Sector Fined 110 Million for AML Violation’, 2 September 2014, 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201409/t20140902_624476.html. 




high quality products and services, and undermined efficiency in the car insurance 
market. 
As can be seen in the decisions, NDRC’s reasoning was largely effects-based; 
although there was no quantitative evidence and even the relevant market was not 
defined, it analysed the adverse effects the cartel had on market competition and 
consumer welfare. As NDRC considered the context in which the agreements were 
implemented and their anti-competitive effects before it drew a final conclusion, it 
seems to suggest that its application of Article 13 of the AML in this cartel case 
followed an analytical approach comparable to the EU analysis of infringement by 
effect under Article 101(1) TFEU, although it was not explicitly mentioned in the 
decisions that the actual effects of the agreements must be proved before the 
infringement can be established.  
Both the Japanese Auto Parts and Bearings Cartels and Zhejiang Insurance 
Cartel were handle by NDRC itself as opposed to its local agencies, and this fact gives 
rise to serious concerns as to the inconsistent manner in which NDRC is enforcing the 
AML. Due to the fact the AMEAs are not required by any laws or rules to provide any 
detailed and comprehensive decisions57 or to use any mandatory economic analytical 
methods, they have a wide discretion to tailor the final decision into any form they 
seem fit, either to hide any illegitimate treatment in favour of the infringing parties or 
simply to cover the fact that they failed to conduct the investigation thoroughly. No 
outsiders can grasp the real causes of the incoherent decisions. Was it because the 
Japanese Auto Parts and Bearings Cartels involved only foreign undertakings so no 
meaningful analysis was needed and the Zhejiang Insurance Cartel involved only 
domestic undertakings so that a closer look at the case was required? NDRC can 
nonetheless avoid scepticism by increasing the depth and comprehensiveness of the 
                                                             
57 In relation to the issue concerning the preparation of published decision, the European approach will 
be introduced in section 5, Chapter 7. 
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analysis in its official decisions, in which way the public can better understand how 
the AML is interpreted and applied.  
2.1.2 SAIC 
There seems to be a change of attitude from an effects-based to a formalistic 
approach in SAIC’s application of Article 13. In some of its early decisions, a trace of 
competitive analysis, although extremely brief, can be found. For example, in Taihe 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cartel, 58  Huawei LPG Station entered into an 
agreement with six LPG undertakings to monopolise the retail market for LPG in Taihe 
County. In return, Huawei agreed to make monthly payments to the six undertakings 
to compensate for their loss of sales. Jiangxi AIC found that the agreement restricted 
the competition in Taihe and violated Article 13(3) on the grounds that the agreement 
deprived consumers of the freedom to choose products and as a result seriously harmed 
the interests of consumers, and that the agreement made it impossible for more 
efficient undertakings to take part in market competition and restricted their ability to 
expand the scale of operation through competition, therefore adversely affecting the 
optimal allocation of resources. 
In Anyang Used Car Cartel,59 11 second-hand car dealers entered into several 
agreements over three years to divide the market by geographical area and market 
share, and to fix commission rates.60 Henan AIC found that the 11 dealers, which were 
supposed to be competitors, would lack the incentive to increase service quality and 
reduce service price through fair competition as a result of this horizontal agreement. 
Second, compared with pre-cartel market prices, the implementation of the agreement 
led to the increase in transaction fees, which were evidently higher than the fees 
                                                             
58  Taihe Liquefied Petroleum Gas Station (2010) Jiangxi AIC Decision No. 1, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/201307/t20130726_136750.html. 
59  Anyang Used Car Trading Market Co., Ltd. et al. (2012) Henan AIC Decision No. 1, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/201307/t20130726_136758.html. 
60 Since SAIC is only empowered to enforce the AML against non-price-related infringement, the 
practice of fixing commission rates was not touched upon in this case. Next chapter will discuss the 
problematic allocation of jurisdiction between NDRC and SAIC based on price element. 
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charged in neighbouring cities. Since the cartel members completely divided the 
market for second-hand cars, consumers were forced to accept a more expensive 
service. 
In its more recent cartel decisions, however, SAIC has seemed to follow a strictly 
formalistic approach, even though a competitive analysis was not found. For example, 
in Shangyu Concrete Cartel, 61  AIC of Zhejiang Province found that 8 concrete 
undertakings and the Concrete Association of Shangyu City were in breach of the 
AML by formulating and implementing several horizontal agreements that allocated 
market share amongst participating undertakings. In the official decision, Zhejiang 
AIC started by stating the facts of the case, which were followed by an index of 
evidence.62 Instead of going further to analyse the anti-competitive effects of the cartel, 
Zhejiang AIC concluded immediately after the list of evidence that the concrete cartel 
violated Article 13(3) of the AML that prohibited the division of sales market or the 
raw material procurement market. Therefore, it appears that the finding of 
infringement was purely based on the fact that the agreements entered into by 
offending undertakings divided the concrete market in Shangyu, and the adverse 
effects derived from these agreements on the concrete market were not relevant. 
Similarly, in Wuxi Quarry Cartel,63 several quarries competed excessively for 
supplying gravel to a motorway construction site by substantially reducing the price 
of gravel. As a result all quarries were less profitable and some even incurred operating 
losses. In order to end the excess competition, four individuals who controlled all 
seven quarries in Wuxi County of Chongqing City decided to allocate different 
sections of the motorway construction site near Wuxi area amongst themselves and 
each quarry would be responsible for supplying gravel to the sections allocated. Given 
                                                             
61  Shangyu Concrete Industry Association et al. (2014) Zhejiang AIC Decision No. 20, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/201412/t20141201_150200.html. 
62 Unlike NDRC, which never provides information on evidence used in cases, SAIC has included a 
list comprising of the titles of all evidence collected during the investigation to support its fact-finding 
decision in every AML case. 




the high transportation costs, gravel had to be purchased from nearby quarries, and 
therefore the department supervising the motorway project was forced to accept this 
agreement. After providing a list of evidence to prove these facts, Chongqing AIC 
concluded that the four quarries were in breach of Article 13(3). Again, no competitive 
analysis was given in this decision. 
Whilst the decisions made by the two AMEAs have not provided much valuable 
information and guidance with regard to the analysis of cartel infringement, the next 
section will examine an analysis of RPM under Article 14 conducted by the court, 
which may be able to shed some light on how Article 13 is interpreted since in this 
case the court seems to suggest the interpretation of Article 13 should be equally 
applied to Article 14. 
2.2 Enforcement against Resale Price Maintenance 
  Although the pro-competition effects of RPM such as preventing free-riders, 
eliminating double marginalisation, and solving inventory problems, are widely 
recognised,64 its anti-competitive effects are equally profound, and it is therefore 
deemed a serious restriction on competition. In the EU, RPM is treated as hard restraint 
which ‘[removes] the benefit of the block exemption’.65 Although, as discussed in 
section 2.1 above, Article 101 TFEU does not recognise per se illegality, RPM is 
‘unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3)’.66 In the US, RPM had been treated 
as per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for almost a century as a result of Dr. 
Miles.67 The Supreme Court in the landmark Leegin case68 found that the per se rule, 
which would only be applied to agreements that ‘always or almost always tend to 
                                                             
64 Shan Jiang and Daniel Sokol, ‘Resale Price Maintenance in China: an Economic Perspective’ (2015) 
3 (suppl 1) Journal of Antirust Enforcement i132, i135. 
65 Article 4, Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices. 
66 Para. 47, Commission Notice of 10 May 2010 – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130 of 
19.05.2010. 
67 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
68 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
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restrict competition and decrease output’, 69  no longer applied to RPM and 
subsequently overturned the ruling of Dr. Miles. RPM is now analysed under the rule 
of reason. Therefore, overall there has been an increasingly flexible attitude regarding 
RPM.70 Similarly, in China the judicial application of Article 14 of the AML suggests 
that RPM is not per se illegal under the AML. 
2.2.1 Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson 
On 1 August 2013, the Shanghai High People’s Court delivered its appellate 
judgement on the Rainbow v. Johnson & Johnson case,71 the first litigation concerning 
a vertical monopoly agreement in China. The plaintiff, Beijing Ruibang Yonghe 
Science and Technology Trade Company (Rainbow), had been the distributor of 
Johnson & Johnson Medical (Shanghai) Ltd. and Johnson & Johnson Medical (China) 
Ltd for 15 years, during which time the distribution contracts were renewed annually. 
On 2 January 2008, in a new distribution contract, the parties agreed that Rainbow 
would sell Johnson & Johnson products in a designated area at prices not lower than 
those stipulated by Johnson & Johnson. In March 2008, Rainbow won a bid in an 
unauthorised area at a price below the fixed minimum resale price. As a punishment, 
Johnson & Johnson deducted Rainbow’s deposit of CNY 20,000 in July, and 
terminated its dealership in December. Rainbow sued Johnson & Johnson in August 
2010.  
Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, the court of first instance, ruled in 
favour of the defendant by concluding that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden 
to prove, that the RPM in question had restricted inter- or intra-band competition,72 
                                                             
69 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). 
70 Roberto Pardolesi, ‘Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Dominance: Some Remarks about the 
Substantive Rules’ in Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang (eds.) Competition Policy and Regulation: 
Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe (Edward Elgar 2011) 288. 
71 Shanghai High People’s Court, Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson (2012) Hu Gao Min San (Zhi) Zhong 
Zi No. 63. 
72  Similarly, para.17 of Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU provides that the 
assessment of whether an agreement is restrictive of competition is necessary to take account of the 
likely impact of the agreement on inter-brand competition (i.e. competition between suppliers of 
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and therefore the agreement was not considered by the court as a ‘monopoly agreement’ 
for the purpose of the AML, and that the damages claimed were caused by RPM. The 
court found that the damages suffered by the plaintiff in fact resulted from contractual 
dispute.73 Rainbow appealed to the Shanghai High People’s Court (Shanghai High 
Court), where it was found that the agreement was in breach of the AML and the 
judgment of the lower court was overturned.74 
The Shanghai High Court ruled, inter alia, that the definition of monopoly 
agreements provided in paragraph two of Article 13 applied equally to vertical 
monopoly agreements stipulated in Article 14, therefore elimination or restriction of 
competition should be a prerequisite for the finding of a vertical monopoly agreement. 
It also found that, since the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues 
concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from 
Monopolistic Conduct (Judicial Interpretation) was silent on the burden of proof in 
private litigation concerning vertical agreements, according to Article 46 of the Civil 
Procedure Law – ‘[i]t is the duty of a party to an action to provide evidence in support 
of his allegations’75 and thus the appellant, Rainbow, should bear the burden of proof. 
It held that four elements needed to be considered in proving the anti-competitive 
effects of RPM: the level of competition in the relevant market; the market power of 
defendant; 76  the intention of defendant to implement RPM; and the competitive 
effects on competition. 
The judgment of the Shanghai High Court was said to be ‘to date the most 
systematic and most elaborate discussion of the economics of RPM in a decision 
                                                             
competing brands) and on intra-brand competition (i.e. competition between distributors of the same 
brand). 
73 Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson (2010) Hu Yi Zhong 
Min Wu (Zhi) Chu Zi No. 169. 
74 Shanghai High People’s Court, Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson (2012) Hu Gao Min San (Zhi) Zhong 
Zi No. 63. 
75  Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on 9 April 1991, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm. 
76 It has been widely acknowledged that RPM will result in reduced welfare only when the undertaking 
implementing RPM has significant market power; in the case of a weak market power, RPM will not 
substantially undermine market equilibrium. See for example, Pardolesi (fn 70) 288. 
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delivered by a Chinese court, with a prudent classification of substance and procedural 
issues’.77 Indeed, the court’s four-step analysis of anti-competitive effects of RPM 
offers significant guidance value for future cases concerning vertical agreements, the 
level of informativeness and the comprehensiveness of legal and economic analysis 
are not found in any decisions made by the AMEAs. 
Nonetheless, although the final findings of the lower court and appellate court 
were different, the analytical approach adopted by the lower court was in fact followed 
by the appellate court. The Shanghai High Court unequivocally agreed with the lower 
court that RPM was not anti-competitive in itself. In addition, the court even implied 
that an agreement that formed a price-fixing cartel was also not anti-competitive in 
itself:  
‘Article 7 of the Judicial Interpretation provided that ‘where the alleged 
monopolistic conduct is a monopoly agreement as described in Article 13(1)-
(5) of the AML, the defendant shall assume the burden to prove the 
agreement does not have the eliminating or restricting effects on 
competition’, in accordance with this Article, proving the effects to eliminate 
or restrict competition should be the prerequisite for the finding that the 
horizontal agreements prescribed in Article 13 constitute monopoly 
agreements. Generally, since horizontal agreements directly eliminate and 
restrict market competition, the adverse effects of horizontal agreements are 
worse than vertical agreements, therefore, since the effects to eliminate and 
restrict competition are a necessary requirement for horizontal agreements, 
which have stronger anti-competitive effects, to constitute monopoly 
agreements, all the more reason to make the effects to eliminate and restrict 
competition a necessary requirement for vertical agreements, which has 
weaker anti-competitive effects, to constitute monopoly agreements’.78 
                                                             
77 Jiang and Sokol (fn 64) i146. 
78 Shanghai High People’s Court, Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson (2012) Hu Gao Min San (Zhi) Zhong 
Zi No. 63. This line of reasoning was also seen in Shenzhen Pest Control Association, a case concerning 
a price-fixing cartel, the court rejected the claim of the plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that the 
plaintiff failed to prove that the horizontal agreement which fixed the minimum price an undertaking 
was allowed to charge for its service had restricted market competition, so the agreement was not a 
monopoly agreement within the meaning of Article 13. See Guangdong High People's Court, Shenzhen 
Huierxun Science and Technology Co., Ltd. v Shenzhen Pest Control Association (2012) Yue Gao Fa 
Min San Zhong Zi No. 155. 
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Such a statement, however, presents an inherent pitfall of the judgment in relation 
to the understanding of both the Judicial Interpretation and the AML. Instead of 
providing a legal basis for requiring the present of eliminating or restricting effects in 
the establishment of infringement of horizontal agreement, Article 7 of the Judicial 
Interpretation implies that the items listed in Article 13(1)-(5) of the AML are not 
random examples of horizontal agreements but examples of monopoly agreements, 
since the sentence ‘monopoly agreement[s] as described in Article 13(1)-(5)’ clearly 
indicates that what are described in Article 13(1)-(5) are monopoly agreements. It also 
implies that there is an assumption that the items listed in Article 13(1)-(5) have the 
effects to eliminate or restrict competition, and it is for the defendant to rebut this 
assumption since if there are no anti-competitive effects to start with, it would be 
meaningless to incorporate an article requiring the defendant to prove otherwise. Both 
implications indicate that an agreement to form a price-fixing cartel is a monopoly 
agreement for the purpose of the AML, and therefore there is no need to prove its anti-
competitive effects on competition since it is already assumed. If there is a logical 
relationship between the structure of Article 13 and that of Article 14, and the 
definition of monopoly agreements provided in Article 13 applies equally to vertical 
agreements as was held by the Shanghai High Court, there should be no difficulty in 
finding that RPM is illegal per se under the AML, and the plaintiff should not bear the 
burden of proof.  
In addition, it is worth noting that in a public consultation draft of the Judicial 
Interpretation, it was stipulated that:  
‘Where the alleged monopolistic conduct is a monopolistic agreement as 
described in Article 13 (1)-(5) and Articles 14(1) and (2) of the AML, the 
plaintiff shall not assume the burden to prove that the agreement has the 
eliminating or restricting effects on competition’.79 
                                                             
79 Article 8, Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law 
in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct (Public Consultation Draft). 
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The reference to Article 14 was removed later. The difference between the 
wording in the draft and the final Judicial Interpretation, which clearly puts heavier 
burden of proof on the plaintiff, seems to suggest that the treatment of Article 13 is 
different from that of Article 14. Whilst monopoly agreements under Article 13 are 
treated as illegal per se, effects to eliminate or restrict competition need to be proved 
to establish the infringement of vertical agreements. If this is the case, then the ruling 
of the Shanghai High Court, which suggested that analysis conducted under Articles 
13 and 14 followed a same pattern, may give rise to ambiguity. 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
The current enforcement against monopoly agreements under the AML raises two 
problems. The first accrues from the design of administrative enforcement of the AML. 
Despite the increasing number of investigations and cases, the information provided 
in official decisions falls short of the analytical standard that competition law decisions 
should present, not to mention that NDRC almost always announces decisions on 
competition cases in the form of a press release as opposed to the full text of official 
decisions. Under the AML, SAIC and NDRC are not required to publish their decisions 
in a detailed manner.80 Based on the official decisions, which are abstract and general, 
it is difficult to grasp the pattern of interpretive approaches adopted by both NDRC 
and SAIC, which have not yet presented their competence as vehicles through which 
Articles 13 and 14 are applied. 81  As a result, the level of legal certainty and 
                                                             
80 Article 44 of the AML only requires NDRC and SAIC to publish their decisions on handling alleged 
monopolistic conduct, but not the legal analysis and reasoning on which the decisions are based. In 
addition, since most administrative penalties imposed under laws other than the AML are based on the 
facts of violation instead of sophisticated economic analysis, the Administrative Penalty Law of China 
also does not set out any stipulations in relation to the reasoning based on which the penalty is imposed. 
See Article 39, Administrative Penalty Law of China. 
81 It is worth reiterating that SAIC does not have jurisdiction to apply Article 14 of the AML since both 
Articles 14(1) and (2) are price-related. Although in theory agreements formulated by undertakings in 
the upstream market that divide the market amongst undertakings in the downstream market – as in 
Rainbow v Johnson & Johnson, where Rainbow was only able to sell Johnson & Johnson’s product in 
a specific area designated by the latter – should fall into the ambit of Article 14(3) and are therefore to 
be prohibited by SAIC, SAIC has not yet concluded any case under Article 14. 
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predictability of decision-making remains relatively low. Since anti-competition 
infringements concerning monopoly agreements are so common in China,82 the way 
in which the AMEAs handle their cases has decisive impacts on the formulation of 
business strategies by a massive number of business operators. A more transparent and 
comprehensive decision-making process is necessary fully to appraise the application 
of the AML by both NDRC and SAIC, upon which a more stringent publicity 
obligations should be imposed.  
Second, problems emerge as to the design of the statute. There is a divergence 
between what seems to be suggested by a literal interpretation of the text of the AML 
and what the Court actually interpreted. In light of the modernisation of EU 
competition law, a formalistic analytical approach to competition cases may not 
produce results that accurately reflect market conditions and may therefore give rise 
to Type I errors. Nonetheless, a careful reading of how Articles 13 and 14 are written 
and structured may suggest that the per se rule should be followed in infringements 
involving the practices listed, and there is no room for an effects-based approach to be 
taken. It is not argued here that a per se rule is the optimal approach; in fact the ruling 
given by the Shanghai High Court demonstrated a high level of expertise. It was 
certainly well-drafted and largely in line with the EU’s two-step analysis of 
infringement by object or effect and the US treatment of RPM under the rule of reason. 
Nonetheless, it is not appropriate for either the AMEAs or the courts to second-guess 
the intentions of the legislature when the provisions are clearly written. Therefore, for 
the sake of consistency and coherence, either the AML should be amended to allow 
for a more modern approach to monopoly agreements,83 or the Supreme People’s 
Court of China (SPC) should adopt another judicial interpretation – judicial 
                                                             
82 Dan Wei, ‘Antitrust in China: An Overview of Recent Implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2013) 
14 European Business Organization Law Review 119, 130. 
83 It is reported that NDRC has already taken on the task of revising the AML. Legal Daily, ‘NPC 




interpretations of the SPC have legal effects84 – to set out the proper interpretation of 
Articles 13 and 14, and ensure the consistent and coherent application thereof.  
In light of the shortcomings of the enforcement against monopoly agreements, 
the next section studies the substantive provisions of the AML on abuse of a dominant 
position, and their application by the SPC in the landmark case of Qihoo 360 v. Tencent. 
The case illustrates how Chinese enforcers in fact have the capability of applying the 
AML accurately to the most novel competition law issues, and delivering a convincing 
effects-based decision when the law itself is clear and political intervention is not 
involved. 
3 PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION 
Abuse of a dominant position to eliminate or restrict competition is prohibited 
under the AML. 85  Article 17 provides a non-exhaustive list of conduct which is 
deemed to be abusive: selling at unfairly high prices or buying at unfairly low prices; 
below-cost sales without justification; refusals to deal without justification; exclusive 
or designated dealing without justification; tying or imposing unreasonable trading 
conditions without justification; and discriminatory dealing. From the wording of 
Article 17, the opportunity to claim justification is not available for unfair pricing and 
discriminatory dealing.86  This raises particular concerns, since the freedom for a 
monopolist to set prices is significantly restricted,87 although such stipulation is not 
uncommon in other jurisdictions.88 It is argued that a cautious approach should be 
                                                             
84 Article 5, Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work. 
85 Article 6, AML. 
86  It is not provided in the AML as to what factors will be considered as a valid justification. 
Nonetheless, Articles 12-14 of NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly provide non-exhaustive lists of 
valid justification. 
87 Article 11 of NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly sets out three factors which should be considered 
in determining if a specific price is ‘unfairly high’ or ‘unfairly low’. 
88 See, for example, Article 102(a) TFEU. In United Brands, the ECJ held that ‘[c]harging a price which 
is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied may be 
an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of subparagraph (a) of article 86’. Case C-27/76 
United Brands Co and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207, at 9. 
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adopted to unfair pricing claims, otherwise the incentives of leading undertakings to 
innovate would be reduced.89 
A dominant market position is defined in paragraph 2 of Article 17 as a market 
position held by a business operator having the capacity to control the price, quantity 
or other trading conditions of commodities in the relevant market, or to hinder or affect 
any other business operator to enter the relevant market. In the EU, a slightly different 
definition of dominant position was laid down in Continental Can Co.90 and later 
upheld in United Brands 91  as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained in the 
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers’.92  
Article 18 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing if a business 
operator holds a dominant market position: the market share of a business operator in 
and the competitiveness of the relevant market; the capacity of a business operator to 
control the sales markets or the raw material procurement market; the financial and 
technical conditions of the business operator; the degree of dependence of other 
business operators upon of the business operator in transactions; and the degree of 
difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market. 
Article 19 contains three rebuttable presumptions of dominant position based on 
the market share hold by the business operator(s) in question.93 It provides, inter alia, 
that a business operator can be assumed to have a dominant market position if the 
market share of one business operator accounts for 50% or more in the relevant market. 
                                                             
89 David S. Evans, Vanessa Yanhua Zhang and Xinzhu Zhang, ‘Assessing Unfair Pricing under China's 
Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries’ (2014) Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series 
in Law and Economics No. 678, 4-5. For an in-depth study on excessive pricing, see Massimo Motta 
and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Excessive Pricing in Competition Law: Never Say Never?’ in Swedish 
Competition Authority (eds.) The Pros and Cons of High Prices (Konkurrensverket 2007). 
90 Case C-6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
91 United Brands (fn 88). 
92 Ibid., at 65. 
93 See paragraph 3, Article 19. For a discussion on the Article 19 presumptions, see Félix E. Mezzanotte 
and Liyang Hou, ‘The Role of Presumptions of Market Dominance in Civil Litigation in China’ (2015) 
3 (suppl 1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement i108. 
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Although EU competition law does not have similar presumptions of dominance, the 
market share of an undertaking is an important factor in the assessment of a dominant 
market position. In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court held that: 
‘The existence of a dominant position may derive from several factors 
which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative but among these 
factors a highly important one is the existence of very large market 
shares.’94  
‘Very large market shares’ were defined to be 50% or more in AKZO. 95 
Nonetheless, the presumption of existence of a dominant position based on substantial 
market share can be rebutted since the importance of market share varies in different 
markets.96 This is especially true in relation to dynamic and volatile markets like 
technology markets, in which incumbents can be more easily surpassed by new 
entrants no matter how powerful they once were, like IBM, Motorola and Nokia. In 
such markets, competition is always intense and market conditions change 
significantly over time. The fact that a particular undertaking holds a large share of the 
market does not necessarily give it the power actually to control prices or output or 
implement other anti-competitive policies. In light of the fact that the AML is not 
helpful in clarifying the factors which are deemed relevant in rebutting the rigid 
presumptions of dominance based on market shares, it is thus important for 
competition enforcement agencies to rely more on a competition-oriented assessment 
of dominant position as provided in Article 18. The next section will examine how the 
SPC had analysed market dominance in dynamic technology market without relying 
on the Article 19 presumptions. 
 
 
                                                             
94 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 39. 
95 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 60. 
96 Hoffmann-La Roche (fn 94) para. 40. 
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3.1 Qihoo 360 v Tencent 
On 16 October 2014, the SPC delivered its first AML judgement, 97  which 
concerned an abuse of dominance dispute between Qihoo 360, a provider of free 
security software known as Koukou Bodyguard, and Tencent, a provider of a free 
instant-message (IM) application, QQ. In the judgment, SPC upheld the decision of 
the court of first instance,98 Guangdong High People’s Court, and dismissed claims 
made by Qihoo on exclusive dealing99 and illegal tying.100 
In September 2010, Qihoo released a new security named Koukou Bodyguard, 
and claimed that this product was able to protect the privacy and internet security of 
QQ users by preventing QQ from scanning the hard drive of its users. As a counter 
measure, on 3 November 2010 Tencent announced that it would make QQ 
incompatible with any of Qihoo’s security software by implementing the ‘choose 1 
from 2’ plan, which forced the users of both products to choose either one to uninstall. 
However, compatibility was restored on the next day ‘under the intervention of 
relevant government department’ after the recall of Koukou Bodyguard.101 
In April 2012, Qihoo brought a private action before Guangdong High People’s 
Court claiming that Tencent had abused its dominant position in IM software and 
service market in mainland China by carrying out exclusionary practice, and by tying 
the installation of QQ with that of QQ Software Manager, which included Tencent’s 
security software QQ Doctor. The claims were dismissed by the Court on the ground 
that Qihoo’s definitions of relevant product and geographic markets were too narrow. 
Since Tencent did not possess a dominant position, there was no abuse. The case was 
                                                             
97 Supreme People’s Court, Qihoo 360 v Tencent (2013) Min San Zhong Zi No.4.  
98 Guangdong High People’s Court, Qihoo 360 v Tencent (2011) Yue Gao Fa Min San Chu Zi No. 2. 
99 Article 17(4), AML. 
100 Ibid., Article 17(5). 
101 It is not sure which department was involved on that day, nonetheless, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology made a public announcement on 20 November 2010 to criticise the practices 
of both undertakings, and urged them, inter alia, to make public apology, ensure the proper functioning 
of relevant products, and refrain from carrying out similar conduct. See Ministry of Industry and 




then appealed by Qihoo to SPC, where an in-depth economic analysis was conducted 
focusing on three main aspects. 
3.1.1 Market definition 
The SPC stated that an unequivocally and clearly defined relevant market was not 
necessary for every abuse of dominance case in which the definition of relevant market 
was merely a tool to assess the market power of business operator and the effects of 
the alleged monopoly conduct on competition.  
In the first instance judgment, the Guangdong High Court applied the SSNIP102 
(‘small but significant and non-transitory increase in price’) test to define the product 
market. Since the test required an increase of the product price by 5 to 10%, which was 
not possible with a totally free product, the Court alternatively assumed a small 
absolute increase in price. Although the SPC acknowledged that the Hypothetical 
Monopoly Test (HMT) was generally applicable in defining the relevant market, it 
rejected this rigid application of the HMT on the ground that charging a price on a 
previously free product would result in the fundamental change of business model in 
a two-sided market, and a significant decline in the number of users who might be 
forced to look for alternative products with no substitutability. It therefore rendered 
the market definition too broad. The more appropriate test, in the SPC’s opinion, could 
be the SSNDQ test.  
Instead of applying the HMT, the SPC assessed the demand-side substitutability 
based on product characteristics, functions, quality and accessibility 103  amongst 
integrated and non-integrated IMs, 104  Mobile Instant Messaging (MIM), social 
networking websites, Weibo,105 text messaging and email. In conclusion, the SPC 
                                                             
102 See Article 10, Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on the Definition 
of Relevant Market. 
103 Ibid., Article 8. 
104 As defined by the SPC, an integrated IM, such as QQ, provides texting, audio and video functions, 
whilst non-integrated IM only provide one or two of the above functions. 
105 Weibo is China’s equivalent of Twitter. 
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rejected the finding of the court of first instance that social networking websites and 
Weibo were included in the relevant market, and defined the relevant product market 
as IM service market – including both PC-based IM and MIM, and both integrated and 
non-integrated IM. The SPC also overturned the Guangdong High Court’s finding that 
the relevant geographic market was global on the grounds, inter alia, that most major 
foreign IM service providers such as MSN, Yahoo, Skype and Google had already 
been operating in China before the alleged monopoly conduct was carried out. The 
choice of overseas IM services for Chinese users was considerably limited, and since 
foreign IM service providers could only operate in China’s IM service market by 
obtaining necessary government permits and establishing joint ventures with Chinese 
telecommunications companies, 106  the likelihood that other foreign IM service 
providers could enter China’s market and possess significant market power in a 
relatively short period of time (for example, a year) was low. The SPC therefore 
concluded that the relevant geographic market in this case was mainland China. 
3.1.2 Market power 
The SPC determined whether Tencent had a dominant position in the IM service 
market in China by assessing market share, competition condition in the relevant 
market, the ability of Tencent to control product prices, outputs and other trading 
conditions, Tencent’s financial and technological capacity, the reliance of business 
operators on the transactions with Tencent, and the entry barriers of the relevant market. 
This analytical approach is in conformity with Article 18 of the AML which sets out 
the factors to be considered in determining a dominant market position.107 
First, the SPC found that, during 2009-2011 Tencent had an average annual 
market share of over 80% in the PC-based IM service market, whilst the closest 
                                                             
106  See, for example, Article 2, Rules on the Administration of Foreign Investment in Domestic 
Telecommunications Enterprises.  
107 See also Article 18, NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly; and Article 10, SAIC Rules on the 
Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
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competitor during the same period had only 4.2%. In the MIM service market, Tencent 
had an average monthly market share of over 90% since August 2012. Under 19(1) of 
the AML, when the market share of a business operator accounts for 50% or more in 
the relevant market, it may be assumed that it has a dominant market position. 
Nonetheless, the SPC stated that high market share did not necessarily translate into a 
dominant market position, especially in the telecommunications industry characterised 
by dynamic competition.108 
Second, in the IM service market in China, at the time when the alleged monopoly 
conduct took place, there were dozens of IM products, some of which had more than 
100 million users. In addition, there was a trend in the IM service sector to integrate 
other internet platforms such as advertisements, news, online dating, and microblogs 
into the IM platform, and as a consequence competition became diversified. Therefore, 
there was sufficient competition in the IM service market. 
Third, since IM services had been conventionally provided to users for free, users 
would lack the willingness to pay for any IM products that were charged, and no IM 
service providers would have the ability to control the prices of IM services. Moreover, 
owing to the fact that substitution between IM products would induce no or 
insignificant financial and technological obstacles, and many IM products were 
homogenised with no evident difference in the functions, IM service providers would 
normally not risk refusing to provide services or changing trading conditions. 
Therefore, the ability of Tencent to control product quality, quantity or other trading 
conditions was weak.109 
                                                             
108 Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that the shift of consumer demand of a firm’s product can be sudden 
and drastic, and consequently makes high market share transient. Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (Volume XI) 
(Aspen Publisher 2005) 505. See also Harris et al. (fn 2) 93. 
109 ‘Other trading conditions’ are defined by NDRC and SAIC as elements other than price and quantity 
that substantially affect market transactions, which include, inter alia, quality, payment conditions, 
delivery methods, after-sales services. See Article 17, NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly; and 
Article 3, SAIC Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
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Fourth, although Tencent had abundant financial and technological resources,110 
other major competitors in the IM service market such as Alibaba, Baidu, Microsoft 
and China Mobile all had comparable conditions which were sufficient to impact the 
leading role of Tencent. Therefore, the influence of the financial and technological 
conditions of Tencent on its market power was very limited.111 
Fifth, Qihoo claimed that IM service had significant network effects and customer 
stickiness; an increase in the number of users would attract more users, and the cost to 
change IM service was high after the formation of a social network through long-term 
use.112 The SPC rejected this claim by stating that it was common for a user to use 
multiple IM products simultaneously. According to a survey, 90% of IM service users 
used 2 or more IM products, therefore the network effects and customer stickiness 
were substantially alleviated. Moreover, the development of new technology such as 
easier export and import of contact details, which could be accessed by IM products, 
between different mobile phones furthered the alleviation of network effects and 
customer stickiness. The SPC supported its reasoning with the example of MSN. MSN 
had a global market share of 40% in 2011, however, the number of active users 
decreased to only 100 million after only one year in 2012. Therefore, customer 
stickiness did not necessarily translate into a reliance on a particular business operator. 
Sixth, the SPC assessed the difficulty of entering the market and expanding 
market share.113 It held that it was possible for a new entrant to increase its market 
share dramatically in a short period of time and create effective competitive constraint 
                                                             
110 According to the financial statement published by Tencent, in 2014 it generated an annual revenue 
of CNY 78.9 thousand million. See Chinadaily, ‘Tencent Publishes Financial Statement of the Fourth 
Quarter’, 18 March 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/xfly/2015-03-18/content_13394226.html. 
111 Financial status was also considered in United Brands and Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission 
[1983] ECR 3461. 
112 Customer stickiness was considered as a valid factor for the assessment of market power in Case T-
203/01 Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) [2003] ECR II-4071. Article 10(4) of SAIC Rules on the 
Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position stipulates that degree of reliance should be 
determined by taking into account of volume of transaction, duration trading relationship and difficulty 
to switch to other trading parties. 
113 In the determination of barriers to entry, factors to be considered include regulation of market access, 
possession of essential facility, distribution channel, financial and technological requirements. Article 
10(5), SAIC Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
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to the incumbent. For example, the number of users of Fetion, developed by China 
Mobile, increased from 0 to 100 million in less than one year. The SPC also found that 
the increase rates of users of several IM services surpassed the increase rate of the 
number of internet user during the same period. This evidence indicated that the entry 
barriers and difficulty of market expansion were low. 
In response to Qihoo’s argument that Tencent dared to implement the ‘choose 1 
from 2’ plan was only because Tencent believed that most users would choose QQ 
over Koukou Bodyguard, and it indicated Tencent had a dominant position, the SPC 
stated that the subjective intention of Tencent to implement the plan was irrelevant to 
the determination of a dominant position. Also, the implementation of the plan, which 
lasted merely one day, led to a dramatic increase in user numbers of major competing 
IM services. In the same month in which ‘choose 1 from 2’ took place, the user 
numbers of MSN, which had been declining, increased by 61.93% compared with the 
previous month; Fetion by 9.95%; and Alibaba by 5.15%. Since many IM service 
providers were able to expand their market due to Tencent’s short-lived alleged 
monopoly conduct, it could be proved that Tencent did not have a dominant market 
position. 
3.1.3 Abusive conduct 
Although the SPC could choose to exercise judicial economy after finding that 
Tencent did not have a dominant position, it nonetheless continued with the analysis 
of Tencent’s alleged abusive conducts.  
Qihoo claimed that the ‘choose 1 from 2’ conduct was a violation of Article 17(4) 
of the AML because Tencent forced the uninstallation of users’ own software. The SPC 
found that, first, the incompatibility practice targeted only the products and services of 
Qihoo. On the face of it, Tencent required users to choose between QQ and Koukou 
bodyguard, which in fact restricted its own operating environments. Although such 
restriction might cause inconvenience to users, the inconvenience could be mitigated 
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by the fact that there were sufficient substitution in both the IM service market and 
security software market. Second, the incompatibility practice was a countermeasure 
in response to Qihoo’s unfair competition practices114 – the release and operation of 
Koukou Bodyguard, which specifically targeted QQ – rather than conduct intended to 
eliminate or restrict competition in the IM service market. Third, as discussed above, 
the one-day ‘choose 1 from 2’ conduct in fact generated more vigorous competition. It 
was therefore justifiable to speculate that if the conduct had lasted longer, the market 
share of Tencent would have declined more significantly. On the other hand, although 
Tencent’s conduct in fact had adverse effects on the market share of Qihoo, the focus 
of the AML was not on protecting individual undertaking, but on whether a healthy 
market competition mechanism was distorted or undermined. After the ‘choose 1 from 
2’ took place, Qihoo’s market share in the security software market dropped from 74.6% 
to 71.3%; and during the same period, Tencent’s market share in the security software 
market only increased by 0.57% from 3.89% to 4.46%. It was clear that the effects of 
Tencent’s conduct on security software market were negligible, and competition in the 
security software market was not eliminated or restricted. In conclusion, the ‘choose 1 
from 2’ conduct did not amount to monopolistic conduct for the purpose of the AML. 
In relation to whether the tying practice of Tencent was in breach of Article 17(5) 
which prohibited business operators with dominant market position from tying 
products without any justification, the SPC found that Qihoo failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to prove that Tencent had leveraged its competitive advantages in 
the IM service market into the security software market, since Qihoo had a market 
share of no less than 70% in the security software market after both the ‘choose 1 from 
2’ and the tying practice took place, whilst Tencent only had less than 5%. Second, it 
                                                             
114 During largely the same period of time as this anti-monopoly case, Qihoo was sued by Tencent under 
AUCL with regard to the same product, Koukou Bodyguard, which as claimed by Tencent undermined 
the integrity and security of Tencent’s products and services, damaged the commercial and product 
creditability of Tencent. Both the Guangdong High People’s Court – the first instance court – and the 
SPC supported the claims of Tencent, and held Qihoo to compensate Tencent CNY 5 million. See 
respectively, Guangdong High People’s Court, Tencent v Qihoo 360 (2011) Yue Gao Fa Min San Chu 
Zi No. 1, and Supreme People’s Court, Tencent v Qihoo 360 (2013) Min San Zhong Zi No.5.  
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was reasonable to tie the installation of QQ with that of QQ Software Manager, since 
such practice could realise the integration of functions, protect the security of accounts, 
and improve the performance and value of QQ. Third, the coerciveness of Tencent’s 
tying practice was not obvious.115 Although there was no notification when QQ and 
QQ Software Manager were installed, users could freely choose to uninstall any of the 
software. Therefore, the supply of IM service was not conditioned upon the use of QQ 
Software Manager. 
3.1.4 Implications of Qihoo v. Tencent 
In upholding the decision of Guangdong High Court, the SPC corrected several 
mistakes made by the court of first instance, the most noteworthy being the 
recommended replacement of the SSNIP test with the SSNDQ test. Although the SPC 
in the decision did not actually apply the SSNDQ test, it did carefully analyse the scope 
of the SSNIP test and its limited relevance to a product that was provided free of charge. 
It identified the special characteristics of the IM product, and examined the standard 
context in which the SSNIP typically applied. Instead of rigidly applying the SSNIP 
test, the SPC acknowledged that the SSNDQ test – although it is in a way more difficult 
to apply owing to the non-quantifiable feature of the quality of products – is more 
adaptable to accommodate the special conditions of the internet industry. It shows the 
Court’s growing familiarity with well-established competition doctrines and the 
application thereof. 
The same degree of flexibility can also be found in the determination of market 
power, where the court commendably ruled that a considerable market share – even as 
high as 80% – did not necessarily confer a dominant market position. Normally, 
AMEAs rely heavily on market share to determine if a business operator has a 
dominant position, as will be seen later, but when a relatively high market share does 
                                                             
115 The EU competition law also requires the proof of coercion in the evaluation of tying practices. See 
for example Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
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lead to the establishment of a dominant position, market share cannot accurately 
demonstrate the real market power a business operator possesses. The characteristics 
of the technology sector in general and PC-based or mobile software in particular, such 
as high innovation rate and low dissemination cost, dictates that the enforcement 
experience in traditional sectors should be adjusted accordingly in order for the law to 
be effectively applied. Therefore, the SPC successfully set a standard for assessing 
market power in a dynamic and volatile market through quantitative analysis. 
Some parts of the analysis can be further elaborated. For example, in relation to 
the effects of Tencent’s ‘choose 1 from 2’ conduct on the competition condition of IM 
service, it would be better to establish more firmly the casual link between Tencent’s 
conduct and the increase in its competitors’ market share, instead of taking the 
statistics for granted, by examining if the increase in market share was a result of, for 
example, a newly released IM products or a major upgrade of the previous version. 
Nevertheless, this landmark judgement provides valuable guidance – for example, an 
effects-based and statistical approach towards assessing alleged abusive conducts – for 
future AML litigation as well as administrative enforcement, especially in the 
vigorously developing internet sector and also the two-sided markets. Competition 
issues are derived from economic development, and a myriad of novel competition 
issues which cannot be foreseen by any legislature will be raised as economic activities 
continuously develop. It requires both the courts and the AMEAs to apply the AML in 
a way which preserves the basic norms and principles on which the competition law is 
founded such as the distinction between protecting competitive process and protecting 
competitors,116 and addresses the unique features of a given product and market by 
giving a sophisticated economic analysis.  
Sections 2 and 3 above discussed the application of the AML respectively to 
monopoly agreements and abuse of a dominant position. The discussion found that 
                                                             
116 As will be discussed later, MOFCOM in P3 Network seemed to be substantially influenced by the 
potential adverse effects of the proposal transaction on China’s domestic shipping companies. 
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whilst both courts – the Shanghai High Court and the SPC – had done an excellent job 
in conducting economics-based reasoning and analysis,117 both NDRC and SAIC fell 
short of this standard. The next section will analyse MOFCOM’s application of the 
AML in reviewing concentrations. It intends to show that, compared with the 
approaches taken in Qihoo v Tencent, the same degree of inflexibility and opacity 
presented in the decisions of NDRC and SAIC can also be found in merger control. 
4. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
A merger control system for foreign acquisition of domestic undertakings was 
established a few years before the enactment of the AML.118 Chapter IV of the AML 
sets out the merger control mechanism. Concentration is defined in Article 21 as 
merger of business operators; or acquisition of control over other business operator by 
acquiring their shares or assets; or acquisition of control over or exercise of decisive 
influence on other business operator by contract or other means.119 This definition is 
very similar to the European definition of concentration, which emphasises actual 
control rather than shares; however, unlike EU competition law, a definition of ‘control’ 
is not provided in the AML.120 In the EC Merger Regulation, concentration is defined 
as ‘a change of control on a lasting basis’,121 whilst control is ‘constituted by rights, 
contracts or any other means which […] confer the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on an undertaking’.122 Nonetheless, in June 2014 MOFCOM published the 
revised Guiding Opinions on the Notification of Concentration of Business Operators, 
                                                             
117 Howard Chang, David Evans and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘Analyzing Competition among Internet 
Players: Qihoo 360 v. Tencent’ (2013) Antitrust Chronicle, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/analyzing-competition-among-internet-players-
qihoo-360-v-tencent. 
118  See the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors. 
119 Articles 20(1) – (3), AML. 
120 Harris et al. (fn 2) 127. 
121  Article 3(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (ECMR). 
122 Article 3(2), ECMR. 
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which lists a series of factors to be considered in assessing if there is a change of 
control by virtue of the transaction, including the objectives and future plans of the 
transaction, the composition of the board of directors or supervisors and their voting 
mechanism, and the appointment and dismissal of senior executives.123 
As in most competition jurisdictions, ex ante notification is mandatory for 
transactions which meet certain thresholds. 124  Specific thresholds for mandatory 
notification are not provided in the AML.125 Instead, on 3 August 2008, the State 
Council adopted Regulations on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of 
Undertakings. Setting substantial factors such as thresholds through secondary 
regulation makes it possible for policy makers to adjust notification requirements 
according to economic and market conditions without the need to amend the AML 
itself.126  
Article 23 sets out the required documents for notifying a concentration 
notification and Article 24 allows merging parties to supplement materials within a 
time limit if the first submission is held incomplete by MOFCOM. However, neither 
the AML nor the subsequent MOFCOM Measures on the Notification of 
Concentrations of Undertakings 127  provides the timeframe for supplement of 
additional materials. Although the wording of Article 23 does not seem to impose 
significant burden on merging parties, it is in fact one of the major causes of delay in 
the reviewing process.128 
Once the submission is complete, a ‘2 plus 1’ reviewing process commences. In 
phase one, a preliminary review is conducted within thirty days. If a further review is 
necessary, the review will enter phase two which gives MOFCOM ninety days to make 
                                                             
123 Articles 3(1), (4) and (5), the Guiding Opinions on the Notification of Concentration of Business 
Operators. 
124 Article 21, AML. 
125 Article 21 of the AML articulates that the threshold of declaration is to be stipulated by the State 
Council. 
126 Harris et al. (fn 2) 138; and Xiaoye Wang, Detailed Interpretation to China’s AML (Intellectual 
Property Right Press 2008) 167. 
127 See Article 13, MOFCOM Measures on the Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings. 
128 See section 3.1, Chapter 5. 
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a decision. However, phase two can be extended to another sixty days.129 The notified 
transactions cannot be implemented before MOFCOM has reached a conclusion130 or 
has failed to make a decision within the time limit. 131  However, in practice, 
MOFCOM always finds a way to prolong the reviewing process.132 
  Article 27 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in the 
reviewing process, including the market share of the merging parties and the 
controlling power thereof over the relevant market, the degree of market concentration 
in the relevant market, the impact of the transaction on market access, technological 
progress, consumers, other business operators and national economic development. 
These factors, though largely in conformity with international norms, 133  are not 
necessarily competition-related, but instead represent a wide range of considerations 
similar to the legislative objectives of the AML.134 Indeed, the merger control regime 
is accused of pursuing national interests at the expense of orderly market 
competition.135 
  Similar to Article 15, which provides exemptions for monopoly agreements, the 
opportunity for an alleged anti-competitive transaction to be exempt is provided in 
Article 28. For an exemption to be granted, the parties to the transaction will need to 
prove that the positive impacts of the transaction on competition evidently outweigh 
the negative impacts thereof, or that the transaction is in conformity with the public 
interest.136 Due to the opacity of MOFCOM’s reviewing process, it is not clear how 
MOFCOM assess an application for exemption in practice. Indeed, thus far only two 
                                                             
129 Paragraph 3, Article 26, AML. 
130 Paragraph 1, Articles 25 and 26, AML. 
131 Paragraph 2, Article 25 and Paragraph 3, Article 26, AML. 
132 See section 3.1, Chapter 5. 
133 Ping Lin and Jingjing Zhao, ‘Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2012) 41 
Rev Ind Organ 109, 117. See for example, Article 2(1) EUMR. 
134 See Article 1, AML. 
135 See section 5.3, Chapter 6. See also Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, where the transaction was prohibited on 
the ground, inter alia, that it ‘would adversely affect the sustainable and healthy development of China’s 
fruit juice industry’. Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 22, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.shtml. 
136 Article 28, AML. 
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transactions have been blocked by MOFCOM – Coca-Cola/Huiyuan 137  and P3 
Network138 – and it was similarly stated in both official decisions that merging parties 
‘could not prove that the positive impacts of the transaction on competition evidently 
outweigh the negative impacts thereof, or that the transaction is in conformity with 
public interests’. Since no further information or clarification is available, this 
statement alone cannot ascertain the fact was whether the parties did not successfully 
discharge the burden of proof or they simply did not invoke exemption.  
Apart from prohibiting a transaction, MOFCOM can attach restrictive conditions 
to a decision that allows the transaction to be implemented.139 Imposing restrictive 
conditions, either structural remedies, behavioural remedies or both, 140  aims at 
eliminating or reducing negative effects of the transaction.141 However, the AML does 
not require MOFCOM to provide explanations for decisions to prohibit a transaction 
or impose restrictive conditions.142 Such a pitfall led to the over-generality of and the 
lack of substantive analysis in MOFCOM’s early decisions. 
Article 31 establishes a separate security review process for merger and 
acquisition of Chinese undertakings by foreign undertakings, which was not included 
in the draft AML submitted by LAO to the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC.143 
As a consequence, a transaction involving foreign acquisition of domestic undertaking 
that reaches the required thresholds may be subject to both the merger review under 
the AML for competition purposes and the security review under relevant laws for 
national security purposes. 144  In February 2011, the State Council published the 
                                                             
137 Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (fn 135). 
138  Maersk/MSC/CMA-CGM (2014) MOFCOM Notice No. 46, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201406/20140600628586.shtml. 
139 Article 29, AML. 
140  Article 3(1)-(3), Provisional Regulation on the Imposition of Restrictive Conditions on 
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http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/200911/20091106639145.shtml. 
141 Article 29, AML. 
142 Article 30 only requires the timely publication of decisions of, rather than the reasons for, rejection 
or additional approval.  
143 Zhenguo Wu, ‘Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 
73, 101. See also section 3, Chapter 3. 
144 MOFCOM has not yet publicised any case in which Article 31 is applied. 
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Circular on the Establishment of Security Review System regarding Merger and 
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors pursuant to Article 31 of the 
AML. The Circular concerns not only transactions that reach the notification 
thresholds under the AML but also those that are not required to go through the merger 
review process.145 This is the first comprehensive security review system for foreign 
acquisition of domestic undertakings in China.146  
Over the past seven years, MOFCOM has been extremely active and has shown 
an increasingly sophisticated competition analysis.147 However, significant problems 
concerning MOFCOM’s application of the AML were nonetheless revealed. The 
following sections will look at how merger review was conducted by MOFOCM in its 
second prohibition decision under the AML. 
4.1 The P3 Network 
On 18 June 2013, world’s top three container carriers, the Danish A.P. Møller-
Maersk A/S (Maersk), the Swiss Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (MSC), and 
the French CMA CGM S.A. (CMA-CGM), announced a proposition to enter into a 
long-term vessel sharing agreement covering three routes, Asia-Europe, Transpacific 
and Transatlantic – the so-called P3 Network (P3). It was intended to ‘make container 
liner shipping more efficient and improve service quality for the shippers […] due to 
more frequent and reliable services’.148 It was stated that P3 was merely an operational 
as opposed to commercial cooperation, and the three participating undertakings would 
remain independent competitors.149  
                                                             
145 Section 1(1), Circular. 
146 Fels (fn 25) 21. Article 12 of the Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors also sets forth a security review requirement, however, it is not accompanied by 
detailed implementing rules.  
147 Lin and Zhao (fn 133) 130. 





On 20 March 2014, the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) announced that 
it approved the agreement on the ground that P3 was unlikely to increase transportation 
cost or reduce transportation service unreasonably. 150  Later on 3 June 2014 the 
European Commission declared that it would not initiate investigation into P3 after the 
undertakings submitted a self-assessment on the compliance of the alliance with EU 
competition law.151 However, two weeks later, MOFOCM surprisingly published its 
decision to disapprove the formation of the P3 Network, 152  the first time that 
MOFCOM blocked a foreign-to-foreign transaction. The following sections examine 
the official decision of MOFCOM. 
4.2 MOFCOM’s Decision 
MOFCOM received notification of the proposed establishment of a network centre 
in the form of limited liability partnership jointly by Maersk, MSC and CMA-CGM 
on 18 September 2013. However, the first submission of notification documents and 
materials was deemed incomplete by MOFCOM, and the undertakings had to make a 
second submission. Three months later on 19 December 2013, MOFCOM officially 
started the merger review procedure. On the last day of Phase One, MOFCOM decided 
to conduct further review on 18 January 2014. Similarly, on the last day of Phase Two 
– 18 April 2014 – MOFCOM decided to extent the time limit and brought the case into 
Phase Three. A final conclusion was made on the last day of Phase Three, 17 June 
2014. This timeline of the review on P3 is in fact quite interesting, as it shows that the 
review went through the longest possible time permitted by the AML for reviewing a 
single concentration.153 This fact seems to suggest that MOFCOM experienced major 
                                                             
150 The Federal Maritime Commission, ‘P3 Agreement Clears FMC Regulatory Review’, 20 March 
2014, http://www.fmc.gov/nr14-06. 
151 Maersk, ‘Maersk Line and P3 Partners Receive European Commission Affirmation’, 4 June 2014, 
http://www.maerskline.com/hi-in/countries/int/news/news-articles/2014/06/p3-partners. 
152  Maersk/MSC/CMA-CGM (P3 Network) (2014) MOFCOM Notice No. 46, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201406/20140600628586.shtml. 
153 Articles 25 and 26, AML. However, as can be seen in the next chapter, on some occasions the 
merging parties withdrew the initial notification after the reviewing process had already begun and filed 
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difficulties during the review. It is worth reiterating that the merger review on P3 was 
conducted against the background that the US FMC had approved the agreement 
without significant delay whilst the European Commission had not even initiated 
official investigation. Therefore it can be assumed that the fact of the case and the 
potential effects of the proposed alliance on competition were at least not profoundly 
intricate. As will be shown later, this delay may be a result of the substantial 
involvement of interested parties in the reviewing process. 
4.2.1 Relevant market 
In relation to the relevant product market, MOFCOM defined it as the 
international container liner transportation service market. MOFCOM acknowledged 
that the international shipping market mainly included the container liner and non-liner 
market, solid bulk cargo transportation service market, and tanker transportation 
service market. It then defined the international container liner shipping service as a 
transportation service method according to which container liner enterprises provided 
normative and repeated container cargo transportation services to non-fixed 
consignors pursuant to stipulated operating rules between fixed ports on the 
international fixed routes according to shipping schedules formulated in advance, and 
calculated the freight based on the freight rate of per twenty-foot equivalent unit. 
MOFCOM concluded that there was no substitutability between non-liner 
transportation and liner transportation, and there was no substitutability amongst solid 
bulk cargo transportation, bulk cargo transportation, tanker transportation and 
container transportation. MOFCOM did not in fact provide any analysis to explain 
how the definition of relevant product market was formulated. According to the 
AMC’s Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market, to assess the degree of 
substitutability amongst different products from demanders’ perspectives, demanders’ 
                                                             




demand for the functions of the product, demanders’ acceptance of the quality and 
price of the product, and the degree of availability all need to be considered. 154 
However, MOFCOM failed to examine any of these aspects.155 
A brief conclusory statement rather than any rigorously comprehensive analysis 
was provided for the definitions of three geographic markets, which were respectively 
defined as Asia-Europe routes, transatlantic routes, and transpacific routes. It was also 
stated that, since the transatlantic routes did not cover any ports in China, MOFCOM 
would focus on the effects of P3 on the Asia-Europe and transpacific routes. As 
explained by MOFCOM, the Asia-Europe routes consisted of two trade routes; the 
transatlantic routes consisted of three trade routes; and the transpacific routes consisted 
of four trade routes. However, MOFCOM did not explain how each of the above nine 
specific routes could be substituted by other route(s) in the same category and were 
therefore not appropriate to be defined as a relevant geographic market on its own.  
4.2.2 Competitive analysis 
Before analysing the effects of P3 on the relevant market, MOFCOM stated: 
‘Since there are competitors with high market shares on the transpacific routes and the 
market structure is comparatively dispersed, MOFCOM mainly investigated the 
container liner transportation service market on the Asia-Europe routes.’ This 
statement clearly presents the lack of transparency, coherence and necessary depth in 
MOFCOM’s decision. It should have clarified: who these competitors were; how high 
the market shares of these competitors and of the P3 partners were; and what it meant 
                                                             
154 Article 5. 
155 MOFCOM provided simple ‘conclusions’ on as opposed to analysis of relevant product market in 
several cases, see for example, Merck/AZ Electronics Materials (2014) MOFCOM Notice No. 30, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201404/20140400569060.shtml; MediaTek/MStar (2013) 
MOFCOM Notice No. 61, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201308/20130800269821.shtml; 
Baxter/Gambro (2013) MOFCOM Notice No. 58, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201308/20130800244176.shtml; UTC/Goodrich (2012) 
MOFCOM Notice No. 35, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201206/20120608181083.shtml; and 
Walmart/Niuhai (2012) MOFCOM Notice No. 49, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201303/20130300058730.shtml. Similarly, the definitions of 
relevant geographic market in these cases were also extremely brief. 
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by ‘dispersed market structure’, as the existence of business operators possessing 
market shares which were high enough to disregard the effects of P3 seems to suggest 
a concentrated rather than dispersed market structure.  
4.2.2.1 ‘Tight joint operation’ versus ‘loose shipping alliance’ 
MOFCOM found that P3 was a ‘tight joint operation’, which was essentially 
different from traditional ‘loose shipping alliance’. MOFCOM then carefully 
compared ‘tight joint operation’ with ‘loose shipping alliance’ in great detail. However, 
the discussion on the difference between traditional shipping alliance and P3 does not 
seem to be extremely relevant to assessing the competitive effects of the P3 transaction. 
Article 20 of the AML provides that a concentration refers to: a merger of business 
operators; acquisition of control over other business operators by virtue of acquiring 
their equities or assets; or acquisition of control over other business operators or the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on other business operators by virtue of 
contact or any other means. To trigger the merger review, a given transaction between 
business operators must fall within one of these three categories. Although MOFCOM 
has not specifically clarified under which circumstance the establishment of a new 
joint venture will fall, Article 20(2) should be the legal basis of this merger review 
given the facts concerning the operation of the network centre. Since the establishment 
of the network centre was already treated as concentration under the AML, although 
the P3 partners claimed it to be ‘an operational, not a commercial, operation’, it is 
obviously different from an alliance formed by independent undertakings by its nature. 
Nevertheless, MOFCOM still spent most of its time differentiating the structure and 
operating mechanism of P3 with those of traditional shipping alliance, which could 
only explain, at most, why P3 fell into the ambit of merger control rather than how this 
‘tight joint operation’ gave rise to substantial competition concerns that led to the 
prohibition decision. Moreover, it is noteworthy that whilst the US FMC approved P3 
under the Shipping Act, and the European Commission considered the agreement 
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forming P3 as horizontal cooperation agreement as suggested by the self-assessment 
conducted by P3 partners,156 China was the only jurisdictions amongst the three to 
initiate a merger review procedure to assess the impact of P3. 
4.2.2.2 Market share and market concentration 
The second and third aspects of MOFCOM’s competitive analysis were market 
share157 and market concentration. It was found that, as the first three largest shipping 
companies on the Asia-Europe routes, Maersk, MSC and CMA-CGM had market 
shares of 20.6%, 15.2% and 10.9% respectively as of 1 January 2014. The integrated 
market share after the formation of P3 would be 46.7%, which represented a significant 
increase in market power. In addition, it was found that P3 would dramatically increase 
the degree of concentration in the relevant market. MOFCOM applied the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to support its argument.158 Before the transaction, the HHI in 
the international container liner transportation service market on Asia-Europe routes 
was 890; after the transaction, due to the reduction in the number of competitors, the 
HHI increased to 2240, an increment of 1350. Therefore, the dispersed market 
structure of the international container liner transportation service market on Asia-
Europe routes would become highly concentrated. Since the conditions of the relevant 
market in this case were totally different from that of the relevant market in Qihoo v 
Tencent, it was legitimate for MOFCOM to rely more on market share in the 
assessment of market power and regard 46.7% as a high market share in a market 
                                                             
156 Article 1, Regulation 1/2003. 
157 In a number of earlier cases, MOFCOM did not provide market share data in the analysis of market 
power, which demonstrates the lack of rigorousness in MOFCOM’s decision-making. See for example, 
ARM/G&D/Gemalto (2012) MOFCOM Notice No. 87, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201212/20121208469841.shtml; GE/Shenhua (2011) MOFCOM 
Notice No. 74, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201111/20111107855595.shtml; GM/Delphi 
(2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 76, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200909/20090906540211.shtml; and InBev/ Anheuser-Busch 
(2008) MOFCOM Notice No. 95, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.shtml. 
158 In addition to the HHI, MOFCOM can also apply Concentration Ratio Index (CRn) to measure the 
degree of market concentration. See Article 6, Provisional Rules on the Assessment of Competitive 
Effects of Concentrations of Undertakings. 
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characterised by capital-intensity and high risks. However, the application of HHI by 
MOFCOM was careless. First, MOFCOM failed to clarify how the pre-transaction 
HHI was calculated, since it did not provide information on the names and 
corresponding market shares of the incumbents. Second, even if the pre-transaction 
HHI (890) was correct, the increment in the post-transaction HHI should have been 
1406.68, rather than 1350. Third, the HHI is frequently used to assess the coordinated 
effects of a concentration,159 however MOFCOM had not even touched upon the issue 
of possible collusion amongst competitors.160 
4.2.2.3 Ease of entry 
After the analysis of market share and market concentration, MOFCOM moved 
on to analyse barriers to entry. It was found that the transaction integrated P3 partners’ 
operating networks, eliminated the effective competition amongst the major 
competitors in the relevant market, and might further heighten the entry barriers of the 
international container liner transportation service market, which prevented the 
generation of new competitive constraints. However, MOFCOM’s analysis on barriers 
to entry was primarily qualitative rather than quantitative; no evidence was provided 
concerning the competition conditions of the relevant market and the way in which the 
entry of new entrants would be impeded by the formation of P3. In fact, due to the 
capital-intensive characteristics of and excess capacity in the container liner 
transportation service market,161 there would unlikely be any new entrant even in the 
absence of P3. 
                                                             
159 Haixiao Gu and Andrew L. Foster, ‘Substantive Analysis in China’s Horizontal Merger Control: A 
Six-Year Review and Beyond’ (2015) 3 (suppl 1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement i26, i42. 
160 Compared with unilateral effects, the theory of coordinated effects is rarely examined by MOFCOM. 
In case where the theory was used, a plain statement instead of reasoned analysis concerning possible 
coordination was given. See for example, Novartis/Alcon (2010) MOFCOM Notice No. 53, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201008/20100807080639.shtml. 
161 Francesco Munari, ‘Competition in Liner Shipping’ in Jürgen Basedow, Ulrich Magnus and Rudiger 
Wolfrum (eds.) The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2009 & 2010 (Springer Publishing 2012) 4. 
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4.2.2.4 Impacts on other business operators 
In the last part of its competitive appraisal, MOFCOM acknowledged that other 
competitors in the market would be squeezed out due to the increased market power 
of P3, a statement explicitly referring to the protection of competitors rather than 
competition. Moreover, MOFCOM stated that since consignors had limited bargaining 
power vis-à-vis container transportation, the increased market power of P3 might 
undermine the interests of consignors, and P3 might force ports to accept a reduced 
port charge. Although buyer power is a legitimate consideration for merger 
appraisal, 162  it remains unclear whether the consideration of the interests of 
consignors and ports was based solely on competition grounds. In fact, the potential 
adverse effects of P3 on China’s shipping industry had made many consignors and 
associations of consignor in China anxious. 163  It seems that the protection of 
competitors might be a consideration in MOFCOM’s analysis. In addition, it was 
provided at the beginning of the decision that advice from ‘relevant government 
departments, industry associations and relevant enterprises’ was sought by MOFCOM 
during the review in order to ‘comprehend the definition of relevant market, the market 
structure, the industry characteristics, and the prospects of future development’. As 
discussed in the preceding chapters, multiple objectives including industrial policy 
considerations were incorporated into the AML by design as a result of political 
compromise.164 The extent to which MOFCOM had incorporated non-competition 
considerations and been influenced by Chinese shipping industry in P3 Network is 
unknown. Currently, rules on weight of evidence are lacking, and in particular the 
extent to which the documents and materials submitted to MOFCOM will serve as a 
basis for its final decision is uncertain. 165  MOFCOM’s decision-making may 
                                                             
162  Article 27(4), AML. See also Panasonic/Sanyo (2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 82, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200910/20091006593175.shtml. 
163 Sina, ‘P3 Network May Trigger New Round of Integration in Shipping Industry’, 11 November 
2013, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hyyj/20131111/020017277871.shtml. 
164 Section 3.1.2, Chapter 3. See also Lin and Zhao (fn 133) 126. 
165 Wei (fn 82) 124. 
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therefore be subject to rent-seeking practice and political lobbying.166 The opacity of 
MOFCOM’s decision-making will always lead the public to question its neutrality as 
a competition enforcer. 
4.2.2.5 Proposed remedies 
On top of non-comprehensive analysis of competitive harm, no useful 
information was given about MOFCOM’s decision to prohibit the proposed 
transaction rather than to impose additional conditions. In MediaTek/MStar, the 
analytical methods conducted by MOFCOM were largely similar: it was noticed that 
the transaction substantially altered the structure of the LCD TV main control chip 
market, eliminated the main competitor, created a dominant position, and restricted the 
choice of chip suppliers. Despite the fact that the merged undertaking would have a 
market share of 80% and the HHI increment was 1962,167 MOFCOM accepted the 
remedies proposed and conditionally approved the transaction. But in P3 Network, 
where the post-merger market share was merely 46.7% and the HHI increment was 
1406.68, MOFCOM only briefly stated that the remedies proposed by the merging 
parties were not able to offset the restrictive effects of the transaction without 
mentioning what remedies had been proposed and why they had been declined.  
4.2.2.6 Conclusive remarks 
Although the analytical structure in P3 Network was strictly in line with the 
stipulation provided in Article 27 of the AML, 168  the analysis conducted by 
MOFCOM was largely formalistic as opposed to effects-based.169 It provided no in-
                                                             
166 Ibid. 
167 However, the correct HHI increment should be 1967, since MOFCOM also provided the pre-merger 
HHI (4533) and the post-merger HHI (6500). There must be a mistake in MOFCOM’s calculation. 
168  See also, Articles 3-5, Provisional Regulations on the Assessment of Competitive Effects of 
Concentrations of Business Operators. 
169 MOFCOM’s reliance on the structure rather than effects of a concentration can also been found in 
Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite (2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 28, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.shtml and Pfizer/Wyeth (2009) 
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depth analysis to support its concerns in relation to the proposed transaction. A central 
issue in the appraisal of merger transaction is to balance the reduction in market 
competition against possible efficiency gains from economies of scale arising from the 
transaction.170 However, MOFCOM considered how the proposed transaction would 
alter the structure of current market without appraising possible anti-competitive 
effects and pro-competitive efficiencies the transaction would have.171 Competitive 
harm of a horizontal concentration includes both the coordinated effects and unilateral 
effects. In this case, it appears that MOFCOM merely focused on the latter. Unilateral 
effects arise when ‘the merged firm, without any coordination with non-merger rivals, 
will be able profitably to exercise market power to a materially greater degree than 
would have been possible for either of the merged firms before the merger’.172 The 
merged undertaking may be incentivised to raise prices above the pre-merger level, 
since the merging parties were previously competitors and constrained each other’s 
ability to raise prices.173 However, MOFCOM did not explain why P3 would have the 
incentive to exercise its market power, provided that significant increase in market 
power was proved, 174  independent of the pressures from remaining competitors. 
Although MOFCOM appeared to use both the dominance test and the substantial 
lessening of competition test,175 the analysis was notably brief and was not grounded 
                                                             
MOFCOM Notice No. 77, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.shtml. See 
also Gu and Foster (fn 159) i39. 
170 Lin and Zhao (fn 133) 125. 
171 See Article 28 AML and Articles 8-11, Provisional Rules on the Assessment of Competitive Effects 
of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
172  ICN, ‘Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis’ (2010), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, 17. 
173 Ibid. 
174  MOFCOM basically relied on the increase in market share and high market concentration to 
establish P3’s market power, however, these are merely initial rather than conclusive indicators that the 
transaction raises competitive concerns. Ibid., 14. 
175 Under the dominance test, a merger should be prohibited if ‘it strengthens or creates a dominant 
position in the market’; under the SLC test, a merger should be prohibited if ‘it is likely to substantially 
lessen competition in the market’. OECD, ‘Report on Country Experiences with the 2005 OECD 





in sound economics. It is therefore difficult to ascertain if the transaction was truly 
prohibited as a result of competition concerns. 
Ironically, consolidation of domestic shipping companies is treated much more 
leniently. On 11 December 2015 the State Council approved a merger between China 
Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) and China Shipping (Group) Company 
(China Shipping), respectively the world’s sixth- and seventh-largest container 
shipping companies, both of which are central SOEs under the supervision of 
SASAC. 176  The new company will become the fourth-largest container shipping 
company in the world after the three P3 partners, and the world’s largest solid bulk 
shipping company. 177  The merger was approved against a background of excess 
capacity suffered by COSCO and China Shipping, the subsidiaries of which, China 
COSCO Holdings Co. Ltd. and China Shipping Container Lines Co. Ltd, reportedly 
made losses of CNY 1.7 billion and CNY 1 billion in the third quarter of 2015.178 The 
government anticipates that the integration of capacity and networks is able to promote 
the efficiency of these two companies, reduce costs, and increase their competitiveness 
in the global market.179 The objectives of this merger seem to be largely similar to 
those the P3 Network was expected to achieve, and the market powers of the merging 
parties are equally significant; nonetheless, provided that this transaction is notified to 
MOFCOM, it will undoubtedly approve the merger without imposing any conditions. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, potential intervention of the AML is 
hardly a concern for state-led mergers between large central SOEs; in the event of SOE 
restructuring, industrial policy almost always takes precedence over competition 
policy. 
                                                             
176  SASAC, ‘COSCO and China Shipping to Consolidate’, 11 December 2015, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85901/c2152972/content.html. 
177 Xinhua News Agency, ‘Consolidation Plan for COSCO and China Shipping Will Soon be Issued’, 
11 December 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2015-12/11/c_128519605.htm. 
178 Wall Street Journal, ‘Consolidations between China’s SOEs Raise Concerns’, 10 December 2015, 
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20151210/biz112153.asp. 
179 Xinhua News Agency (fn 177). 
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In theory MOFCOM’s decision-making would be more transparent and 
sophisticated if it is exposed to judicial review.180 However, it is noticed that the 
outcome of administrative litigation is largely uncertain since the courts in China is 
not independent enough to deliver unbiased judgments regarding appeal of 
administrative decisions. 181  In addition, multiple mandates of the AMEAs which 
mean that they in fact oversee various aspects of undertakings’ businesses other than 
competition-related matters182 make undertakings reluctant to challenge competition 
decisions in the first place.183 When there is a conflict between an undertaking and an 
AMEA in a competition case, there is a high possibility that the AMEA will retaliate 
in areas where the performance of the undertaking’s business is subject to regulatory 
approval by or cooperation of the AMEAs.184 Possible methods of retaliation are, for 
example, refusing to grant certain licences and deliberately delaying the approval 
process. It is therefore wise for undertakings to establish a good relationship with the 
AMEAs by not challenging their decisions. In fact, based on publicly available 
information, no competition decisions made by the AMEAs have so far been 
challenged before the courts. 
                                                             
180 Judicial review is an important aspect of competition enforcement, however, due to the limited 
length of this thesis, it will not be discussed in detail here. For general studies on judicial review in 
China, see Yuwen Li and Yun Ma, ‘The Hurdle is High: The Administrative Litigation System in the 
People’s Republic of China’ in Yuwen Li (eds.) Administrative Litigation Systems in Greater China and 
Europe (Ashgate Publishing 2014); Ji Li, ‘Suing the Leviathan – An Empirical Analysis of the Changing 
Rate of Administrative Litigation in China’ (2013) 10 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 815; Eric C. 
Ip, ‘Judicial Review in China: A Positive Political Economy Analysis’ (2012) 8 Review of Law and 
Economics 331. For a discussion on judicial review regarding competition cases, see Lester Ross and 
Kenneth Zhou, ‘Administrative and Civil Litigation under the Anti-Monopoly Law’ in A. Emch and D. 
Stallibrass (eds.) China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: the First Five Years (Kluwer Law International 2013). 
181 Mark Furse, ‘Merger Control in China: Four and a Half Years of Practice and Enforcement – a 
Critical Analysis’ (2013) 36 World Competition 285, 294. 
182 See section 4, Chapter 2. 
183  Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2014) King’s 
College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-9, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391187, 12. 




The substantive and procedural provisions of the AML are largely consistent with 
competition norms in leading jurisdictions, although the application of some 
provisions by the courts have raised concerns due to the lack of sufficient 
implementing rules and judicial interpretation. However, as can be demonstrated in 
Johnson & Johnson, one can question the interpretation of Articles 13 and 14 given by 
the Shanghai High Court, while in Qihoo 360 v Tencent, the application of the law can 
be in line with advanced effects-based analysis. After seven years of enforcement, 
some Chinese judges have started to reveal their sophistication in handling novel 
competition issues and conduct in-depth economic analysis. 
However, the application of the AML by AMEAs embodies the non-normative 
aspect of China’s competition system. They are still in the process of digesting 
competition concepts and understanding the provisions. Notwithstanding the 
rationality or legality of adopting a per se illegal or rule of reason approach, 
consistency in the law should always be preserved in order to restrict the abuse of 
discretionary power. The seemingly different analytical approaches adopted in 
Japanese Auto Parts and Bearings Cartel and Zhejiang Insurance Cartel seriously 
undermined the predictability of NDRC’s decision-making. In addition, the 
interpretive analysis in the official decisions on monopoly agreements made by both 
NDRC and SAIC is largely general, and provides limited if any in-depth economic 
consideration. Similar pitfalls can also be found in MOFCOM’s decision in P3 network, 
in which although MOFCOM followed an internationally recognised procedure and 
adopted standard theories of harm, it failed to explain several important findings in 
desirable detail and the approach taken in presenting the case was more descriptive 
than analytical, not to mention the incorrect application of the HHI. The P3 case also 
gives rise to concerns over MOFCOM’s ability to withstand political lobbying, in spite 
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of the fact that the degree of involvement of consignors and associations of consignors 
remains unclear. 
Sloppy decision-making is a product of multiple weaknesses of the competition 
system, such as the lack of experience of competition officials and the lack of judicial 
oversight. The most essential weakness, however, is the lack of means to hold the 
agencies accountable. Neither the AML nor its implementing rules have rules laid 
down to ensure the consistent application of the law or to require that decisions are 
presented in an informative manner, let alone an enforceable mechanism to punish any 
ill-behaved officials. Therefore, some major problems concerning the application of 
the AML to monopolistic conducts, such as the lack of information in official decisions, 
do not only concern the experience and professional knowledge of the enforcer, but 
also the design of China’s public competition enforcement system as a whole. The next 
chapter will identify the outstanding problems of the public competition enforcement 





Public Competition Enforcement System in China 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter examined the text of the AML and its application by the 
AMEAs and the courts to monopolistic conduct. It was found that the substantive 
provisions of the AML – for example, Articles 13 and 14 – potentially gave rise to 
incoherent decision-making and caused the divergence between the enforcement by 
the AMEAs and by the courts. In addition, the AMEAs still failed to deliver convincing 
effects-based decisions to the same extent as the courts did. This chapter argues that 
the prominent problems that constrain the proper application of the AML in fact stem 
from the competition enforcement system as a whole rather than a single piece of 
legislation. It evaluates the overall performance of the AMEAs since the entry into 
force of the AML in the areas of merger control and antitrust, and sheds some light on 
the ineffective institutional design of the Chinese competition system, the lack of 
transparency and consistency in decision-making, and the complex relationship 
between the AMEAs and the government.  
In 2015, the AML enters its seventh year of enforcement. During the first three 
years the AMEAs were occupied with the construction of a legislative framework for 
a new competition system, enforcement activities were, therefore, to a large extent 
dormant and the public had little awareness of how this new legislation might have 
substantial impact on market behaviour. Indeed, several commentators raised serious 
concerns about the prospect of competition enforcement in China.1 After the AMEAs 
                                                             
1 See for example Nathan Bush, ‘Chinese Competition Policy: It Takes More than Law’ (2005) The 
China Business Review, http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0505/bush.html; Salil Mehra and 
Meng Yanbei, ‘Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law’ (2008) 49 
Virginia Journal of International Law 379; and Thomas Brook, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: History, 
Application, and Enforcement’ (2011) 16 Appeal 31. 
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acquired greater familiarity with applying the AML, the past four years have seen an 
increasing number of competition cases. News about high-profile probes and 
enormous fines imposed by the AMEAs on well-known domestic as well as foreign 
conglomerates commonly make the headlines. Nonetheless, these ostensibly positive 
developments may not be enough to tell the true story about China’s competition 
system, which has from the very beginning suffered from major defects involving 
ineffective institutional design, lack of transparency and consistency in decision-
making, and all too frequent political intervention.  
2. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE IN CHINA 
Trebilcock and Iacobucci 2  classify the institutional design of competition 
authorities into three models: a bifurcated judicial model, under which competition 
agencies have authority to investigate, but formal complaints must be brought before 
the courts; a bifurcated agency model, under which competition agencies have 
authority to investigate, but formal complaints must be brought before specialised 
agencies which have adjudicative power; and an integrated agency model, under which 
competition agencies have authority to investigate and adjudicate. China’s competition 
system, which follows an integrated agency model, relies substantially on 
administrative rather than judicial machinery as its primary enforcement mechanism. 
The AML establishes a three-tier administrative enforcement system. The first is 
a policy-making body, the AMC established by the State Council, which is in charge 
of ‘organising, coordinating, and guiding anti-monopoly work’.3 The AMC is chaired 
by the Vice Premier of China; the directors of NDRC, SAIC and MOFCOM and a 
deputy secretary general of the State Council all serve as deputy directors of the AMC. 
                                                             
2  Michael Trebilcock and Edward Iacobucci, ‘Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values, 
Structure, and Mandate’ (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 455, 459. 
3 Article 9, AML. 
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It also comprises deputy ministers of 14 ministries who act as members. 4  The 
involvement of numerous ministries leaves many uncertainties as to how such an 
institution will work effectively and independently, as no official information with 
regard to the division of responsibilities and functions among these ministries has been 
publicly available thus far.5  
The second tier comprises central AMEAs designated directly to enforce the 
AML. Pursuant to the State Council’s san ding [三定 ] scheme, 6  three AMEAs 
currently share the authority to enforce the AML, and each of the three was already 
responsible for certain aspects of competition enforcement under pre-AML laws. The 
division of responsibility as laid down in these rules is largely identical to that which 
existed in the pre-existing system. First, MOFCOM,7 the enforcer of the Rules on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (M&A Rules), 
is responsible for merger control review and overseeing mergers and acquisitions 
which may have an adverse effect on competition in the Chinese market.8 Second, 
NDRC,9 the enforcer of the Price Law, is responsible for enforcement against price-
related monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant position.10 Finally SAIC,11 the 
                                                             
4 The Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Main Functions and Constituent 
Members of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council.  
5 Liyang Hou, ‘An Evaluation of the Enforcement of China's Anti-Monopoly Law in 2008-2013’ (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292296, 3. 
6 San ding – literally three determinations – is the basis for institutional reform in the State Council: 
first, to determine the administrative functions of a ministry (ding zhize [定职责]); second, to determine 
its internal structure (ding jigou [定机构]); and three, to determine the assignment of officials (ding 
bianzhi [定编制 ]). San ding is put forward to accommodate government’s policy to streamline 
administrative organs. 
7 The responsible unit within MOFCOM is the Anti-Monopoly Bureau. See http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn  
8  Section 3.11, Rules on Major Duties, Internal Organization and Staffing of MOFCOM, 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-08/23/content_1077586.htm  
9  The responsible unit within NDRC is the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau. See 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn  
10  Section 2.3, Rules on Major Duties, Internal Organization and Staffing of NDRC, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-08/21/content_9574275.htm.  
11 The responsible unit within SAIC is the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement 
Bureau. See http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz  
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enforcer of the AUCL, is responsible for enforcement against non-price-related 
monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant position.12 
At the third level, these three central AMEAs, with the exception of MOFCOM 
whose agencies at the local level are not entrusted with merger review authority, may 
delegate their enforcement responsibilities to their responding provincial-level 
AMEAs, including those of centrally administered municipalities and autonomous 
regions.13 In fact, most competition cases concluded so far have been handled by local 
rather than central AMEAS. SAIC has a total number of 32 provincial-level 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (AICs) in 23 provinces, 4 centrally 
administered municipalities and 5 autonomous regions. It also has a massive number 
of municipal-level and county-level branches, but these agencies are only entrusted 
with the authority to accomplish other missions of SAIC. Similarly, NDRC has 
agencies at provincial, municipal and county level, but in most cases its corresponding 
local agencies are not provincial Development and Reform Commissions (DRCs), but 
provincial Price Bureaux. Guangdong Province provides one of the exceptions to this 
complex institutional arrangement. Whilst the provincial Price Bureau was originally 
responsible for enforcing the AML under the supervision of NDRC, it was dissolved 
in early 2014 as a result of reorganisation of government structure in Guangdong, and 
all its functions were absorbed into the DRC of Guangdong Province.14  
Most scholars are wont to describe the Chinese system as a two-tier system with 
the AMC being the first tier and all AMEAs the second.15 Such descriptions, however, 
overlook an important bureaucratic characteristic of China: local AMEAs are all part 
                                                             
12  Section 2.6, Rules on Major Duties, Internal Organization and Staffing of SAIC, 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-07/26/content_1056531.htm  
13 AML, Article 10(2). The term ‘SAIC’ and ‘NDRC’ used in the following paragraphs can denote both 
the central agencies and their local agencies. 
14 See China.org, ‘Guangdong Dismantles Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
Functions of Price Bureau Assumed by Provincial DRC’ 27 February, 2014, at 
http://news.china.com.cn/2014-02/27/content_31617326.htm. 
15 See for example, Dan Wei, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and Its Merger Enforcement: Convergence 
and Flexibility’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 807, 809; and Angela Huyue Zhang, 
‘The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An Institutional Design Perspective’ (2011) 56 
The Antitrust Bulletin, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783037, 4. 
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of the government structure of their respective provinces. They are administratively 
and financially controlled not by central AMEAs, which exercise only ‘professional 
leadership’ over their local agencies, 16 but by provincial-level governments – the 
‘administrative leaders’ of provincial AMEAs – which have the same administrative 
rank as central ministries. This contributes to the difficulty in applying the AML at 
local level, which will be elaborated on later. 
In addition to the three-tier system, in some rare cases the sector-specific 
regulator might be deemed the de facto competition enforcement agency. Though they 
cannot enforce the AML, they can nonetheless intervene where the alleged anti-
competitive behaviour also falls foul of particular sector-specific regulation. For 
example, Article 41(3) of the Telecommunications Provisions of China prohibits 
telecommunications service operators from ‘modifying, or modifying in disguised 
form, its charge rates […] without authorisation’.17 Such behaviour may give rise 
concurrently to a prima facie case of, for example, price fixing or of unfairly charging 
high prices,18 both of which fall within the jurisdiction of NDRC. As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, when the AML is enforced against SOEs in certain regulated 
sectors, this blurred and unclear division of responsibility in relation to regulating 
competition-related issues between the AMEAs and sector-specific regulators has led 
to undesirable confusion and uncertainty. 
                                                             
16 China adopts a ‘dual leadership’ system, in which an administrative leader has the authority over the 
appointment of cadres and the budget of the supervised government body; a professional leader may 
issue instructions and directives in relation to the performance of functions of the supervised 
government body. For example, Guangdong Provincial government is the administrative leader of 
Guangdong Provincial DRC, while NDRC is the professional leader. In case of conflict of views, 
administrative leadership takes priority over professional leadership. See Yasheng Huang, 
‘Administrative Monitoring in China’ (1995) 143 The China Quarterly 828, 836; and Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton University Press 1988), 148. 
17 See Article 41(3), the Telecommunications Provisions of People’s Republic of China, adopted on 20 
September 2000, http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2000-09-25/18619.shtml.  
18 See respectively Articles 13 (1) and 17(1). 
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Before discussing the problems confronting the Chinese competition enforcement 
system, recent developments of implementing rules and major enforcement efforts by 
the AMEAs over the past seven years will be examined. 
3. ENFORCEMENT TREND  
3.1 Ministry of Commerce 
MOFCOM, the most active player among AMEAs, 19  oversees the review 
procedure that requires parties to notify a merger transaction that reaches certain 
thresholds; a concentration cannot be implemented without MOFCOM’s clearance.20 
In addition, under circumstance where it does not reach the specified thresholds, 
MOFCOM can nonetheless investigate a concentration proven to have the effect, or 
likely to have the effect, of eliminating or restricting competition.21 MOFCOM is 
required by the AML to make public any decision that rejects or imposes restrictive 
conditions on a merger transaction.22 In recent years, as the public appeal in relation 
to increasing the transparency of competition enforcement has attracted growing 
attention, MOFCOM has also published quarterly every decision of unconditional 
approval, although only the names of the merging parties are available.23 Since the 
entry into force of the AML, MOFCOM has, as of 27 November 2015, concluded 
1,215 transactions, with 1,186 unconditional clearances, 27 conditional approvals, and 
2 rejections. 
                                                             
19 See Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2014) King’s 
College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-9, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391187, 13; Wei (fn 15) 815; and Fei Deng and Cunzhen Huang, ‘A Five 
Year Review of Merger Enforcement in China’ Antitrust Source, 
http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/fei_antitrust_source_a_five_year_review_of_merger_enforc
ement_in_china.pdf, 1. 
20 Article 3(1) and (2), Rules of the State Council on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of 
Business Operators; and Article 21, the AML. 
21 Article 4, Rules of the State Council on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Business 
Operators. 
22 AML, Articles 30 and 29, the AML. 
23 For cases which were approved unconditionally, see http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb. For cases 
which were approved conditionally or rejected, see http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx. 
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One of the major improvements of the merger review system can be seen in the 
implementation of secondary rules. Pursuant to Article 21 of the AML, which states 
that the notification thresholds shall be stipulated by the State Council, the Rules of 
the State Council on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Business 
Operators came into force two days after the enforcement of the AML. This short legal 
document removes the inconvenient thresholds based on market share under the 
former M&A Rules,24 which created a degree of uncertainty as to whether a given 
transaction should be notified. The new notification thresholds under the Rules are 
based on the worldwide and China-wide turnovers of the participating undertakings.25 
The Rules were followed by two important and more detailed implementing rules in 
2009, both in force as of 1 October 2010: Measures on the Notification of 
Concentrations of Business Operators, which provide the explanation of certain critical 
terms such as the meaning of ‘control’ that are relevant to the calculation of turnover, 
the procedures and required documents for submitting a notification; and the Measures 
on the Review of Concentrations of Business Operators, which sets out the procedures 
for reviewing a merger transaction. In addition, on 6 June 2012, a new Notification 
Form for Anti-Monopoly Review of Concentration of Undertakings was issued, which 
replaced the Notification Form for Concentration of Undertakings effective as of 1 
May 2009.  
Whilst earlier rules are concerned mainly with filing notification for review, rules 
governing the procedural aspect of dealing with concentrations which have not been 
notified were adopted later: the Provisional Measures on the Investigation and 
Handling of Concentrations between Business Operators Not Notified in Accordance 
with the Law came into force on 1 February 2012. The legal basis for MOFCOM to 
probe into un-notified transactions is Article 48 of the AML, and the remedies and 
penalties provided in the Measures are identical to those in Article 48. When the 
                                                             
24 Article 51, M&A Rules. 




monetary punishment, a fine up to CNY 500,000, is unlikely to provide sufficient 
deterrence, the Measures additionally allow MOFCOM to order the participating 
undertakings to cease implementing the offending transaction, to dispose of shares or 
assets and transfer the business within a prescribed time.26 The risks for companies 
that deliberately or unknowingly fail to notify their transaction theoretically increase 
with the existence of detailed procedural rules.27 
Another significant development was the publication of the Provisional Rules on 
the Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentrations of Business Operators 
(Simple Cases Rules), in force as of 12 February 2014. Given that the review process 
in China has a reputation for tedious length, the introduction of these Regulations will 
hopefully simplify the notification process for some transactions which are deemed 
simple by creating a ‘fast-track’ procedure, and as a result promote MOFCOM’s 
reviewing efficiency.28 These Rules were followed two months later by the Guiding 
Opinions on the Notification of Simple Cases of Concentrations of Business 
Operators, 29  which lay down the procedural rules for simple case notification. 
Following the introduction of these Opinions, MOFCOM also began to publish online 
every transaction notified under the new Simple Cases Rules; a party who considers 
the classification of a transaction as a simple case to be inappropriate is invited to 
submit evidence to MOFCOM within ten days.30  
With regard to reviewing merger transactions, the most notable trend in recent 
years has been the growing confidence of MOFCOM in taking independent decisions 
without following unquestioningly the analysis of other competition jurisdictions 
                                                             
26  Article 13, Provisional Measures on the Investigation and Handling of Concentrations between 
Business Operators Not Notified in Accordance with the Law. 
27 As of 10 October 2015, 7 undertakings were fined for violating the Provisional Measures. 
28 This ‘fast-track’ procedure is available in case where (i) the undertakings to the transaction do not 
hold a substantial share in the given market; (ii) the joint venture or the acquired undertaking does not 
operate businesses in China or (iii) the joint venture established as a result of the transaction was already 
controlled by two or more undertakings to the transaction. See Article 2(1)-(6), Provisional Rules on 
the Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentrations of Business Operators 
29 Available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/xgxz/201404/20140400555353.shtml. 
30 See MOFCOM, ‘MOFCOM Publishes Simple Cases of Concentrations among Business Operators’, 
23 May 2014, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201405/20140500598547.shtml. 
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concerning the same transaction. For example, Western Digital’s acquisition of 
Hitachi Global Storage Technologies was cleared by both the US Federal Trade 
Commission and the European Commission with structural remedies31 which required 
the divestment of essential production assets for 3.5-inch hard disk drives. Yet whilst 
MOFCOM ordered similar structural remedies in its decision, it went further in 
ordering a behavioural remedy which required Western Digital to hold Hitachi 
separate as an independent competitor for at least 24 months.32 In another divergent 
decision, both the US and EU cleared the Google/Motorola Mobility transaction with 
no conditions attached, but MOFCOM obliged Google, inter alia, to continue 
providing a free and open Android platform and to treat all original equipment 
manufacturers non-discriminatorily in terms of the platform.33 Whilst these cases to a 
certain degree embodied MOFCOM’s growing confidence in reviewing merger 
transactions, there is a good chance that making innovative decisions such as the 
frequent use of ‘hold-separate’ remedy 34  which depart from normal practices in 
mature competition jurisdictions, would be deemed inappropriate from a legal 
standpoint. Indeed, these divergent decisions are widely debated among competition 
practitioners and scholars.35 Nevertheless, it is undeniable that MOFCOM’s expertise 
in merger review is becoming more sophisticated. For instance, in UTC/Goodrich, 
                                                             
31 See respectively, Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Action Preserves Competition in the Market for 
Desktop Hard Disk Drives Used in Personal Computers’, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/03/ftc-action-preserves-competition-market-desktop-hard-disk; and Case 
COMP/M.6203 – Western Digital Irland/ Viviti Technologies, Commission decision of 23 November 
2011. 
32 Western Digital/Hitachi Global Storage Technologies (WD/HGST) (2012) MOFCOM Notice No. 9, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/201203/20120307993792.shtml. 
33  See Google/Motorola Mobility (2012) MOFCOM Notice No. 25, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/201206/20120608199125.shtml. 
The latter obligation was removed by MOFCOM on 9 January 2015 as a result of Chinese technology 
giant Lenovo’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility. See MOFCOM’s decision concerning the removal of 
Google’s obligation at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201501/20150100862331.shtml.  
34  In addition to WD/HGST, see also Marubeni/Gavilon (2013) MOFCOM Notice No. 22, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201304/20130400100376.shtml; MediaTek/MStar (2013) 
MOFCOM Notice No. 61, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201308/20130800269821.shtml; and 
Seagate/Samsung (2011) MOFCOM Notice No. 90, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201112/20111207874274.shtml. 
35 See for example, Mark Furse, ‘Merger Control in China: Four and a Half Years of Practice and 




MOFCOM approved the acquisition of the electrical systems business of Goodrich,36 
subject to the divestitures of its assets. Similar structural remedies concerning the 
divestitures of Goodrich's businesses in the production of aircraft electrical power 
systems and engine control systems were then required by the US Department of 
Justice37 and European Commission38 a month later. This is the first case in which 
MOFCOM has published a decision in advance of its American and European 
counterparts regarding the same transaction.  
Whilst MOFCOM has indeed issued several important implementing rules to 
guide and facilitate its merger review procedures, and has made independent decisions 
without unduly following the analytical approach of other jurisdictions, the analysis 
conducted by it in official decisions is far from satisfactory.39 In addition, as will be 
discussed in section 4.1 below, the length and opacity of reviewing process also give 
rise to serious concerns. 
3.2 National Development and Reform Commission 
In 2011, several implementing rules were adopted to elaborate further the 
enforcement responsibilities of NDRC. It has published Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly 
and Procedural Rules on Administrative Enforcement against Price Monopoly. 
Specifically, NDRC oversees enforcement against monopoly agreements concerning 
price fixing and resale price maintenance (RPM),40 and against abuse of a dominant 
position concerning unfairly high or low prices, predatory pricing, price discrimination, 
and exclusive dealing through price discounts.41 
                                                             
36  UTC/Goodrich (2012) MOFCOM Notice No. 35, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/fwzl/201206/20120608181085.shtml  
37 Department of Justice, ‘Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Order for United Technologies 
Corporation to Proceed with Its Acquisition of Goodrich Corporation’, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-divestitures-order-united-technologies-
corporation-proceed-its. 
38 Case COMP/M.6410 – UTC/Goodrich, Commission decision of 26 July 2012. 
39 See section 4, Chapter 4. 
40 Articles 7 and 8, Rules on Anti-price Monopoly Conduct. 
41 Ibid., Articles 11 to 14. 
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Positive progress has been made in respect of enforcement against monopoly 
agreements. In recent years, ‘targeting famous undertakings’ and ‘imposing massive 
fines’ have proven to be the most effective tools in raising public awareness of the 
AML. Indeed, in 2013 alone fines imposed by NDRC and its local agencies exceeded 
the total amount in the previous four years, with the record of highest fines being 
repeatedly surpassed,42 and most cases involving well-known domestic or foreign 
giants. In January 2013 a fine of CNY 144 million was imposed in the international 
liquid-crystal-display cartel case, which involved big names like Samsung and LG, 
being the first time foreign undertakings had been punished for anti-monopoly 
agreements. 43  A month later, Wuliangye and Moutai, two Chinese state-owned 
Baijiu44 corporations, were fined CNY 202 million and CNY 247 million respectively 
by NDRC’s local agencies for implementing policies that restricted distributors’ 
freedom to set resale prices, being the first time SOEs had been penalised for RPM.45 
In another case also concerning RPM, in August 2013 six manufacturers of infant milk 
formula, including Fonterra and Mead Johnson, were fined a total of CNY 670 
million.46  
In 2014 the enforcement activities of NDRC became an issue of great contention 
in China. This is because NDRC finally reached a conclusion on the alleged anti-
competitive pricing policy implemented by luxury car makers as a result of a 
nationwide anti-monopoly campaign against car makers and dealers. The prices of 
foreign luxury vehicles set in China have long been a topic of public concern. There is 
                                                             
42 See Ifeng, ‘Fifth Year of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: the NDRC has Imposed more Fines than the 
First Four Years’, http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/nfzm/detail_2013_09/28/29971882_0.shtml. 
43 Xinhua News Agency, ‘Six Foreign Undertakings Colluded to Manipulate Price of LCD, NDRC 
Imposed Fines of over CNY 100 Million’, 5 January 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2013-
01/05/c_124184578.htm. However, since the anti-competitive business policies of these undertakings 
were implemented and later ceased prior to the promulgation of the AML, the decision of this case was 
in fact made under the Price Law of China. These six undertakings had already been fined by the 
European Commission in December 2010 for price-fixing cartel. Case No COMP/39.309 – LCD (Liquid 
Crystal Displays), Commission decision of 8.12.2010. 
44 A kind of Chinese distilled spirit, generally about 40–60% alcohol by volume. 
45 Xinhua News Agency, ‘NDRC Administers Liquor Industry, Moutai and Wuliangye Fined CNY 449 
Million’, 20 February 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-02/20/c_124365285.htm. 




a huge gap between the prices of imported cars in China and their overseas prices. For 
example, the recommended on-the-road price of a Mercedes-Benz GL63 AMG 
provided on Mercedes’ UK website is GBP 93,350,47 whilst the recommended retail 
price of the same model provided on its Chinese website is CNY 1,980,000, or 
approximately GBP 198,000. 48  The anti-monopoly probe into the auto sector 
reportedly started in as early as 2011, and formal investigation drew to a close in 2014. 
From the latter half of 2014 through to the latter half of 2015, fines were imposed by 
NDRC’s local agencies on a large number of car makers and dealers over price-related 
restrictive agreements.49 In addition, in June 2015 NDRC was commissioned by the 
AMC to draft an anti-monopoly guideline for the automobile sector50 which will be 
instructive in the formation of more effective compliance programmes, and will 
hopefully improve the consistency and predictability of NDRC’s decision-making. 
Apart from monopoly agreements, abusive business practices of foreign 
undertakings in China have also been targeted by NDRC. Technology giants 
InterDigital and Qualcomm were accused of charging Chinese companies unfairly 
high royalties for patent licences, bundling the licences for standard-essential patents 
(SEPs) with non-SEPs, and forcing Chinese companies to accept unreasonable 
                                                             
47 Apart from the vehicle itself, the ‘recommended on-the-road price’, according to Mercedes, also 
includes ‘a standard UK delivery charge (GBP 540.00 incl. VAT), new vehicle registration fee (GBP 








49 See for example, Xinhua News Agency, ‘The Biggest Fine Ever in Chinese Antimonopoly History’, 
20 August 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-08/20/c_126894311.htm; Financial Times, 
‘NDRC Fines FAW- Volkswagen and Chrysler’, 11 September 2014, 
http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001058157; Biru Han, ‘NDRC Fines FAW-Volkswagen and Chrysler’ 
Financial Times, 11 September 2014, http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001058157; Xinhua News Agency, 
‘China Imposes Antitrust Fine on Mercedes-Benz’, 23 April 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/23/c_134177599.htm; and NDRC, ‘Guangdong DRC 
Imposed CNY 120 million on Dongfeng-Nissan’, 25 September 2015, 
http://fgs.ndrc.gov.cn/xtjl/201509/t20150925_752485.html. 
50  Xinhua News Agency, ‘The Drafting of Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for Automobile Sector 




licensing terms.51 The investigation of InterDigital was suspended by NDRC in May 
2014 after the American corporation committed to ‘take specific steps to eliminate the 
consequences of [its] suspected monopolistic behaviour’.52 After more than a year, 
the investigation against Qualcomm finally came to an end in February 2015 with a 
fine of CNY 6.088 billion imposed, the highest fine in the AML history.53 In addition 
to the fine, Qualcomm, which had abused its dominant position in CDMA, WCDMA 
and LTE wireless communications, SEPs, licensing markets and the baseband 
processor market, agreed to rectify its business and licensing practices by charging 
royalties in China based on 65% (previously 100%) of the net wholesale price of the 
device in question. They also provided Chinese licensees with full lists of licensed 
patents and stopped charging license fees for expired licenses, requesting free cross-
licenses from Chinese licensees, bundling the licenses of SEPs with non-SEPs, and 
making the supply of its baseband processors subject to Chinese licensees’ acceptance 
of unreasonable conditions in the licensing agreement.54 
In September 2014 NDRC for the first time published its decision on an 
administrative monopoly investigation.55 It was found that, in 2013 the Department of 
Transport, the Price Bureau, and the Department of Finance of Hebei Province had 
violated the AML by issuing government resolutions that allowed passenger vehicles 
                                                             
51  See New York Times, ‘China Investigating Qualcomm's Pricing’, 20 February 2014 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/technology/china-investigating-qualcomms-pricing.html?_r=0.; 
John Ruwitch and Matthew Miller, ‘China Suspends InterDigital Anti-monopoly Probe’ Reuters, 22 
May 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/interdigital-china-idUSL3N0O80PQ20140522. 
52 Ibid. 
53  Qualcomm Incorporated (2015) NDRC Decision No. 1, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201503/t20150302_666176.html. Qualcomm is currently 
being investigated by both the European Commission and the Fair Trade Commission of Korea for its 
alleged abusive practices. See respectively European Commission, Press Release IP/15/5383, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5383_en.htm; and Don Clark, ‘Qualcomm Says South Korea 
Recommends Fine for Alleged Antitrust Violations’ The Wall Street Journal, 18 November 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-says-south-korea-recommends-fine-for-alleged-antitrust-
violations-1447820172. 
54 See NDRC, ‘NDRC Orders Rectification and Fines Qualcomm CNY 6 billion’, 10 February, 2015, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201502/t20150210_663822.html.  
55 See NDRC, ‘NDRC Puts Forward Suggestion Pursuant to the Law to People’s Government of Hebei 
Province of Rectifying the Behaviour of Departments of Transport and Other Departments of Abusing 




registered in Hebei Province to enjoy a 50% discount on toll charges.56 Since toll 
expenditure accounted for a substantial percentage of the revenue generated by 
passenger vehicles, the implemented preferential policy effectively subsidised 
passenger vehicle businesses in Hebei. NDRC stated that the practices of the three 
departments had violated Articles 8 and 33(1) of the AML, and issued a letter of 
recommendation to the General Office of Hebei Provincial Government suggesting 
that the relevant departments correct their practices and treat all passenger vehicles 
equally regardless of their origin.57 Following this case, in March, June and August 
2015, NDRC issued respectively letters of recommendation to urge the ratification of 
abuse of administrative power by the Department of Transport of Shandong 
Province, 58  the Communications Administration of Yunnan Province, 59  and the 
Health and Family Planning Commission of Bengbu City.60 However, there is no 
further update on what punishment, if any, has been imposed on the relevant 
departments or officials. 
As the ‘Little State Council’, 61  NDRC is empowered to regulate various 
industries. In recent years, NDRC has become increasingly active in applying the AML 
to a wide range of products, such as electric appliance, alcohol, infant formula, and 
auto parts. It indeed attracts more attention than SAIC, which shares similar 
enforcement jurisdiction to NDRC; nonetheless, as will be shown later, high-profile 
enforcement activities at the same time reveal significant weakness concerning 
                                                             
56 See Department of Transport of Hebei Province, ‘Three Departments Unify Preferential Policy on 
Tolls Payable by Passenger Vehicles Using Toll Roads’, 6 November 2013, 
http://www.mot.gov.cn/st2010/hebei/hb_jiaotongxw/jtxw_wenzibd/201311/t20131108_1509846.html. 
57 AMEAs are not allowed directly to punish a government body. The only available action for the 
AMEAs in case on administrative monopoly is to issue a letter of recommendation suggesting the 
relevant superior authority to handle the illegal practices in question. See Article 51, AML. 
58  Department of Transport of Shandong Province (2015) NDRC Decision No. 501, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201503/t20150327_668912.html. 
59 NDRC, ‘Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition by the Administration 
for Communication of Yunnan Province was Rectified under the AML’, 2 June 2015, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201506/t20150602_694807.html. 
60  Bengbu Health and Family Planning Commission (2015) NDRC Decision No. 2175, 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201508/t20150826_748684.html. 
61 See section 4.2, Chapter 2. 
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NDRC’s competition enforcement. 
3.3 State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
SAIC issued three significant rules in 2011: the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse 
of Dominant Market Position, the Rules on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, 
and the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or 
Restrict Competition. In relation to abuse of dominance, SAIC is responsible for 
enforcement against refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, and discriminating 
against equivalent trading partners.62 In relation to monopoly agreements, SAIC is in 
charge of enforcing the AML against restrictions of output or sales, allocation of sales 
markets or raw materials supply markets, restrictions of purchase of new technologies 
and equipment, and boycott of transactions.63 
Compared with NDRC, SAIC’s decision-making is more transparent as it has 
published all of its case decisions. However, it is noticeable that, unlike NDRC, the 
influence of SAIC’s enforcement activities is rather limited, since its regulatory focus 
seems to be put on small local companies in small cities and counties.64 In all 29 cases 
handled by either SAIC or local AICs, only 9 took place in comparatively large cities.65 
Seven of these 9 cases involved tying practices of state monopolies operating in the 
industries of water supply, tobacco and telecommunications, their dominant positions 
and abusive acts were therefore comparatively easier to prove. Moreover, the total 
amount of fines imposed by SAIC under the AML to date is approximately CNY 52.67 
                                                             
62 Articles 4 to 7, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
63 Articles 4 to 7, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. 
64 Xiaoye Wang and Adrian Emch, ‘Chinese Antitrust – A Snapshot’ (2015) 3 (suppl 1) Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement i12, i21. 
65 The term ‘comparatively large city’ was originally introduced by Article 30 of the Constitution of 
China, however, its definition was not provided. Under the Legislation Law, the right to formulate local 
regulations is granted only to a ‘comparatively large city’, which refers to ‘a city where a provincial or 
autonomous regional people's government is located or where a special economic zone is located, or a 
city approved as such by the State Council’. Article 63, Legislation Law. Currently, there are 49 
comparatively large cities. 
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million,66 which is significantly less than most of the fines imposed by NDRC on 
individual undertakings. This phenomenon may be a result of SAIC’s rather scarce 
enforcement resources,67 which restrict its ability to target larger undertakings and 
more complex cases. It may also be a result of the different focus of SAIC’s mandates, 
which involve less if any macroeconomic control and more supervision and regulation 
of market order and individual business practices at local level.68 
Compared with MOFCOM and NDRC, SAIC still lags somewhat behind in the 
intensity of competition enforcement and attracts scant public attention. It published 
its first decision under the AML only in August 2010.69 SAIC and its local agencies 
have concluded to date only 29 cases in 7 years. While all but one concluded cases 
were handled by local AICs under authorisation from SAIC, SAIC itself probed into 
only 3 cases.70 However there is a welcome trend in the last 2 years: the enforcement 
priority of SAIC seems to be veering from monopoly agreements to abuse of a 
dominant position – an area into which both NDRC and SAIC rarely ventured in the 
past – and from private undertakings to SOEs. Generally investigation of abuse of 
dominance requires more resources than cases concerning only monopoly agreements, 
for detailed market surveys and complex economic analyses are essential to, for 
                                                             
66 The highest fine imposed on a single undertaking is CNY 5.95 million whilst the lowest is CNY 
1,800. See respectively Chifeng Tobacco Company (2014) Inner Mongolia AIC Decision No. 2, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201407/t20140730_147161.html; and Yongzhou Branch of 
An Bang Insurance Co., Ltd. (2013) Hunan AIC Decision No. 11, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201401/t20140107_140988.html. The total amount also 
includes a fine of CNY 200,000 imposed under Article 52 of the AML – the first time in the history of 
the AML – which prohibits business operators under competition investigation from refusing to provide 
relevant materials and information, providing fraudulent materials or information, concealing, 
destroying or removing evidence, or refusing or obstructing investigation in other ways. See Sunyard 
System Engineering Co., Ltd. (2015) Anhui AIC Decision No. 2, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201511/t20151105_163656.html. 
67 See fn 129, Chapter 3. 
68 ‘With creating a regulated and harmonized market environment of fairness, justice and faithfulness 
for the coordinated socioeconomic development as its objective, SAIC functions in maintaining market 
order and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of businesses and consumers by carrying out 
regulations in the fields of enterprise registration, competition, consumer protection, trademark 
protection and combating economic illegalities.’ SAIC, ‘Mission’, at 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission. 
69  Lianyungang Concrete Cartel (2010) Jiangsu AIC Decision No. 37, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/dxal/201302/t20130219_133370.html. 
70 One of these three cases has been terminated by SAIC in February 2015, and the other two involve 
respectively Tetra Pak and Microsoft, which are still pending. 
148 
 
example, defining the relevant product and geographical markets, and determining 
both the dominant status and adverse effects on competition. SAIC initiated its very 
first case of abuse of a dominant position in 2013 by investigating Tetra Pak for alleged 
tying practices in the market for food and liquid packaging71 but the case has yet to 
be concluded. In January 2014, SAIC closed its first abuse of dominance case, in which 
AIC of Guangdong Province fined a state-owned water company CNY 3.2 million.72 
Subsequently, as of October 2015, ten abuse of dominance cases have been closed, 9 
of which involved SOEs in industries such as tobacco, water, gas and 
telecommunications. However, in all 6 cases concerning the telecommunications 
sector, local AICs chose to suspend the investigations without imposing any fines.73 
In light of the growing attention to abusive practices of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) as in the Qualcomm case, another notable development is SAIC’s publication 
of the Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate 
or Restrict Competition (IPR Rules) on 7 April 2015. The IPR Rules represent the first 
regulation in the sphere of intellectual property under the AML.  
Whilst Article 55 of the AML, which forms the legal basis for competition 
scrutiny of the exercise of IPRs, is too abstract to provide any practical guidance to 
IPR holders, the IPR Rules lay down lists of examples of IPR-related anti-competitive 
agreements and abuse of a dominant position that may induce violation of competition 
law. One of the most controversial provisions in the IPR Rules is Article 7, which 
requires patent owners compulsorily to license their patents that are deemed ‘essential 
facilities’.74 Whilst the IPR Rules state that competition law and regulation of IPR 
share the same objectives of encouraging competition and innovation, enhancing 
                                                             
71  Reuters, ‘China Starts Investigation into Tetra Pak 'Dominance': State Media’, 5 July 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/us-china-tetrapak-idUSBRE9640E620130705.  
72  Huizhou Daya Bay Yiyuan Purified Water Co., Ltd. (2014) Guangdong AIC Decision No. 2, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201401/t20140106_140962.html. 
73 Some of these suspended investigations will be explored in section 2.2, Chapter 6. 
74 The circumstances in which a patent will constitute an essential facility are laid down in Article 7(1)-
(3) of the IPR Rules. 
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economic efficiency and protecting consumer and public interests,75 the incorporation 
of the ‘essential facility’ doctrine seems to be greeted as an egregious development for 
IP-intensive industry in developed countries. Although China has the largest number 
of patent applications in the world,76 the general trend of China importing patents 
from more advanced economies remains intact.77 It is therefore a logical consequence 
for China to adopt a comparatively harsher scheme for mandatory licence of IPR when 
foreign patented technologies and know-how have proven to be an essential stimulus 
to the development of the Chinese technology sector and economy. The deftness with 
which SAIC, whose enforcement capacity seems to afford a rather limited caseload, 
applies this important piece of regulation to protect competition whilst seeking to 
ensure that competition enforcement does not stifle technological innovation remains 
to be seen. 
Moreover, when future abuses of IPR such as those in the Qualcomm case emerge, 
there is a good chance that SAIC will wade in and apply the IPR Rules. However, since 
the IPR Rules apply only to non-price-related practices,78 the marginal increase in 
legal certainty and enforcement predictability given by the IPR Rules with regard to 
competition enforcement against IPR abuses will be lost where the abuses are price-
related. Whilst it is difficult at the current stage to provide a reliable prediction as to 
the extent to which the IPR Rules will be instructive to NDRC’s future enforcement 
against price-related IPR abuses, it is beyond question that the non-price-related 
practices in the Qualcomm case such as a mandatory cross-licensing agreement79 all 
fall within the scope of the IPR Rules. 
                                                             
75 Article 2. 
76  WIPO, ‘WIPO IP Facts and Figures’, June 2014, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2013.pdf.  
77 ‘In 2012, China had a record deficit in royalties and license fees of nearly $17bn – compared with an 
$82bn surplus for the US.’ Valentina Romei, ‘China’s Patent/Royalty Disconnect’ Financial Times, 6 
May 2013, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/05/06/chart-of-the-week-chinas-patent-royalty-
disconnect. 
78 Article 3, IPR Rules. 
79 See Article 10, IPR Rules. 
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Recently AMEAs appear to be more sophisticated and confident in applying the 
AML, although regulation of administrative monopoly is still rare.80 On top of that, 
public competition enforcement is well supplemented by the implementation of 
various secondary rules and is meeting initial success.81 Some investigations indeed 
attract worldwide attention as the companies involved are internationally renowned 
undertakings and their businesses all rely heavily on the Chinese market. Nonetheless, 
whilst intensified enforcement raises public awareness of the AML and expectations 
of the prospect of competition enforcement, it reveals at the same time a myriad of 
unsolved problems concerning this fiendishly complex, and in ways unsound, 
competition system. 
4. OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF CHINA’S COMPETITION SYSTEM 
Periodic upgrades and regular refinements are necessary for a competition system 
to function effectively,82 and the first step is to identify what the existing problems are. 
The following sections explore six outstanding issues which impede the effective 
enforcement of the AML. First, the lengthy reviewing time of proposed concentration 
and the opacity of MOFCOM’s decision-making undermine the interests of merging 
parties. Second, multiple mandates of the AMEAs and division of jurisdiction between 
NDRC and SAIC have proven problematic and lead to incoherence. Third, a 
functioning coordination mechanism in place to resolve conflicts in relation to 
                                                             
80 NDRC concluded only four administrative monopoly cases in more than seven years, whilst SAIC 
has concluded none.  
81 Apart from secondary rules governing the nationwide enforcement activities of the AMEAs, in order 
to enhance the legal framework of one of China’s most important experimenting project – the free trade 
zone – the Measures for the Enforcement Work against Monopoly Agreement Abuse of Dominant 
Position and Administrative Monopoly in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the Measures on the 
Work of Anti-Price Monopoly in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and the Measures on the 
Work of Anti-Monopoly Review of Concentrations of Business Operators in China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone were issued respectively by Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
Shanghai Development and Reform Commission and Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce 
in 2014.  
82 William E. Kovacic, ‘China’s Competition Law Experience in Context’ (2015) 3 (suppl 1) Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement i2, i4. 
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enforcement responsibility is lacking, and fourth, decision-making in antirust cases is 
not consistent and induces an accusation of selective enforcement. Fifth, the lack of 
investigatory powers and independence make the AMEAs vulnerable to local 
governments and SOEs, and finally the current AML structure is not able to ensure 
effective enforcement and generate meaningful deterrence against administrative 
monopoly. 
4.1 Lengthy Timelines and Lack of Transparency in M&A Reviews 
Although MOFCOM receives far more plaudits than the other two AMEAs, it 
faces several problems that undermine the efficiency of the review process. First, the 
duration of review conducted by MOFCOM has been notoriously long, which may 
seriously jeopardise the commercial strategy of the parties to the merger transaction. 
Under the AML, MOFCOM will initially have up to 30 days to conduct a preliminary 
review (‘Phase One’) and decide if further review is necessary.83 Once MOFOCOM 
decides to conduct further review after Phase One, it will be given 90 days (‘Phase 
Two’), to draw a conclusion.84 The time limit will be extended by another 60 days 
(‘Phase Three’), for MOFCOM to take a final decision.85 If no conclusion is made 
after Phase Three, the transaction is automatically allowed to proceed.86 When most 
transactions in the US and the EU are cleared in their equivalent of Phase One, 
MOFCOM clears most transactions in Phase Two or Phase Three.87 
   The statutory review time from the acceptance of filing to the conclusion of a case, 
therefore, lasts up to six months. However, in practice the actual duration between 
                                                             
83 Article 25, AML. 
84 Ibid., Article 26. 
85 The circumstances under which the review process is allowed to enter Phase Three are: (1) the 
business operators and MOFCOM have reached an agreement to extend the time limit; (2) the 
documents or materials submitted are in need of further verification; or (3) there has been a material 
change after the notification of the concentration in question. Articles 26(1)-(3), the AML. 
86 AML, paragraph 3, Article 26. 
87 Deng and Huang (fn 19) 6; and Mark Thatcher, ‘European Commission Merger Control: Combining 
Competition and the Creation of Larger European Firms’ 53 (2014) European Journal of Political 
Research 443, 451. 
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initial notification of a transaction and the final decision may be much longer.88 The 
reason is threefold. First, Phase One will commence only on receipt of all the relevant 
documents and materials which are required pursuant to Article 23.89 However, the 
Article 23 submission requirement has proved to be a difficult one for merging parties 
to fulfil. In all 29 transactions that were either conditionally approved or rejected by 
MOFCOM, only two successfully submitted all the required documents and materials 
at the first attempt. 90  This high re-submission rate suggests that review of most 
transactions would have commenced earlier, but were delayed at the very early stage 
of the process. The delay in relation to the re-submission can be substantial, for 
example, in MediaTek/MStar, the gap between initial and final submissions was two 
months.91 Second, MOFCOM frequently extends the time limit and brings the review 
process into Phase Three. In 21 out of 29 transactions, there was a request for extension 
made by MOFCOM. Since MOFCOM is the sole department that decides if a 
concentration can be implemented, the parties to the transaction will most certainly 
                                                             
88 Since only the names of the parties to an unconditionally approved transaction are available to the 
public, the statistics and analyses here mainly focus on transactions which did not receive unconditional 
approval. 
89  Article 24, AML. This requirement is in line with the EU practice, see Article 10(1) EUMR. 
Moreover, in exceptional circumstances, the Commission also has the discretion under Article 10(4) 
EUMR – the so-called ‘stop-the-clock’ provision – to suspend proceedings in order to request additional 
information from the merging parties. Examples of the Commission stopping the clock include Case 
COMP/M.6992 – Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica, Commission decision of 28 May 2014; Case 
COMP/M.7009 – Holcim/Cemex West, Commission decision of 5 June 2014; and Case COMP/M.7000 
– Liberty Global/Ziggo, Commission decision of 10 October 2014. However, the use of this provision, 
which leads to the delay of the review process, may undermine the interests of the merging parties, see 
for example, Case T-145/06 Omya v Commission [2009] ECR II-145. 
90  These two transactions are Uralkali/Silvinit (2011) MOFCOM Notice No. 33, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201106/20110607583288.shtml; and Novartis/Alcon (2010) 
MOFCOM Notice No. 53, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201008/20100807080639.shtml.  
91  MediaTek/MStar (fn 34). Nonetheless, it is announced by MOFCOM that the Measures on 
Notification of Concentration of Undertakings is currently under revision, and one of the notable 
changes is the establishment of an information feedback mechanism before case filing, which provides: 
‘Where the notification documents and/or materials are not complete or does not satisfy the conditions 
as provided in these Measures, MOFCOM should inform the notifying party of all the contents that 
should be supplemented and/or corrected within five working days. Where MOFCOM fails to inform 
the notifying party within the above time limit, the notification should be deemed as being officially 
accepted as of the date, on which MOFCOM receives the notification documents and/or materials.’ Lefu 
Xu, ‘Measures on Notification of Concentration of Undertakings’ Workshop on Procedural Matters in 
Merger Investigations, EU-China Competition Week, 22 October 2015, 
http://www.euchinacomp.org/index.php/competition-weeks?id=481. This new change is in line with the 
EU practice, which  
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agree to such request.92 Third, for the same reason, in cases where merging parties 
have not reached a desirable outcome with MOFCOM concerning the possible 
remedies, or MOFCOM simply does not finish its review on time, the parties to the 
transaction are encouraged to withdraw their filings and make new filings. 93  In 
WD/HGST, five days before the expiry date of Phase Three, after which the transaction 
could be implemented regardless of MOFCOM’s decision, it was said that Western 
Digital voluntarily withdrew the filing on the ground that there was a material change 
concerning the transaction.94 The parties filed again only six days later, and the review 
went through Phase Two in the second round, making the total review time 297 days.95 
In MediaTek/MStar, the parties and MOFCOM failed to reach a consensus after 
several rounds of negotiations with regard to possible remedies to remove competition 
concerns. The parties withdrew in Phase Three and filed again three weeks later. The 
second round review also went through all three Phases, and the final review time was 
416 days, the longest to date in the AML history.96 These serious delays significantly 
undermined the commercial rationale underlying the merger transactions. 
The delay is caused partially by the lack of MOFCOM manpower, which is badly 
understaffed compared with other merger review agencies in large jurisdictions. The 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, responsible for reviewing around 200 cases 
each year, 97  only has approximately 30 staff, 98  and unlike NDRC and SAIC, 
MOFCOM’s local agencies are not involved in the merger review process. Whilst the 
Simple Cases Rules were adopted to speed up the process, its operation may not be as 
simple as it appears. For example, in Articles 3 of the Simple Cases Rules, exceptions 
                                                             
92  As discussed in the preceding chapter, multiple mandates of MOFCOM make merging parties 
reluctant to challenge its decisions. See fn 182, Chapter 4. 
93 Deng and Huang (fn 19) 5. 
94 WD/HGST (fn 32). 
95 Ibid. 
96 MediaTek/MStar (fn 34). 
97 China.org, ‘Official: China’s Anti-Monopoly Enforcement ‘Not Selective’’, 11 September 2014, at 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-09/11/content_33490663.htm. 
98 Deng and Huang (fn 19) 1; Yong Huang and Zhiyan Li, ‘An Overview of Chinese Competition 
Policy: Between Fragmentation and Consolidation’ in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds.) 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: the First Five Years (Kluwer Law International 2013) 9. 
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which exclude the application from the fast-track procedure are provided. Pursuant to 
these exceptions, concentration which has potential adverse influence on ‘national 
economic development’99 would not be deemed to be a simple case.100 Moreover, 
MOFCOM is allowed to take into account new circumstances under which the fast-
track procedure would not be applicable.101 The vagueness of this provision and the 
non-exhaustive nature of the list of exceptions provide MOFCOM with a legal basis 
to intervene in a particular transaction, which would otherwise be deemed a simple 
case, so rendering the actual impact of the procedure on mitigating delays uncertain. 
The second problem with MOFCOM’s merger review is the opacity of its 
decision-making. Compared with its early decisions, which are extremely short and 
over-simplified, MOFCOM has begun to provide more information in its recent 
decisions.102 As with its analyses of relevant products and markets, and the assessment 
of the competitive effects, which still lack appropriate depth, any information with 
regard to its decision-making process is largely general. In its published decision, there 
is always a similar sentence stating that during the review process, MOFCOM has 
obtained opinions and information concerning the definition of relevant market and 
current market structure from ‘relevant’ government departments, trade associations, 
upstream/downstream and competing undertakings. This consultation can take various 
forms. Mostly, information is obtained through organising symposiums;103 in 3 cases, 
MOFCOM conducted surveys of competing undertakings and consumers,104 and in 2 
conducted telephone interviews. 105  In addition, independent third parties such as 
                                                             
99 This provision adheres to Article 27(5) of the AML, which states that competition agency shall 
consider ‘the influence of the concentration of business operators on the national economic development’ 
in the merger review process. 
100 Article 3(5), Provisional Rules on the Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentrations of 
Business Operators. 
101 Ibid, Article 3(6). 
102 Deng and Huang (fn 19) 4. 
103  For example in Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite (2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 28, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.shtml. 
104  Panasonic/Sanyo (2009) MOFCOM Notice No. 82, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200910/20091006593175.shtml; Thermo Fisher/Li Fei (2014) 
MOFCOM Notice No. 3, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201401/20140100461603.shtml; and 
UTC/Goodrich. 
105 Panasonic/Sanyo and Novartis/Alcon. 
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consulting organisations also participated to verify the data provided by the filing 
parties106 or to conduct quantitative analyses.107 Other than this general summary, 
MOFCOM has never stated what the ‘relevant’ government department, organisations 
or interviewees from which it sought information and opinions specifically were, and 
what kinds of opinions and information were actually obtained.  
Such a consultation process, which forms another reason for serious delay, is in 
fact indispensable in many cases, since it is unrealistic to expect MOFCOM to have 
all the necessary knowledge and expertise to conduct complex economic analyses 
independently concerning every sector. It nonetheless contributes substantially to the 
unpredictability of the review process, since competition practitioners involved in 
merger reviews have claimed that MOFCOM does not communicate the information 
it obtains during the consultation with the parties to the transaction.108 To the merging 
parties, some information obtained from competing undertakings or third party 
organisations may adversely affect the final decision, but the opacity prevents them 
from confronting MOFCOM about the relevance or accuracy of the source. In addition, 
it is more easily foreseeable that MOFCOM regularly consult with the NDRC and the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), since these two ministries 
oversee the making of macroeconomic and industrial policies, but there is at the same 
time suspicion that MOFCOM might be influenced in making the final decision by 
their opinions which are based primarily on industrial policy rather than pure 
economics.109 Since it is highly impractical to make all relevant information and 
materials in every case publicly available, the only way to still this suspicion – a 
reasonable one given the close relationship between the ministries – is to bring the 
                                                             
106  GE/Shenhua (2011) MOFCOM Notice No. 74, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201111/20111107855595.shtml. 
107 Thermo Fisher/Li Fei. 
108 Deng and Huang (fn 19) 10. 
109 Ibid.; D. Daniel Sokol, ‘Merger Control under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2013) Minnesota 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-05, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207690, 14-15; Zhang (fn 19) 14; 
and Ping Lin and Jingjing Zhao, ‘Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2012) 41 
Rev Ind Organ 109, 128. 
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merging parties more closely into the review procedure and thus ensure the fairness of 
this process.110 
4.2 Shared Jurisdiction of Competition Enforcement Leads to Conflicts and 
Incoherence 
As a direct consequence of the conflicts among the three AMEAs during the 
drafting of the AML, a tripartite enforcement structure was introduced as a 
compromise.111 A substantial weakness of China’s competition system which hinders 
the development of competition enforcement is that 3 central AMEAs are not distinct 
and standalone government bodies, but are directly under respective larger 
ministries.112 As three ministerial bodies, MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC are charged 
with performing many other functions, and the priorities of the 3 bodies are largely 
different.113  
When there is a divergence of tasks and limited resources, the enforcement 
agenda is always shaped to prioritise bureaucratic missions which yield the most 
‘profits’ – policy control powers;114 and as a consequence, resources would not be 
preferentially invested in those units which are not able to maximise this interest. In 
this sense, the enforcement of the AML is actually a drudgery which not only requires 
more resources than other jobs that the AMEAs are more familiar with, but also 
generates less positive impact on the development of the AMEAs, or more specifically, 
on the political prospects of the leaders of the AMEAs. Since at the local level, only 
the provincial-level AMEAs can enforce the AML, the bureaucrats certainly lack 
                                                             
110 In the EU, in order to increase the transparency of competition proceedings, relevant parties have 
rights of access to commission files. This issue will be discussed in section 5.1, Chapter 7. 
111 See section 3.2, Chapter 3. 
112 Zhang (fn 19) 26. 
113 Ibid.; and Wang Xiaoye and Adrian Emch, ‘Enforcement under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: So 
Far, So Good?’ in Nicolas Charbit and others (eds) William E. Kovacic; An Antitrust Tribute Liber 
Amicorum, vol. 1 (Concurrences 2012) 384. For the functions of each central AMEAs, see section 3 of 
Chapter 2 and section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
114 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge University Press 2000) 412; 
and Zhang (fn 19) 26. 
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intense enthusiasm to prioritise competition enforcement when all their local agencies, 
including those at municipal and county levels, are able to fulfil other designated 
responsibilities. 115  Competition enforcement officials within the AMEAs may 
frequently have to consider issues other than competition-related matters when 
enforcing the AML, or even handle cases that are not relevant to competition 
enforcement. For example, in local Price Bureau it is common for an official from the 
Anti-Monopoly Division to join other teams and probe into non-competition-related 
cases as the price regulator for certain key commodities under the Price Law. 116 
Indeed, in practice, competition enforcement only constitutes a minor part of the day-
to-day work of these AMEAs: at central level, there are only approximately 50 people 
who are handling anti-monopoly matters in these 3 ministries combined.117 In contrast, 
although the European Commission also has a wide range of missions, competition 
enforcement has become one of its major priorities, and the Directorate-General for 
Competition has a total staff of approximately 900.118  
    A separation of jurisdiction of competition enforcement amongst various 
departments can also lead to different understanding of the law because they are each 
part of a distinct environment dealing with different tasks, and it is likely that when 
interpreting the law the 3 agencies would have different understanding of some 
                                                             
115 For example, SAIC and local AICs concluded 37,219 counterfeiting cases in 2014, whilst during 
the same time the number of concluded AML cases is eight. See SAIC, ‘Administrative Enforcement 
of Trademarks’, 22 April 2015, 
http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/ztbd/xsbfsxyzn/gzgl/201504/t20150422_155391.html. 
116 As discussed above, the Price Law also has some competition-related provisions, for example, 
Article 14(1) prohibits price-fixing cartel. So there is a certain degree of overlap between the Price Law 
and the AML. In practice, NDRC is allowed to apply either the Price Law or the AML against price-
fixing cartels, but this discretion may lead to serious rent-seeking behaviour since the maximum fine 
allowed under the Price Law is significantly less than what is provided for under the AML. There is a 
possibility that offending cartel members may persuade NDRC to apply the Price Law instead of the 
AML, although there is no evidence suggesting that this type of behavour has actually taken place. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of legal certainty, competition-related provisions in the Price Law should be 
removed completely. 
117 MOFCOM, ‘The Information Office of the State Council Holds Press Briefing on Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement’, 11 September 2014, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/201409/20140900733559.shtml. 
118 Alec Burnside et al., ‘Making Life Simpler – China’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau Has Reformed the 





fundamental concepts, which would induce conflicts and incoherence.119 This is a 
particular concern for the enforcement on restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominant positions, where SAIC and NDRC share parallel enforcement 
responsibilities, the demarcation between which is based solely on whether a particular 
practice has a price element. However, such dichotomy is neither absolute nor 
mutually exclusive. 120  When a case triggers the concurrent jurisdiction of both 
agencies, it will in theory require these 2 agencies to work together in a coordinated 
fashion. However, as will be discussed later, the lack of coordination is in fact one of 
the most prominent problems that undermines the effective enforcement of the AML. 
In practice, under circumstances where the anti-competitive practices include both 
elements the enforcement actions seemed to be relatively random. On some occasions, 
one agency stepped in and handled all the illegal practices regardless of their nature. 
In the Qualcomm case, 121  there were several non-price-related anti-competitive 
practices involved, which could not justify NDRC’s intervention. For example, 
although tying SEPs to non-SEPs eventually led to excessive patent royalties, the 
practice alone did not seem to have a price element. Similarly, Qualcomm’s abusive 
practice of incorporating unreasonable conditions into its licensing agreement for the 
supply of baseband processors was also non-price-related. Theoretically, these two 
illegal practices should have been sanctioned by SAIC under Articles 6(1) and (2) of 
SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position, which prohibits 
business operators from ‘tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions 
                                                             
119 Xiaoye Wang, ‘Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2009) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 
133, 144; Nathan Bush, ‘Constraints on Convergence in Chinese Antitrust’ (2009) 54 The Antitrust 
Bulletin 87, 104; Yong Huang, ‘Pursuing the Second Best: The History Momentum, and Remaining 
Issues of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 117, 125; and Zhang (fn 15) 
12. 
120 Xinzhu Zhang and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘New Wine into Old Wineskins: Recent Developments 
in China’s Competition Policy against Monopolistic/Collusive Agreements’ (2012) 41 Rev Ind Organ 
53, 66. 
121 See Qualcomm Incorporated (fn 53). 
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without justifiable cause’. In addition, the newly adopted IPR Rules also make it clear 
that these IPR-related violations fall under SAIC’s jurisdiction.122 
    On other occasions, one agency intervened and dealt with the practices that fell 
within its scope of responsibility while leaving the other practices untouched. In 
November 2012, SAIC’s local agency in Hunan Province, Hunan AIC, imposed fines 
of CNY 1.7 million on insurance industry associations and insurance companies in 4 
cities over monopoly agreements.123 The Hunan AIC found that these agreements 
prevented cross-regional sales of insurance by dividing the sales market among 
participating companies. In addition, they stipulated a discount ceiling on new 
automobiles insurance of 5%. Hunan AIC concluded that the agreements were in 
breach of Article 13(3) of the AML, which prohibits the division of the sales market, 
and made no reference to the illegal practice of setting discounts.124 A month later, in 
a different city of the same province, the Price Bureau of Hunan Province imposed 
penalties of CNY 2.19 million on an insurance cartel over price fixing.125 The cartel 
was led by the Loudi Insurance Industry Association and made up of 11 insurance 
companies and 1 insurance broker. Each member had signed cooperation agreements 
with the Association, which divided the sales market among the members. The 
members also agreed collectively to apply a 5% discount to all automobile insurances. 
Whilst the price fixing was penalised, the practice of market allocation was ignored. 
Given the proximity of time and propinquity of locality and the very close 
similarity of facts in these cases, there is every likelihood that the two AMEAs – Hunan 
AIC and Hunan Price Bureau – were fully aware of the investigations conducted by 
each other, yet were unwilling to be involved in the same case because they feared the 
other agency might ‘steal the show’.126 Such method of enforcement may send the 
                                                             
122 Articles 9 and 10, IPR Rules. 
123 Official decisions available at http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Xinhua News Agency, ‘First Monopoly Case Sanctioned in Hunan Province’, 28 December 2012, 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-12/28/content_2301393.htm.  
126 The competition between SAIC and NDRC will be discussed in the next section. 
160 
 
wrong signal to potential perpetrators and the general public who are unfamiliar with 
the AML and may conclude that the unpunished practices are unobjectionable. In this 
sense, enforcement will be more effective if one agency takes over the responsibilities 
from the other, as did NDRC in the Qualcomm case, although it is not strictly in line 
with current law. 
In addition, this incoherent division of antitrust jurisdiction may worsen the 
application of the leniency programme, the legal basis of which is provided by Article 
46 of the AML. Since NDRC and SAIC each adopts provisions regarding its own 
leniency programme,127 companies seeking to report illegal practices and benefit from 
the leniency programme will have to correctly identify the nature of their conducts and 
then reach the corresponding AMEAs. However, this has already proven not to be an 
easy task even for the AMEAs themselves. Additionally, the AMEAs are silent as to 
whom the whistle-blower should go if the monopoly agreement contains both price-
related and non-price-related elements. The lack of transparency and predictability 
potentially deters those companies that would otherwise apply for leniency and 
endangers the effectiveness of this policy.128  
4.3 Lack of Coordination amongst Government Departments and the AMEAs 
The failure of the AML and its implementing rules to address concrete guidance 
on the allocation of enforcement responsibilities leads to random application of laws. 
Even worse, since the AMC is not functioning as expected, competition enforcement 
is not accompanied by satisfactory cooperation and coordination amongst ministries 
involved and the AMEAs.  
The AMC is supposed to be a superior authority to supervise enforcement 
activities and coordinate conflicts between AMEAs. However, as its everyday 
                                                             
127 See respectively Article 14 of NDRC Procedural Rules on Administrative Enforcement against Price 
Monopoly; and Article 20, SAIC Procedural Rules on the Investigation and Handling of Cases relating 
to Monopoly Agreements and Abuses of Dominant Market Position. 
128 Andrew Eichner, ‘Battling Cartels in the New Era of Chinese Antitrust Enforcement’ (2012) 47 
Texas International Law Journal 588, 613. 
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administrative work is handled by the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM,129 which 
is an AMEA under the supervision of the AMC itself, its neutrality as a coordinator is 
largely questionable. Moreover, what functions it actually has in practice is still 
unknown. It has kept a low-profile since the entry into force of the AML with only one 
guideline published.130  In fact, considerable policy-making and guideline-drafting 
tasks have been performing by the AMEAs in practice. For example, in addition to the 
guidelines on anti-monopoly enforcement in automobile sector as mentioned above,131 
NDRC has been commissioned by the AMC to draft anti-monopoly guidelines on 
issues such as intellectual property rights, leniency programme, exemptions, 
suspension of investigation, and calculation of fines. 132  Moreover, when the 
competition investigation attracts the interests of some particular ministry, it is still not 
clear how the AMC can step in and resolve this kind of problem. This is especially the 
case when the AMC includes representatives from other ministries. For example, MIIT 
is one of the members within the AMC. When the investigation into the abuse of the 
dominance of China Telecom and China Unicom began133 there were debates as to 
which rule should prevail, the AML or sector regulations of the telecommunication 
industry. But there was no evidence that the AMC ever addressed the issue and it is 
believed that, in practice, the commissioners rarely meet to discuss competition 
issues.134 
On top of this, conflicts between NDRC and SAIC are intense.135 It is widely 
perceived that, given all the defects of the status quo, the tripartite enforcement system 
                                                             
129 ‘The Ministry of Commerce shall undertake concrete work of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of 
the State Council […]’ See the Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Main Functions 
and Constituent Members of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council, 28 July, 2008. 
130 See the Guidelines on the Definition of the Relevant Market, at http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2009-
07/07/content_1355288.htm. 
131 See fn 50 above. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Xinhua News Agency, ‘China Telecom and China Unicom Face Anti-Monopoly Investigation’, 10 
November 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-11/10/c_111158620.htm. This case will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.2, Chapter 6. 
134 Zhang (fn 15) 19. 
135 Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘The Enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: An Institutional Design 
Perspective’ (2011)56 Antitrust Bull. 630, 640-645. 
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in China will eventually be replaced by a more logical and preferable structure, namely 
a single body purpose built for to competition enforcement. 136  In response to a 
suggestion that urged China to consolidate its three central AMEAs and confer the sole 
enforcement authority upon a single enforcement agency, Xu Kunlin, the director 
general of NDRC, stated:  
‘Frankly, I personally think that those which were long divided would 
eventually be unified,137 this is a general trend. If we chose to establish 
a single agency to enforce the AML when it was being drafted, its 
promulgation would have been postponed for many years. With the 
development of enforcement, we do need a consolidated, independent, 
authoritative and powerful enforcement agency in the long term.’138  
If the AMEAs are to be consolidated, the normal practice in China when it comes 
to restructuring government bodies is to let the stronger departments absorb the weaker 
departments with similar mandates. As a result, NDRC and SAIC, two enforcement 
agencies afforded similar competition enforcement priorities, are placed in an 
intensely competitive situation. On the one hand, they each ‘strive to achieve pre-
eminence and greater appropriations’,139 and will therefore contend for the right to 
investigate when the case is simple or is likely to raise public concern. On the other, 
they will produce as many obstacles as they can to hinder the investigatory actions of 
the opposite side, and will be unwilling to take on complicated cases.140 This hostile 
competition between the AMEAs clearly makes enforcement more time-consuming, 
wastes public resources, and possibly results in misfeasance.  
                                                             
136 See for example, Xiaoye Wang and Adrian Emch, ‘Five Years of Implementation of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law – Achievements and Challenges’ (2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 247, 268. 
137 This sentence comes from ‘fenjiu bihe, hejiu bifen [分久必合，合久必分]’, an old Chinese idiom 
describing the trend of political evolution in ancient China. It literally means those which were long 
divided would eventually be unified, and those which were long unified would eventually be divided. 
138 MOFCOM (fn 117). The statement given by Xu Kunlin was in Chinese, and was translated by this 
author. 
139 William E. Kovacic and David A. Hyman, ‘Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu?’ 
(2012) GW Law Fculty Publications & Other Works, Paper 628, 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/628, 8. 
140 Interviews with anonymous Chinese competition enforcement officials. 
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4.4 Inconsistency of Decision Making in Antitrust Cases 
Foreign undertakings have been a target of Chinese government bodies and 
viewed as the main source of distortion of Chinese market competition since before 
the adoption of the AML, given that they possess ‘huge advantages in technology, 
scale, capital, etc. It is easy for them to gain a competitive edge, even monopoly 
positions, in the market’.141 After the entry into force of the AML, since the number 
of investigations involving foreign undertakings has grown rapidly in recent years, 
western media have been criticising the AMEAs for selective enforcement by hostile 
targeting of foreign undertakings whilst deliberately overlooking the anti-competitive 
practices of domestic undertakings.142 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that according to 
a public statement made by NDRC, as of 11 September 2014 it has conducted in total 
335 anti-monopoly investigations, among which only 33 involved foreign 
undertakings.143 Similarly, SAIC has initiated 39 cases, only 2 concerned foreign 
undertakings, namely, Tetra Pak and Microsoft.144 Although it appears difficult to 
show statistically that the AMEAs have selectively enforced the AML, suspected bias 
becomes apparent in the use of enforcement discretion in some decisions made by 
NDRC, which is imbedded in the governmental culture 145  and worsened by the 
incorporation of multiple objectives.146  
                                                             
141  Anti-Monopoly Office of the Fair Trade Bureau of SAIC, ‘Anti-Competitive Behaviours of 
Multinationals in China and the Counter-Measures’ (2004) 5 Industry and Commerce Administration 
42. See also Daniel CK Chow, ‘How China’s Enforcement of Its Anti-Monopoly Law Poses Risks to 
Multinational Companies’ 14 Santa Clara Law Review (forthcoming 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2599518, 5.  
142 See for example, Jerin Mathew, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Unit Looks to Strengthen Medical Devices 
and Semi-Conductor Sector against Foreign Competition, 4 September 2014, at 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-anti-monopoly-unit-looks-strengthen-medical-devices-semi-
conductor-sectors-against-1463938; and Richard Epstein, ‘Controlling Chinese Antitrust Abuses 
against Foreign Patent Owners Requires US to Make Sound Decisions at Home’, 1 August 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2015/01/08/controlling-chinese-antitrust-abuses-against-
foreign-patent-owners-requires-u-s-to-make-sound-decisions-at-home.  
143 China.org, ‘Official: China’s Anti-Monopoly Enforcement ‘Not Selective’’, 11 September 2014, at 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-09/11/content_33490663.htm.  
144 MOFCOM (fn 117).  
145 See section 1.2, Chapter 2. 
146 See section 3.1.2, Chapter 3. 
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In the field of monopoly agreements, in 2013 NDRC issued 3 highly influential 
decisions, 2 of which concerned domestic undertakings. In February a case concerning 
vertical agreements which involved two powerful state-owned alcohol enterprises 
came to prominence in the Chinese media. Moutai and Wuliangye had a month earlier 
released new marketing policies to set the lowest retail price, and distributors who 
failed to comply would face heavy penalties.147 However, after only a few days, on 15 
and 17 January Moutai and Wuliangye respectively made similar statements which 
declared that as a result of investigation by NDRC and its local price bureau they 
undertook to comply with the AML and decided to rescind their newly adopted 
marketing policies.148 On 22 February, the Price Bureau of Guizhou Province149 and 
the Sichuan Provincial DRC 150  released their official decisions on Moutai and 
Wuliangye respectively. Penalties of CNY 247 million and CNY 202 million were 
imposed on Moutai and Wuliangye respectively for their RPM practices. Both 
undertakings received the lowest possible fine, namely 1% of their relevant sales 
revenue in the previous financial year,151 because they cooperated actively in the 
investigation, and voluntarily returned to the affected distributors the illegal sanctions 
collected as penalties for non-compliance with the pricing policies. 
A few months later, on 7 August 2013, 6 manufacturers of infant formula were 
fined a total of CNY 670 million for RPM, which is a breach of Article 14(2) of the 
AML.152 The decision was concluded after an NDRC’s investigation commencing in 
                                                             
147 See fn 45 above. 
148 Sina, ‘Moutai and Wuliangye Fined CNY 449 Million over Price Monopoly’, 20 February 2013, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130220/023014588388.shtml  
149 Moutai (2012) Xinhua News Agency, ‘Moutai Fined CNY 247 million for Price Monopoly by 
Guizhou Price Bureau’, 22 February 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-
02/22/c_124377781.htm.  
150 Wuliangye (2013) Sichuan Development and Reform Commission, ‘Wuliangye Fined CNY 202 
million for Price-Fixing’, 22 February 2013, http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm. 
151 It is worth noticing that only the official decision issued by Sichuan Development and Reform 
Commission made reference of the fines imposed to ‘1% of relevant sales revenue’ of the undertaking, 
the relatively short decision from Guizhou Provincial Price Bureau stated only the amount of the fines. 
Therefore, the relation between fines on Moutai and the%age of its sales revenue is probably based on 
speculation, and is mainly referred to in media and academic articles.  
152 Infant Milk Formula Case (2013) NDRC, ‘Biostime and other Infant Milk Formula Manufacturers 




March into 9 infant formula manufacturers, Wyeth, Dumex, Mead Johnson, Meiji, 
Biostime, Beingmate, Abbott, FrieslandCampina and Fonterra, all of which are 
Chinese subsidiaries of foreign undertakings. NDRC found them to have engaged in 
RPM by instructing distributors and retailers to sell their products at a specific price 
set by the manufacturers. In return, compliant retailers and distributors would receive 
rebates whilst any not complying would suffer fines, reduced rebates, or restricted 
supply of products. As for penalties, 3 undertakings received full immunity; 4 faced 
fines corresponding to 3% of their annual sales revenue; and the remaining 2, Mead 
Johnson and Biostime, were fined respectively CNY 203.76 million (4% of annual 
sales revenue) and CNY 162.9 million (6%). According to the decision the varying 
penalty level was a result of the undertakings’ degree of cooperation with the NDRC 
in the investigation, during which Biostime was accused of being highly uncooperative 
and of failing actively to implement corrective measures, whilst Mead Johnson, though 
also not fully cooperative, nonetheless actively adopted corrective methods. Although 
the NDRC decision did not provide any details as to what corrective measures had 
been taken by these companies, it is worth noting that several of them have been 
reported to have ‘voluntarily’ reduced retail prices for their products significantly prior 
to the publication of the NDRC’s decision.153 Therefore, there is a possibility that 
NDRC exerted direct price control by forcing the undertakings to reduce product prices, 
and in return granting confession-based concessions to them according to the level of 
compliance.154 Although consumers can benefit from lower prices in the short term, 
intervention in undertakings’ freedom to set price is an improper means to promote 
consumer welfare, since it is itself a distortion to competitive process and will 
undermine the order of market economy in the long term. 
                                                             
153 Sina, ‘NDRC Clears up Doubts concerning the Immunity of Wyeth: the First to Reduce Prices and 
Admit Faults’, 8 August 2013, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130808/022816379184.shtml. 
154 The unit responsible for price regulation within NDRC is not the Price Supervision and Anti-
Monopoly Bureau, but the Price Department. However, the enforcement activities of these two units 
may be subject to influence of each other, as they answer to the same supervising official – Hu Zucai, 
Deputy Director of NDRC. See NDRC, ‘Hu Zucai – Portfolio’, http://huzucai.ndrc.gov.cn/zggz. 
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  Only 5 days after the infant milk formula decision, NDPC and Shanghai DRC 
published the decision pursuant to an investigation into a Shanghai-based gold 
cartel.155 In the decision, 5 retailers were accused of manipulating the price of gold in 
Shanghai through a pricing scheme created in cooperation with the Shanghai Gold and 
Jewellery Trade Association. The 5 retailers were fined aggregately CNY 10.09 
million, equivalent to 1% of their annual sales revenue, for violating Article 13(1) of 
the AML. Responding to the inquiry as to why the lowest end of a 1% to 10% range 
was chosen, the NDRC claimed that it was because the retailers had been cooperative 
during the investigation by submitting ‘confession reports’ to NDRC in which they 
admitted taking part in the cartel and provided further details in the matter, and that 
they had ceased illegal price-fixing before the investigation.156  
There is a certain degree of similarity in these 3 high profile cases. For example, 
all but two undertakings – Mead Johnson and Biostime – were reported to be 
cooperative and showed a willingness to implement corrective measures, and most 
received a reduced fine on the ground of a high degree of cooperation. Nonetheless, 
the decisions raise some questions concerning the consistency of NDRC’s decision-
making. 
First, because there is no implemented rule available to govern the calculation of 
fines, it is left entirely to the AMEAs’ discretion to evaluate the ‘nature’, the 
‘seriousness’ and the ‘duration’ of the illegal conduct.157 Yet NDRC and its local 
authorities have failed to include any useful information in the decisions as to how the 
adverse effects of the business practices were assessed and how a specific percentage 
of sales revenue was chosen. There is still some debate over whether vertical 
agreements that fix minimum resale price, as in the Moutai and infant formula cases, 
                                                             
155 Shanghai Gold Cartel (2013) NDRC, ‘Shanghai Golden Jewelry Association and A Number of Gold 
Retailers Fined for Implementing Price Monopoly’, 13 August 2013, 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201308/t20130813_553441.html.  
156  Xinhua News Agency, ‘NDRC Talks about the Gold Retailers Case’, 12 August 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-08/12/c_125156636.htm. 
157 Article 49, AML. 
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are per se illegal or whether adverse effects on competition must first be established.158 
The authorities seemed reluctant to touch upon this issue in their decisions, as no 
explicit reference to either a per se rule or a rule of reason is to be found. This debate 
notwithstanding, at least a proper assessment of the illegal conduct in question should 
have been presented in the decisions of the AMEAs, so that the undertakings involved 
would be made aware of how the severity level of their illegal practices were 
determined.  
Second, when using its discretion, there is nothing wrong in a competition 
authority reducing fines or granting immunity. However, the factors that were taken 
into account to justify a reduction in fines remain elusive. In Moutai, Wuliangye and 
Shanghai Goal Cartel, all undertakings involved received reduced fines of 1% of their 
sales revenue owing to their ‘high degree of cooperation’.159 Yet when a ‘high degree 
of cooperation’ was considered a factor that led to fine reduction in the infant formula 
case, the undertakings which were highly cooperative still received fines as high as 3% 
of sales revenue.160 Moreover, several of the manufacturers reduced the retail prices 
of their products during the investigation, but had this fact been considered as an 
element helping to reduce the fine? NDRC’s failure to explain in detail how different 
levels of seriousness of conduct and different degrees of cooperation led to differences 
between fines makes some raise the question of whether there is actually a different 
treatment between domestic – or more specifically, SOEs 161  – and foreign 
undertakings.162 This could be relevant since the government has been extremely 
                                                             
158 For study on the treatment of RPM in China, see Shan Jiang and Daniel Sokol, ‘Resale Price 
Maintenance in China: An Economic Perspective’ (2015) 3 (suppl 1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 
i132. 
159 See fn 149, fn 150 and fn 155 above. 
160 See fn 162 above. 
161 See also Zhejiang Insurance Cartel, all of the three undertakings benefiting from the leniency 
programme were SOEs, and the original fines imposed on the two undertakings entitled to reduction 
were, again, 1% of the relevant revenue. Namely, the actual fines levied on these two SOEs were merely 
0.1% and 0.55% of the relevant revenue respectively. See section 2.1.2 of Chapter 4 for case details. 





supportive of domestic infant formula manufacturers ever since the domestic milk 
scandal started.163  
Third, whilst the AML empowers the AMEA to impose a fine of 1% up to 10% 
of the sales revenue in the previous year on business operators for reaching monopoly 
agreements or abusing their dominant positions,164 there is an ambiguity as to the 
calculation of the ‘sales revenue’ and a divergence of the determination of what 
‘previous year’ refers to. In Wuliangye, the fine was based on the ‘relevant revenue’ of 
Wuliangye;165 in Qualcomm, ‘sales revenue in China’ of Qualcomm; and in Zhejiang 
Insurance Cartel, ‘revenue of commercial car insurance’ of the Zhejiang Branches of 
each insurance company.166 It is clear that there is an inconsistency in determining 
whether the ‘sales revenue’ refers to the total revenue or the revenue of the relevant 
product of an undertaking, which clearly greatly affects the calculation of the final fine. 
In addition, it is still unknown how ‘previous year’ is defined. In a seminar organised 
during the Ninth EU-China Competition Week, an official from NDRC stated that 
‘[w]e tend to understand the previous year as [‘]the previous year before the anti-
monopoly enforcement agency make the penalty decision[’]’. 167  This was the 
approach taken in Zhejiang Insurance Cartel, where the final decision was made in 
2013, as a consequence the revenue in 2012 was used to calculate the fine. However, 
in Qualcomm, NDRC stated that the sales revenue referred to was Qualcomm’s sales 
                                                             
163  See BBC, ‘China ‘Fake Milk’ Scandal Deepens’, 22 April 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3648583.stm. 
164 Articles 46 and 47, AML. 
165 Wuliangye (fn 150). 
166 See for example, Zhejiang Branch of Min An Insurance Co., Ltd. (2013) NDRC Decision No. 29, 
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revenue in China in 2013. According to the official decision, the investigation into 
Qualcomm’s abuse of dominant position commenced in November 2013 and 
concluded in February 2015, it is clear that ‘previous year’ was treated neither as the 
fiscal year before the investigation started nor as the fiscal year before the final 
conclusion was made. Moreover, on some other occasions, the AMEAs did not provide 
information on the relevant revenue used to calculate the fine.168 
In order to reduce legal uncertainty, limit discretion of the AMEAs, preserve 
consistency of decision-making, it is necessary for either the AMC or the relevant 
AMEAs to adopt clear guidance on the calculation of fines, and, in this regard, the 
European experience is highly relevant.169 
4.5 The AMEAs lack Sufficient Investigatory Powers 
In today’s commercial world, as no single business can survive on its own, the 
actual boundary between markets can be blurred, and every little interest in a particular 
product may connect, directly or indirectly, to huge profits gained in different markets. 
It is, therefore, not difficult to envisage how desperately a businessman will try to 
protect his commercial interests, even those which seem to be small in scale, by 
whatever means he is able to employ. This is even more explicit in China, where most 
wealth is in the hands of a small group of people who inevitably enjoy some sort of 
governmental connections;170 and at the same time, the Chinese government is the 
regulator of and, ironically, the player in commercial markets. Against this background, 
when trying to protect market competition with the AML, the AMEAs are confronted 
with one inherent institutional problem that impedes the effective competition 
                                                             
168 See for example, Infant Milk Formula Case (fn 152). 
169 See section 5.4, Chapter 7. 
170 A study conducted by Peking University finds that Chinese households at the top 5% of all income 
earners took in 23% of the total, while the bottom 5% earned 0.1%. See ‘In China, A Wide Gap between 
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and-poor/UPI-11571374248981. The close relationship between businessmen and government officials 
stems from China’s traditional culture of guanxi, which will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
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enforcement at very early stage: the lack of sufficient investigatory powers to 
overcome local impediments. 
In most cases concerning merely local undertakings, either private or state-owned, 
political pressures from superior government bodies are not likely to be major, as the 
commercial links between these bodies and local undertakings are generally indirect 
and weak. However, when facing constraints from local government during 
investigation at the local level, the AMEAs often do not have adequate means to cope 
with the situation, because the investigatory powers they enjoy are too limited. Several 
procedural rules have been issued to entrust the AMEAs with sufficient investigatory 
powers, for example, the Procedural Rules for Investigating and Handling Cases 
Relating to Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Dominance Cases for SAIC, and 
Procedural Rules on Anti-price Monopoly Conduct for NDRC. However, in China 
sometimes there is a wide gap between what legal documents state on paper and how 
they are implemented in practice, especially when the interests of local undertakings 
will be harmed by state-formulated rules. 171  Generally, effective performance of 
investigation would always be realised only with the assistance and cooperation of 
some other government bodies at local level.  
In 2013 an undertaking in Guangdong Province was accused of abusing its 
dominant position in the river-sand 172  exploitation market in Qujiang District of 
Shaoguan City by charging unfairly high prices. 173  The case was brought to the 
competition agency, the Price Bureau of Guangdong Province, upon a complaint filed 
with the Provincial Government of Guangdong alleging that the construction of a 
motorway across the region near Qujiang was delayed as a consequence of significant 
increase in the river-sand price. Although the actions of the competition agency were 
                                                             
171  Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima and Dwight H. Perkins, Under New Ownership: Privatizing 
China’s State-Owned Enterprises (Stanford University Press 2006) 85-86. 
172 River-sand is one of the basic raw materials for the production of concrete. 
173  Guangdong River Sand Case (2013) Guangdong DRC, ‘Price Bureau of Guangdong Province 
Investigates Price Monopoly Conduct by River Sand Undertaking’, 4 September 2013, 
http://www.fzb.gd.gov.cn/sofpro/otherproject/text/content.jsp?info_id=10848. The details of this case 
were mainly obtained through interviews with anonymous competition officials. 
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backed by a direct order from the provincial government, the investigation did not go 
as smoothly as expected. It took a much longer for the agency to obtain all the 
information it needed, mainly because the local government of Qujiang was unusually 
un-cooperative with the agency and protective of the monopolist undertaking during 
the investigation. At the same time, the agency did not have adequate means to cope 
with the situation. It was believed that the reason that the case was able to be concluded 
was only because one of the high-ranking officials at the Price Bureau used his own 
personal connections to persuade the local government to co-operate. The use of 
connections rather than legal means may be a time-efficient solution where more 
powerful implementing rules and meaningful coordination between government 
bodies are lacking, but it is fundamentally contrary to the rule of law.  
The local government’s reluctance to cooperate in this case might also be a result 
of a possible abusive exercise of administrative power. In China, the extraction of 
river-sand is a business that can only be legitimately run when a license is granted to 
an undertaking by the local government. However, the bidding process concerning the 
grant of license is not always transparent enough to guarantee compliance with 
relevant laws, including the AML. Investigation into the illegal practice of the river-
sand undertaking would inevitably trace back to the conferral of its license at the very 
beginning, and lead to the exposure of the illegal exercise of administrative power on 
the part of the local government. 
The AMEA’s vulnerability at local level mainly results from there being no rule 
to protect the investigative powers of the AMEAs from intervention by local 
government, and the governmental structure – which is largely based on rule of man 
rather than rule of law – dictates that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to hold 
local government accountable for hindering an ongoing competition investigation. A 
second issue is the close link between local government and local enterprises, which 
will be the topic of discussion for the next section. 
172 
 
4.6 The Difficulty of Tackling Administrative Monopoly 
The prohibition of administrative monopoly is included in Chapter V of the 
AML.174 Administrative monopoly refers to the abusive exercise of administrative 
power of government departments in relation to the supervision and regulation of 
economic activities that have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.175 
The causes of administrative monopoly are complicated, but generally include 
government’s far-reaching power in resource allocation, government’s financial 
reliance on tax revenue generated by local undertakings, and the lack of transparency 
and supervision in government’s decision making. It was recognised at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee that the over concentration of 
authority had been a ‘serious weakness’ of the economic administration system. 
Therefore the economic supervision power should be decentralised and devolved to 
local levels, where local enterprises should be allowed to enjoy more managerial 
                                                             
174  Article 3 of the AML provides the definition of ‘monopolistic conducts’: ‘(1) monopolistic 
agreements among business operators; (2) abuse of dominant market positions by business operators; 
and (3) concentration of business operators that eliminates or restricts competition or might be 
eliminating or restricting competition.’ In addition to this three basic areas of regulation, Article 8 
further prohibits the abuse of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition – the so-called 
administrative monopoly. Following a literal interpretation of Articles 3 and 8, abuse of administrative 
power to eliminate or restrict competition is not deemed a ‘monopolistic conduct’, therefore the term 
‘administrative monopoly’ does not seem to be absolutely accurate. Nonetheless, since the term is 
widely used in literature, this thesis will use ‘administrative monopoly’ to refer to the abuse of 
administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition. 
175 The AML does not define administrative monopoly. Instead, it provides a list of governmental 
actions which constitute abuse of administrative power. See Articles 32 to 37. It is noteworthy that a 
few scholars argue that administrative monopoly includes both industry monopoly and regional 
monopoly. See for example, Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: 
A Third Way for Competition Regime?’ (2003) 24 Nw J. Int’L L. and Bus. 107, 113; Jacob S. Schneider, 
‘Administrative Monopoly and China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Lessons from Europe’s State Aid 
Doctrine’ (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review 869, 871; and Changqi Wu and Zhicheng Liu, 
‘A Tiger without Teeth? Regulation of Administrative Monopoly under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ 
(2012) 41 Rev Ind Organ 133, 135. Nonetheless, the wording of Article 8 and Chapter V of the AML 
indicates the illegality of the abuse of administrative power; however, an industry monopoly is a 
legitimate economic policy implemented by the state for the purpose of preserving public interests. It is 
by nature fundamental different from regional monopoly, and is excluded from the framework of the 
AML. Therefore, industry monopoly should be regarded as ‘state monopoly’ instead of administrative 
monopoly. See Gordon Y.M. Chan, ‘Administrative Monopoly and the Anti-Monopoly Law: an 
Examination of the Debate in China’ (2009) 18 Journal of Contemporary China 263, 264. For the 
purpose of this thesis, only regional monopoly will be considered in this section. 
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autonomy and the law of value should be appreciated. 176  As a consequence, the 
traditional planned economy was transformed to embrace elements found in the market 
economy, such as market regulation and supply-demand relationship.177  With the 
gradual market and price liberalisation, incentives to pursue profits grew dramatically, 
as did the non-state sector.178 Finally, in 1992, the establishment of a socialist market 
economy where market forces rather than government planning are the core in the 
allocation of resources, became the essential goal of economic reform. Since then 
competition has become an integral part of China’s economic development.179  
However, the decentralised feature of Chinese economy induced serious 
problems of local protectionism. During Mao’s era, local self-sufficiency – or autarky 
– was advocated for defence purpose, since the dispersal of key industries would 
ensure the ability of China to counterattack even if large parts of the country were 
occupied.180 Local self-sufficiency led to duplicated industrial infrastructure being 
built in almost every province in disregard of regional characteristics, and this caused 
serious excess capacity.181 Due to decentralisation of economic development, local 
governments – which had increasing supervisory power over local economy – have 
had a tendency towards protecting local enterprises from the competition of a large 
number of similar out-of-province undertakings. They cause the fragmentation of 
Chinese market.182 
                                                             
176 See the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, 22 December 1978, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5103/5205/20010428/454803.html.  
177 Part IV and V of the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform 
of the Economic System, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on 20 October 1984, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5104/5198/20010429/467454.html. 
178  Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for 
Competition Regime’ (2003) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1, 7. 
179 Ibid. 
180  Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 109. 
181 It was noticed that in 1987, 80 factories in 21 provinces produced refrigerators, over 100 factories 
in 26 provinces produced televisions and 300 factories in 28 provinces produced washing machines. 
World Bank, ‘China – Internal Market Development and Regulation’, 17 March 1994, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1994/03/698509/china-internal-market-development-
regulation, 4. 
182 Jung and Hao (fn 175) 15. 
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The inclusion of administrative monopoly in the AML is certainly a revolutionary 
step forward, given the fact that it is one of the major sources of monopoly in China 
that has never been seriously confronted. 183  However, though evidence of 
administrative monopoly could be easily gathered as government resolutions are in 
most cases documented in either written or electronic form, rather than in the form of 
secret meetings, the performance of enforcement against administrative monopoly 
since adoption of the AML has been negligible and yielded few successes.184 Maybe 
this could have been predicted, for the Chinese government has always been anxious 
that exposure of government wrongdoing could send the wrong message to society and 
potentially weaken the authority of the government. The inclusion of this chapter does 
show that the government is fully aware of the need to address prohibition of 
administrative monopoly in the first ever competition law in China, yet the 
enforcement against administrative monopoly is unlikely to be effective under China’s 
current bureaucratic structure in the near future for 2 main reasons. 
First, local protectionism is essentially a political and fiscal – instead of legal – 
problem due to the devolution of political and economic powers to local governments. 
Since ancient times, China has had a traditional problem with enforcing centrally-
formulated orders and policies at the local level. 185  The areas subject to central 
government control are relatively broad, and it is unrealistic for it to supervise the 
implementation of all policies. It therefore creates room for local government merely 
to follow those orders that best serve its interests. Policies with restrictive nature made 
by the central government, such as prohibition of administrative monopoly, are likely 
to be met with fierce opposition at local level; so are central agencies investigating at 
                                                             
183 Zhengxin Huo, ‘A Tiger without Teeth: the Antitrust Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (2008) 
10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 32, 37. See also fn 148, Chapter 2. 
184  Shiying Xu and Baisha Zhang, ‘Judicial and Administrative Remedies against Administrative 
Monopoly: Cases and Analysis’ in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds.) China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law: the First Five Years (Kluwer Law International 2013) 274. 
185 Xinzhu Zhang and Yanhua Zhang, ‘The Antimonopoly Law in China: Where Do We Stand?’ (2007) 
3 Competition Policy International 185, 199. For a general discussion on the relation between central 
and local governments, see Suli Zhu, ‘Federalism’ in Contemporary China – A Reflection on the 
Allocation of Power between Central and Local Government’ (2003) 7 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1. 
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the local level. In China, local governments are financially dependent on tax income 
from local undertakings; the better performance of these undertakings might to a 
certain extent translate into the better performance of the governments. Before 
meaningful fiscal reform is introduced to address the local government revenue 
shortfall, local government will always have the momentum towards adopting specific 
regulations to protect the interests of these undertakings and, accordingly, its own.186 
In the case concerning the preferential discount on tolls for local passenger vehicles,187 
the discriminatory treatment was adopted by the local government to the detriment of 
competition in the Hebei passenger vehicle market, and it effectively enhanced the 
performance of local passenger vehicle undertakings. Clearly, proper enforcement of 
the AML against local protectionism fundamentally conflicts with local governments’ 
interests.188  
Second, the mechanism adopted regarding enforcement of the AML against 
administrative monopoly is largely ineffective and creates limited deterrence. Local 
AMEAs, namely provincial DRCs and provincial AICs, are in fact administratively 
and financially controlled by provincial governments. They answer to their 
administrative leaders within the bureaucratic system of provincial governments, 
rather than their professional leaders at the central level. When affiliated department 
of the provincial government, municipal or county government abuse its 
administrative powers, there is a possibility that the provincial AMEAs will be facing 
enormous pressures if the anti-competitive practice is in fact carried out under the 
order of or is accord with the interests of the provincial government. Though it is not 
orthodox, the fact is that the bureaucratic structure and the lack of independence of 
local AMEAs make it impractical to disobey and apply the AML against the will of 
their administrative supervisors.  
                                                             
186 Thomas Cheng, ‘Competition and the State in China’ in Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng and Ioannis 
Lianos (eds.) Competition and the State (Stanford University Press 2014) 171. 
187 See fn 55 above. 
188 Zhang and Zhang (fn 185) 199. 
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When anti-competitive governmental resolutions are directly implemented by the 
provincial government, the central AMEAs will intervene instead of their provincial 
AMEAs. 189  However, because of the administrative hierarchy in China, central 
AMEAs may as well feel reluctant to probe into the case. Under the Civil Servant 
Law,190 China establishes a sequence of civil servant posts, which are divided into 
five levels, and each level is further divided into chiefs and deputies.191 According to 
this administrative hierarchy, the three central AMEAs are all ministerial-level 
departments, whilst their responding anti-monopoly units, namely, the Anti-Monopoly 
Bureau of Ministry of Commerce, the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau 
of NDRC, and the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau 
of SAIC, are all bureau-level departments. As a logical consequence, central AMEAs 
are required by the AML to bring enforcement actions against local government bodies 
with equal or even higher administrative ranks. As China does not currently have a 
government structure based on a clearly defined rule of law,192 such institutional 
arrangements puts the AMEAs in an uncomfortable and awkward position. It is 
difficult to think of a single reason why central AMEAs would risk offending these 
higher-ranking departments when they do not even have enough investigatory power 
to confront these departments at the local level.  
According to Article 51 of the AML, when dealing with abuse of administrative 
power, AMEAs are not allowed to directly punish the department in question; they can 
only put forward advisory suggestions on possible remedies to the superior authorities 
of the department in question. When AMEAs are certainly not capable of overseeing 
the work of the superior authorities, there is no supervising mechanism in place to 
ensure the superior authorities that receive the suggestions are as neutral as they should 
                                                             
189 See for example, Article 3, Procedural Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power 
to Eliminate or Restrict Competition. 
190 Article 15, Civil Servant Law of China.  
191 Ibid., Article 16. The five levels are: state level; provincial and ministerial level; department and 
bureau level; county and section level; and township and sub-division level. 
192 Bruce M. Owen and others, ‘China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Antimonopoly Law and 
Beyond’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 231, 257. 
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be in dealing with disputes involving their subordinate departments.193 In fact, in all 
four administrative monopoly cases concluded by NDRC there has been no further 
update on what penalty, if any, was imposed on the relevant officials. The lack of an 
impartial third-party adjudicator renders the enforcement against administrative 
monopoly largely ineffective.194 
China’s unique political structure and its incomplete economic transition dictate 
that administrative monopoly cannot be eradicated, since the government is and will 
continue to be substantially involved in resource allocation although ‘allowing [the] 
market [to] play a decisive role’ has been firmly reiterated by the Xi administration.195 
At the same time, rampant distortion of market competition by government bodies 
determines that administrative monopoly cannot exist unnoticed, and it is therefore 
necessary for the government to take a stand and prohibit it by law, even if it is merely 
a political gesture. Anti-competitive administrative practices such as local blockades 
and protectionism were initially addressed in Chinese legislation over thirty years ago, 
and numerous rules have incorporated provisions on the prohibition of administrative 
monopoly.196 However, decades of enforcement yielded scarce success. It should be 
clear enough that the way in which the government tackled administrative monopoly, 
namely by empowering a superior government body to make rectification orders,197 
was simply a failure. There was no feasible mechanism in place to ensure that penalties 
on government officials were commensurate with the violations, and as a consequence 
they could not be effectively deterred.198 The AML nonetheless inherited the old 
                                                             
193 Wang and Emch (fn 136) 266. 
194 Cheng (fn 186) 184. 
195 See the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, adopted at the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 16 November 
2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm. 
196 See section 3.5, Chapter 2. 
197 For example, Article 30, AUCL stipulates ‘where a government or its subordinate departments, in 
violation of the provisions of Article 7 of this Law, restrict people to purchasing commodities from a 
designated business operator or impose limits on other business operator's rightful operation activities 
or the normal circulation of commodities between different areas, the supervision and inspection 
department at higher levels shall order them to make corrections’. 
198 Dan Wei, ‘Antitrust in China: An Overview of Recent Implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law’ 
(2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 119, 122. 
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mechanism with no material enhancement.199 It is therefore not surprising that the 
AML fails to produce any meaningful results in tackling administrative monopoly.  
5. CONCLUSION  
Although the competition system of China is comparatively young and immature, 
it has nonetheless become one of the major competition jurisdictions in the world as a 
result of China’s great importance in the global economy. Competition policy is an 
increasingly influential tool to protect market competition and preserve market order, 
as the AMEAs grow to be active in many aspects of the Chinese economy. However, 
it should be noted that although cases involving large multinational undertakings have 
certainly raised public attention and awareness, and that the knowledge and experience 
of competition officials are constantly accumulating, the current structure of 
enforcement and the work carried out by AMEAs are not without problems.  
The extremely lengthy process and opacity of merger control, and the 
inconsistency of decision-making in antirust are caused by a number of factors. The 
incorporation of multiple objectives creates room for the AMEAs to abuse their 
administrative powers and balance the interests of various interest groups, and the 
political tradition to conceal the exchange of interest from the supervision of the public 
since political interests take precedence over a transparent governmental decision-
making process. The problematic allocation of jurisdictions and the lack of 
coordination among the AMEAs directly results from the compromises made during 
the drafting of the AML. Had the conflicts not taken place, there would not have been 
the need to allocate jurisdiction and coordinate the enforcement activities among 
                                                             
199 It is worth noticing that under Article 30 of the AUCL, SAIC is empowered to confiscate the illegal 
gains of the business operator benefited from the anti-competitive governmental action and to impose 
on it a fine amounting to one to three times the illegal gains. However, whilst the 2004 Draft AML also 
had a similar provision – Article 48 – and additionally granted competition agency, rather than the 
superior authority of the delinquent department, the power directly to order the department to cease anti-
competitive action and impose administrative penalties on relevant officials, the enforcement method 
provided in the final AML is in fact regressive. 
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various AMEAs in the first place. If these problems of China’s competition system are 
not properly solved, competition policy may create more distortions of the market 
structure than it prevents and hold back sustainable economic development in China.  
However, the difficulties of conducting investigations at local level and tackling 
administrative monopoly are essentially not problems that can be completely solved 
by the AML alone. They are products of the decentralisation of political and economic 
powers, which led to the fragmentation of China’s domestic market and the reliance 
of local government on local undertakings. Their resolution requires substantive fiscal 
and institutional reform. Similarly, as will be shown in the next chapter, the AML alone 
is not capable of effectively regulating market distortions caused by the SOEs. External 





Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the implementation of competition policy in the state 
sector, where the AML is still not able fully to function. It illustrates the conflict 
between the capitalist concept of competition and socialist concept of state control in 
China by studying the status quo of the state sector, the ineffective competition 
enforcement against SOEs, the poor corporate governance of SOEs, the complicated 
relation between competition and industrial policies, and the external tools used to 
remove the vested interests in China’s state sector.  
The previous chapters have identified several issues in need of special attention 
with regard to competition enforcement in China. Some are expected to be solved 
when the AMEAs and courts become more comfortable and sophisticated in applying 
the AML through increasingly frequent enforcement efforts. However, intense 
impediment is likely to be met when some other problems in relation to the 
implementation of competition policy are dealt with, and the application of the AML 
to SOEs is with no doubt the most intricate one amongst them.  
As will be demonstrated later, the AML is applicable to SOEs, and there is a 
growing willingness for AMEAs to intervene when SOEs are involved in anti-
competitive activities. However, although the AML does not explicitly lay down a 
distinction between enforcement against private undertakings and non-private 
undertakings, in practice it is difficult if not impossible to treat undertakings with 
diverse ownership equally since the doctrine of non-discrimination as found in EU 
competition law is largely missing in China’s competition system. Generally, the 
reason to establish an SOE is that the government seeks either to rectify perceived 
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market failures, or to advance social objectives.1 However, China’s SOEs represent 
the core constituent part of the Communist ideology, and their existence is based 
mainly on political rather than economic considerations. State ownership of major 
enterprises creates incentives for the government to protect these enterprises from 
regulations that impede their performance. 2  As a consequence, such political 
proximity has made the outcomes of competition enforcement unsatisfactory. In light 
of the special characteristics of SOEs, the next section looks at the status quo of and 
competition enforcement in the state sector. 
2. POWERFUL AND WELL-CONNECTED MARKET PLAYERS 
2.1 SOEs in China’s Economy 
An intuitive benchmark for evaluating the significance of SOEs in Chinese 
economy is SOEs’ share of GDP. However, given the complexity, and sometimes 
inconsistency, concerning the classification of SOEs,3  there is no helpful official 
statistics to quantify their actual economic influence on China’s economy. Statistics 
based on different calculation criteria and definitions of SOEs have resulted in 
divergence of final numbers. For example, in a report prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance, as of 2013 there were 155,000 ‘state-owned and state-controlled enterprises’ 
in China excluding state-owned financial institutions with CNY 104.1 trillion worth of 
assets and 36.98 million employees. 4  However, according to the latest national 
economic census of China published in December 2014, which used data available as 
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4 This is the first time an official report on the overall financial status of SOEs is published. See Ministry 





of 31 December 2013, there were 113,000 SOEs.5 In the latter case, the term ‘SOEs’ 
merely refers to enterprises that are fully state-funded. Nevertheless, one important 
conclusion is undeniable: the share of the state-owned economy is shrinking rapidly. 
As compared with the second national economic census of 2008, the number of SOEs 
has dropped by 2.1% whilst the number of private enterprises has increased from 3.6 
million in 2008 to 5.6 million (amounting to 68.3% of the total number of corporate 
enterprises) in 2013.6 
Indeed, decades of economic reform have led to the continuous decline of the 
total number of SOEs and their dominance in China’s industrial development. Between 
1998 and 2010, SOEs’ share in the total number of industrial enterprises fell from 39.2% 
to 4.5%, their share in total industrial assets from 68.8% to 42.4%, and their share in 
national employment from 60.5% to 19.4%.7 Currently there has been a growing 
reliance on private enterprises and market-oriented incentives in China’s transition 
economy, and the CPC’s attitude towards private enterprises and entrepreneurs, which 
were regarded as class enemies in pre-reform era,8 has been changing substantially. 
In one of the constitutional amendments passed in March 1999, the legal status of the 
non-public economy – including individual, private and foreign economies – was 
formally established. Article 11 stipulates that ‘[t]he non-public sectors of the 
economy […] constitute an important component of the socialist market economy’. 
Nonetheless, the current role of government in shaping economic outcomes and the 
significance of state ownership in economic development in China is largely 
unchallenged. Despite the growing share of the private sector in the Chinese economy, 
SOEs remain, as Premier Li Keqiang remarked, ‘the prominent material and political 
                                                             
5 National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Communiqué on Major Data of the Third National Economic Census’, 
16 December 2014, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201412/t20141216_653982.html. 
6 State Information Center, ‘Corporate Structure Improved, Market Vitality Promoted’, 30 June 2015, 
http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/4883.htm. 
7 World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, China 2030: Building a Modern, 
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basis of the development of the Communist Party and the state’.9 In fact, the reform 
of the Chinese economy, and specifically that of SOEs, has made the elite’s 
undertakings in certain sectors more powerful and their dominance more stable. It was 
stated by SASAC that the state would maintain absolute control over seven 
strategically important industrial sectors through SOEs.10 The government will aim to 
increase the injections of state capital in these industries, and will seek to develop some 
‘backbone’ SOEs into world-class corporations.11  
Because of direct state control and prioritised state investment, some SOEs in 
these sectors are among the wealthiest in the world. Among the top 500 Chinese 
undertakings, 12  293 are state-owned or state-controlled enterprises, the aggregate 
annual revenues of which account for 78.3% of the total revenue of all undertakings 
on the list.13 Moreover, 3 SOEs are among the top 10 of ‘Fortune Global 500’.14 The 
business performance of these SOEs has substantially benefited not only from a 
number of government policies including favourable tax treatment and preferential 
status in government procurement market,15 but also from financial support from 
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state-owned banks which provide them with easier access to credit, below-market 
interest rates on loans, and flexible repayment. 16  However, whilst the financial 
support gives SOEs considerable competitive advantages over their private 
counterparts, the most important factor giving rise to real competition concern in China 
is the government’s vested interests in SOEs that lead to frequent political intervention. 
2.2 Competition Enforcement against SOEs 
Chinese SOEs are not to be taken simply as market players making profits and 
competing with other firms, they are sometimes created to achieve certain political 
objectives of the government. Neither are they to be seen as mere puppets of the 
government. They are combinations of interests, either common or conflicting, of 
numerous behind-the-curtains factions17 known as ‘families’ which do not necessarily 
represent the government. Indeed, there are too many interests involved in the path 
towards enforcement against SOEs. When the expectations of society are raised 
because of the tendency that China is taking actions to correct anti-competitive 
practices of SOEs through the enforcement of the AML, the AMEAs are not given 
independent status to achieve the expected goals, and they are too weak and vulnerable 
to take on SOEs.  
The moderate attitude of the AMEAs towards SOEs can be seen in the series of 
investigations into the telecommunications sector. In 2011, the Price Supervision and 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the NDRC initiated an investigation against China Telecom 
and China Unicom, together accounting for 90% of China’s broadband business.18 
This was the first time SOEs in strategically important sector were investigated under 
the AML. The issue in NDRC’s investigation was whether the two companies had 
                                                             
16 Jin Zeng and Kellee Tsai, ‘The Local Politics of Restructuring State-owned Enterprises in China’ in 
Jean C. Oi (eds.) Going Private in China: the Politics of Corporate Restructuring and System Reform 
(The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center 2011) 39. 
17 For general work on Chinese factions, see Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2000). 
18 Xinhua News Agency, ‘China Telecom and China Unicom Face Anti-Monopoly Investigation’, 10 
November 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-11/10/c_111158620.htm. 
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abused their dominant position in broadband access and interconnection to eliminate 
competition in the downstream market.19 In response to the news revealed by the 
national television broadcaster CCTV that NDRC had started an investigation into the 
two companies, a journal belonging to MIIT reported that ‘China Unicom and Telecom 
say there is no basis’ for the NDRC investigation.20 Similarly, another article in an 
industry specific publication managed by MIIT stressed that the fact that ‘in the market 
for Internet access providers China Telecom and Unicom have a dominant market 
position is not itself illegal’. 21  Although MIIT had not made any official 
announcement regarding this investigation, it is not difficult to see that MIIT was 
questioning the jurisdiction of the AMEAs in matters concerning the regulation of the 
telecommunications industry. Later, the investigation was suspended without penalties 
after the two undertakings committed to ‘raising substantially their broadband speeds 
while further lowering broadband costs over the next five years’.22  
In December 2012, complaints about tying practices of Ningxia branches of 
China Tietong, China Unicom and China Telecom were diverted from SAIC to the 
AIC of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Official investigation was initiated in 
June 2013. After almost two years, in May 2015 Ningxia AIC found that these 3 
undertakings had abused their dominant positions in the internet service market by 
tying the sale of landline telephone services to the provision of fixed internet services. 
However, Ningxia AIC decided to suspend the investigations after all 3 undertakings 
gave certain undertakings. They committed to engage in ‘self-correction’ tasks, 
                                                             
19  Yanbei Meng, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between Antitrust Enforcement and Industry-Specific 
Regulation in China’ in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds.) China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: the First 
Five Years (Wolters Kluwer 2013) 260. 
20 Meng (fn 19) 260. 
21 Zhao Jin and Li Lei, ‘Two Media Outlets belonging to MIIT Refute the Report on China Telecom 
and China Unicom’s Suspected Monopoly Practices’, 12 November 2011, 
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/tech/2011/11/12072611543388.shtml. 
22 Xinhua News Agency, ‘China Telecom, China Unicom Pledge to Mend Errors after Anti-monopoly 
Probe’, 2 December 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2011-12/02/c_131285213.htm. 
For detailed analysis of this case, see Xiaoye Wang and Adrian Emch, ‘Five Years of Implementation 
of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law – Achievements and Challenges’ (2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement 247, 258-9. 
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provide training projects to the sales team, and prevent future tying practices; to 
publicise their commitment to allow consumers to choose products and services freely; 
and to ensure that requests of aggrieved consumers to cancel the tied landline 
telephone services would be approved.23 In light of Article 45 of the AML, on which 
the decisions to suspend were based, Ningxia AIC stated in all of the 3 official 
decisions:  
‘The purpose of anti-monopoly enforcement is to prevent monopoly, 
protect competition, and safeguard consumer interests. The Administration 
considers that the party was highly cooperative during the investigation, 
and has already perceived the adverse nature of tying practices; the 
commitments and rectifying measures put forward are adequate to 
eliminate the negative effects of the illegal practices, the objectives of anti-
monopoly enforcement are therefore achieved.’24  
Following this line of thinking, it seems to suggest that punishment in any form 
will not be necessary as long as an undertaking is remorseful about carrying out anti-
competitive practices and actively puts forward rectifying measures. This level of 
leniency has never been and will likely never be found in competition cases involving 
only private undertakings. A sceptical but somewhat plausible assumption is that there 
were local impediments involving in the investigation process, since it unusually took 
Ningxia AIC 2½ years from the acceptance of complaints to the suspension of 
investigations to reach conclusions on cases the facts of which were not even 
particularly complex. 
In addition, representing the economic arms of the Chinese government, SOEs 
are often instructed to pursue certain goals, which can be economic, political, or social. 
Therefore, the success of an SOE is not merely measured by its financial performance 
but sometimes by political commitments. Since most managers of SOEs are party 
                                                             
23  Ningxia Branch of China Tietong (Group) Co., Ltd. (2015) Ningxia AIC Decision No, 2, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201507/t20150715_158905.html; Ningxia Brach of China 
United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (2015) Ningxia AIC Decision No, 3, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201507/t20150715_158907.html; and Ningxia Branch of 
China Telecom Co., Ltd. (2015) Ningxia AIC Decision No, 4, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/cfjd/201507/t20150715_158909.html. 
24 The remarks are translated by the author. 
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members, and loyalty and obedience rank higher than business performance when it 
comes to advancement of political careers, distortion of market orders may not be an 
issue of concern for managers of SOEs if an anti-competitive business strategy, albeit 
illegal, is able to realise these goals set by their superiors more readily. Given the 
overall lack of competition culture in China’s state sector, and the liberal approach 
adopted by the AMEAs towards anti-competitive practices of SOEs, it seems that 
violation of the AML becomes a risk that SOEs are more than willing to take. In 
November 2010, the Wuchang branch of the Hubei Salt Group Company was 
investigated by the Hubei Price Bureau for tying the sale of washing powder to the 
sale of salt.25 In this case, the branch compelled its salt distributors to purchase a 
certain amount of washing powder from it when they purchased salt. Its decision to 
sell washing powder was a direct result of a business plan formulated by its parent 
company – the Hubei Salt Group Company – which required all branches to ‘develop 
[a] non-salt economy’ by expanding their scale of operation.26 In order to fully comply 
with this policy, the Wuchang branch aimed to raise the sale of washing powder by 
abusing its dominant position in the salt wholesale market, which gave it the market 
power to penetrate into the washing powder market. Although the practices were found 
illegal under the AML, no fine was imposed owing to the Wuchang branch’s 
cooperation with the investigation, which was then suspended with several 
commitments made by the branch to rectify its business policy.27 
When touching upon the issue of competition enforcement against large SOEs, 
what the government needs – assuming it wishes the AML to be applied to large SOEs 
– is an agency independent enough to mitigate the adverse influence coming from 
                                                             
25 The distribution of salt in China is monopolised by China National Salt Industry Corporation and its 
wholly-owned provincial and municipal subsidiaries, for example, the Hubei Salt Group Company and 
its Wuchang branch in this case. See the Measures on the Exclusive Licensing for Table Salt. Since 
privately owned salt producers, which require quotas from the local salt industry management bureau 
legally to produce edible salt, are required by law to sell all the salt to state distributors, every salt 
company naturally holds a dominant position in the wholesale market for salt in the local area it serves.  
26 NDRC, ‘Hubei Price Bureau Sanctioned Wuchang Salt Group Company for Tying’, 15 November 
2010, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/zhdt/201011/t20101115_380425.html. 
27 Ibid.  
188 
 
these ‘families’. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is unlikely that an 
enforcement agency which is independent of all other government bodies and interest 
groups is going to be established in the foreseeable future. The existing AMEAs are 
relatively vulnerable in front of SOEs. Most of the time, the AML seems to be merely 
a bargaining chip during political meddling: when agreements between government 
and offending SOEs are reached, and rounds of interest distribution are accomplished, 
the mission of the AML is complete. The end result is that SOEs become both arsonist 
and firefighter at the same time. Therefore, the outstanding issue is no longer about 
how to apply the AML correctly, but – as ironic as it sounds – how to bring the AML 
into the enforcement activities against SOEs, which still remain largely symbolic. If 
competition enforcement is not even about correcting and punishing anti-competitive 
practices in the first place, the discussion of the actual application of the substantive 
texts will be meaningless. The following sections analyse the factors that make SOEs 
different from private undertakings from a competition law point of view and protect 
SOEs from the effective intervention of competition law.  
3. WEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
On 18th September 2015, Premier Li Keqiang at a forum on deepening reform and 
development of SOEs urged market-oriented reform of SOEs since languid operating 
mechanisms and poor corporate governance had resulted in a decline of profits and 
loss of state-owned assets.28 It is also considered that weak corporate governance 
leads to higher levels of corruption.29 The advancement of corporate governance has 
                                                             
28  Xinhua News Agency, ‘Premier Urges Progress in SOE Reforms’, 20 September 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/20/c_134642631.htm. Apart from reiterating the 
importance of increasing SOEs’ efficiency, Premier Li also stated that chronic loss-making ‘zombie 
enterprises’, which became burdens for the sustained growth of the economy, should be closed down. 
29 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Corruption’ (1993) 108 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
599. The topic on corruption in China’s state sector will be discussed later in section 5.2 below. 
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been the priority for SOEs reform since the mid-1990s.30 However, the achievement 
so far remains unsatisfactory.  
3.1 Corporate Governance System of SOEs 
Corporate governance of modern enterprises generally follows two patterns. One 
that relies on the control of the stock market – the ‘Anglo-American system’ – and one 
that relies on the control of funding entities – the ‘Continental system’.31 In the former 
system, the stock market is able to constitute the basis for the increase of corporate 
transparency, improvement of corporate efficiency, and separation of government’s 
administrative and business functions. 32  Also, legal protection of the interests of 
minority shareholders in this system is prioritised and the market discipline mechanism 
is well developed, and as a result the board of directors, which holds the final decision 
on both the appointment and removal of managers, has to monitor and give serious 
consideration to the satisfaction of shareholders about the performance of 
management.33 In the latter system, oversight of corporate management is exercised 
by the parties providing funds for the undertaking, namely core investors, who 
consequently have insider information about the performance of management and 
adopt necessary corrective measures.34 
In China, where the interests of minority shareholders are inadequately 
protected,35 the corporate governance system based on the stock market for SOEs 
‘serve[s] a very weak disciplinary role’ since most listed SOEs have parent 
undertakings (typically SOEs) which hold the majority shares, and whose controlling 
status is constitutionally incontestable by non-state shareholders unsatisfied with the 
                                                             
30 See section 3.2, Chapter 2. 
31 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (MIT Press 2007) 319. 
32 David Blumental, ‘‘Reform’ or ‘Opening’? Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises and WTO 
Accession – The Dilemma of Applying GATT to Marketizing Economies’ (1998) 16 UCLA Pac. Basin 
L.J. 198, 224. 
33 Naughton (fn 31) 319. 
34 Ibid. 




management. 36  Since major shares of SOEs are not tradable on the market, the 
influence of private shareholders and other market mechanisms on the operation of 
SOEs is largely negligible.37 Likewise, the system based on control of funding parties 
has also proven ineffective. SOEs rely financially on credit from banks, most of which 
are as well state-owned. Therefore, SOEs face a soft budget constraint which allows 
them to be more flexible in terms of repayment and regulatory scrutiny, but at the same 
time causes inefficiency of SOEs and accumulates non-performing loans.38 The state-
owned banks, which in most cases merely follow the financial policy and sometimes 
even direct orders of the government concerning loans granted to SOEs, are neither 
incentivised nor obligated to monitor the performance of SOEs since they are unlikely 
to be held responsible even for loans granted to chronic loss-making SOEs.39  
Since China began its economic transition from a centrally planned economy to 
a socialist market economy, reforms aimed at privatising and restructuring Chinese 
SOEs have commenced.40 In theory, a sharp separation should be made between 
managerial autonomy and state ownership.41 In addition, the old management model 
adopted in the planned economy era would have to be replaced by a modern system of 
corporate governance characterised by safeguards for minority shareholders and strong 
transparency. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Chinese government has no 
intention of privatising all of its SOEs – especially the large ones – but instead seeks 
to ‘corporatise’ them to diversify the ownership of SOEs by converting them into 
shareholding cooperative corporations whilst preserving the controlling shares. Whilst 
state control remains in evidence, the line between management and ownership is 
inevitably blurred.  
                                                             
36 Naughton (fn 31) 321. 
37 Blumental (fn 32) 224. 
38 Cheng (fn 35) 25. 
39 Naughton (fn 31) 320. 
40 See Kai Guo and Yang Yao, ‘Causes of Privatisation in China’ (2005) 13 Economics of Transition 
211. 
41 Daniel C.K. Chow, ‘An Analysis of the Political Economy of China’s Enterprise Conglomerates: A 




In March 2003, SASAC was established at the First Plenary Session of the 10th 
National People’s Congress to execute the theory of separation between managerial 
autonomy and state ownership.42 Following the establishment of SASAC, in October 
2008 the Enterprise State-Owned Assets Law (State Assets Law) was promulgated at 
Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s 
Congress, which explicitly stipulates that SASAC is entitled to returns on assets of 
SOEs, and should enjoy the right to participate in major decision-making and selection 
of managers.43 However, whilst SASAC is not allowed to intervene in the business 
activities of SOEs,44 the State Assets Law nonetheless requires any decision of SOEs 
concerning merger, splitting, increase or reduction of registered capital, issuance of 
bonds, distribution of profits, dissolution, and petition for bankruptcy to be approved 
by SASAC. 45  In addition, SASAC also compels SOEs to fulfil certain political 
objectives through the issuance of government documents. For example, in 2013 the 
party committee of SASAC issued the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening and 
Improving the Work of Women Employees of Central State-Owned Enterprises, which 
requires central SOEs, inter alia, to guide women employees to serve the development 
of enterprises, establish and advance the training programmes for women employees, 
protect the legal rights and special interests of women employees, and increase the 
level of science in women employees’ work. Although essentially these opinions raise 
the awareness of the protection of individual rights, they indicate at the same time that 
SASAC’s functions go far beyond ordinary investor responsibilities and against basic 
principles of corporate governance. Although the establishment of SASAC in fact 
accelerates the speed of SOEs reform and to a certain degree promotes the 
transparency of the operation of SOEs, 46  the fusion of the government’s 
                                                             
42 See section 4.3. Chapter 2. 
43 Article 12, State Assets Law. 
44 Ibid., Article 14. 
45 Article 31, State Assets Law. 
46 Since SASAC advocates SOEs to be listed on stock markets – although the portion of tradable shares 
is not huge – reporting requirements concerning the operation of SOEs are imposed. 
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administration and business functions under the old framework has not been 
fundamentally changed. 
As a consequence of poor corporate governance characterised by insider control, 
financial tunnelling, and excessive political meddling, SOEs are able substantially to 
engage in rent-seeking behaviours by virtue of their close relationship with 
government. They are protected from competition by governments through the 
implementation of preferential policies. The barriers to entry are consequentially 
heightened for private undertakings,47 and the AMEAs are easily captured to favour 
the interests of SOEs in competition enforcement.48 Rent-seeking in general, and 
regulatory capture in particular, are closely associated with guanxi [关系] (connection) 
which is an integral part of Chinese economy. 
3.2 The Guanxi Network 
Guanxi, regarded as ‘special social investment’,49 is deeply embedded in Chinese 
traditional culture which values mutual-benefit, and influences virtually every aspect 
of daily life of the general public. A network of guanxi is vital for any business 
operators, either public or private. For any guanxi network to function, there must be 
give-and-take or exchange of favours;50 one must have means to fulfil a party’s need 
in order for his own need to be fulfilled with the help of that party. Guanxi is so 
important in China that it sometimes becomes an alternative to market forces in 
economic activities. 51  For example, in the public procurement market where bid 
rigging is regularly detected, the determinant of the supplier selection process in 
                                                             
47 It is noteworthy that, as discussed in the previous chapter, local protectionism is not an issue concerns 
merely SOEs, but can also involve protection of local private undertakings. 
48 Section 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 has discussed how the pluralistic objectives feature of the AML can be 
used by the SOEs and other interest groups to capture the AMEAs in competition enforcement. 
49 Udo Braendle, Tanja Gasser and Juergen Noll, ‘Corporate Governance in China – is Economic 
Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?’ (2005) 110 Bus. Soc. Rev. 389, 394. See also Snejina 
Michailova and Verner Worm, ‘Personal Networking in Russia and China: Blat and Guanxi’ (2003) 21 
European Management Journal 509. 
50 Thomas Dunfee and Danielle Warren, ‘Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business 
in China’ (2001) 32 Journal of Business Ethics 191, 192. 
51 Braendle et al. (fn 49) 390. 
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certain transactions is not product quality or price but the guanxi between the 
government department involved and the supplier. Only well-connected suppliers are 
able to consummate a deal. In the most common and straightforward case, the starting 
point for a private undertaking to set up guanxi with government agencies is by bribing. 
However, there is no need for SOEs to establish guanxi with the government, since 
they are already inherently connected through state ownership. Therefore, 
substantially benefiting from the natural guanxi network which creates competitive 
advantages, SOEs do not have the same level of incentives to promote efficiency as 
their private undertakings do. 
The same theory applies to department-to-department guanxi as well. In China, 
there is too much red tape in the bureaucratic system, which means a single task of one 
department always involves many other uncoordinated departments. 52  Since the 
accomplishment of the task depends on the cooperation of these departments, rent-
seeking is induced: it is a tacit understanding that cooperation is conditional upon the 
return of favour. When the departments are glued together with a mutually-beneficial 
guanxi network, in light of the continual overlapping of government functions and 
future cooperation, no department is willing to endanger this relationship for the sake 
of one single event. This departmental guanxi network partially explains why the 
AMEA is unwilling to take on SOEs. Since SOEs are always backed by ministries, 
local governments or ‘families’, when competition enforcement undermines the 
interests of these groups – which is almost always the case – the guanxi between them 
and the AMEAs may as well be endangered. Since guanxi links directly to the 
prospects of the AMEAs and competition officials, the enforcement against well-
connected SOEs is always treated with cautions.  
Another factor that worsens the corporate system is the appointment system for 
management of SOEs, which is as well closely associated with guanxi. 
                                                             
52 See for example, the Guangdong river-sand case discussed in section 4.5, Chapter 5. 
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3.3 Executive Appointment System 
Since China’s economic reform is not accompanied by corresponding political 
reform, the poor corporate governance of SOEs is featured by rigid government 
oversight. Indeed, the right to control the appointment of positions which have decisive 
influence over the management of SOEs – essentially a political rather than business 
consideration – is the most important power underlying state ownership.53 It is one of 
the main sources that protects SOEs from any ‘adverse’ law enforcement actions, such 
as competition enforcement. 
As the controlling shareholder, the government is legally entitled to appoint and 
remove the key position-holders in SOEs which are incorporated under the Company 
Law. In order to be appointed, potential candidates have to have well-functioning 
guanxi with officials within the CPC that oversee the appointment. Therefore, the 
selecting process is easily manipulated and the positions are not assigned based on 
capability or achievements but personal connection and political consideration.54 In 
December 2009, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the 
Provisional Rules on the Management of Executives in Central SOEs, which explicitly 
states that the principle of ‘the Party controls the cadres’ should be strictly followed.55 
In addition, when the Rules stipulate five basic requirements for leaders of central 
SOEs, the requirement of ‘high degree of political quality’56 seems to take precedence 
over the other given the order in which the requirements are listed, including, inter 
alia, outstanding achievements and necessary expertise. 57  As a consequence, the 
management has the tendency towards acting in the interests of whoever contributes 
                                                             
53 Qu Qiang, ‘Corporate Governance and State-Owned Shares in China Listed Companies’ (2003) 14 
Journal of Asian Economics 771, 777. 
54 For discussion on the selection of management personnel in SOEs, see On Tam, ‘Ethical Issues in 
the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China’ (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 303; Thomas 
Lin, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Recent Developments, Key Problems, and Solutions’ (2004) 1 
Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance 23; and Zezhong Xiao, Jay Dahya and Zhijun Lin, 
‘A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in China’ (2004) 15 British 
Journal of Management 39. 
55 Article 3(1). 
56 Article 4(1). 
57 Articles 4(2) and (3). 
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to the successful appointment as a return of favour with no regard of the interests of 
the enterprise. Therefore, appointment based on guanxi and poor corporate governance 
make it possible for the management to translate the interests of the enterprise into 
personal benefits.58 
The body at the core of this appointment guanxi network is the Central 
Organisation Department (COD). 59  The CPC Central Committee, through COD, 
adopted a Soviet-style nomenklatura system – literally a list of names – to manage the 
placement of cadres.60 The central nomenklatura system consists of two lists.61 The 
first is a list of top 5,000 leadership positions which follow a strictly hierarchical 
order.62 The second lists the suitable cadres with their detailed dossiers. For SOEs, the 
top positions of 53 ministerial level and vice-ministerial level central SOEs are directly 
appointed by COD,63 whilst the top positions in the remaining central SOEs – bureau 
level rank – are appointed by SASAC with COD applying decisive influence.64 These 
top positions are secretary, vice-secretary and members of CPC committee, 65 
chairman and vice-chairman of board of supervisors, manager and vice-manager, and, 
                                                             
58 Braendle et al. (fn 49) 401. However, since the financial rewards of executives are measured by the 
financial performance of SOEs, it is possible and in fact quite common that personal guanxi is used by 
executives to advance the interests of the enterprise, since certain essential resources, like the planning 
permission for the development of a piece of land, are rarely obtainable without government guanxi. 
See Ying Fan, ‘Questioning Guanxi: Definition, Classification and Implications’ (2002) 11 
International Business Review 543. 
59 COD is one of the most important bodies within the CPC institutional structure that exercises control 
over major personnel matters. Apart from central SOEs, it appoints important positions ranging from 
ministers and governors to director of National Museum of China and principals of 31 vice-ministerial 
level universities. 
60 In addition, there are equivalent nomenklatura systems in place at provincial and municipal levels. 
The appointment of cadres at these levels is controlled by respective local organisation departments. 
See David Shambaugh, ‘The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era’ in David Shambaugh (eds.) The 
Modern Chinese State (Cambridge University Press 2000) 173-174. 
61 Sebastian Heilmann and Sarah Kirchberger, ‘The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition: a Study based 
on Internal Cadre Statistics of the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party’ 
(2000) China Analysis No.1, www.chinapolitik.de/resources/analysis1.pdf, 3. 
62 See the List of Cadre Posts Managed by the CPC Central Committee, as amended on 7 July 2008. 
63 List of Cadre Posts Managed by the CPC Central Committee. It has to be emphasised that, since 
these 53 central SOEs are considered the crown jewels of state economy, the decision of COD on the 
appointment of top executives in these SOEs has to be finalised by the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo, China’s highest decision-making body. 
64 Article 22, State Assets Law. See Szamosszegi and Kyle (fn 15) 75.  
65 The CPC substantially influences the day-to-day operation of SOEs through the establishment of 
CPC committees within each SOE. The secretary of CPC committee, instead of board chairman or 
manager, is the de facto head of a SOE. 
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if there is a board of directors, chairman and vice-chairman of that board. Since the 
executives holding these positions are all party cadres whose career path is determined 
by the CPC, they are incentivised to follow orders and instructions without regard to 
market conditions, just like how SOEs operated in the era of centrally planned 
economy. 
Weak corporate governance of SOEs characterised by the prevalence of guanxi 
and rigorous state control over executive appointment strengthens the ties between 
SOEs and the government. Such ties protect SOEs, which represents the government’s 
overwhelming vested interests, from effective competition enforcement, which has the 
potential fundamentally to alter the current structure of the state sector. This is the 
reason why the attitude of the AMEAs towards SOEs under the AML is much more 
lenient compared with the treatment towards private undertakings, given the fact that 
the AMEAs are vulnerable to political pressures as a result of China’s bureaucratic 
structure.66 Besides poor corporate governance, another factor that renders public 
enforcement of the AML – which is of an administrative nature – largely ineffective, 
is China’s heavy reliance on its industrial policy – which is of a political nature. In 
theory, the AMEAs should refrain from incorporating industrial policy considerations 
in competition enforcement. However, as will be shown later, the AMEAs sometimes 
seem to base their decisions solely on industrial policy grounds. The following section 
examines the relation between competition and industrial policies in China. 
4. COMPETITION POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Network industries, which include telecommunications, energy, water supply and 
railways, normally are deemed natural monopolies since the provision of services in 
these industries presupposes the state-mandated access to fixed network infrastructures 
                                                             
66 See section 4.6, Chapter 5. 
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of the incumbents.67 Due to the sunk costs of some of these infrastructures, repeated 
construction of ‘essential facilities’, which can promote competition in the upstream 
markets, is either inappropriate or unrealistic for private investors.68 Therefore, these 
industries were occupied initially by state-owned monopolies. The original objective 
was that public enterprises were more capable of providing services of general 
economic interest for lower prices and in a stable manner. Nonetheless, the lack of 
competition resulted in a lack of incentives to improve efficiency and promote 
innovation,69 which slowed down the speed of industrial development and increased 
production costs. The development of the private sector was also impeded due to the 
inaccessibility of the network infrastructures. Currently, state-owned natural 
monopolies have been privatised in many economies, where the downstream market 
is open to free competition and the governments merely act as an infrastructure 
provider and industrial regulator.70 
Nonetheless, the situation in China is largely different. The upstream markets of 
all network industries are still occupied by state-owned monopolies. In the centrally 
planned economy, where private undertakings were virtually non-existent and state-
owned undertakings had no managerial autonomy, the only ‘natural monopoly’ was in 
fact the State Planning Commission. In the socialist market economy, increasing 
economic gains became one of the primary purposes of fostering state-owned 
monopolies; they exist so that the government can exercise control over the most vital 
industrial sectors and public services for political consideration.71 However, in a non-
competitive sector, economic development and consumer welfare will be undermined 
                                                             
67 Martin Hellwig, ‘Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries’ in 
Xavier Vives (eds.) Competition Policy in the EU: Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 203. 
68 Judith Clifton, Francisco Comín, and Daniel Díaz Fuentes, Privatisation in the European Union: 
Public Enterprises and Integration (Springer Science 2003) 24. 
69 Ibid., 25. 
70  Willem Hulsink, Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications: Comparing 
Britain, the Netherlands and France (Routledge 1999) 108-109. 
71 Bridger Mitchell and Paul Kleindorfer, ‘Public Enterprise and Regulation in International Perspective’ 
in Bridger Mitchell and Paul Kleindorfer (eds.) Regulated Industries and Public Enterprise: European 
and United States Perspectives (Lexington Books 1979) 3. 
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if the operation of SOEs is unfettered, which leads to inefficient allocation of goods 
and services and consequentially to possible social unrest. Therefore, sector-specific 
regulations are implemented and institutions are established to oversee the business 
practices in these sector on a continuous and systematic basis, and ensure they are 
strictly consistent with public interests.72  
Like competition policy, industrial policy is also in essence government 
intervention in economic activities. Essentially, both competition and industrial 
policies share the common goal and theoretical basis of correcting business practices 
that are deemed detrimental to economic development and social welfare.73 However, 
they are very different in other aspects. Before discussing the incorporation of 
industrial policy considerations in competition enforcement in China, the next section 
examines the doctrinal difference between competition law and sector-specific 
regulation. 
4.1 Competition Law versus Sector-Specific Regulation 
The most prominent difference is that the enforcement of competition law follows 
an ex-post approach. Instead of specifically guiding the behaviour of undertakings 
beforehand,74 it is only applicable when an illegal behaviour has been carried out. As 
a consequence, undertakings can be punished even if they are unaware that their 
business practices are anti-competitive. On the other hand, sector-specific regulation 
follows an ex-ante approach, which lays down specific business practices that are 
regulated or restricted, so undertakings will have a clear idea about the nature of any 
                                                             
72  Ibid.; and Ingo Vogelsang, ‘The Design of Regulatory Rules’ in Bridger Mitchell and Paul 
Kleindorfer (eds.) Regulated Industries and Public Enterprise: European and United States 
Perspectives (Lexington Books 1979) 9. 
73 Meng (fn 19) 262. 
74  However, it becomes increasingly common for competition authorities to issue ‘guidelines’ for 
undertakings to consult as reference and accordingly establish a better compliance programme, which 
consist of useful information concerning the enforcement practices and priorities, and the interpretation 
of the law by competition authorities. These guidelines are significant in promoting legal certainty, 
transparency and consistency of enforcement. But these guidelines do not have the same legal effects 
as the intervention by sector-specific regulators. 
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business strategy they are going to implement.75 In short, in the regulation of industrial 
practices, competition policy intervenes in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion whilst the 
intervention of sector-specific regulation is more continuous and systematic.76 
In addition, the competition authority can intervene in anti-competitive behaviour 
regardless of the nature of the industry concerned. It will have to analyse substantially 
different market structures and technological expertise in different cases. Sector-
specific regulator, on the other hand, is characterised by its specialty and expertise 
concerning a particular industry. Therefore, a sector-specific regulator knows about 
the status quo and development trajectory of the industry it regulates much better than 
competition authority does. 
Lastly, although the ultimate objective of competition policy and sectoral 
regulation is conformity, that is the promotion of consumer welfare, the approaches 
they adopt to achieve this objective are different. The analysis of a case given by 
competition authority is, at least in theory, economic in nature; the primary focus is on 
a particular business practice and the effect it may have on the relevant market as a 
whole rather than on particular competing undertakings. However, the focus for sector-
specific regulator is on the governance of an industry and more detailed and specific 
‘operational protocols’ in that industry which involve, for example, the specification 
of the pricing and quality level for a particular product or service, and dispute 
resolution between competing undertakings or between undertakings and their trading 
parties. Therefore, in a way, regulatory oversight is more directly linked with consumer 
welfare relative to competition policy. 
When an industry becomes more mature and effectively competitive, it is 
believed that the sector-specific regulation governing that industry should be replaced 
by general competition rules – the so-called regulatory forbearance – since in a free 
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market economy, government intervention should exist only when there are failures 
that cannot be naturally corrected by market forces.77 Therefore, ex-post regulation is 
able to limit the influence of government intervention on free economy to the 
minimum. Littlechild once famously illustrated the relationship between competition 
and regulation:  
‘Competition is indisputably the most effective means – perhaps ultimately 
the only effective means – of protecting the consumers against market 
power. Regulation is essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses 
of monopoly; it is not a substitute for competition. It is a means of ‘holding 
the fort’ until competition arrives.’78  
However, does this theory equally apply to the unique situation in China? 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below explore how the conflict between competition and 
industrial policies is dealt with in China. The interpretation of Article 7 of the AML – 
the only article in the AML implicitly makes reference to industrial policy – will be 
studied first. 
4.2 Interpreting Article 7 
In 2008, the NPC published an article, which was written by the chairman of the 
Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee, to provide the public 
with its comments on and interpretation of the new AML.79 In this article, it was 
argued that since the AML should be drafted in full conformity with the Constitution, 
which stipulated:  
‘The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of 
China is socialist public ownership of the means of production […] In the 
primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic economic system 
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in which the public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of 
ownership develop side by side […]’80 
Accordingly, three basic principles were followed during the drafting process. 
First, the law must protect the basic economic system of China by strengthening and 
developing the public economy, whilst simultaneously encouraging, supporting, and 
guiding the development of non-public economy. Second, it must establish basic rules 
for market competition, which ensure that SOEs and all other types of enterprises 
operate through fair and orderly market competition in accordance with the 
requirements of socialist market economy. Third, it must adequately take into account 
the reality of economic and social development of China at its current stage, and 
coordinate the relationship between competition policy and national industrial policy 
so as to ensure business operators could enlarge business operation, and increase 
industrial concentration and market competitiveness through fair competition and 
voluntary alliance. 81  As clearly shown by these ‘three musts’ which were ‘the 
demonstration of the Chinese characteristics in and the underlying spirit of the AML’,82 
the AML was designed to accommodate multiple objectives besides competition 
policy, and to a degree, serve the more crucial national interests in disregard of market 
competition. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Article 7, which was not initially included in AML 
drafts, 83  is the only provision in the AML that refers, albeit implicitly, to the 
relationship between the AML and sector regulators. It has two paragraphs: 
‘With respect to the industries controlled by the state-owned economy and 
concerning the lifeline of national economy and national security or the 
industries implementing exclusive operation and sales according to law, the 
state protects the lawful business operations conducted by the business 
                                                             
80 Constitution, Article 6. 
81 Yang (fn 79). See also, US Chamber of Commerce, ‘Competing Interests in China’s Competition 
Law Enforcement: China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Application and the Role of Industrial Policy’, 9 
September 2014, at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf, 
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82 Yang (fn 79). 
83 See section 3.1.2, Chapter 3. 
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operators therein. The state also lawfully regulates and controls their 
business operations and the prices of their commodities and services so as 
to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote technical progresses. 
The business operators as mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be 
honest and faithful, be strictly self-disciplined, accept social supervision, 
shall not damage the interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant or 
exclusive positions.’ 
On the face of Article 7, in any of the industries qualified as a ‘lifeline’ – which 
are fully controlled by SOEs – the relevance of the AML is largely questionable. 
Clause 1 of Article 7 makes it clear that dominant undertakings in lifeline industries 
operating strictly pursuant to the laws, which grant them their monopoly status, are not 
to be punished under the AML. However, Clause 2 of Article 7 states that no dominant 
undertaking as stipulated in Clause 1 is allowed to abuse its dominant position to 
‘damage interests of consumers’, and therefore effectively overrides the seeming anti-
monopoly immunity granted to the strategically important SOEs.  
Nonetheless, Article 7 does not clarify which law should prevail when a particular 
lifeline enterprise damages the interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant or 
exclusive positions, the AML or the law governing the industry in question. If Article 
7 did not exist, one can easily assume that, at least theoretically, the AML applies 
equally to every undertaking regardless of its ownership status or the industry in which 
it operates as long as it qualifies as a ‘business operator’ under the AML. However, the 
inclusion of Article 7 gives rise to uncertainty over the relevance of the AML vis-à-vis 
the enforcement against lifeline enterprises. Although from the enforcement actions in 
the past seven years, the speculation that SOEs would be immune from the AML has 
already proved to be invalid, the roles of competition policy and industrial policy in 
the regulation of anti-competitive behaviours of SOEs remain unclear. Based on 
existing practice under the AML, it is still unknown if Article 7 suggests that SOEs in 
lifeline industries will be protected from the application of the AML when the anti-
competitive practices carried out by them are indispensable to the fulfilment of tasks 
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entrusted by sector-specific laws.84 Whilst the insertion of Article 7 may be simply a 
political gesture which emphasises the ideological foundation of China’s economy and 
provides no explicit and solid protection for SOEs, practice suggests that when it 
comes to the implementation of important national industrial policy, competition 
considerations will almost always give way to industrial policy considerations. 
4.3 Pursuing Industrial Objectives 
The ultimate objective of China’s adoption of the AML is still debatable, with 
many scholars arguing that the AML is merely used as a tool to further the CPC’s 
industrial objectives or national goals, rather than to promote a market-oriented 
economy. 85  For example, in the merger between Glencore and Xstrata in 2013, 
Glencore, a Swiss mining undertaking, sought to acquire another Swiss mining 
undertaking, Xstrata, and submitted its notification to MOFCOM for clearance. Whilst 
the transaction was cleared elsewhere, 86  MOFCOM approved the transaction on 
condition that a copper mine owned by Xstrata in Las Bambas in Peru – the biggest in 
Peru – was sold to a third party approved by MOFCOM.87 Glencore accepted the 
condition, and sold the mine in July 2014 to a consortium led by MMG Ltd., a 
subsidiary of China Minmetals Corporation, a large state-owned metal and mineral 
trading company. 88  This decision raised serious doubt as to whether competition 
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policy was being manipulated by MOFCOM to further China’s industrial goals in 
South America.89 
Mergers between central SOEs have proved to be even more problematic, since 
most of the time the merger decision is not made by the merging SOEs, or by their 
supervising ministries, but by the State Council. The government’s attitude towards 
mergers between SOEs has not changed significantly since the old centrally planned 
economy era, when merger and restructuring of SOEs were basically political 
decisions with no need to take into account the economic effects of the transactions.90 
The number of SOEs in general, and the number of the most powerful central SOEs in 
particular, has been declining steadily since the reform, but this in no way indicates 
that the state sector plays a less important role in China’s economic development. The 
decrease in the number of central SOEs dominating the strategically important sectors 
is largely a result of wide scale consolidation of these SOEs initiated by the 
government. The primary aim is mainly twofold. First, by consolidating central SOEs 
that are already formidable national champions in the market, the government will 
have larger SOEs with more prominent financial power to compete globally and 
become world leaders. Second, SOEs operating overseas have always encountered a 
situation in which undertakings bidding for the same project are all Chinese SOEs, as 
a result, consolidation of SOEs with similar scale of operation can effectively prevent 
excess competition and loss of state-owned assets. Due to the strategic importance of 
SOE restructuring, the AML is rarely applied to oversee state-led mergers between 
SOEs. 
For instance, it has been reported that a merger in 2008 between two leading 
telecommunication companies in China, China Unicom, which had a turnover of CNY 
100.47 billion, and China Netcom, which had a turnover of CNY 86.92 billion, should 
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have qualified as a ‘concentration’ under the AML, but the merger was never notified 
to MOFCOM.91 Officials from the merging parties argued that the transaction had 
been approved by MIIT,92 which at the time was a member of the Anti-Monopoly 
Commission. It is hard to be convinced that MOFCOM was not involved in such an 
influential transaction, yet MOFCOM was silent on this topic, or possibly was silenced. 
This merger seems to suggest that as long as the supervisor of the merging SOEs 
proposes or approves the transaction, the notification requirement – let alone the 
review process – under the AML can be practically circumvented.  
In addition, on 30 December 2014, the State Council approved a merger between 
China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Corporation Limited (CSR) and 
China North Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Corporation Limited (CNR),93 
the top two train makers in the world, with a combined annual revenue of CNY 149 
billion in 2013.94 They collectively produce around 90% of the trains on mainland 
China, though the share of the overseas rolling stock market is less than 10%.95 The 
new undertaking, CRRC Corporation Limited, will have a market capitalisation of $26 
billion.96 On 5 January 2015, the Federal Cartel Office of Germany accepted the 
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merger notification filed by CNR and CSR,97 and the transaction was unconditionally 
approved on 20 January, making Germany the first country to clear the merger. It was 
followed by the Competition Commission of Singapore on 7 January 2015.98  
Nonetheless, the transaction clearly has the ability to substantially affect China’s 
rolling stock market and beyond doubt raises competition concerns, since the two 
undertakings were effectively a duopoly in China’s rolling stock market. The merger 
between them therefore would eliminate market competition completely. In theory, if 
the two undertakings were treated as parts of a single entity belonging to the 
government under the AML, the merger between them – mere internal restructuring 
instead of concentration in the competition law sense – would not trigger a merger 
review. 99  Nonetheless, on 3 April 2015, both CSR and CNR made public 
announcements that MOFCOM had cleared the transaction unconditionally, 100 
indicating that the doctrine of single economic entity was not followed. Since it was 
an unconditional decision, MOFCOM is not required by the AML to explain its 
decision. However, it can be speculated that the transaction was cleared on the ground 
that it was pursuant to public interests, so the positive impact outweighed the 
negative.101 Nevertheless, the analysis of MOFCOM of this transaction was in fact 
largely irrelevant to the final outcome, since it seems exceptionally unlikely that a 
merger approved by the State Council would then be turned down by MOFCOM on 
the ground of anti-competitive effects, as the sole rationale behind the merger was to 
eliminate the ‘destructive competition’ between these two SOEs. 102  The review 
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process in this case was merely a rubber stamp to ensure that the transaction was 
legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
Thus far, the AML has yielded limited success in either regulating the anti-
competitive practices of SOEs or in promoting competition in highly concentrated 
state sectors. Even worse, competition policy occasionally has to pursue industrial 
goals because these goals serve the ‘national interest’ which should be pursued by the 
AML103 since they are supported by the central government. However, the authority 
of the AML can be seriously undermined as a result. In light of the above cases, it 
seems that another unique feature of introducing a competition law in a socialist 
country is in fact the forbearance of competition policy104 – as opposed to regulatory 
forbearance – in industrial sectors where state control remains pervasive, especially 
when a particular industrial policy is pursed in the interests of the nation as a whole, 
such as state-led consolidation of large SOEs.  
As can be seen in the previous chapters and the discussion above, there are several 
sectors where the AMEAs are particularly active, such as car insurance, 105 
automobile106 and telecommunication.107 However, whilst both NDRC and SAIC has 
sanctioned a number of undertakings and achieved meaningful results in the insurance 
and automobile sectors where business operators were mainly private undertakings, 
they all failed adequately to punish the infringements of SOEs in the 
telecommunications sector. All investigations were either terminated or suspended, 
and MOFCOM even failed to investigate a questionable merger. The inaction of the 
AMEAs in these cases does not seem to be a coincidence. The political pressures were 
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so substantial that even proper investigations could not be fully carried out in the 
telecommunications sector, let alone liberalisation. Therefore, it seems that both 
NDRC and SAIC in antitrust enforcement and MOFCOM in merger reviews have 
consciously taken a forbearance-based approach to anti-competitive practices in the 
most important industrial sectors.  
Maybe this is exactly what the government wants the AML to achieve in the 
socialist market economy. In relation to the market economy spectrum, the AML 
demonstrates to the world that China is ready to take the openness of its domestic 
market to another level, so that foreign capital will be attracted, most distortions on 
domestic market will be corrected, economic efficiency will be improved, and 
economic growth will be sustained. In relation to the socialist economy spectrum, the 
AML tactfully abstains from regulating the most vital industrial sectors over which 
only the state can exercise control. It intervenes only in a way that suppresses the 
suspicion that China does not apply competition law to its state sector, but does not 
practically alter the structure in the state sector or prevent the accomplishment of 
industrial policy. 
As can be seen in the discussion on the corporate governance of SOEs and the 
implementation of industrial policy, China’s public economy remains largely a 
political arena occupied by powerful interests groups instead of a modern market place 
where orderly economic activities take place. Whilst market forces do not function in 
the unique circumstances of the state sector, and legal methods meant to promote 
competition such as the AML remain largely ineffective, it is sometimes better to fight 
fire with fire; the government has chosen to use political instead of legal methods to 
reform its state sector. The next section discusses how China’s ongoing 
comprehensively deepening reform and anti-graft campaign have removed vested 
interests and promoted market-oriented reform in the state sector, tasks which the 
AML fails to accomplish. 
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5. EXTERNAL FACTORS FACILITATING SOE REFORM 
The Chinese government recognises that SOEs need to improve their efficiency 
in order to improve the overall efficiency of the economy.108 As China moves away 
from a low- to a medium-income country, future growth of the economy will need to 
come from efficiency gains, rather than simply from further increases in capital and 
labour inputs. The main objective of the AML is to increase efficiency in the economy 
and sustain economic growth by promoting competition. However, as shown in the 
discussion above, it is clear that whilst the AML is theoretically able to regulate 
corporate behaviour of SOEs and eventually promote their efficiency, the close tie 
between SOEs and the government may destroy the opportunities for the AML to 
intervene in the first place. In order to further SOE reform and subsequently facilitate 
competition enforcement against SOEs, radical reformers within the government 
chose an alternative path other than using sorely the AML. 
China underwent its most recent ‘once-in-a-decade’109 leadership transition in 
November 2012 when the First Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the 
CPC110 elected the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee,111 
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the highest decision-making body in China. The new Secretary General of the Central 
Committee of the CPC, Xi Jinping, was elected at the First Plenary Session of the 12th 
NPC112 to be the President of China in March 2013. All other top governmental posts 
were either elected or approved by the NPC at the same session.113 Li Keqiang, at his 
debut press conference as Chinese Premier after the closing meeting of the 1st Plenary 
Session of the 12th NPC, stated that there were three top tasks awaiting China’s newly-
installed government: maintaining economic growth, improving people's livelihood, 
and safeguarding social justice.114 To fulfil these tasks, Premier Li said ‘China must 
build an innovative, clean government and government following the rule of law.’115 
He further stated that the government was responsible for furthering the reform and 
‘will try to make the dividends of reform benefit all the people.’ 116 However, he 
admitted:  
‘In pursuing reform we have to navigate uncharted waters. We may also 
have to confront protracted problems, because we will have to shake up 
vested interests. Sometimes stirring vested interests may be more difficult 
than stirring the soul. But however deep the water may be, we will wade 
into the water because we have no alternative. Reform concerns the destiny 
of our nation.’117 
Issues mentioned by Premier Li at the press conference were the views of the 
entire the government. Although it presumably also involved consensus reached 
between various interest groups, these statements provided a good indication as to 
what kinds of developing strategy the government was going to adopt, and where 
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China was heading. Three years have passed since the Premier made his statements, 
but it is still too early to tell if anything avowed has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, 
impressive efforts to confront the major obstacle to furthering economic reform – 
vested interests in the state sector – have indeed been made since the instalment of the 
new government.  
After the discussion on the evolution of SOEs, it is not difficult to perceive that 
the state sector holds enormous vested interests as a beneficiary of China’s pre-reform 
economic policy, and all interested parties involved would inevitably resist if the 
reform ever crossed the line and stepped into their territory. Like AMEAs, whose 
enforcement activities are monitored and influenced by both professional leaders and 
administrative leaders,118 the operation of local industrial SOEs is also subject to 
conflicting instructions from two sets of institutions: central ministries overseeing 
industrial development, and local governments.119 As a result of decentralisation, the 
power of local governments is considerable, and central government is generally not 
able to apply direct influence on the operation of local SOEs. Therefore, the innate 
economic bond between local governments and local SOEs is too overarching to be 
broken through legal means. However, fighting a battle is always about choosing the 
appropriate tactic, and there exists a powerful weapon to clear the path so that the AML 
can proceed to play its part in the new round of reform. As the inherent demerits of 
SOEs are holding back China’s economic reform, the government regards the state 
sector as the perfect deep water into which to wade. 
5.1 ‘De-administrationisation’ 
‘De-administrationisation’ (‘qu xingzhenghua [去行政化]’) essentially means the 
abolition of the administrative ranks currently conferred on executives of SOEs, and it 
has been a task which the central government has endeavoured to accomplish for years 
                                                             
118 See section 4.6, Chapter 5. 
119 Blumental (fn 32) 226. See also Anna M. Han, ‘China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in a 
Transitional Economy’ (1996) 5 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'Y J. 457, 489. 
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but with no meaningful result so far. 120 As discussed in Chapter 2, every time a 
political movement and campaign advocated by the CPC failed, economic reform 
became the lifesaver. Political failures and conflicts were always successfully 
concealed by a new round of economic reform, and public attention was soon 
redirected as a consequence. Indeed, China’s economy miracle has no equivalent in 
the realm of politics. When no reform plan of political structure is implemented, the 
bureaucratic behaviour of government officials is not likely to be greatly improved.121 
The same applies to the state sector, where executives of SOEs are effectively 
government officials performing bureaucratic duties. The Chinese market economy 
has therefore been characterised as a ‘bureaucratic market economy’.122 As a result, 
political means are needed to improve the performance of SOE executives and change 
their mode of running the business. The most prominent political feature in a SOE is 
the administrative rank; another ‘vested interest’ that needs to be cracked down besides 
massive financial benefits. 
Ownership is what separates private undertakings and SOEs. It is also the reason 
why the application of the AML to SOEs becomes a major issue of concern. State 
ownership creates government connection, which is also shared by the AMEAs. Most 
SOEs are protected by government from negative influence because, quite 
straightforwardly, SOEs remit revenues to the government and competition 
enforcement adversely influences their financial performance. In some occasions, even 
without government protection, some executives of SOEs are powerful or well-
connected enough to have impact on enforcement outcomes.  
Because of the administrative ranking system operated by the Chinese 
government and the close ties between SOEs and the government, the distinction 
between an executive of SOE and a government official is obscure and the revolving 
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door phenomenon extremely common. In many cases, officials are appointed to hold 
positions in the management of SOEs, 123  and research shows that 115 senior 
executives in 47 central SOEs which disclosed information on the working experience 
of their senior management had previously worked in the government. 124 
Alternatively, executives of SOEs are appointed to hold posts in the government,125 
the same research showed that 56 out of 183 government officials above vice-
ministerial level in 19 government ministries and commissions had previously worked 
in SOEs.126 In both cases, though high-level executives of SOE do not have civil 
servant status, administrative ranking nonetheless applies to them. When the three elite 
groups – provincial governors, ministers, and military leaders – have continuously 
constituted the principal components of the CPC Central Committee and its 
Politburo, 127  the number of SOE executives in central leadership has grown 
steadily.128 However, from time to time, executive posts were treated by some as 
merely stepping stones in pursuing their political ambitions, in which case promoting 
the performance of SOEs they oversee is not a priority. The oil sector, which is the 
primary target of CPC’s most recent anti-graft campaign,129 vividly points to how 
corporate posts become important in a government official’s career path, and how 
                                                             
123 Jiang Jiemin, the former director of SASAC, was appointed to be the deputy governor and deputy 
party secretary of Qinghai Province when he was the vice-president of CNPC. After four years in 
Qinghai, he moved back to CNPC before being sacked as director of SASAC. 
124 Hong Sheng and Nong Zhao, China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform 
(World Scientific 2013) 217. 
125 For example, Li Xiaopeng, the son of former Chinese Premier Li Peng and the current governor of 
Shanxi Province, was the former general manager of China Huaneng Group, a large SOE in electricity 
sector, and was dubbed ‘king of electricity in Asia’; Su Shulin, the current governor of Fujian Province, 
was the former chairman of Sinopec; Zhang Qingwei, the current governor of Heibei Province, was the 
former chairman of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, a SOE which builds large-size 
passenger aircraft ‘with the goal of challenging the dominance of Boeing and Airbus in the global 
marketplace’. See Cheng Li, ‘China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders 
of Major State-Owned Enterprises)’ (2011) 34 China Leadership Monitor 9, 9. 
126 Sheng and Zhao (fn 124) 217. 
127 Li (fn 125) 9. 
128 In the 17th CPC Central Committee (2007-2012), there was only one SOE executive – Kang Rixin, 
the then party secretary of China National Nuclear Corporation, who was sentenced to life imprisonment 
in 2010 for corruption. In the 18th CPC Central Committee (2012-2017), the number of SOE executive 
increased to five. 
129 The anti-graft campaign in the oil sector will be discussed in the next section. 
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personnel mobility between corporate and government posts can have huge impact on 
departmental decision-making. 
The oil sector, which is dominated by the China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec Group) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC),130 has been 
the domain of powerful party officials since the founding of the PRC owing to the 
massive revenue it is able to produce and the ineffectiveness of the supervising and 
monitoring mechanisms. Years of development have made the network within the oil 
sector too politically complex and thorny for reformers to touch. Zhou Yongkang, 
former general manager of CNPC, was the strongest link between government 
leadership and the oil sector. Because of his senior status in the CPC as the secretary 
of the Central Political and Legislative Committee (CPLC), Zhou was ‘one of the most 
powerful and divisive figures in Chinese politics’ before he retired in late 2012. He 
was later taken into custody for corruption and became the most senior ranking 
communist member to be investigated in the history of PRC.131 He was later sentenced 
to life imprisonment in June 2015.132  
Starting his career as an oilfield technician in late 1960s, Zhou had worked in the 
oil sector for almost 30 years until he was promoted from general manager and party 
secretary of CNPC to minister and party secretary of Ministry of Land and 
Resources.133 He then successfully moved into the inner circle of CPC as he became 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the secretary of CPLC, 134  a 
                                                             
130  See Opinions on Cleaning-up and Rectifying Small Refineries and Regulating the Order of 
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powerful organisation that oversees security apparatus and law enforcement agencies, 
and has in practice enormous influence on courts, procuratorates, and police forces.135 
It is hard to imagine how competition law, so far legislation of relatively minor 
significance within Chinese legal system, could be properly enforced against an SOE 
when the big boss who had the final say on enforcement matters is in fact closely 
associated with that SOE.  
As a tool to deal with the close link between political and economic activities, a 
blueprint for future reform, the Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (Deepening Reforms Decision), 136  was 
adopted at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. The Deepening 
Reforms Decision, which is described as CPC’s ‘biggest package of reforms since the 
1990s’,137 recognises that China’s economic development ‘has entered a new phase’, 
and its reform ‘has entered a period of overcoming major difficulties and a deep-water 
zone’.138 The Deepening Reforms Decision, besides allowing more private capital 
into the state sector, pledged to promote a modern corporate system for SOEs and to 
carry out reform, focusing on separation of government administration from enterprise 
management and separation of government administration from state asset 
management. 139  One of the most prominent characteristics of SOEs is their 
administrative element, which stems from China’s old planning economy and 
significantly impedes the reform process. However, previous efforts to separate 
government administration from enterprise management had not produced ideal 
outcomes. The rail sector provides an example. 
                                                             
135 China Internet Information Center, ‘the Major Functions of the Central Political and Legislative 
Committee’, http://www.china.com.cn/cpc/2011-04/15/content_22369240.htm. 
136 Full text is available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm. A new 
CPC organ, the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, led by Xi Jinping, 
was established following the adoption of the Decision. 
137  China.org, ‘Sinopec Embraces Private Investors’ 20 February, 2014, at 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-02/20/content_31534712.htm. 
138 Section 1(4), the Deepening Reforms Decision. 
139 Ibid., Section 2(7).  
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The Ministry of Railways of China, which was both the policy-maker and service 
provider in the railway market, was dissolved in March 2013. Its original 
administrative functions were brought under the Ministry of Transport, whilst the duty 
of construction and management was assumed by a newly established China Railway 
Corporation. The last minister of Ministry of Railways, Sheng Guangzu, became the 
first general manager and party secretary of China Railway Corporation. One of the 
main purposes of this move was to ‘reduce bureaucracy and improve railway service 
efficiency’.140 However, it is ironic that the China Railway Corporation is in fact 
directly under the supervision of State Council, just like the Ministry of Railways used 
to be, and therefore becomes a ministerial level central SOE; and Mr Sheng is still a 
ministerial level official. In such a case the railway monopoly will be transformed from 
a government monopoly into a large enterprise monopoly. This would legalise 
monopolies and result in a situation that is worse than the previous government 
monopoly. 
The essence of the government’s failure in the ‘de-administrationisation’ is the 
executive appointment system that includes rotation between corporate position and 
government position. When SOEs incorporated under the Company Law are 
empowered to make their own managerial, operational, and production decisions, the 
state retains the authority to appoint, remove, and reward high-level executives of 
SOEs, which according to the law should be the functions of the board of directors.141 
Although SOE executives are rewarded based on financial performance, the future 
career paths of the top SOE executives upon leaving the SOEs are determined by the 
COD, which gives incentives to SOE executives to follow the government’s policy 
guidance. 142  Therefore, under a circumstance where the financial interests of 
shareholders conflict with the political goals of the state, management of SOEs is more 
                                                             
140  Xinhua News Agency, ‘China to Dismantle Railway Ministry’ 10 Marche, 2013, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132221707.htm.  
141 Article 47(9), Company Law. 
142 See Nan Lin, ‘Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and its Future’ (2010) 
7 Management & Org. Rev. 63. 
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than likely to prioritise the latter.143 They certainly have the incentives to do so, as 
only those who perfectly adhere to CPC priorities and government orders, and are 
therefore deemed obedient and loyal by the COD, will rise rapidly in their career paths.  
In order for SOEs to be transformed into a real modern corporation and for 
executives to act in the interests of shareholders rather than related government 
departments, their administrative rankings must be revoked, and in order for SOEs 
fully to be ‘de-administrationised’, the CPC appointment system must be reformed. In 
October 2015 it was reported that the board of directors of Xinxing Jihua Group Co., 
Ltd. appointed a non-cadre professional manager who has no administrative ranking 
and would therefore not be appointed to a government position in the future, as the 
general manager of the company. This is the first time that the board of directors of a 
central SOE exercised the right to appoint general manger without the interference of 
either SASAC or COD.144 This is a welcome development, and it is expected that the 
experiment will be introduced to central SOEs in different sectors with the issuance of 
the pending reform plan on the governance of board of directors of SOE and 
modernisation of corporate system.145 
However, a gradualist and moderate reform plan like de-administrationisation 
may not be useful in certain sectors where political oversight is extremely prevalent, 
since the likelihood that this plan will be implemented in the first place is low. In these 
sectors, a more radical political device may act as ‘ice-breaker’. The next section will 
use the oil sector as an example to illustrate how political means have helped further 
reform in the state sector. 
5.2 Anti-Graft and the Oil Sector 
On 27 August 2013, the Politburo approved a five-year plan on anti-graft 
                                                             
143 Szamosszegi and Kyle (fn 15) 2. 
144 As far, 74 central SOEs have a board of directors. Sina, ‘General Manager of Central SOE No 





(Working Plan) prepared by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
CPC (CCDI), the top agency empowered to investigate corruption and malfeasance. 
The Working Plan states that the government will firmly fight corruption and maintain 
its ‘high-handed posture’ over the next five years. It is reiterated in the Working Plan 
that the CPC will continue its pursuit of both ‘flies’ and ‘tigers’146 as well as its fight 
against harmful working styles – ‘the hotbed of corruption’.147 On the same day, 
SASAC stated on its website that three oil executives – Li Hualin, deputy general 
manager of CNPC; Ran Xinquan, vice president of PetroChina;148 and Wang Daofu, 
chief geologist of PetroChina and head of the Research Institute of Petroleum 
Exploration and Development of PetroChina – were under investigation as a result of 
suspicion of grave violations of discipline.149 One high-ranking CNPC executive had 
already been investigated by CCDI because of grave violations of discipline a day 
before.150 Just a few days later, Jiang Jiemin, who was promoted to head the SASAC 
after the First Plenary Session of 12th NPC in March, was under investigation by CCDI 
and was later ousted. Jiang had been working in the oil industry for almost 40 years 
and was the chairman of CNPC before he assumed duties in SASAC. The oil executive 
and officials under investigation were the elite and backbone of CNPC who formed a 
powerful network within the company that led to large-scale corruption. It represents 
                                                             
146 Section 3(1), Working Plan. At a plenary meeting of CCDI in January 2013, General Secretary Xi 
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the most serious corruption case in the history of Chinese energy system. Jiang was 
convicted of corruption and sentenced to 16 years in prison on 12 October 2015.151 In 
addition, Su Shulin, the governor of Fujian Province and the former manager, party 
secretary and chairman of CNPC, is currently under investigation for suspicion of 
grave violations of discipline.152 It is still unknown whether this investigation has any 
link with his time in the oil sector, where he had worked for nearly three decades.  
The detention of several executives and officials is just the beginning of China’s 
path towards the so-called comprehensively deepening reform; it by no means 
indicates that government is going to be more comfortable in cracking down vested 
interests. Nevertheless, the undergoing investigations clearly indicate that 
government’s effort to fight corruption extends beyond administrative organs to 
powerful parts of the state sector. By valiantly revealing the political scandal 
concerning state conglomerates like the CNPC, the government at least shows the 
resolution to develop its SOEs in a more transparent and modern way as it attracts 
more public attention and critical opinion, whilst at the same time provides larger room 
for public supervision. In fact, positive development concerning the reform of oil 
sector was seen after the anti-graft campaign against the oil giant.  
The first is the abovementioned Deepening Reforms Decision, which was 
adopted in November 2013. It pledged, inter alia, vigorously to develop a mixed 
economy with cross share-holding of state-owned capital, collective capital and non-
public capital; 153  to support the healthy development of non-public sector by 
removing all hidden barriers for the non-public economy and encouraging non-public 
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enterprises to participate in SOE reform;154 and to let market play a decisive role in 
price determination without improper intervention by the government.155  
In light of this important decision, in December 2013, Zhang Yi, who succeeded 
the ousted Jiang Jiemin as director of SASAC, spoke at a conference that SASAC’s 
future tasks with regards to SOEs reform were encouraging more private capital, 
improved supervision, and better efficiency.156 In addition to improving SASAC’s 
performance as state assets watchdog and introducing more efficient operating 
mechanisms into management of SOEs, Zhang said SASAC would endeavour to create 
more favourable conditions for developing mixed ownership by introducing private 
capital in the restructuring of SOEs as well as in major state projects.157 Later in 
March 2014, at the opening of the 2nd Plenary Session of 12th NPC, Premier Li Keqiang 
reiterated that the government ‘will formulate measures for non-state capital to 
participate in investment projects of central government enterprises.’158 Non-state 
capital will be allowed to participate in a number of projects in areas such as banking, 
oil, electricity, railway, telecommunications, resources development and public 
utilities.159 The government pledged to open competitive operations in more areas to 
encourage full participation of private capital.160 
Immediately after Premier Li’s remarks at the NPC, CNPC announced that the 
company planned to make six business areas open to private investors.161 Though 
detailed plans have not been issued, it is thought that CNPC will attract private capital 
to build pipelines, refineries and chemical complexes and tap unconventional oil and 
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gas resources.162 Furthermore, CNPC also plans to open its overseas exploration and 
production and finance operations to private investment.163 A month ago, Sinopec, the 
only competitor of CNPC in Chinese petroleum market and Asia’s largest oil refiner, 
approved the plan to sell up to 30% of its retail oil business to private investors, 
including more than 30,000 fuel stations, pipelines, and storage.164 While these initial 
steps in the new phase of SOEs reform are expected to produce positive results such 
as promoting industrial efficiency of SOEs, are not enough to make the markets 
dominated by SOEs become more suitable an area to be regulated by competition law, 
as the limits of shares hold by private investors mean that the SOEs remain the final 
decision-maker and therefore the strong tie between SOEs and relevant government 
organs, which has been hindering competition enforcement, continues to provide 
protection for vested interests. Nonetheless, this ongoing anti-corruption campaign 
certainly has the impact of breaking the existing political pattern within China’s 
industrial sector and subsequently facilitates the effective competition enforcement 
therein. 
Moreover, in August 2014 the public was thrilled by more news concerning the 
oil sector. Guanghui Petroleum Co. Ltd of Xinjiang was granted a licence by 
MOFCOM to import crude oil in 2014, making it the first private enterprise ever to 
obtain such a licence.165 Many believed that this move signalled the government’s 
willingness to break the monopoly of SOEs in the upstream market of the petroleum 
industry. 166  Despite this positive anticipation, the actual effect of the entry of 
Guanghui on breaking the dominant status of SOEs in petroleum industry remains 
largely symbolic. According to the licence, the import quota was merely 200,000 tons, 
which was less than a third of China’s daily imports, not to mention that Guanghui 
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was required to sell the crude oil to oil refining enterprises conforming to industrial 
policy, which could be subsidiaries owned by Sinopec and CNPC.167 Nonetheless, 
given China’s typical gradualist approach employed through its reform era, this move 
has the nominal potential to become the beginning of a diversifying and competitive 
petroleum industry in China. 
Apart from crude oil, major developments in relation to refined oil can also be 
anticipated in the near future. On 12 October 2015, several Opinions of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Furthering the 
Reform of Price System (Price Reform Opinions) were issued.168 These Opinions set 
forth primary principles for the reform of price system.169 First, insistence on price 
determination by the market; the government should be refrained from improperly 
intervening in price determination when prices are able to be determined by the market, 
and price control in competitive areas should be relaxed. Second, insistence on the 
combination of delegation of power and effective oversight; oversight of the 
government’s price control power in areas where prices are determined by the 
government should be rigorous and effective, and regulations and enforcement should 
be enhanced in areas where prices are determined by business operators. Third, 
insistence on innovation of reform; the government should pursue the innovation of 
price system and regulatory mechanism, and promote the transformation of price 
control from direct price determination to regulation of pricing behaviour and 
macroscopic supervision. Fourth, instead of steady and prudent reform; price reform 
should coordinate with the reforms of, such as, fiscal system, income distribution and 
industrial management, and any risks that endanger economic efficiency, social 
welfare and stability should be prevented.  
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One of the most important areas that the Price Reform Opinions address is the 
price of refined oil.170 Currently, NDRC adopts both government-set and government-
guided prices for refined oil,171 which vary according to the crude oil price on the 
international market. 172  According to the Price Reform Opinions, energy prices, 
including refined oil, gas and electricity, will be liberalised no later than 2020.173 
However, it should be noted that the overhaul of the pricing mechanism does not 
necessarily translate into the promotion of consumer welfare if the inherent structure 
of network industry is not overhauled, since natural monopolies may even be able to 
increase oil price substantially when it is liberalised by limiting output. 
Whilst above events are all encouraging development in relation to the rigidly-
control state sector, they are by no means a victory in themselves. Anti-graft 
campaigns, like the political movements in pre-reform China, can be an effective 
weapon to eliminate substantial political constraints. However, they must be followed 
by functioning legal mechanisms and conducive market environment which are the 
only long-term solution to ensure that the lowering of entry barriers, the advent of 
private actors, and the marketisation of price determination which will ultimately lead 
to the liberalisation of the state sector.  
6. CONCLUSION 
  As above discussion clearly showed, SOEs are embedded in and integrated into 
China’s hierarchical government bureaucracy.174 The same theory applies equally to 
China’s competition policy, which is largely a derivative of political policy. As a 
consequence, simple and straightforward application of competition law – if the 
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AMEAs are lucky enough to be allowed to intervene – will not be an option to handle 
cases concerning SOEs; it is more of a political task of balancing interests than 
economic and legal consideration of business practices. The AML can only be a real 
economic constitution if external factors, namely the reform of SOEs’ corporate 
structure and separation of government’s administrative function from enterprise 
management, are able to achieve meaningful results in terms of eliminating vested 
interests. Although the AML currently fails to regulate anti-competitive practices of 
SOEs effectively, one of the main rationales behind this legislation – promoting a 
competitive socialist market economy – does create an environment conductive to 
forcing the overhaul of Chinese public sector and breaking the complete monopoly 
SOEs once enjoyed in some industrial sectors, as can be shown by China’s ongoing 
corruption probe.  
After the discussion on the historical development of China in Chapter 2, it is 
clear that any reform in China can be characterised by gradualism. Therefore, applying 
a competition law to liberalise a previously rigorously controlled sector and 
subsequently promoting economic efficiency through market competition is a big bang 
approach in the eyes of the Chinese government. Following a gradualist approach, a 
problem concerning a given sector can only be solved from within the sector, therefore, 
the efficiency of the state sector should be promoted through means other than 
competition law, for example, state-led reform in relation to the structure of the sector 
in general,175 and the governance of SOEs in particular. Since political intervention is 
so pervasive in the history of China, it can only be defeated by political means, and 
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anti-corruption and de-administration are merely the first step towards promoting an 
economically efficient state sector. 
SOEs were the core of China’s traditional centrally planned economy. Although 
their dominance has been weakened since the beginning of the economic transition, 
their significance to China’s economic and political stability remains largely 
unchanged in the new era. Nevertheless, for SOEs to continue to be the impetus to 
economic growth rather than holding it back, the public sector needs to be transformed 
from the apparatus of government into a modern enterprise system, which calls for the 





The EU Competition System: Implications for China 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In light of the substantial involvement of European competition agencies in the 
drafting of the AML, the prominent similarities of the substantive competition laws in 
the two jurisdictions, and the problems with regard to China’s competition law and 
competition system identified in the previous chapters, this chapter examines issues 
concerning the EU competition system which are instructive to solving China’s 
problems. These include the design of competition institutions, enforcement efficiency, 
and last but not least, enforcement against SOEs.  
This chapter does not intend to provide an in-depth and critical analysis of the EU 
competition system, it only seeks to provide relevant European reference to answering 
Chinese questions. Although the policy environments in which the competition 
systems of China and the EU operate are largely distinguishing, the emphasis of the 
EU competition system on, inter alia, transparency, consistency and predictability of 
decision-making, and equal treatment of private and public undertakings can indeed 
be valuable guidance for Chinese competition policymakers and enforcers. At the same 
time, however, this chapter does not suggest that the EU has a perfect competition 
model which should be transplanted completely in China; in fact, the EU competition 
system, like any other legal systems in the world, is subject to continuous criticism. 
Rather, it argues that since the EU competition system has partly been through what 
China is now dealing with – reform of the public economies and modernisation of 
competition system – besides receiving assistance during the drafting of the AML, 
China could also benefit from EU’s experiences in seeking the optimal design of 
competition system which might provide China with a desirable shortcut to reforming 
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its own competition system. For example, the most prominent weakness of China’s 
competition system – the inability of the AMEAs to withstand political pressures – is 
in fact the strength of its European part: the European Commission has been acting 
strictly in the interests of the EU only, and member states always ensure that 
competition authorities are independent of political meddling.  
Nonetheless, as already made clear, several major pitfalls of competition 
enforcement in China are not derived from the competition system itself, and can only 
be avoided with the realisation of wide-scale economic and political reforms. The 
European practices recommended in the chapter will be limited to those which are 
feasibly and practically implementable within the political and institutional constrains 
to which the competition system is subject. The next section will introduce the bilateral 
cooperation between China and the EU in the field of competition policy. 
2 EU-CHINA COMPETITION COOPERATION 
Although the objectives a piece of competition legislation seeks to achieve vary 
in different jurisdictions 1  which do not share common competition traditions, in 
essence, a competition system protects and promotes competition in the marketplace. 
When the present day sees a constantly globalised economy and a steeply growing 
number of multinational corporations, there is an urgent need to harmonise the 
regulatory framework that oversees the economic behaviour of these market players 
for the sake of obviating potential conflicts that endanger commercial exchange. 
Advanced and sophisticated competition norms are therefore exported from leading 
competition jurisdictions to other parts of the world, particular to their trading partners. 
                                                             
1  The AML states in Article 1 that competition rules are formulated to ‘prevent and prohibit 
monopolistic conduct, safeguard fair market competition, improve efficiency of economic operation, 
protect the consumer and public interests, and promote the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy’; In the EU, it has been widely debated as to what the goal, or goals, of EU competition law 
really are, see for example, Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU 
Competition Law’ (2013) CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013. 
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More efficient interaction and communication between different competition 
jurisdictions also become more frequent.2  
Since the establishment of formal relations in the 1970s,3 Sino-EU trade has been 
dramatically increasing. China is the second trading partner and the biggest source of 
imports of the EU; and the EU is the biggest trading partner and source of imports of 
China.4 Nonetheless, as the European Commission has once stated, ‘China is the 
single most important challenge for EU trade policy’.5 Whilst the economic interests 
shared by these two economic powers are tremendous, trading conflicts are not 
uncommon. Such tension requires the partnership, which was of an economic nature 
at the beginning, to solve various tasks concurrently. It has indeed developed over the 
past decades to encompass a much wider range of topics including, inter alia, security 
matters, human rights, and climate change.6 Competition, as one of the most important 
areas of interest to the EU,7 also became an issue regularly discussed in the bilateral 
communication. In September 2001, the 4th EU-China Summit called for the 
intensification of contacts and co-operation in the area of competition policy.8 As a 
result, in May 2004 the Directorates-General for Competition of European 
Commission and MOFCOM jointly established a dialogue on competition – the EU-
China Competition Policy Dialogue – which aims to establish a permanent forum of 
consultation and transparency between China and the EU in the area of competition 
policy, and to enhance the EU’s technical and capacity-building assistance to China.9 
                                                             
2 Qianlan Wu, ‘EU – China Competition Dialogue: A New Step in the Internationalisation of EU 
Competition Law?’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 461, 461. 
3 The current EU-China partnership is based on the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
concluded in 1985 by China and the then European Economic Community. 
4  European Commission, ‘Trade – China’, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/china. 
5 European Commission, ‘Competition and Partnership: A Policy for EU-China Trade and Investment’, 
24 October 2006, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130793.pdf.  
6 Meetings and dialogues between China and the EU are organised under ‘three pillars’: political 
dialogue, economic and sectoral dialogue and people to people dialogue. See European Union, ‘EU-
China Dialogue Architecture – Main Elements’, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/eu_china_dialogues_en.pdf.  
7 See Protocol No. 27, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
8 See Joint Press Statement of the 4th EU-China Summit, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-
01-312_en.htm?locale=en. 
9 Section 1, Terms of Reference for EU–China Competition Policy Dialogue. 
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This Dialogue is the first bilateral dialogue on competition joined by the EU, and it 
played a significant role in shaping the AML with EU competition thinking.10  
In September 2012, acknowledging the importance of cooperation and 
coordination between competition authorities in enhancing an effective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory competition enforcement, the Directorate-General for 
Competition (DG Competition) – the institution responsible for conducting 
competition proceedings within the Commission – signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Anti-Monopoly Law with the other two 
Chinese competition enforcement agencies – NDRC and SAIC – aiming to increase 
mutual understanding and awareness of the trends and development of competition 
policy in the EU and China.11  
In addition, in October 2015 DG Competition and MOFCOM, pursuant to the 
Terms of Reference for EU–China Competition Policy Dialogue, jointly issued the 
Practical Guidance for Cooperation on Reviewing Merger Cases.12 The Guidance 
notices that cooperation in reviewing merger cases that fall within the jurisdiction of 
both the Commission and MOFCOM is, in fact, beneficial. It is also stated that both 
authorities should establish and maintain communication during the respective review 
of the same cases, and endeavour to make efficient, consistent, and non-conflicting 
decisions. Given that MOFCOM had from time to time made divergent decisions 
either by blocking a transaction which was approved by the Commission13 or by 
putting forward unique remedies,14 it remains unclear how this newly issued Practical 
                                                             
10 Wu (fn 2) 465. 
11 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Anti-Monopoly Law, 20 September 
2012. 
12  Practical Guidance for Cooperation on Reviewing Merger Cases of 15 October 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/china.html. 
13 See the P3 Network case. 
14  See for example Nokia/Alcatel (2015) MOFCOM Notice No. 44, 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201510/20151001139743.shtml. The case was unconditionally 
cleared by the Commission in July 2015, see Case No COMP/M.7632 – Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, 
Commission decision of 24 July 2015. 
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Guidance can promote a convergence of decision-making in merger cases through 
effective communication and coordination. 
Despite the more frequent communication and cooperation between competition 
authorities in the EU and China, it is worth noting that cooperation in the sphere of 
competition policy is just a means to serve the ultimate goal shared by the two 
economies, which is ‘the establishment of smooth and sustainable trade relations 
between China and the EU’. 15  Indeed, as will be shown later, protection and 
promotion of competition is never the only goal for the implementation of competition 
policy in the EU. The next section briefly introduces the EU competition system. 
3. THE EU COMPETITION SYSTEM 
The EU has a long history of protecting market competition with well-developed 
competition policy, which plays a vital role in promoting consumer welfare in the form 
of lower prices, better quality of products, and more choice. It is widely recognised 
that competition law in Europe arose because rules regulating the market within the 
broader of Europe has become an economic, as well as political, necessity. The 
introduction of competition law not only provides a regulatory framework that fosters 
the free movement of goods and services by removing artificial and regulatory 
obstacles to intra-Union trade,16 but also helps create ‘an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’.17 The TFEU replaced the EC Treaty following the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The primary EU competition rules are now found in 
Articles 101-109 TFEU, which replaced Articles 81-89 EC (originally Articles 85-94 
EEC). Although the Treaty of Lisbon is said to suppress the EU’s commitment to 
                                                             
15 See fn 9 above.  
16  See European Commission, ‘Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and Its 
Member States’, Report 2015. See also European Commission, ‘A Deeper and Fairer Single Market: 
Commission Boosts Opportunities for Citizens and Business’, 28 October 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5909_en.htm. 
17 Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 325 of 24.12.2002. 
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‘undistorted competition’,18 the EU competition system is still considered to be not 
only one of the most mature and advanced competition systems in the world,19 but 
also a unique one, as it consists of enforcement authority at the EU level, the European 
Commission – a collegiate institution composed of 28 politically appointed 
commissioners from 28 member states – as well as national enforcement authority 
(NCAs) in 28 member states.  
The following sections provide a brief overview of the historical development of 
EU competition law. 
3.1 The Emergence of Competition Law 
At the end of the nineteenth century, modern competition rules appeared in the 
United States.20 However, Europe only had its competition rules more than half-
century later with the promulgation of the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty),21 which initiated a process of 
substantial economic integration in the steel and coal sectors among six nations: 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands. Besides a number 
of legal and economic provisions organising the trade of coal and steel, the founding 
                                                             
18 According to Article 3(1) (g) EC (now Article 3(3) TFEU), one of the objectives of the Community 
is to establish ‘a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted.’ However, such 
reference was removed from the main body by the Lisbon Treaty. Now, the substantive content of 
Article 3(1) (g) EC is placed in Protocol No 27 on the Internal Market and Competition, annexed to the 
TEU and the TFEU. As such, there were concerns about competition enforcement in the EU would be 
downplayed. However, it has been argued that, following the practices of EU competition agencies and 
EU courts after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the omission of the sentence from the body of 
the amended EC Treaty ‘does not affect the constitutional status of the Treaty rules on competition’, 
and Protocol No. 27 is ‘seen as a constitutive part of Article 3(3) TFEU and appears to have the same 
interpretative value as the appealed Article 3(1) (g) EC.’ Therefore the removal of Article 3(1) (g) EC 
is simply ‘symbolic’. Ben Van Rompuy, ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU Competition Law: A 
Review of Recent Case Law of the EU Courts’ (2011) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970081, 9. This argument was recently confirmed by the General Court. Case 
T-456/10 Timab Industries v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:296, paras. 211-212. 
19 The EU has ‘one of the world’s two leading competition law systems.’ Ian Forrester, ‘Due Process 
in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures’ (2009) 34 European 
Law Review 817, 817. 
20 See the Sherman Act 1890 of the United States, 15 U.S.C. 
21 Officially the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 
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member states, being ‘enlightened by the US experience’,22 drafted competition law 
provisions23 prohibiting both cartels and abuses of economic power in the steel and 
coal sectors.  
In 1957, the six founding member states of the ECSC decided to extend the scope 
of their economic integration to a larger number of sectors.24 They expanded the 
competition provisions of the ECSC Treaty to all economic sectors in the Treaty of 
Rome25 which holds undistorted competition as one of its fundamental objectives.26 
The main competition provisions of the EEC Treaty can be found in Articles 85-90 
EEC. In addition to Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibited restrictive 
agreements between firms and abuses of a dominant position respectively, the EEC 
Treaty also contained Article 92 EEC aimed at preventing state aid.  
After lengthy negotiations on the ex ante rules and ex post rules supported by 
Germany and France respectively, 27  the rules governing the enforcement of 
competition law finally came to existence in 1962 with the adoption of Council 
Regulation 17/62.28 In favour of the German position, Regulation 17/62 established a 
centralised enforcement system,29 where the European Commission was entrusted 
with significant investigative and regulatory powers to scrutinize ex ante agreements 
between firms through a notification system. It required firms to notify all agreements 
falling within the scope of Article 85 EEC – provided that the parties to the agreements 
seek exemption under Article 85(3) EEC – must be notified to the Commission.30 In 
contrast, the role played by the competition authorities in Member States and national 
                                                             
22 Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Hart Publishing Ltd 
2007) 36. 
23 Arts 65 and 66, ECSC Treaty. 
24 Elhauge and Geradin (fn 22) 36. 
25 Officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
26 Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty. 
27  Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 17. 
28 Council Regulation No 17/62 of 6 February 1962 (EEC): First Regulation implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty, OJ 013 of 21.02.1962. 
29 Council Regulation No 17/62 of 6 February 1962 (EEC): First Regulation implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty, OJ 013 of 21.02.1962, at 204. 
30 Article 4. 
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courts in the implementation of EC competition rules was marginal.31 Article 9(1) of 
the Regulation provided that the Commission had the sole right to apply Article 85(3) 
EEC and grant exemptions – subject to review by the Court of Justice – to agreements 
which would otherwise be automatically void under Article 85(2) EEC. 
Whilst the EEC Treaty governed anti-competitive agreements and abuse of 
dominant position, it made no reference to a merger control system, which was instead 
established by the Council pursuant to Regulation 4064/89 in 1989.32 Regulation 
4064/89 was revised in 1997 and again in 2004, and the current legal instrument 
governing the EU merger system is Regulation 139/2004 (EUMR).33  Apart from 
primary EU legislation, sources of EU competition law also include regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. The latter two have no binding 
force and may take the form of notice, guideline or guidance. Whilst the core of the 
EU competition law as provided by the EEC Treaty remains largely intact, the 
implementing rules have been constantly amended to accommodate new developments 
in competition law arena.34 
3.2 The Overhaul of European Competition System 
Along with economic development, agreements were formulated more regularly, 
and the workload of the Commission to handle notifications was increasingly heavy. 
Since a significant number of the agreements entered into by undertakings were in fact 
able to satisfy the requirements of Article 81(3) EC, 35  the Commission adopted 
several so-called ‘block exemption regulations’, under which certain types of 
                                                             
31 Elhauge and Geradin (fn 22) 39. 
32  For example, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 257 of 21.09.1990. 
33 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 24 of 29.01.2004. 
34 Philip Lowe, ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century – the Experience 
of the European Commission and DG Competition’ (2008) Competition Policy Newsletter, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2008_3_1.pdf, 3. 
35 Elhauge and Geradin (fn 22) 37. The EEC Treaty was renamed the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (EC) in 1992. 
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agreements 36  or agreements concerning certain industrial sectors 37  were 
automatically exempt from the application of Article 81(3) EC. In addition, the 
Commission also issued guidelines, comfort letters, negative clearance decisions, and 
de minimis notices in order to enhance the efficiency of the notification procedure and 
ensured a timely enforcement of competition law.38 However, these measures could 
not fundamentally compensate for the shortcomings of the system.  
At the turn of the century, the Commission realised that, with 10 new member 
states joining the EU in 2004, its capacity would no longer be able to afford the 
increasing amount of notifications. Particularly, the centralised system set up by 
Regulation 17 could no longer secure a balance between effective supervision and 
simplified administration as required by Article 83(2)(b) EC.39 On the one hand, the 
notification requirement ‘impose[d] a heavy burden of work and expense on 
undertakings’40 to draft notifications for agreements most of which did not pose real 
threat to trade between member states.41 On the other, due to the fact that a major part 
of available resources had been devoted to reviewing notifications, the Commission 
was not able to ‘detect the most serious infringements of the competition rules’.42 
Moreover, whilst the Commission had the sole authority to grant exemption, initially 
national courts and competition authorities lacked the necessary expertise and 
                                                             
36 See, for example, Commission Regulation 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of 
Art 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, OJ 2000, L 304 of 29.11.2000; 
Commission Regulation 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Art 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of research and development agreements, OJ 2000, L 304 of 29.11.2000; and Commission 
Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Art 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336 of 22.12.1999. 
37 See, for example, Commission Regulation 358/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the application of Art 
81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the 
insurance sector, OJ 2003, L 53 of 27.02.2003; and Commission Regulation 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 
on the application of Art 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
in the motor vehicle sector, OJ 2000, L 203 of 31.07.2002. 
38 Geradin et al. (fn 27) 17. 
39 Recitals 2 and 3, Regulation 1/2003. 
40 White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules implementing Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
COM (99) 101 final, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1, 29 
41 Eric Gippini-Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003’ (2008) Community Report to the FIDE Congress, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139776, 4. 
42 White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules implementing Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
COM (99) 101 final, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1, 29 
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resources to conduct sophisticated economic evaluations under Article 81(3) EC, this 
was no longer the case since the Commission had already set major precedents in the 
application of Article 81(3) EC, and the capacity of national courts and competition 
authorities to handle complex competition cases had been significantly increased.43 
As a consequence, the Commission proposed the abolition of the notification 
procedure and the decentralisation of the application of Article 81(3) EC.44 
Following the Commission’s proposition, the Council replaced Regulation 17/62 
with Regulation 1/2003,45 the so-called ‘Modernisation Regulation’, which ushered 
in far-reaching changes to save the Commission from an increasingly overloaded and 
ineffective enforcement system.46 Regulation 1/2003 came into force on 1 May 2004. 
After over 40 years of centralisation, the EU modernisation reforms brought by the 
Regulation abolished the ex ante notification procedure for agreements falling within 
the scope of Article 81 EC, diverted the enforcement of Article 81 EC from ‘a standard 
presumption of illegality to a default assumption of legality’,47 and decentralised the 
power to enforce Article 81(3) EC which was previously held solely by the 
Commission. The reformed framework gave NCAs and national courts a primary role 
in the application of EU competition law and allowed the Commission to ‘focus its 
investigations on sectors where there are only a few players, where cartel activity is 
recurrent or where abuses of market power are generic’.48 This modernisation reform 
is said to be ‘the most important legal and cultural policy revolution in the history of 
                                                             
43 John Cooke (2004) ‘Competition Law and Policy of the European Union: the Reform of Competition 
Law Enforcement – Will it Work?’ in Dermot Cahill (eds.) The Modernisation of EU Competition Law 
Enforcement in the European Union: FIDE 2004 National Reports (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
33. 
44 White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules implementing Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
COM (99) 101 final, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1, 30 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 001 of 04.01.2003. 
46 Wouter Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing 2005) 1. 
47 Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, ‘The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: the 
Economics of Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 309, 311. 
48 Communication for the Commission – A pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe, 
COM (2004) 293 final, 16. 
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European competition law,’49 and it has profoundly changed the way in which EU 
competition law is enforced.50 
The Commission also adopted a ‘Modernisation Package’ comprising of six 
notices to complement Regulation 1/2003, which aimed to promote the efficiency of 
the EU competition enforcement and reduce bureaucracy for undertakings to comply 
with the EU competition rules. 51  In the Modernisation Package, the Notice on 
Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities was of particular 
importance as it laid down the scope within and procedures through which the 
European Competition Network (ECN), established pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, 
would be operating.52  
4. INTRA-NETWORK COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 
The primary consideration leading to the decentralisation of competition 
enforcement, both in the EU and China, is that central agencies do not have the 
capacity in terms of financial resources and manpower to deal with a large number of 
competition cases, and so devolution of power to the local level is helpful and 
necessary. Through decentralisation, central agencies are able to devote scarce 
resources to the most complicated and influential cases whilst local agencies handle 
those with merely regional impact. However, consistent enforcement may be 
compromised as a result of inefficient communication caused by multi-level 
governance and involvement of multiple agencies. 53  Mechanisms to facilitate the 
cooperation and coordination amongst enforcement agencies – such as the European 
                                                             
49 Angela Wigger ‘Revisiting the European Competition Reform: the Toll of Private Self-Enforcement’ 
(2004) Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Working Papers Political Science, No.2004/07, 3. 
50 Ibid.  
51  European Commission, ‘Commission Finalises Modernisation of the EU Antitrust Enforcement 
Rules’, 30 March 2004, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-411_en.htm?locale=en. 
52 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101 of 
27.04.2004. 
53 Firat Cengiz, ‘Multi-Level Governance in Competition Policy: the European Competition Network’ 
(2010) 35 European Law Review 661, 661. 
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Competition Network (ECN)54 in the EU and the AMC in China – are therefore 
essential to mitigate the weakness of decentralisation of the competition enforcement.  
Whilst the relationship between EU and national law in general55 – and that 
between EU and national competition law in particular56 – need to be clarified in the 
EU, the relationship between national and local law is certainly not subject to debate 
in China.57 However, as already illustrated, the interplays between central and local 
AMEAs and between local AMEAs can be subtle yet intricate even in a unitary state 
like China. The lack of coordination represents one of the major sources that contribute 
to the ineffectiveness of China’s competition enforcement. This phenomenon exits at 
the central level, where the AMC is not functional in performing its coordinating duty; 
it worsens at local level, where the local DRCs and AICs are in a competing 
relationship.  
In a loose sense, the ‘3-64’ competition enforcement structure in China – three 
central AMEAs, 32 DRCs and 32 AICs – can be compared to the ‘1-28’ enforcement 
structure in the EU – a European Commission and 28 National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) – whilst the AMC can have similar functions to those of the ECN. 
The purpose of such comparison is to consider how the effective coordination and 
cooperation taking place within the ECN – which should, at least in theory, be a much 
                                                             
54 For a general discussion on the development of the ECN, see David J. Gerber, ‘The Evolution of a 
European Competition Law Network’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) 
Constructing the EU Network of Competition Authorities (Hart Publishing 2004). 
55 In Flaminio Costa v ENEL, the ECJ held that ‘[b]y creating a community of […] real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the 
Member States have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both 
their nationals and themselves’. Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593. The 
principle that the EU law prevails over national law in the case of a conflict was affirmed by the 
Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which reads ‘the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have 
primacy over the law of Member States’. Declaration concerning primacy, OJ 2008/C 115/01, at 344. 
56 Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that in the case of a conflict the EU competition law 
prevails over national competition law. In addition, Member States are refrained from adopting either 
stricter or more lenient rules on anti-competitive agreement, whilst they are allowed to adopt stricter 
rules on unilateral conduct. 
57 Although, from time to time, there will be several local laws and regulations which are deemed 
unconstitutional. See China Daily, ‘Scholars Propose: Reviewing the Law before Reviewing the Case 




more complex apparatus than the network consisting of the AMEAs since the ECN 
involves the interests of both supranational entity and sovereign states58 – can be an 
instrumental source of inspiration for enhancing the coordination and cooperation 
between the AMEAs, and contributing to the consistent and coherent application of 
the AML. 
The ECN, as a ‘splendid success story’, 59  is a forum for discussion and 
cooperation of European competition authorities including the Commission and NCAs 
in relation to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102, and helps create and maintain 
a common competition culture in Europe.60 It was established for the purpose of 
preserving both an efficient division of work and an effective and consistent 
application of EU competition rules.61 In relation to the division of work, the primary 
objective is to prevent conflicts amongst enforcement agencies by identifying a ‘well 
placed’ authority.62 The Commission is ‘well placed’ to intervene in cases if they have 
effects on competition in more than three Member States,63 if they are closely linked 
to other EU provisions which may be exclusively or more effectively applied by the 
Commission, and if the EU interest requires the adoption of a Commission decision to 
develop EU competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to ensure 
effective enforcement. 64  Since all NCAs have parallel competences in applying 
Articles 101 and 102, cases can be dealt with by a single NCA or several NCAs acting 
in parallel. Three cumulative conditions need to be fulfilled for an NCA to be ‘well 
placed’ to initiate an investigation. First, the alleged anti-competitive practice in 
                                                             
58 For an evaluation of the functioning of the ECN, see Mislav Mataija, ‘The European Competition 
Network and the Shaping of EU Competition Policy’ (2010) 6 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy 75; and Mihalis Kekelekis, ‘The European Competition Network (ECN): It Does Actually Work 
Well’ EIPAScope 2009/1, 35-39. 
59  Bruno Lasserre, ‘The Furture of European Competition Network’ 21st St. Gallen International 
Competition Law Forum ICF, May 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567620, 
1. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the ECN, as a platform of policy development and dissemination, 
lacks transparency and democratic accountability. Mataija (fn 68) 78. 
60 Para. 1, Notice on Network of Competition Authorities. 
61 Ibid., para. 3. 
62 Cengiz (fn 53) 667. 
63 Para. 14, Notice on Network of Competition Authorities. 
64 Ibid., para. 15. 
239 
 
question has substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects on competition within its 
territory, and is implemented within or originates from its territory. Second, the NCA 
is able to adopt a cease-and-desist order the effect of which will be sufficient to bring 
an end to the infringement and, where appropriate, adequately sanction the 
infringement. Third, the NCA is able to gather the necessary evidence, either with or 
without the assistance of other authorities, to prove the infringement.65 
In order to ensure cases are dealt with by a ‘well placed’ competition authority, 
the ECN provides mechanisms through an ECN Electronic Transmission project for 
NCAs to inform the Commission before commencing an investigation under Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU,66 and to inform each other of a possible re-allocation of cases by 
means of a standard form containing information such as the authority dealing with 
the case, the product, territories and parties concerned, the alleged infringement, the 
suspected duration of the infringement, and the origin of the case.67 In addition, no 
later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision, NCAs are obliged to provide the 
Commission with a summary of the case, the envisaged decision, or the proposed 
course of action.68 In addition, the Commission and NCAs have powers to exchange 
and use information collected legally by them.69 An NCA is able to ask another NCA 
for assistance in order to collect information or to carry our fact-finding measures on 
its behalf.70 These mechanisms make it possible for the Commission to intervene and 
relieve NCAs of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in a timely 
fashion.71  
Although the ECN does not directly divide the work, the framework provided by 
it for exchange of information amongst the Commission and NCAs ensures the 
                                                             
65 Ibid., para. 8(1) (2) and (3). 
66 Article 11(3), Regulation 1/2003. 
67 Para. 17, Notice on Network of Competition Authorities. 
68 Article 11(4), Regulation 1/2003. 
69 Ibid., Article 12. 
70 Para. 29, Notice on Network of Competition Authorities. 
71 Ibid., para. 54. 
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efficiency of case allocation.72 The same level of efficiency is largely lacking in China. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the division of jurisdiction between NDRC and SAIC based 
on whether the alleged anti-competitive practice has a price-related element has proven 
to be largely questionable. In Hunan Insurance Cartel, the two separate cases that 
seemed to be related were handled by local agencies of NDRC and SAIC, whilst some 
illegal practices were left unpunished.73 Since it is impractical to expect these two 
competing agencies to cooperate voluntarily, if there was a mandatory mechanism for 
collection and exchange of information at the AMC level amongst NDRC, SAIC and 
their local agencies, the AMEAs would have contributed to each other’s investigations 
by providing additional evidence and information, and the cases would have been dealt 
with more efficiently.  
The division of jurisdiction between central AMEAs and their local agencies is 
also problematic: in Moutai and Wuliangye, the RPM practices of the two SOEs, which 
affected numerous distributors on a national scale, were handled by the Price Bureaux 
of Guizhou Province and Sichuan Province.74 In Zhejiang Insurance Cartel, where 
insurance companies and consumers mainly from Zhejiang Province were involved, 
the horizontal agreements were sanctioned by NDRC. However, the Hunan Insurance 
Cartel, which involved only insurance companies based in and affected car owners 
mainly from Hunan Province, were handled by Hunan AIC and Hunan Price Bureau. 
There seems to be no pattern behind the division of work in these cases. The most 
obvious difference between a central and a local intervention is that the fines imposed 
                                                             
72 For a critical analysis of exchange of information and cooperation undertaken within the ECN, see 
Julian Nowag, ‘Due Process: the Exchange of Information and Risk of Hindering Effective Cross-
border Co-operation in Competition Cases’ (2010) 7 The Competition Law Review 105; and Andreas 
Schwad and Christian Steinle, ‘Pitfalls of the European Competition Network – Why Better Protection 
of Leniency Applicants and Legal Regulation of Case Allocation is Needed’ (2008) 29 European 
Competition Law Review 523. 
73 See section 4.2, Chapter 5. 
74  It was stated that the two cases were first initiated by NDRC, but were subsequently directed 
respectively to local authorities in Guizhou and Sichuan. Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘Bureaucratic Politics 
and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2014) King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-9, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391187, 33. However, the 
reason of the delegation of enforcement authority remains unknown. 
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on infringing business operators are remitted to national treasury in the former case, 
and to the provincial treasury in the latter. Although there is no evidence suggesting 
that central AMEAs and provincial governments had engaged in any form of benefit 
exchange – namely, a furtive communication with regard to which enforcement agency 
should abstain from initiating the investigation in a particular case and what benefits 
the restrained agency could possibly obtain – a clearly defined allocation of 
jurisdiction amongst central and local AMEAs can certainly prevent the abuse of 
discretionary power and eliminate the advent of such maladministration. 
Apart from allocation of jurisdictions among competition authorities, another 
important aspect of the EU from which China can draw a lesson is the Commission’s 
promotion of a coherent decision-making process by adopting legal instruments and 
establishing supplement institutions. 
5. TRANSPARENCY, CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE IN 
COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 
As can be shown by the lack of information in official decisions made by the 
AMEAs, non-transparency of decision-making has been a major problem undermining 
parties’ rights of defence and leading to inconsistency of decision-making.75 It also 
prevents the public from effectively scrutinising and evaluating the enforcement 
activities under the AML, and the agencies from actively accumulating competition-
related expertise. In the EU, improving transparency is the main way to promote good 
governance and ensure the participation of civil society.76 Decisions taken and work 
conducted within the EU are required to be as open as possible.77  
                                                             
75 See respectively section 3.1 of Chapter 5 regarding the opacity of MOFCOM’s decision-making 
process and section 3.4 of Chapter 5 regarding NDRC’s inconsistent fine setting. 
76 Article 15(1), TFEU. 
77 Article 1 TEU; Article 15(1) TFEU. 
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 Article 30 of Regulation 1/2003 requires the Commission to publish – in the 
Official Journal of the European Union and on DG Competition’s website78 – any 
decision of finding and termination of infringement, order of interim measures, 
acceptance of commitments and finding of inapplicability,79 as well as any decision 
on fines and periodic penalty payments.80 Similar publication requirements are also 
set out in Article 20(1) of EUMR. In the published decisions, the Commission will 
make as much information as legally permitted available to the public.81 Apart from 
these general principles governing the openness of published decisions, the 
Commission has been working towards providing fundamental procedural safeguard 
for transparency in competition proceedings. 
5.1 Rights of Access to the File 
The legal basis of the rights of addressees of a statement of objections made by 
the Commission82 to access to Commission file can be found in Articles 27(1) and (2) 
of Regulation 1/2003, and Articles 18(1) and (3) of Regulation 139/2004. The right is 
further recognised by Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which states ‘[every person has] the right […] to have access to his 
                                                             
78 Paras. 134 and 135, DG Competition – Best Practices on the conduct of proceedings concerning 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
79 Article 30, Regulation 1/2003. 
80 Ibid. In addition, the Commission may make the initiation of antitrust proceedings public before 
informing the parties concerned. Article 2(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 relating to 
the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 
123 of 27.04.2004. 
81 Para. 2, Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission Decisions adopted under 
Articles 7 to 10, 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003. See also Guidance on the preparation of public versions 
of Commission Decisions adopted under the Merger Regulation. According to Article 28(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003 and Article 16(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 
relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, the Commission should refrain from disclosing confidential information which is covered by 
the obligation of professional secrecy. Any confidential information will need to satisfy three 
cumulative conditions in order to be covered by the obligation of professional. Case T- 198/03 Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt v Commission [2006] ECR II-1429, para. 71.  
82 Para. 7, Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325/07 of 22.12.2005 (Right of Access Notice). (‘Access to the 
file […] is intended to enable the effective exercise of the rights of defence against the objections 
brought forward by the Commission.’) 
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or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of 
professional and business secrecy.’ In 1997, pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation 17/62, 
the Commission adopted the Notice on the rules of procedure for access to the 
Commission’s competition file83 in order to increase transparency of procedures for 
parties involved in antitrust and merger cases.84 Any breach of the rights of defence 
will in principle lead to the annulment of the decision.85 In 2005, the Notice was 
revised to ‘increase the transparency of competition procedures and underline the 
Commission’s commitment to due process and parties’ rights of defence’.86 
The file to which the access may be granted consists of all documents that have 
been obtained, produced, or assembled by DG Competition during the investigation, 
with the exception of non-accessible documents,87 including internal documents,88 
business secrets,89 or other confidential information such as military secrets.90 Given 
the increasing reliance on economic data in merger reviews in recent years, the 
Commission also permits merging parties to verify the Commission’s use of economic 
data and empirical methods.91 The Commission is allowed to decide in which way the 
access to the file should be granted.92 In GE/Instrumentarium, after concluding that 
the proposed merger would significantly restrict competition, the economists retained 
by the merging parties were granted the access to the database and the computer 
                                                             
83 Commission notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in 
cases under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, OJ C 23 of 23.01.1997. 
84  European Commission, Press Release IP/97/50, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-
50_en.htm?locale=en. 
85 Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2002] II-4389, para. 89. 
86  European Commission, Press Release IP/05/1581, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-
1581_en.htm?locale=zh. 
87 Paras. 8 and 10, Right of Access Notice. 
88 Ibid., paras. 12-16. 
89 Ibid., para. 18. 
90 Ibid., paras. 19 and 20. 
91 Nicholas Levy, ‘Procedural Aspects of Merger Control’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds.) 
Handbook on European Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 315. 
92 Para. 44, Right of Access Notice. See also DG Competition – Best Practices on the disclosure of 
information in data rooms in proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and under the EUMR. 
244 
 
programs used by the Commission to generate its empirical results.93 Because the data 
was confidential and could not be forwarded directly, the economists, after signing 
confidentiality agreements, were invited to work on the Commission’s premises.94  
Irrespective of the rationality of the final decision in a competition case, in the 
event that technical capability is restricted, a procedural measure such as the one in 
GE/Instrumentarium is able to provide a desirable degree of transparency for the 
parties involved, which will have the opportunity to understand the reasoning of the 
decision and will therefore be better placed to determine on their own if the decision 
had addressed all fundamental issues. The AMEAs should endeavour to make 
available to parties involved the evidence and information on which their decisions are 
based so as to give them the chance to express their views and increase the credibility 
of the decisions.95 
Disputes between the parties and the Commission regarding confidentiality 
claims96 or access to the file in general will be dealt with by the Hearing Officer. 
5.2 Hearing Officer 
For the purpose of safeguarding the effective exercise of the procedural rights of 
the parties concerned,97 the post of Hearing Officer was created by the Commission 
in 1982.98 The Hearing Officer should be ‘an independent person experienced in 
competition matters who has the integrity necessary to contribute to the objectivity, 
                                                             
93 Guillaume Loriot, François-Xavier Rouxel and Benoit Durand, ‘GE/Instrumentarium: A Practical 
Example of the Use of Quantitative Analyses in Merger Control’ (2004) 1 Competition Policy 
Newsletter 58, 61. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Article 32 of the Administrative Penalty Law of China stipulates: ‘The parties shall have the right to 
state their cases and to defend themselves. Administrative organs shall fully heed the opinions of the 
parties and shall reexamine the facts, grounds and evidence put forward by the parties; if the facts, 
grounds and evidence put forward by the parties are established, the administrative organs shall accept 
them.’ 
96 Para. 42, Right of Access Notice. 
97 These rights include all the procedural rights as set out in Regulation 1/2003, Regulation 139/2004, 
Regulation 773/2004, Regulation 802/2004, as well as in the relevant case law of the Court of Justice 
of the EU. Recital 2, Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission on the 
function and terms of reference of the Hearing Officer in competition proceedings, OJ L 275/29 of 
13.10.2011 (Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer). 
98 Recitals 3 and 4, Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer. 
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transparency and efficiency of [antitrust and merger] proceedings’. 99  In order to 
ensure the independence of the Hearing Officer from DG Competition, the post is 
attached to the Competition Commissioner, from whom the Hearing Officer should 
not seek or take instructions in exercising his or her functions,100 for administrative 
purposes.101  
The Hearing Officer operates to resolve issues affecting the effective exercise of 
the procedural rights of the parties involved, complainants, or interested third persons 
where such issues could not be resolved through prior contacts with the 
Commission. 102  The main functions of the Hearing Officer, apart from making 
reasoned decisions on requests for access to the files that are necessary for the proper 
exercise of the right to be heard,103 include ensuring the parties involved are properly 
informed of their procedural status by DG Competition; 104  deciding on whether 
applications to be heard from third persons should be accepted and conducting the oral 
hearing for the addressees of a statement of objection or other third parties;105 deciding 
on whether extension should be granted to addressees of a statement of objections or 
other third parties who consider that the time to make their views known is 
inadequate.106 The Hearing Officer is required to, , prepare a final report in relation to 
the effective exercise of procedural rights during the proceedings based on the decision 
                                                             
99 Ibid, Recital 3. 
100 Wouter Wils, ‘The Role of the Hearing Officer in Competition Proceedings before the European 
Commission’ (2015) updated version of a paper initially published in (2012) 35 World Competition 431, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=456087, 5. See Article 3(1), Terms of 
Reference of the Hearing Officer. (‘In exercising his or her functions, the hearing officer shall act 
independently’). 
101 Recital 5 and Article 2(2), Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer. 
102 Ibid, Recital 8. 
103 Ibid, Article 7. 
104 Ibid, Article 4(2) (d). 
105 Ibid, Articles 5 and 6. According to Article 14, the Hearing Officer is required to submit an interim 
report to the Commission after the oral hearing to address issues including disclosure of documents and 
access to the file, time limits for replying to the state of objections, the observance of the right to be 
heard and the proper conduct of the oral hearing. 
106 Ibid, Article 9. 
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drafted by the Commission and submitted to the Advisory Committee,107 which is to 
be published in the Official Journal together with the Commission’s decision.108 
The impartial and independent nature of the Hearing Officer in exercising these 
functions is of particular relevance for China’s competition system,109 in which there 
is no mechanism to resolve disputes between parties and the AMEAs regarding 
effective exercise of the procedural rights. Due to the lack of transparency, it is 
possible that the decisions made by the AMEAs are based on facts the parties deem 
incomplete, and on objections to which the parties involved have no chance to respond. 
An institution to protect the rights of third parties110 whose interests may be affected 
by an ongoing investigation, to express their views on the proceedings, and have access 
to relevant information is equally necessary. Nonetheless, it has to be admitted that 
creating a position like the Hearing Officer in China will not produce meaningful 
outcomes, since the policy environment dictates that whoever holds the position is 
unlikely to be independent enough to fulfil the responsibility. 
5.3 Advisory Committee 
An Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies was originally 
set up by Regulation No 17, 111  and was renamed the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions,112 whose role has been strengthened 
following Regulation 1/2003. A similar committee – the Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations – was set up under EUMR. 113  Both Advisory Committees are 
                                                             
107 Article 16, Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer. 
108 Ibid, Article 17. 
109 For the discussion of potential weakness of the Hearing Office, see Nicolo Zingales, ‘The Hearing 
Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect for the Right to be Heard?’ (2010) 
7 The Competition Law Review 129. 
110 The initiation of antitrust investigation and acceptance of concentration notifications under the AML 
are not publicised, therefore interested third parties may be excluded from the enforcement procedure. 
Dan Wei, ‘Antitrust in China: An Overview of Recent Implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2013) 
14 European Business Organization Law Review 119, 124. 
111 Article 10, Regulation 17/62.  
112 Article 14, Regulation 1/2003. 
113  Article 18, Regulation 139/2004; Recital 19, Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 
implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L133/1 of 7 April 2004. 
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composed of representatives of the competition authorities of the member states.114 
The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies is said to ‘ha[ve] 
functioned in a very satisfactory manner’,115 and although it does not issue opinions 
on cases dealt with by NCAs, 116  it is able to act as a forum for multilateral 
communication among NCAs and help safeguard the consistent application of the EU 
competition rules.117  
The Commission is required to consult the Advisory Committee before taking 
some antitrust or merger decisions, 118  based on which the relevant Advisory 
Committee will deliver a written opinion on the preliminary decision drafted by the 
Commission.119 The opinion formulated by the Advisory Committee is to be taken 
into account by the Commission to the greatest extent possible, and the Commission 
is required to inform the Advisory Committee as to the manner in which the opinion 
has been addressed.120 In addition, the Commission is required to consult the Advisory 
Committee when drafting rules in order to implement Regulation 1/2003 121  and 
Regulation 139/2004.122 
The Advisory Committee was established in the era of centralised enforcement 
of European competition rules, and it continued to play an active role after the ECN 
was founded, although a certain degree of overlap is bound to exist between these two 
forums. Whilst the original objective of creating an Advisory Committee was to 
establish closer liaison with NCAs and to integrate their decision-making processes, 
the Advisory Committee within the current EU competition system is becoming an 
external supervisory institution that monitors the substantive aspect of decision-
making of the Commission. It ensures that the analytical thinking of the Commission 
                                                             
114 Article 14(2), Regulation 1/2003, and Article 19(4), Regulation 139/2004 
115 Recital 19, Regulation 1/2003. 
116 Ibid., Article 14(7). 
117 Ibid., Recital 19. 
118 Article 14(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 19(3) of Regulation 139/2004. 
119 Article 14(3) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 19(6) of Regulation 139/2004. 
120 Article 14(5) of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 19(6) of Regulation 139/2004. 
121 Article 33(2). 
122 Article 23(2). 
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is consistent and compliant with the EU competition rules. In light of the lack of 
judicial review in China’s competition system, the existence of an impartial external 
organisation that is entrusted to review competition decisions should be able to, at least 
nominally, compensate for the arbitrary decision-making of the AMEAs.  
Among the existing competition institutions in China, the AMC should be the 
most suitable to undertake this responsibility, since it is in essence an advisory rather 
than enforcement body. The Anti-Monopoly Experts Advisory Committee, a think-
tank within the AMC, should be perfectly qualified to provide constructive opinions 
in respect of decisions drafted by the AMEAs, as it consists of 21 renowned Chinese 
legal and economic scholars. This Committee was created in 2011 to provide 
professional opinions on development of competition policy and related guidance, and 
on outstanding competition cases. Nevertheless, it is not properly functioning due to 
the lack of procedural rules to lay down the consultation process. The only perceivable 
activity of this Committee so far is the dismissal of one of its members in August 2014, 
who was alleged to have taken ‘huge rewards’ to defend Qualcomm during the 
investigation initiated by NDRC123 and was therefore in breach of the disciplinary 
rules of the Committee.124 
Another measure implemented in the EU competition which has proved useful to 
prevent inconsistent and non-arbitrary application of competition rules is the 
guidelines formulated by the Commission governing different stages of the decision-
making process. The next section will use the fine-setting of the Commission as an 
example to illustrate the importance of detailed and comprehensive legal instruments 
in supplementing competition enforcement.125 
                                                             
123 For the Qualcomm case, see section 3.2, Chapter 5. 
124 Reuters, ‘China Sacks Anti-Monopoly Adviser over Qualcomm Payment: Xinhua’, 13 August 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/13/us-antitrust-china-europe-idUSKBN0GD0SS20140813. 
125 In Tréfilunion, although the court declined a complaint concerning the inadequacy of the statement 
of the reasons on which the Commission’s method of calculation of the fine was based, it considered 
that ‘it is desirable for undertakings in order to be able to define their position in full knowledge of the 
facts to be able to determine in detail, in accordance with any system which the Commission might 
consider appropriate, the method of calculation of the fine imposed upon them’. Case T-148/89 
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5.4 The Fining System 
Since criminalisation of competition enforcement is not available in China – 
similar to the EU – the penalties imposed on any breach of the AML are administrative 
in nature, and the imposition of fines is the principal means by which the AML deters 
and remedies anti-competitive practices. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
inconsistent decisions made by the AMEAs in relation to fine setting have been a major 
source of suspicion that the AMEAs are selectively enforcing the AMLs to the 
detriment of foreign undertakings. The unregulated use of discretion mainly results 
from the fact that there are no rules governing the calculation of fines in China. In this 
regard, the EU experience can be a useful source of inspiration.126 
Regulation 17/62 stipulated that the gravity and the duration of the infringement 
should be considered in fixing the amount of the fine.127 In Musique Diffusion France, 
the ECJ held that during the assessment of the gravity of an infringement for the 
purpose of fixing the fine, the Commission must take into consideration both the 
particular circumstances of the case and the context in which the infringement occurred, 
and must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect.128 The court further 
provided that it was permissible to have regard both to the total turnover of the 
undertaking, the size of the undertaking, and its economic power, and the proportion 
of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was 
                                                             
Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, paras. 141-142. 
126 For critical analysis of the EU finding system, see, for example, Jeremy Lever, ‘Whether, and If So 
How, the EC Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Setting Fines for Infringements of Articles 81 And 82 
of the EC Treaty are Fairly Subject To Serious Criticism’ (2009) BDI, 
http://bdi.eu/download_content/Publikation_BDI_Gutachten__Opinion__zu_EU_Bussgeldleitlinien.p
df; Éric Barbier de La Serre and Charlotte Winckler, ‘A Survey of Legal Issues Regarding Fines 
Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
356; and Damien Geradin, Christos Malamataris and John Wileur, ‘The EU Competition Law Fining 
System’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds.) Handbook on European Competition Law 
(Edward Elgar 2013). 
127 Article 15(2). 
128 Joined Cases 100-103/80 SA Musique Diffusion française and others v Commission [1983] ECR 
1825, para. 106. 
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committed. This gives an indication of the scale of the infringement, 129  and 
Regulation 1/2003 also follows this line of reasoning.130  
Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, the Commission established a two-step process in 
the calculation of fines.131 First, the Commission will determine a basic amount. The 
basic amount will be set based on a proportion of the value of the undertaking’s sales 
of goods or services of the last full business year of its participation in the 
infringement, 132  to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the 
geographic area within the EEA. This is generally up to 30%, but may vary depending 
on the degree of gravity of the infringement. After the proportion of the value of sales 
is determined, the Commission will multiply it by the duration in years of the 
infringement to determine the final basic amount. In relation to the most harmful 
restrictions of competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation 
cartels, the Commission will add 15% to 25% of the value of sales to the basic amount.  
Second, the basic amount may be adjusted to reflect any circumstances that 
should lead to an increase or decrease.133 The basic amount will be increased where 
aggravating circumstances are found, such as recidivism, refusal to cooperate, and a 
leading role in the infringement. It will be decreased according to mitigating 
circumstances, such as termination of the infringement as soon as the investigation 
starts, evidence that the infringement has been committed as a result of negligence, 
and avoidance of implementing the offending agreement. On top of the two-step 
calculation process, in order to ensure that the fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect 
the Commission may choose to increase the fines when undertakings have a large 
turnover beyond the sales of goods or services to which the infringement relates, and 
                                                             
129 Ibid., para. 121. 
130 Article 23(3). 
131  Para. 9, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210 of 01.09.2006 (Fine Setting Guidelines). 
132 In rare cases, the Commission may be allowed to refer to business year different from the definition 
given in the Guidelines to reflect the normal economic situation of the infringing undertaking. Case C-
76/06 Britannia Alloys & Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR I-4405, para. 43. 
133 Para. 27, Fine Setting Guidelines. 
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when the gains of offending undertakings resulted from the infringement exceed the 
fines imposed. However, there is a ceiling of 10% of the total annual turnover of each 
of the offending undertakings for the final amount of the fine.134 The Commission 
may, in exceptional cases, take into account the undertaking’s inability to pay, and 
reduce the final fine on the basis that its imposition would irretrievably jeopardise the 
economic viability of the undertaking.135 
 This two-step process has been rigorously followed by the Commission in 
competition cases. In a decision to impose a fine, the Commission explains step by 
step not only how the amount of the fine is calculated by assessing the gravity, nature, 
impact and duration of the infringement, but also on what grounds its imposition is 
justified by analysing why the infringing party’s objections to the imposition of a fine, 
if any, should not be accepted. In the famous Intel case,136 for example, Intel contested 
the conclusion that it had infringed Article 82 EC and further argued that even if it had, 
no fine should be imposed since the Commission failed to prove that the abuses were 
committed intentionally or negligently.137 The Commission responded and dismissed 
all arguments put forward by Intel.138 The final fine was €1.06 billion, equivalent to 
4.15% of Intel’s annual turnover. The Commission’s decision was upheld by the 
General Court, which considered, inter alia, that ‘there is nothing in the […] arguments 
[…] put forward by the applicant […] from which it might be concluded that the fine 
that was imposed on it is […] disproportionate’.139 
                                                             
134 Under the AML, there is an identical ceiling of 10%, see Articles 46 and 47 AML. However, there 
is additionally a minimum penalty of 1% of the sales revenue in the previous year imposed on 
undertakings infringing Articles 13, 14 and 17 AML. 
135 Para. 35, Fine Setting Guidelines. See for example Case COMP/39.168 – PO/Hard Haberdashery: 
Fasteners, Commission decision of 19 September 2007 (See Summary of Commission Decision of 31 
March 2011 amending Decision C(2007) 4257 final of 19 September 2007, OJ C 210 of 16.07.2011); 
and Case COMP/38589 – Heat Stabilisers, Commission decision of 11 November 2009. 
136 Case No COMP/C-3/37.990 – Intel, Commission decision of 13 May 2009.  
137 Ibid., para. 1759. Article 23(2) (a) provides that fines may be imposed where the infringements of 
Article 101 TFEU or 102 TFEU are either intentional or negligent. 
138 Intel (fn 136) 1760-1772. 
139 Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, para. 1647. Nonetheless, the seemingly 
formalistic as opposed to effects-based analysis of both the Commission and the General Court in the 
Intel case has been criticised. See for example, Damien Geradin, ‘The Decision of the Commission of 
13 May 2009 in the Intel Case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm?’ (2009) TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2010-022, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1490114; and 
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It was reported that NDRC has been in the process of drafting six anti-monopoly 
guidelines at the request of the AMC,140 including one on the calculation of illegal 
gains and fines. 141  If the Guidelines on the method of setting fines are used for 
reference by NDRC, which is likely given the experiences of China in emulating EU 
competition rules and the increasingly frequent communication between the two 
jurisdictions, the transparency of and consistency in decision-making with regard to 
fine setting will certainly be significantly improved, and the agency will 
consequentially be more accountable. 
6. MARKET LIBERATION AND INTEGRATION 
As discussed in Chapter 5, China’s economic decentralisation, which provides 
local governments with substantive controlling powers over local economy and 
amplifies their financial reliance on local undertakings, has led to market 
fragmentation. 142  The most prominent reason for inserting the prohibition of 
administrative monopoly in the AML is to prevent local protectionism and protect free 
circulation of commodities between regions, 143  so as to establish an integrated 
national market in China. Like the AML, in addition to enhancing consumer welfare144 
                                                             
Damien Geradin, ‘Loyalty Rebates after Intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to Overrule 
Hoffman-La Roche’ (2015) George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-15, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586584. 
140 Issuing anti-monopoly guidelines is one of the functions of the AMC, see Article 9 of the AML. In 
practice, the work of drafting guidelines is carried out by the AMEAs on behalf of the AMC. 
141  People.cn, ‘NDRC is Drafting Six Anti-Monopoly Guidelines’, 5 November 2015, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/1105/c1004-27781012.html. The other five are respectively on 
abuse of intellectual property rights, monopolistic practices in automobile sector, leniency programme, 
commitments, and procedures for the exemption of monopoly agreements. 
142 For general studies on decentralisation and market fragmentation in China, see Gabriella Montinola, 
Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Federalism, Chinese Style: the Political Basis for Economic 
Success in China’ (1995) 48 World Politics 50; and Chenggang Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions of 
China’s Reforms and Development’ (2011) 49 Journal of Economic Literature 1076. 
143 Article 33, AML. 
144 Para. 33, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27.04.2004. See 
also, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten SaRL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 299, at 340; and Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] 
ECR I-3055, para. 36. 
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and ensuring an efficient allocation of resource,145 European competition law is also 
applied to achieve a political goal of establishing an internal market where ‘the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. 146  David Gerber 
identifies two factors which are involved in the process of market integration in Europe: 
the reduction of government controls over economic activity, and the elimination of 
artificial borders that inhibit competition and the exchange of goods and services.147 
These two factors are in fact useful points of reference for the competition enforcement 
against SOEs and the elimination of local protectionism through administrative 
monopoly in China. 
    Although the benefits of a more integrated and open market created by effective 
competition policy are apparent, the mere existence of competition in certain cases 
may pose a threat to the state sector and consequently to political stability in China. 
Despite the fact that the AML has various legislative objectives which ought to be in 
conformity, they sometimes conflict with each other as vague terms such as ‘healthy 
development of socialist market economy’ 148  can be interpreted in any way the 
government deems fit, either pro-competition or pro-protectionism. When conflict 
does arise, pure competition goals will most likely be sacrificed to more prominent 
political goals, such as the creation of national champions. Therefore China, as a one-
party communist state, has to sustain the political and ideological constraints which 
European states are not experiencing. Historically, all European states to a certain 
degree experienced significant government control of economic activities and 
prevalence of SOEs.149 In order to promote an integrated market in the EU, one of the 
outstanding priorities is to downplay the unjustified intervention of Member States in 
market operations, and such priority creates and preserves a political environment 
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conductive to the development of competition law.150 In Europe, where the same level 
of obsession with state-owned economy as in China is not found, pure competition 
goals such as economic efficiency and consumer welfare are compatible with and 
contribute significantly to the superior political goal of creating an internal market. 
Therefore, market integration acts both as an objective and as a means to enhance 
competition in the EU.151 As China is in the reform process of relaxing government 
control of economy and emphasising the importance of market forces, the effects of 
Article 106 TFEU on promoting market liberalisation and integration can be 
constructive.  
Article 106(1) TFEU prevents member states from implementing any measure 
contrary to EU competition rules on public undertakings and undertakings on which it 
has conferred special or exclusive rights, 152  and it will always be applied in 
combination with other Treaty Articles. In addition, Article 106(2) TFEU provides an 
exception for undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest (SGEI) if the application of EU competition rules obstructs the 
performance of the tasks assigned to them.153 In Höfner, the ECJ held that a member 
state was in breach of 106(1) if it created a situation in which an undertaking entrusted 
with SGEI – the Federal Office for Employment of Germany in this case – could not 
avoid abusing its dominant position because it was manifestly not able to satisfy the 
demand on the market.154 In ERT, the ECJ held that, whilst the Treaty did not prevent 
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the granting of monopoly for public interest considerations, the manner in which the 
monopoly is organised or exercised might infringe the rules of the Treaty.155 When 
the granting of a monopoly was liable to create a situation in which the undertaking 
was led to infringe Article 102 TFEU by virtue of a discriminatory policy, Article 
106(1) TFEU was breached.156 In RTT, a state measure that led to the extension of the 
dominant position of the undertaking in the market for the establishment and operation 
of telephone network was found to be in breach of Article 106(1) TFEU in conjunction 
with Article 102 TFEU.157 Similarly, actual abuse on the part of undertaking was not 
required in DEI, where the ECJ upheld the Commission’s claim that infringement of 
Article 106(1) TFEU may be established ‘where the State measures at issue [created] 
unequal conditions of competition between companies, [which allowed] the public 
undertaking or the undertaking which was granted special or exclusive rights to 
maintain, strengthen or extend its dominant position over another market’, and there 
was no need to establish that any abuse actually exist.158 
Moreover, the Commission, pursuant to Article 106(3) has issued directives and 
made proposals on liberalising various public service sectors. 159  Apart from the 
relevance to the liberalisation of sectors in which SOEs are pervasive, the reasoning 
of the ECJ in these cases, which prohibits member states from ‘[putting] public 
undertakings and undertakings to which they grant special or exclusive rights in a 
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position which the said undertakings could not themselves attain by their own conduct 
without infringing [Article 102 TFEU]’,160 is similar to the reasoning underpinning 
Article 36 of the AML, which concerns the second element relating to market 
integration in the EU: the elimination of barriers to trade.  
Administrative monopoly involving protectionist measures, such as physical and 
technical trade barriers, creates impediments to the creation of an internal market in 
China to the detriment of the efficiency of national economy.161 Nonetheless, it is not 
unique in China, although it is fair to argue that it is much more intractable in a single-
party state.162 Key provisions of TFEU on free movement of goods,163 services164 
and capital165 are in fact similar to Articles 33 and 35 of the AML. These freedoms, 
alongside the free movement of workers,166 are complementary to competition rules 
and contribute to the elimination of artificial borders and the establishment of an 
integrated, competitive and efficient European Single Market.167 The Commission is 
responsible for monitoring the functioning of the Single Market and ensuring the 
legislation proposed by Member States does not create unjustified barriers to trade.168 
Unlike NDRC, SAIC and their local agencies, which fail to eliminate abuse of 
administrative power mainly due to their close connection with and dependence on 
government departments which are subject to regulation, the independence of the 
Commission in pursuing the goals of the EU is protected by primary legislation. Article 
17(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) stipulates that ‘[i]n carrying out its 
responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely independent […] the members of 
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the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other 
institution, body, office or entity. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with 
their duties or the performance of their tasks’, and member states are required to 
respect the independence of the members of the Commission and refrain from 
influencing them in the performance of their tasks. 169  Since the Commission is 
independent of political lobbying and represents solely the interest of the EU,170 the 
likelihood of it being captured by interest groups during enforcement against 
government measures that create obstacles to inter-regional competition is lower than 
its Chinese counterparts. 
Indeed, it has to be acknowledged that, because of the lack of independence on 
the part of the AMEAs, these instructive theories and principles which are capable of 
furthering the liberation and integration of markets cannot be directly adopted. In 
relation to administrative monopoly, the legal basis for prohibiting administrative 
monopoly – similar to EU’s provisions on free movement of goods, services, and 
capital – is already provided by the AML, so theoretically they can enforce the AML 
against any government department with regard to the abuse of administrative powers. 
However, the main reason that the enforcement against administrative monopoly 
yielded nominal outcomes is because, apart from the lack of sufficient punishment to 
deter abuse under the AML,171 only on rare occasions can the AMEAs successfully 
initiate an investigation against a government department as a result of political 
interference. The governmental framework makes the AMEAs rely more on the 
consent of their superior departments rather than independent and conscientious 
judgment to commence an investigation. In relation to SOEs, China’s competition 
system is not even at a stage where the question ‘how competition law should be 
applied to SOEs’ can be asked by the AMEAs, let alone to answer it. As made clear in 
the last chapter, it is not the intention of the Chinese government to use the AML to 
                                                             
169 Article 245 TFEU. 
170 Article 17, TEU. 
171 See section 4.6, Chapter 5. 
258 
 
liberalise the state sector, particularly the most strategic industries. The AML merely 
provides some of the necessary impetus for SOEs to promote their economic efficiency. 
Therefore, the AMEAs are always ‘informed’ in relation to when and the extent to 
which they should apply the AML to SOEs. This policy environment dictates that the 
AMEAs will not, for example, refer to market demand – as the ECJ did in Höfner – in 
considering the legality of a measure put forward by the government, simply because 
they are far from independent enough to question any state-adopted measure in the 
first place, as can be seen in all the state-led consolidation of large SOEs. Unlike the 
AMEAs, the Commission is put in a position out of the reach of political intervention 
and it has also proven to be crucial in the preservation of the ‘pureness’ of competition 
policy when weighing it against industrial policy in merger review. 
7.  THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION IN DECISION-MAKING 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, in the battle against industrial policy, 
competition policy almost always loses. It is particularly true when the ongoing reform 
of SOEs is concerned, which puts great emphasis on state-led mergers between large 
SOEs. The restructuring and consolidation of the strategic state sector is able to 
promote the creation of powerful SOEs in terms of technological and financial capacity, 
which will then be able to have competitive advantages in global markets. However, 
it at the same time further diminishes the level of competition of this sector in domestic 
market. Whilst the role played by competition policy – the AML more specifically – 
is largely symbolic in regulating the distortion of competition in the state-owned sector, 
it is ironically significant in pushing forward industrial policy. Instead of introducing 
competition into heavily regulated sectors, competition policy seems to be hijacked to 
accommodate industrial policy objectives. The causes of this peculiar phenomenon are 
in fact multifaceted, among which the lack of independent status of the AMEAs is 
proved one of the most prominent. However, this fatal weakness of the AMEAs seems 
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to be an exceptional strength of the Commission. The following sections will describe 
how the Commission has safeguarded the value of competition policy in the area of 
merger control, where EU member states have been actively pursuing the goals of 
industrial policy of their respective states. 
7.1 Industrial Policy in Merger 
The past decades have witnessed a dramatic structural change in network 
industries in Europe. SOEs which previously enjoyed a natural monopoly status in 
network industries were largely privatised, which was followed by the opening of 
network industries to market competition. 172  In addition, the previous regulatory 
mechanism of network industries characterised by direct control of the prices of final 
products and services was reoriented towards a focus on promoting the competitive 
process.173 In order to promote an EU-wide internal market, both the ECJ and the 
Commission have been vigorous advocates of eliminating natural monopolies and 
encouraging competition in downstream markets of network industries in member 
states.174 They mandated the undertaking owning the essential network infrastructures 
to provide access to these facilities to downstream undertakings at reasonable prices, 
even if the latter were competing with the former in the downstream markets. 175 
Influence of industrial policy was thus significantly reduced as a result of the 
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proliferation of neoliberal doctrine in EU competition law.176 Nevertheless, industrial 
policy still played an important role especially in times of economic crisis.177 Instead 
of having state-owned monopolies, member states held ‘golden shares’ in undertakings 
that were of strategic importance, and started to rely on ‘national champions’ to pursue 
their industrial policy goals and to compete in global markets. In order to create 
national champions in the most vital industrial sectors, such as network industries, 
member states pushed forward industrial consolidation despite of merger control 
rules178 – not an uncommon strategy in light of China’s practices.  
For example, in January 2002 the Federal Cartel Office in Germany blocked the 
acquisition of a 60% holding in the gas company Ruhrgas, the largest German grid gas 
company, by E.ON, one of Germany’s largest energy companies, on the grounds that: 
‘[t]he combination of E.ON and Ruhrgas in a time of emerging 
liberalisation in the gas markets would cement Ruhrgas’ dominant position. 
This would considerably diminish the likelihood of any effective 
competition from other grid gas companies. There was also the danger of 
E.ON’s market position in the electricity sector being further strengthened 
to the detriment of small competitors and consequently consumers’.179  
However, following E.ON’s application for ministerial approval of the 
E.ON/Ruhrgas transaction in February, the German Ministry of Economics and 
Technology acknowledged that ‘the merger will increase the international 
competitiveness of Ruhrgas and that it will help secure Germany’s gas supply’, and 
subsequently overturned the decision of the Federal Cartel Office by granting 
ministerial approval with stringent requirements designed to promote competition in 
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the gas market. 180  Although the E.ON/Ruhrgas raised significant competition 
concerns and might be incompatible with the goal of the single market, the 
Commission was not able to intervene in this case as the parties had more than two-
thirds of their aggregate turnover within Germany.181 
Nonetheless, the independent status of the Commission allowed it to reject 
industrial policy arguments of member states at the EU level and to prevent EU merger 
control being politicised. In May 1991, Aerospatiale of France and Alenia of Italian 
notified the Commission of their proposed joint acquisition of de Havilland, a 
Canadian division of Boeing. This transaction was strongly supported by both the 
French and Italian governments, since it would not only lead to the creation of a 
dominant turboprop aircraft manufacturer on the global market, but would also 
positively impact on employment. 182  The two governments even put pressure on 
commissioners appointed by them. 183  Whilst Jacques Delors, then Commission 
President, also supported the merger, Leon Brittan, then Competition Commissioner, 
opposed it on ‘purely economic grounds’.184 Eventually, the Commission blocked the 
transaction – the first time a prohibition decision was made under ECMR – on the 
ground that the proposed concentration would have created a non-temporary dominant 
position on the global markets for commuters of 40-59 seats and 60 seats, and would 
therefore significantly impede effective competition.185  
In September 1999, the Commission received notification of proposed acquisition 
by Volvo of Scania. Both parties were Swedish undertakings active in the manufacture 
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and sale of heavy trucks and buses. The proposed concentration would create the 
largest European producer of heavy trucks and the second largest European bus 
manufacturer.186 Despite the Swedish competition authority opposing this transaction, 
the Swedish government actively engaged in political lobbying for the Commission’s 
approval.187 Nevertheless, after concluding that the remedies proposed by Volvo were 
insufficient to remove the competition concerns, the Commission prohibited the 
transaction in 2000 as the concentration would result in significant impediment of 
effective competition in a number of national markets for heavy trucks, touring 
coaches, inter-city buses and city buses.188 
In 2001, the Commission prohibited an acquisition of Legrand by Schneider, both 
active in electrical equipment market. 189  Possibly incentivised by strong political 
support (it was said that French President and Prime Minister personally lobbied 
Commission President Romano Prodi and Competition Commissioner Mario Monti 
for the approval of the transaction190), Schneider implemented the transaction by 
holding 98.1% of the shares in Legrand before the Commission made its final decision. 
The Commission subsequently made a decision to request Schneider to demerge from 
Legrand.191 Although Schneider chose to challenge the Commission’s decisions of 
incompatibility and divestiture before the Court of First Instance (now General Court), 
it concluded a contract of divestiture with the Wendel-KKR consortium in July 2002. 
Despite the fact that both of the Commission’s decisions were later annulled by the 
Court of First Instance on the ground, inter alia, that the Commission had failed to 
                                                             
186 Case No COMP/M.1672 – Volvo/Scania, Commission decision of 14 March 2000, paras. 13 and 
214. 
187  Øivind Støle, ‘Towards a Multilevel Union Administration? The Decentralization of EU 
Competition Policy’ in Morten Egeberg (eds.) Multilevel Union Administration: the Transformation of 
Executive Politics in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 98. 
188 Case No COMP/M.1672 – Volvo/Scania, Commission decision of 14 March 2000, para 363. Scania 
was acquired by Volkswagen of Germany in 2008, and the Commission found that there was no overlap 
between the core businesses of the merger parties. See Case No COMP/M.5157 – Volkswagen/Scania, 
Commission decision of 16 September 2008. 
189 Case No COMP/M.2283 – Schneider/Legrand, Commission decision of 10 October 2001. 
190 Geradin and Girgenson (fn 176) 14. 
191 Schneider/Legrand (fn 189).  
263 
 
have regard to Schneider’s rights of defence,192 the Commission resumed the merger 
control procedure after the judgments. Schneider then abandoned the transaction and 
decided to execute the contract of divestiture with the Wendel-KKR consortium.193 
It has to be emphasised that the above cases do not indicate that the Commission 
is simply against government-supported concentration or the notion of ‘national 
champions’. 194  The existence of national champions is not a violation per se of 
competition law; it is the methods adopted to create them that raise competition 
concerns. Therefore, the policy goals of industrial consolidation can coincide with 
competition policy goals if a transaction supported by government does not 
appreciably impede effective competition.195 Besides creating national champions, 
member states also sought to use merger as a means to protect domestic undertakings 
from being acquired by foreign undertakings.196  
7.2 Article 21 EUMR and State Intervention in EU Merger Control 
The Commission not only blocked transactions strongly supported by member 
states, but also cleared transactions that member states strongly opposed. Whilst 
Article 21 EUMR provides a ‘one-stop-shop’ for mergers and acquisitions which have 
a EU dimension, Article 21(4) EUMR (ex-Article 21(3) ECMR) allows member states 
to take measures to protect legitimate interests on grounds including but not limiting 
to public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules. The measures will be 
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approved by the Commission only if they are ‘appropriate, proportional and non-
discriminatory and more generally in line with [EU] law’.197 Member states on a 
number of occasions invoked this ‘legitimate interest’ provision to implement 
economic protectionist measures and protect their national champions from 
acquisitions by foreign undertakings.198 In 1999, when UniCredit, an Italian bank, 
acquired a state-owned Polish bank, Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. (Pekao), the Polish 
Ministry of Treasury concluded an agreement with UniCredit in which a ‘non-
competition clause’ prohibited UniCredit from, inter alia, acquiring control of banks 
active in Poland for a period of ten years. In October 2005, the Commission cleared 
the acquisition of the German bank Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG (HVB) by 
UniCredit.199 However, since HVB indirectly controlled a Polish bank, BPH S.A., the 
Polish State Treasury argued that UniCredit had breached the ‘non-competition clause’ 
and requested UniCredit to divest its shares in BPH. The Commission considered that 
the measure adopted was in breach of Article 21 EUMR and launched proceedings 
against the Polish Treasury in March 2006.200 Merely a month later, the dispute was 
resolved as UniCredit reached an agreement with the Ministry of Treasury in which 
UniCredit agreed to ensure BPH’s independent status on Polish financial market by 
divest 200 outlets of BPH. 201 In addition, the Ministry of the Treasury was entitled 
to appoint two members of the supervisory board of BPH.202 
In April 2006, the Commission cleared the acquisition of Endesa, a Spanish 
electricity operator, by the German energy company E.ON AG (E.ON).203 After E.ON 
announced its bid over Endesa and before the Commission cleared the transaction, 
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since the Spanish government wished Endesa to be acquired by another Spanish energy 
company, Gas Natural, in order to create a national champion.204 The Spanish Council 
of Ministers adopted an urgent legislative measure, Royal Decree-Law 4/2006, to 
extend the supervisory powers of the CNE, Spain’s energy regulator.205 Consequently, 
the CNE decided to impose restrictive conditions on the E.ON/Endesa transaction. The 
Commission found that these conditions were not compatible with EC law and Spain 
had violated Article 21 EUMR. 206  The modified conditions put forward by the 
Spanish Minister of Industry, Tourism and Trade were also not accepted by the 
Commission.207 Similarly, in another acquisition concerning Endesa, while on 5 July 
2007 the Commission approved the joint control of Endesa by ENEL – an Italian 
electricity operator – and Acciona – a Spanish undertakings whose business include, 
inter alia, development and management of infrastructure and real estate projects208 – 
the CNE imposed restrictive conditions on the transaction. 209  The Commission 
subsequently asked Spain to lift these conditions.210 Endesa was eventually acquired 
jointly by ENEL and Acciona, which divested €10 billion worth of assets to E.ON.211 
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In August 2006, a merger between Abertis of Spain and Autostrade of Italy – both 
active in the management of toll motorways – was blocked by the Italian Ministers of 
Infrastructures and of Economic Affairs, and ANAS, a public entity responsible for 
granting motorway concessions in Italy.212 It was believed by the Italian government 
that the transaction was ‘a disguised Spanish takeover of vital Italian infrastructure 
services’.213 Nonetheless, the merging parties notified the proposed merger to the 
Commission, where a clearance decision was made in September 2006. 214 
Subsequently, the Commission announced a preliminary assessment that Italy had 
violated Article 21 EUMR due to unjustified obstacles placed in the way of the 
merger.215 These obstacles were later removed by the withdrawal of the decisions of 
both the Ministers and the ANAS. 216  However, the transaction was eventually 
abandoned due to ‘insurmountable obstacles placed in the way of the deal by the Italian 
government’.217 
As shown by these cases, intervention of member states in transactions already 
cleared by the Commission is not uncommon but has been dealt with cautiously. After 
initiating infringement proceedings against Poland in UniCredit/HVB, the then 
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that ‘I am determined to ensure that 
Member States do not stand in the way of mergers falling within the Commission’s 
exclusive competence. Otherwise the EU’s Single Market will descend into chaos.’218 
Therefore, it is important to examine closely if the measures adopted by Member States 
                                                             
212  European Commission, Press Release IP/06/1418, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-
1418_en.htm?locale=en. 
213 Jonathan Galloway, ‘EC Merger Control: Does the Re-emergence of Protectionism Signal the Death 
of the ‘One Stop Shop’?’ (2007) CCP Summer Conference, University of East Anglia, Norwich. 
214 Case No COMP/M.4249 – Abertis/Autostrade, Commission decision of 22 September 2006. 
215  European Commission, Press Release IP/06/1418, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-
1418_en.htm?locale=en 
216  European Commission, Press Release MEMO/06/414, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-06-414_en.htm?locale=en. 
217  Financial Times, ‘Autostrade and Abertis Abandon Merger’, 13 December 2006, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/78606be6-8a9f-11db-8940-0000779e2340.html#axzz3rps3BXb2. 




to disrupt a transaction are compatible with EU laws and to ensure any industrial policy 
considerations based solely on economic protectionism are not taken into account.  
The above cases clearly show that the Commission is able to withstand political 
intervention of member states219 and conduct the investigation independently, the 
prerequisites for a competition-oriented and comprehensive decision. The merit of the 
analysis given by the Commission in these cases is a separate topic of discussion. 
Although it is not realistic to expect the AMEAs to have the same level of 
independence as that of the Commission not least because the Commission is not 
directly controlled by the government of any member state, it has to be noticed that 
increased independence will allow the AMEAs to focus more on the analysis of market 
conditions as well as the efficiency of potential merging undertakings. Essentially, 
there is nothing wrong with creating national champions to compete in global 
marketplace as long as they are really champions on their merits instead of mere 
political products. Therefore, the selection of national champions should be conducted 
vigorously through economic consideration underpinning competition policy, and this 
is how competition policy and industrial policy can be reconciled.  
8. CONCLUSION 
It is not possible for any legal system to be completely flawless. The same applies 
to EU competition system, which is already deemed one of the most advanced in the 
                                                             
219 The Commission also successfully resisted political lobbying of the US in GE/Honeywell. See Case 
No COMP/M.2220 – GE/Honeywell, Commission decision of 2 July 2001. However, this decision was 
subject to heavy criticism as the Commission was accused of taking into account industrial policy and 
protecting competitors rather than competition. See for example, Charles James, ‘International Antitrust 
in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence’, OECD Global Forum on Competition, 17 October 
2001, http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/international-antitrust-21st-century-cooperation-and-
convergence. See more generally about the GE/Honeywell case, Eleanor Fox, ‘Mergers in Global 
Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control’ (2002) 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 457; and 
Stefan Schmitz, ‘The European Commission’s Decision in GE/Honeywell and the Question of the Goals 
of Antitrust Law’ (2002) 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 539. 
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world. 220  Nonetheless, more than half decade of evolvement allows the EU to 
accumulate invaluable experiences with regard to how a competition system should be 
designed in order effectively to address and enforce competition policy. The 
modernisation brought about by Regulation 1/2003 clearly demonstrates that 
transparency, consistency, and coherence are the core values that ensure and safeguard 
the proper functioning of the EU competition system. The legal framework facilitating 
coordination and cooperation amongst European enforcement authorities, the legal 
instruments guiding enforcement activities, the judicial interpretation pursuing goals 
of the Union, and the institutional independence protecting the impartiality and 
objectivity of the Commission all contribute to the preservation and pursuance of the 
core values, and these sustained efforts are what make the EU competition system an 
instrumental model for China to learn from. 
As the communication between the Commission and the AMEAs becomes 
increasingly frequent, it is expected that the EU’s efforts in working towards 
establishing a better competition system will have positive impacts on changing the 
way in which China’s competition system operates, and increasing the extent to which 
it accommodate the interests of the general public in China. However, when certain 
concerns can be eliminated the AMEAs through internal reform, other concerns, such 
as the issue on the independence of the AMEAs, can only be dealt with by external 
reform involving, among other things, restructuring of political and governmental 
structure. As a new entrant in the competition law family, China has already benefited 
from EU experiences in establishing its own competition system. This process of 
learning and emulation should be furthered to replace negative and non-normative 
‘local roots’, as the Commission has already illustrated what an independent 
competition authority is capable of achieving.  
                                                             
220 The operation of Commission in the field of competition policy is in fact subject to serious criticism, 
see, for example, OECD, ‘European Commission – Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy’ (2005) 
OECD Competition Law & Policy, www.oecd.org/eu/35908641.pdf; and Ian Forrester, ‘Due Process 
in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures’ (2009) 34 European 
Law Review 817. 
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In light of the practice of EU competition system, some recommendations for 






1. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Since the entry into force of the AML, China has become one of the most 
important and active competition jurisdictions in the world in a comparatively short 
period of time. Whilst the AMEAs have accumulated substantial knowledge, 
experience and confidence over the past seven years, competition enforcement – which 
is increasingly intensified – starts to draw worldwide attention and demonstrates its 
tremendous impact on economic activities. The merger review regime has 
substantially influenced a few global transactions, and hefty fines have been imposed 
on large multinational conglomerates under the antitrust regime. Nonetheless, it has to 
be acknowledged that the growing importance of China’s competition system derives 
mainly from its overwhelming importance in the global economy, rather than from its 
own merits. In fact, many high-profile decisions and investigations were not backed 
by sophisticated competition analysis and considerations, and the interests of business 
operators may be harmed as a result.1 In addition, the AMEA’s lack of determination 
to tackle anti-competitive practices carried out by SOEs effectively, and introduce 
private competition in state sector has led many to question the ability of China’s 
competition system to create a level playing field and promote a competitive market.2 
This thesis argues that whilst some problems – for example, publicity obligations 
of the AMEAs and the application of economics in decision-making – may eventually 
be solved when the competition system develops and becomes more mature. Other 
problems relating to the implementation of competition policy in general and the 
treatment of SOEs in particular cannot be dealt with in isolation of the developments 
                                                             
1 See for example, P3 Network (fn 152, Chapter 4). 
2 See fn 38, Chapter 1. 
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in the economic and political sphere. Essentially the enforcement of a capitalist-style 
legal instrument in a socialist country induces ideological conflict which can only be 
resolved through a close examination of China’s unique economic and political context 
in which competition policy has been evolving. The determination of legislative 
objectives, design of competition institutions and outcome of administrative 
enforcement are all deeply embedded in such context. 
Like the initiation of China’s economic reform project, the introduction of 
competition policy did not exist in a vacuum. The thesis finds that China’s economic 
transition – including both the advent of TVEs and the reforms of SOEs – the accession 
to WTO, and the lack of legal instruments to cope with new economic environment 
were the main factors that led to the evolvement of competition policy and eventually 
to the adoption of the AML.3 Moreover, the emergence of these drivers was facilitated 
by the cease of China’s decades-long social and political upheaval, which had shaped 
the characteristics of the bureaucracy and economy. Through these economic and 
political movements, the CPC established the status of political goals as the top priority 
of the government, and SOEs – representing the economic arm of the government – 
became the major tool to realise this priority.4 In addition, the government’s tendency 
towards protecting departmental interests at the expense of effective application of the 
AML also result from the preference of political goals over other considerations.5 
 The thesis argues that since both domestic and foreign factors made China’s 
reform process and its integration into world economy irreversible, the introduction of 
competition law is an inevitable option for China to further and sustain its dramatic 
economic growth. However, as made clear throughout the thesis that there is an 
inherent contradiction between the competition law which liberalises the market and 
the socialist ideology which constraints the market. This contradiction may be partially 
                                                             
3 See section 3, Chapter 2. 
4 See section 2.2, Chapter 2. 
5 See section 4.2, Chapter 5. 
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explained by Deng Xiaoping, who remarked on the idea of ‘socialist market economy’ 
in 1992:  
‘We should be bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the 
outside and have the courage to experiment … The proportion of planning 
to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and 
capitalism. A planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, because 
there is planning under capitalism too; a market economy is not capitalism, 
because there are markets under socialism too. Planning and market forces 
are both means of controlling economic activity … We shall push ahead 
along the road to Chinese-style socialism.’6  
In essence, the so-called ‘Chinese-style socialism’ requires China’s socialist 
economy to embrace capital elements. Following this line of thinking, capitalist-style 
legislation such as the AML should embrace socialist elements, which are the basis on 
which Chinese-style socialism is formed. This is exactly what the drafters of the AML 
did. They incorporated Chinese-style provisions in a competition law in order to 
address the concerns raised by interest groups that basically opposed market 
liberalisation and competition, another example of political goals taking precedence 
over other goals.7 These provisions – notably, Articles 1 and 7 – significantly changed 
the way in which the AML is enforced. First, Article 1 may allow the AMEAs to base 
their analysis on grounds that are in conflict with competition principles. 8  The 
vagueness and ambiguity by design create rooms for non-competition considerations 
in competition cases, which led to serious regulatory capture in competition 
enforcement. Second, Article 7 gives rise to uncertainty regarding competition 
enforcement against SOEs in strategic sectors. It implicitly establishes the preference 
of industrial policy over competition law whilst failing to either officially define 
‘lifeline industries’ or allocate jurisdiction amongst sector-specific regulators or the 
AMEAs.  
                                                             
6  Deng Xiaoping, ‘Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai (18 
January-21 February 1992)’ in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (1982-1992) (Foreign 
Languages Press 1994). 
7 See section 3.1.2, Chapter 3. 
8 See for example, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (fn 135, Chapter 4). 
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Moreover, the design of the enforcement structure as a political compromise 
made during the drafting of the AML, embodies the bureaucratic conflicts China has 
been experiencing since it was founded.9 MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC, each of which 
was responsible for certain aspects of competition enforcement in the pre-AML era, 
all contended for policy-making powers. This compromise has far-reaching meaning 
for these three ministries, since their policy-making powers will be further enhanced 
as competition policy becomes increasingly important in China. At the same time, it 
has far-reaching meaning for the competition system as well, since this structure 
dictates that bureaucratic conflicts will continue to exist in the enforcement of the 
AML. Apart from the bureaucratic conflicts, as discussed in Chapter 5, the shared 
jurisdiction of competition enforcement is substantially uncoordinated and 
ineffective.10 
The past seven years have seen an increasing number of competition cases.11 
However, several problems have also emerged. In relation to the application of the 
substantive provisions, there is a clear inconsistency in the decision handled by the 
AMEAs. Despite the fact that the interpretations of some Articles are not entirely 
accurate, Chinese courts have shown their capability of conducting economic analysis 
in competition cases. They have delivered decisions that are far more informative and 
convincing than those of the AMEAs. The lack of sufficiently detailed decisions of the 
AMEAs is in fact premeditated by competition policy makers, as no any reference to 
the transparency requirement of published decisions is made in the AML or any other 
implementing rules. However, it is difficult to determine whether the intention was to 
protect immature AMEAs from external pressures because they lack the necessary 
experiences regarding competition analysis, or to conceal the incorporation of non-
competition considerations in the decisions. The AMEAs of course lack the knowledge 
                                                             
9 For a discussion on the bureaucratic conflicts during Cultural Revolution, see Guoqiang Dong and 
Andrew G. Walder, ‘Factions in A Bureaucratic Setting: the Origins of Cultural Revolution Conflict in 
Nanjing’ (2011) The China Journal 1. 
10 See section 4.2, Chapter 5. 
11 See section 3, Chapter 5. 
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and expertise to conduct sophisticated effects-based analysis, but what is more 
prominent is the lack of efficient framework to nurture the environment conducive to 
conducting such analysis. The capacity of the AMEAs can only be substantially 
improved if their decision-making is subject to public supervision. 
Another issue hindering the effective application of the AML is the non-
independence of the AMEAs, which are rarely able to conduct investigations without 
political intervention. Whilst the lack of knowledge and experience will be 
compensated for by increasingly proactive enforcement activities and international 
cooperation during which the expertise of competition officials will always accumulate, 
the most damaging impediment causing the ineffectiveness of China’s competition 
system is not derived from the text of the AML, but from a residual mode of political 
intervention and the prominent Chinese characteristic: rule of man prevails over rule 
of law. Gerber argues that competition law is able to function effectively only when it 
is part of a wider policy aiming to improve market functioning and as a result enjoys 
political support.12 Nonetheless, political support for competition law is still largely 
insufficient in China.13 Without a conductive environment to promoting competition 
policy, any sophisticated competition analysis will only be fancy ornaments. Whilst 
the AML and its enforcement have been substantially shaped by the residual influence 
of centrally planned economy and institutions therein, competition enforcement in the 
state sector further embodies the regressive attribute of China’s competition system. 
‘Zhibiao buzhiben [治标不治本]’ is an old Chinese idiom. It is used when a 
treatment can only temporarily relieve the symptom without completely curing the 
disease. The underlying rationale can equally be applied in the domain of social 
science when a policy description is not able essentially to cure the cause of the 
problem it is expected to solve. This is exactly the dilemma the AML currently 
                                                             
12 David Gerber, ‘Asia and Global Competition Law Convergence’ in Michael Dowdle, John Gillespie 
and Imelda Maher (eds.) Asian Capitalism and the Regulation of Competition towards a Regulatory 




encounters: it is merely a palliative that scratches the surface of the anti-competitive 
issues in the state sector. Like the difficulties of tackling administrative monopoly, the 
anti-competitive ‘disease’ of SOEs are not curable simply by the application of the 
AML. Since in essence anti-competitive conduct of SOEs is a ‘[manifestation] of the 
Chinese government’s extensive intervention in the economy’, 14  the AMEAs are 
anything but enforcement authorities which are independent of bureaucratic restraints. 
Therefore, the extent to which the AML can be successfully applied to SOEs is not and 
will not be determined solely by competition policy, but will depend largely on how 
the ongoing reform of SOEs evolves over time, which represents the changing attitude 
of the Chinese government towards its political and economic structure. This may be 
the reason why after seven years of enforcing the AML, the AMEAs seem to remain 
still helpless when it comes to the battle against state-owned giants. 
On 18 September 2015, Premier Li Keqiang stated at a forum on deepening 
reform and development of SOEs that ‘SOEs are the prominent material and political 
basis of the development of the Communist Party and the state’.15 Indeed, no matter 
how unsuitable it is for public ownership to fit into today’s modern market-oriented 
economy, it is not realistic to expect China to downplay its powerful SOEs. The status 
of SOEs is not determined by market force or any other economic elements, but by 
China’s political ideology: state control over the economy. In any reform plans on 
SOEs, the government encourages diversification of ownership and improvement of 
corporate governance instead of overall privatisation, it is therefore unrealistic to 
expect the AML can be applied to liberalise China’s state sector in the same way as 
Article 106 TFEU is being applied to promote market liberalisation.16 It is apparent 
                                                             
14 Thomas Cheng, ‘Competition and the State in China’ in Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng and Ioannis 
Lianos (eds.) Competition and the State (Stanford University Press 2014) 185. 
15 Xinhua News Agency, ‘Li Keqiang: Use the Dividends of Reform to Enhance the Vitality and 
Competitiveness of SOEs’, 20 September 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-
09/20/c_1116618997.htm. Premier Li’s remarks are originally in Chinese, and are translated by the 
author.  
16 See section 6, Chapter 7. 
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that the government is seeking to promote the efficiency of the state sector without 
endangering the interests thereof.  
In relation to normal monopolistic conduct of SOEs, such as monopoly 
agreements and abuse of dominant position, the AML is not as useful in altering and 
correcting the mode of operation of SOEs as it does in relation to private undertakings, 
since the fines imposed on SOEs are in most cases nominal, not to mention in a few 
cases there was no penalty. Therefore, it seems that the AML in these cases is merely 
used as a legitimate ‘excuse’ by the government to circumvent the vested interests in 
SOEs and subsequently to further the government-led reform in the state sector, rather 
than to promote the efficiency of SOEs directly. Nonetheless, it is a positive trend that 
the AMEAs SAIC in particular 17 are more frequently applying the AML to anti-
competitive conduct of SOEs.  
In relation to state-led mergers and liberalisation of state-controlled sectors, the 
AML is less useful since both the idea of national champions competing in global 
markets and strict state control over national economy concern the ultimate political 
interests of the government. So far, most SOEs are still not modern undertakings like 
those found in developed economies, since the government continues to intervene in 
their management and operation. Although it is expected that the AML will be more 
frequently applied to normal monopolistic conduct of SOEs as the competition policy 
environment improves, it cannot substantially change the status quo of the state sector, 
which can only be influenced by further political reform facilitated by political means 
such as the ongoing anti-graft campaign. However, the AML may be of importance in 
promoting the efficiency of the state sector when political reform therein achieves 
initial success, namely, when a substantial part of bureaucratic impediments have been 
removed. Therefore, the AML should not be seen as powerful a weapon as the EU 
competition law to promote market liberalisation as yet.  
                                                             




This thesis suggests that, in relation to the most strictly controlled industrial 
sectors where industrial policy considerations are prevalent, what competition policy-
makers should aim to achieve is not to advocate market liberalisation or the entry of 
private competitors. In any case, the promotion of competition is not an end in itself. 
The most important objective is to create an environment where the positive results 
stemming from market competition can also be manifestly generated. In light of the 
‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ policy, the more realistic priority for the 
AML concerning the most powerful SOEs is further to encourage the presence of 
private capital in markets where private undertakings are allowed to enter and compete 
with SOEs, for example, promoting a prosperous downstream market. Without the 
government relinquishing its control over the state sector, this is merely another 
compromise China’s competition system will have to make. 
On 13 September 2015, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council jointly 
published the long anticipated Guiding Opinions on the Deepening Reform of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE Reform Opinions).18 This top-down reform plan lays down 
the most outstanding priorities with regard to reforming SOEs and represents an 
accumulation of years of local reform experiences and the prospects of SOEs 
envisaged by the central government. The SOE Reform Opinions pledge to further 
SOE reform, improve modern corporate systems, improve supervision and 
management system of state-owned assets, develop diversified-ownership economy, 
prevent the loss of state-owned assets, and last but not least, reinforce Party leadership 
over SOEs. ‘Decisive accomplishments’ are expected to be achieved by 2020 in major 
fields of SOEs reform.19 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how these general opinions 
are implemented in practice and the extent to which the AMEAs are able to extricate 
themselves from bureaucratic predicament and apply the AML to anti-competitive 
                                                             
18 Guiding Opinions on the Deepening Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, issued on 24 August 2015, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm. 
19 Section 3, SOE Reform Opinions. 
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conduct of SOEs in a more stringent way if and when decisive accomplishments are 
indeed achieved. 
2. POSSIBLE REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1 A Dual Enforcement Structure 
It was China’s unique political environments that significantly delayed the 
drafting process, and led to the ineffective design of competition institutions. The 
tripartite enforcement structure is not a careful competition-related consideration, but 
merely a result of political compromise that aimed to preserve the previous division of 
responsibilities between three existing ministries and alleviate conflicts amongst them. 
The creation of this non-independent, non-transparent, and uncoordinated competition 
enforcement system is to an extent pouring old wine into new bottles, and the 
temporarily suppressed conflicts nonetheless continue to impede the functioning of the 
enforcement system and heavily undermine the effective enforcement of the AML.20 
As recent cases shown, it is difficult to find a valid reason to justify the existence of 
such structure.  
In light of the ongoing ‘super ministry system’ reform initiated in March 2008 by 
the 11th NPC21  which aims to reduce the number of government departments by 
integrating departments with close mandates, streamline administration by 
transforming government functions, and subsequently increase administrative 
efficiency, it seems that a complete integration of competition enforcement functions 
into an entirely new enforcement agency is unlikely in the near future. A more practical 
solution, therefore, seems to be the preservation of two of the agencies, MOFCOM 
                                                             
20 HS Harris, Peter Wang, Yizhe Zhang, Mark Cohen and Sebastien Evrard, Anti-Monopoly Law and 
Practice in China (Oxford University Press 2011) 263; Xinzhu Zhang and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘The 
Antimonopoly Law in China: Where Do We Stand?’ (2007) 3 Competition Policy International 185, 
195. 
21  For an introduction of the super ministry system reform, see Lan Xue and Kuotsai Tom Liou, 
‘Government Reform in China: Concepts and Reform Cases’ (2012) 32 Review of Public Personnel 
Administration 115, 121-122. 
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and NDRC. This suggestion is based on several reasons. First, although MOFCOM, 
NDRC and SAIC are all responsible for the enforcement of the AML, the jurisdictional 
overlap between MOFCOM and the other two – merger control as opposed to anti-
monopoly agreement and abuse of dominant position – is insignificant,22 whilst the 
methods of enforcement between MOFCOM and the other two – ex ante as oppose to 
ex post – are significant.23 Competition enforcement would not be compromised if 
merger control is supervised by an agency which is not responsible for the other two 
basic competition law pillars. Second, MOFCOM and NDRC, unlike SAIC, were new 
ministries formed from existing ministries during the institutional reform of the State 
Council in 2003 as a response to the new economic environment stemming from the 
WTO accession. This means that both MOFCOM and NDRC are more outward-
looking in the sense that they are imposed the responsibility to fulfil the requirements 
of a more globalised Chinese economy,24 whilst the mandate of SAIC – preservation 
of market order – remains largely unchanged. Third, as suggested by the evident 
difference in the number and influence of cases handled by NDRC and SAIC, 25 
NDRC is more capable in terms of budgetary resources26 of enforcing the AML. The 
reason that the number of cases handled by SAIC is low may be because price-related 
anti-competitive behaviours are more prevalent than non-price-related. However, this 
exact reason itself justifies the reason that NDRC should absorb the AML-related 
mandate of SAIC, rather than the other way around. 
                                                             
22 However, there may be overlap between merger review and antitrust enforcement. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, in P3 Network, whilst P3 was treated by the European Commission as a 
horizontal agreement, it underwent merger review in China. 
23 It is argued that ex ante review of merger transactions should be replaced by ex post abuse law, 
namely, competition law should only intervene when abusive practice stemming from the transaction 
actually emerges. Jacques Steenbergen and Leonard Waverman, ‘Do We Need European Merger 
Control?’ in Colin Robinson (eds.) Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation (Edward Elgar 
2005) 203. 
24 For example, the Opinions of the State Council on the Implementation of the Negative List System 
for Market Access were issues in October 2015, which were drafted jointly by MOFCOM and NDRC, 
inter alia, to promote the establishment of an open economy. 
25 See sections 3.2 and 3.3, Chapter 5. 
26 See fn 129, Chapter 3. 
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2.2 More Detailed Implementing Rules and Improved Transparency 
The AML is a broadly-worded legislation that requires the clarification of 
secondary implementing rules. This flexibility allows the AML to be adjusted 
according to the dynamic economic environment through interpretation by courts and 
enforcement agencies without the needs to modify the texts of the law. However, the 
vagueness and ambiguity of some provisions creates room for regulatory capture and 
abusive use of discretionary power during investigation. Vagueness of provisions also 
pose challenge for undertakings which seek to ensure their business practices are 
compliant with the AML, or for victims of anti-competitive practices and whistle-
blowers who wish to identify the correct authority to go to. After seven years, it seems 
to be an appropriate time for NDRC and SAIC – which have only issued eight 
implementing rules, some provisions of which simply mirror the wording of the AML 
and are therefore less useful for the public to understand the AML27 – to issue new 
rules or guidelines in light of their enforcement experience in the past few years. 
In addition, transparency should be significantly increased in relation to the 
published decisions made by the three AMEAs, most of which suffer from over-
generality, since China has no tradition of publishing detailed administrative decisions. 
Pursuant to the Regulations on Open Government Information,28 section 2 of the 
Essentials of the Work on Open Government Information 2014 requires relevant 
government departments to reinforce the opening of the information on administrative 
sanctions. 29  But how to effectively implement this stipulation remains unclear. 
Moreover, there should be legal documents for the AMEAs to consult which lay down 
necessary items to be included in the final published decision.30 In such way, the 
                                                             
27 For example, Article 8 of NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly is exactly the same as Article 14 of 
the AML. 
28  Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information, 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/24/content_592937.htm. 
29  Essentials of the Work on Open Government Information in 2014, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0401/c1001-24796042.html. 




general public is able better to oversee the enforcement activities of the AMEAs and 
so limit the arbitrary use of discretion in decision making. Transparency also helps 
increasing the predictability and consistency of the decision-making of AMEAs, which 
have significant value in guiding the formulation of business strategies of market 
players. The Right of Access Notice and the Fine Setting Guidelines of the EU are all 
practical examples of how legal certainty and transparency can be improved through 
legal means.31 
2.3 A Functioning AMC 
Given the unique structure of China’s competition system, it is a necessity to have 
a coordinating body like the AMC. However, in practice it does not function as 
expected, if it functions at all. Because of the infeasible working mechanism, which 
results from the lack of incentives to prioritise competition enforcement, it becomes a 
factually dispensable empty shell. The creation of this non-independent, non-
transparent and uncoordinated competition enforcement system of China is to an 
extent pouring old wine into new bottles, and such inadequacy indeed heavily 
undermines the effective and consistent enforcement of the law.  
The involvement of multiple ministries may be the reason for its ineffectiveness. 
However, their involvement can at the same time be the solution to the conflict 
between competition policy and sector-specific regulation. Although the Chinese 
political environment dictates that it is unrealistic to call for regulatory forbearance in 
regulated sectors, the AMC can nonetheless be a forum for relevant ministries to 
discuss, share information and cooperate, which is able to improve transparency of 
consultation process and clearly define the jurisdictional responsibility for both the 
AMEAs and sector-specific regulators.  
In addition, provided that the current tripartite enforcement remains intact, the 
operation of the ECN can be instructive for the reform of the AMC. It can act as a body 
                                                             
31 See sections 5.1 and 5.4, Chapter 7. 
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through which cases involving overlapping jurisdictions are allocated to the most 
suitable AMEA and an intermediary in the event that involvement of multiple AMEAs 
is necessary. If the AMC is given sufficient power as a coordinating institution, it is 
able substantially to prevent conflicts and facilitate cooperation amongst the AMEAs. 
As a consequence, through effective cooperation and communication it can also 
safeguard the coherent and consistent application of the AML. 
2.4 The Involvement of COD in Cases concerning Administrative Monopoly and SOEs 
SOEs are powerful in the sense that they do not need to respect market forces and 
market regulations as much as their private counterparts do. Previously, market 
regulations were designed and tailored specifically for them; now, whilst many well 
written legal instruments are in place to regulate market behaviours and market orders, 
they fail to deter SOEs since the consequences of breach is too nominal for SOEs to 
act cautiously, not to mention that in many cases there are no consequences. For China 
to treat SOEs equally as other undertakings, the vested bureaucratic and economic 
interests which are deeply embedded in China’s political system and have been 
accumulating for half century, must be substantially eradicated, a task which will never 
be accomplished in socialist China. Similarly, administrative monopoly is not properly 
prohibited not only because the AMEAs have limited political authority to conduct 
investigations, but also because they are not able to withstand pressures from other 
government departments, particularly their administrative leaders, and punishments 
provided in Article 51 of the AML generate inadequate deterrence. The AML’s 
vulnerability in front of government agencies and SOEs is not because it is badly 
written, but because it is not applied. 
COD has one of the most crucial political powers in China: oversight of job 
placement in CPC and government.32 It is powerful because it determines the political 
career of cadres, and therefore it is where pluralistic sources of guangxi finally 
                                                             
32 See section 3.3, Chapter 6. 
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converge. If the decisions of the AMEAs on competition cases involving SOEs and 
government departments are backed by COD, and the responsible officials are to be 
punished under COD’s nomenklatura system, the deterrence will certainly be more 





Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China1 
中华人民共和国反垄断法2 
(Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 30 August 2007) 
（2007 年 8 月 30 日第十届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十九次会议通过） 
Chapter I General Provisions 
第一章 总  则 
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic 
efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, 
promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy. 
第一条 为了预防和制止垄断行为，保护市场公平竞争，提高经济运行效率，
维护消费者利益和社会公共利益，促进社会主义市场经济健康发展，制定本法。 
Article 2 This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic activities 
within the People’s Republic of China. This Law shall apply to the conducts outside 
the territory of the People’s Republic of China if they eliminate or have restrictive 
effect on competition on the domestic market of the PRC. 
第二条 中华人民共和国境内经济活动中的垄断行为，适用本法；中华人民共
和国境外的垄断行为，对境内市场竞争产生排除、限制影响的，适用本法。 
Article 3 For the purposes of this Law, “monopolistic conducts” are defined as the 
following: 
                                                             
1 English version available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-
02/10/content_17254169.htm. 
2 Authentic Chinese version available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm. 
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(1) monopolistic agreements among business operators; 
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by business operators; and 
(3) concentration of business operators that eliminates or restricts competition or might 
be eliminating or restricting competition. 




Article 4 The State constitutes and carries out competition rules which accord with the 
socialist market economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a unified, open, 
competitive and orderly market system. 
第四条 国家制定和实施与社会主义市场经济相适应的竞争规则，完善宏观调
控，健全统一、开放、竞争、有序的市场体系。 
Article 5 Business operators may, through fair competition, voluntary alliance，




Article 6 Any business with a dominant position may not abuse that dominant position 
to eliminate, or restrict competition. 
第六条 具有市场支配地位的经营者，不得滥用市场支配地位，排除、限制竞
争。 
Article 7 With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned economy and 
concerning the lifeline of national economy and national security or the industries 
implementing exclusive operation and sales according to law, the state protects the 
lawful business operations conducted by the business operators therein. The state also 
lawfully regulates and controls their business operations and the prices of their 
commodities and services so as to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote 
technical progresses. 
The business operators as mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest and 
faithful, be strictly self-disciplined, accept social supervision, shall not damage the 









Article 8 No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative 
powers to eliminate or restrict competition. 
第八条 行政机关和法律、法规授权的具有管理公共事务职能的组织不得滥用
行政权力，排除、限制竞争。 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish the Anti-monopoly Commission, which is 
in charge of organizing, coordinating, guiding anti-monopoly work, performs the 
following functions: 
(1) studying and drafting related competition policies; 
(2) organizing the investigation and assessment of overall competition situations in the 
market, and issuing assessment reports; 
(3) constituting and issuing anti-monopoly guidelines; 
(4) coordinating anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement; and 
(5) other functions as assigned by the State Council. 










Article 10 The anti-monopoly authority designated by the State Council (hereinafter 
referred to as the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) shall be in charge 
of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
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The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) may, when needed, authorize 
the corresponding authorities in the people''s governments of the provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government to take 





Article 11 A trade association shall intensify industrial self-discipline, guide business 
operators to lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the market. 
第十一条 行业协会应当加强行业自律，引导本行业的经营者依法竞争，维护
市场竞争秩序。 
Article 12 For the purposes of this Law,  
“business operator” refers to a natural person, legal person, or any other organization 
that is in the engagement of commodities production or operation or service provision, 
and 
“relevant market” refers to the commodity scope or territorial scope within which the 
business operators compete against each other during a certain period of time for 





Chapter II Monopoly Agreement 
第二章 垄断协议 
Article 13 Any of the following monopoly agreements among the competing business 
operators shall be prohibited: 
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities; 
(2) limiting the output or sales of commodities; 
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(3) dividing the sales market or the raw material procurement market; 
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the development of 
new technology or new products; 
(5) making boycott transactions; or 
(6) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 
For the purposes of this Law, “monopoly agreements” refer to agreements, decisions 
or other concerted actions which eliminate or restrict competition. 








Article 14 Any of the following agreements among business operators and their 
trading parties are prohibited: 
(1) fixing the price of commodities for resale to a third party; 
(2) restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party; or 
(3) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 




Article 15 An agreement among business operators shall be exempted from 
application of articles 13 and 14 if it can be proven to be in any of the following 
circumstances: 
(1) for the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing new 
products; 
(2) for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, 
unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor 
division; 
(3) for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized business operators; 
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(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving energy, protecting 
the environment and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(5) for the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously 
excessive production during economic recessions; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign trade or 
foreign economic cooperation; or 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Where a monopoly agreement is in any of the circumstances stipulated in Items 1 
through 5 and is exempt from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the business operators 
must additionally prove that the agreement can enable consumers to share the interests 















Article 16 Any trade association may not organize the business operators in its own 
industry to implement the monopolistic conduct as prohibited by this Chapter. 
第十六条 行业协会不得组织本行业的经营者从事本章禁止的垄断行为。 
Chapter III Abuse of Market Dominance 
第三章 滥用市场支配地位 
Article 17 A business operator with a dominant market position shall not abuse its 
dominant market position to conduct following acts: 
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(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low 
prices; 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
(3) refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade exclusively with a 
designated business operator(s) without any justifiable cause; 
(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading 
without any justifiable cause; 
(6) applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties with equal 
standing; 
(7) other conducts determined as abuse of a dominant position by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council. 
For the purposes of this Law, “dominant market position” refers to a market position 
held by a business operator having the capacity to control the price, quantity or other 
trading conditions of commodities in relevant market, or to hinder or affect any other 
business operator to enter the relevant market. 













Article 18 The dominant market status shall be determined according to the following 
factors: 
(1) the market share of a business operator in relevant market, and the competition 
situation of the relevant market; 
(2) the capacity of a business operator to control the sales markets or the raw material 
procurement market; 
(3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator; 




(5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market; 
and 
(6) other factors related to determine a dominant market position of the said business 
operator. 







Article 19 Where a business operator is under any of the following circumstances, it 
may be assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(1) the relevant market share of a business operator accounts for1/2 or above in the 
relevant market; 
(2) the joint relevant market share of two business operators accounts for 2/3 or above; 
or 
(3) the joint relevant market share of three business operators accounts for 3/4 or above. 
A business operator with a market share of less than 1/10 shall not be presumed as 
having a dominant market position even if they fall within the scope of second or third 
item. 
Where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant market position 
can otherwise prove that they do not have a dominant market, it shall not be determined 
as having a dominant market position. 










Chapter IV Concentration of Business operators 
第四章 经营者集中 
Article 20 A concentration refers to the following circumstances: 
(1) the merger of business operators; 
(2) acquiring control over other business operators by virtue of acquiring their equities 
or assets; or 
(3) acquiring control over other business operators or possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on other business operators by virtue of contact or any other means. 





Article 21 Where a concentration reaches the threshold of declaration stipulated by the 
State Council, a declaration must be lodged in advance with the Anti-monopoly 




Article 22 Where a concentration is under any of the following circumstances, it may 
not be declared to the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council: 
(1) one business operator who is a party to the concentration has the power to exercise 
more than half the voting rights of every other business operator, whether of the equity 
or the assets; or 
(2) one business operator who is not a party to the concentration has the power to 
exercise more than half the voting rights of every business operator concerned, 









Article 23 A business operator shall, when lodge a concentration declaration with the 
Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, submit the following documents 
and materials: 
(1) a declaration paper; 
(2) explanations on the effect of the concentration on the relevant market competition; 
(3) the agreement of concentration; 
(4) the financial reports and accounting reports of the proceeding accounting year of 
the business operator; and 
(5) other documents and materials as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 
Such items shall be embodied in the declaration paper as the name, domicile and 
business scopes of the business operators involved in the concentration as well as the 
date of the scheduled concentration and other items as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly 










Article 24 Where the documents or materials submitted by a business operator are 
incomplete, it shall submit the rest of the documents and materials within the time limit 
stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council; otherwise, the 




Article 25 The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall conduct a 
preliminary review of the declared concentration of business operators, make a 
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decision whether to conduct further review and notify the business operators in written 
form within 30 days upon receipt of the documents and materials submitted by the 
business operators pursuant to Article 23 of this Law. Before such a decision made by 
the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, the concentration may be not 
implemented. 
Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides not to conduct 
further review or fails to make a decision at expiry of the stipulated period, the 







Article 26 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to 
conduct further review, they shall, within 90 days from the date of decision, complete 
the review, make a decision on whether to prohibit the concentration, and notify the 
business operators concerned of the decision in written form. A decision of prohibition 
shall be attached with reasons therefor. Within the review period the concentration 
may not be implemented. 
Under any of the following circumstances, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council may notify the business operators in written form that the time limit as 
stipulated in the preceding paragraph may be extended to no more than 60 days: 
(1) the business operators concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(2) the documents or materials submitted are inaccurate and need further verification; 
(3) things have significantly changed after declaration. 
If the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council fails to make a decision at 












Article 27 In the case of the examination on the concentration of business operators, 
it shall consider the relevant elements as follows: 
(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant market and the 
controlling power thereof over that market, 
(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market, 
(3) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the market access and 
technological progress, 
(4) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the consumers and other 
business operators, 
(5) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the national economic 
development, and 
(6) other elements that may have an effect on the market competition and shall be taken 
into account as regarded by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council. 







Article 28 Where a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a 
decision to prohibit the concentration. However, if the business operators concerned 
can prove that the concentration will bring more positive impact than negative impact 
on competition, or the concentration is pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly 







Article 29 Where the concentration is not prohibited, the Anti-monopoly Authority 
under the State Council may decide to attach restrictive conditions for reducing the 
negative impact of such concentration on competition. 
第二十九条 对不予禁止的经营者集中，国务院反垄断执法机构可以决定附加
减少集中对竞争产生不利影响的限制性条件。 
Article 30 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to 
prohibit a concentration or attaches restrictive conditions on concentration, it shall 
publicize such decisions to the general public in a timely manner. 
第三十条 国务院反垄断执法机构应当将禁止经营者集中的决定或者对经营者
集中附加限制性条件的决定，及时向社会公布。 
Article 31 Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic enterprise or 
participate in concentration by other means, if state security is involved, besides the 
examination on the concentration in accordance with this Law, the examination on 





Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
第五章 滥用行政权力排除、限制竞争 
Article 32 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power, restrict or restrict in a disguised form entities and individuals to operate, 




Article 33 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or an 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not have any of the 
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following conducts by abusing its administrative power to block free circulation of 
commodities between regions: 
(1) imposing discriminative charge items, discriminative charge standards or 
discriminative prices upon commodities from outside the locality, 
(2) imposing such technical requirements and inspection standards upon commodities 
from outside the locality as different from those upon local commodities of the same 
classification, or taking such discriminative technical measures as repeated inspections 
or repeated certifications to commodities from outside the locality, so as to restrict 
them to enter local market, 
(3) exerting administrative licensing specially on commodities from outside the 
locality so as to restrict them to enter local market, 
(4) setting barriers or taking other measures so as to hamper commodities from outside 
the locality from entering the local market or local commodities from moving outside 
the local region, or 












Article 34 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the locality to participate in 
local tendering and bidding activities by such means as imposing discriminative 





Article 35 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
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power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the locality to invest or set 
up branches in the locality by imposing unequal treatment thereupon compared to that 




Article 36 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power to force business operators to engage in the monopolistic conducts as prescribed 
in this Law. 
第三十六条 行政机关和法律、法规授权的具有管理公共事务职能的组织不得
滥用行政权力，强制经营者从事本法规定的垄断行为。 
Article 37 Any administrative organ may not abuse its administrative power to set 
down such provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition. 
第三十七条 行政机关不得滥用行政权力，制定含有排除、限制竞争内容的规
定。 
Chapter VI Investigation into the Suspicious Monopolistic Conducts 
第六章 对涉嫌垄断行为的调查 
Article 38 The anti-monopoly authority shall make investigations into suspicious 
monopolistic conducts in accordance with law. 
Any entity or individual may report suspicious monopolistic conducts to the anti-
monopoly authority. The anti-monopoly authority shall keep the informer confidential. 
Where an informer makes the reporting in written form and provides relevant facts and 
evidences, the anti-monopoly authority shall make necessary investigation. 







Article 39 The anti-monopoly authority may take any of the following measures in 
investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts: 
(1) conducting the inspection by getting into the business premises of business 
operators under investigation or by getting into any other relevant place, 
(2) inquiring of the business operators under investigation, interested parties, or other 
relevant entities or individuals, and requiring them to explain the relevant conditions, 
(3) consulting and duplicating the relevant documents, agreements, account books, 
business correspondences and electronic data, etc. of the business operators under 
investigation, interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals, 
(4) seizing and detaining relevant evidence, and 
(5) inquiring about the business operators'' bank accounts under investigation. 
Before the measures as prescribed in the preceding paragraph are approved, a written 
report shall be submitted to the chief person(s)-in-charge of the anti-monopoly 
authority. 









Article 40 When inspecting suspicious monopolistic conducts, there shall be at least 
two law enforcers, and they shall show their law enforcement certificates. 
When inquiring about and investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts, law 
enforcers shall make notes thereon, which shall bear the signatures of the persons 






Article 41 The anti-monopoly authority and functionaries thereof shall be obliged to 




Article 42 Business operators, interested parties and other relevant entities and 
individuals under investigation shall show cooperation with the anti-monopoly 
authority in performing its functions, and may not reject or hamper the investigation 
by the anti-monopoly authority. 
第四十二条 被调查的经营者、利害关系人或者其他有关单位或者个人应当配
合反垄断执法机构依法履行职责，不得拒绝、阻碍反垄断执法机构的调查。 
Article 43 Business operators, interested parties under investigation have the right to 
voice their opinions. The anti-monopoly authority shall verify the facts, reasons and 
evidences provided by the business operators, interested parties under investigation. 
第四十三条 被调查的经营者、利害关系人有权陈述意见。反垄断执法机构应
当对被调查的经营者、利害关系人提出的事实、理由和证据进行核实。 
Article 44 Where the anti-monopoly authority deems that a monopolistic conduct is 
constituted after investigating and verifying a suspicious monopolistic conduct, it shall 
make a decision on how to deal with the monopolistic conduct, and publicize it. 
第四十四条 反垄断执法机构对涉嫌垄断行为调查核实后，认为构成垄断行为
的，应当依法作出处理决定，并可以向社会公布。 
Article 45 As regards a suspicious monopolistic conduct that the anti-monopoly 
authority is investigating, if the business operators under investigation promise to 
eliminate the impact of the conduct by taking specific measures within the time limit 
prescribed by the anti-monopoly authority, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to 
suspend the investigation. The decision on suspending the investigation shall specify 
the specific measures as promised by the business operators under investigation. 
Where the anti-monopoly authority decides to suspend the investigation, it shall 
supervise the implementation of the promise by the relevant business operators. If the 
business operators keep their promise, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to 
terminate the investigation. 
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However, the anti-monopoly authority shall resume the investigation, where 
(1) the business operators fail to implement the promise, 
(2) significant changes have taken place to the facts based on which the decision on 
suspending the investigation was made; or 
(3) the decision on suspending the investigation was made based on incomplete or 











Chapter VII Legal Liabilities 
第七章 法律责任 
Article 46 Where business operators reach an monopoly agreement and perform it in 
violation of this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to cease doing so, 
and shall confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales 
revenue in the previous year. Where the reached monopoly agreement has not been 
performed, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed. 
Where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reaching the 
monopoly agreement and provides important evidences to the anti-monopoly authority, 
it may be imposed a mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment as the case 
may be. 
Where a guild help the achievement of a monopoly agreement by business operators 
in its own industry in violation of this Law, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be 
imposed thereupon by the anti-monopoly authority; in case of serious circumstances, 











Article 47 Where any business operator abuses its dominant market status in violation 
of this Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The anti-monopoly authority shall 
confiscate its illegal gains and impose thereupon a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales 




Article 48 Where any business operator implements concentration in violation of this 
Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order it to cease doing so, to dispose of shares 
or assets, transfer the business or take other necessary measures to restore the market 
situation before the concentration within a time limit, and may impose a fine of less 




Article 49 The specific amount of the fines as prescribed in Articles 46 through 48 
shall be determined in consideration of such factors as the nature, extent and duration 




Article 50 Where any loss was caused by a business operator''s monopolistic conducts 




Article 51 Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power 
to eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to make 
correction and impose punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other 
directly liable persons. The anti-monopoly authority may put forward suggestions on 
handling according to law to the relevant superior authority. 
Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the handling 
the organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer public 
affairs who abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, such 







Article 52 As regards the inspection and investigation by the anti-monopoly authority, 
if business operators refuse to provide related materials and information, provide 
fraudulent materials or information, conceal, destroy or remove evidence, or refuse or 
obstruct investigation in other ways, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to 
make rectification, impose a fine of less than 20,000 yuan on individuals, and a fine of 
less than 200,000 yuan on entities; and in case of serious circumstances, the anti-
monopoly authority may impose a fine of 20,000 yuan up to 100,000 yuan on 
individuals, and a fine of 200,000 yuan up to one million yuan on entities; where a 







Article 53 Where any party concerned objects to the decision made by the anti-
monopoly authority in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of this Law, it may first 
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apply for an administrative reconsideration; if it objects to the reconsideration decision, 
it may lodge an administrative lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Where any party concerned is dissatisfied with any decision made by the anti-
monopoly authority other than the decisions prescribed in the preceding paragraph, it 
may lodge an application for administrative reconsideration or initiate an 






Article 54 Where any functionary of the anti-monopoly authority abuses his/her power, 
neglects his/her duty, seeks private benefits, or discloses trade secrets he/she has access 
to during the process of law enforcement, and a crime is constituted, he/she shall be 
subject to the criminal liability; where no crime is constituted, he/she shall be imposed 




Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions 
第八章 附  则 
Article 55 This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise 
their intellectual property rights under laws and relevant administrative regulations on 
intellectual property rights; however, business operators'' conduct to eliminate or 
restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be 






Article 56 This Law does not govern the ally or concerted actions of agricultural 
producers and rural economic organizations in the economic activities such as 
production, processing, sales, transportation and storage of agricultural products. 
第五十六条 农业生产者及农村经济组织在农产品生产、加工、销售、运输、储
存等经营活动中实施的联合或者协同行为，不适用本法。 
Article 57 This Law shall enter into force as of August 1, 2008. 
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